Mixed Questions - Set 25 Flashcards
A single man with a life insurance policy that pays his designated beneficiary $70,000 upon his death was killed in a car accident. His former girlfriend, a resident of State A, was named as beneficiary, but his mother, a resident of State B, also filed a claim for the life insurance proceeds. The insurance company, a State C corporation having its principal place of business in State B, filed an interpleader action in federal court to protect itself from potentially multiple and inconsistent claims.
May the insurance company bring the interpleader action in federal court?
A No, because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000, and there is no diversity between the insurance company and one of the claimants.
B No, because there is no federal court where the insurance company will be able to establish personal jurisdiction over both claimants.
C No, because the insurance company is not diverse from one of the claimants.
D Yes, because the amount in controversy is $500 or more, and both claimants are diverse from one another.
D
The insurance company can bring the interpleader action in federal court. The Federal Interpleader Act provides special rules for dealing with subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue. Under the act, interpleader can be brought if any two claimants are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is $500 or more. Complete diversity is not required. Here, the mother is a State B resident, and the former girlfriend is a State A resident. Thus, both claimants are diverse from one another, and the $70,000 amount in controversy exceeds the $500 minimum. (A) is wrong because it states the general diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction requirements that would be applicable to Rule interpleader. Statutory interpleader has different requirements. (B) is wrong because the Federal Interpleader Act permits the federal court to serve process anywhere in the United States. Therefore, as long as all the claimants reside or can be found anywhere in the country, the federal court can exercise personal jurisdiction over them. (C) is wrong because the Federal Interpleader Statute does not require complete diversity. It only requires diversity between the two contending claimants, which exists in this case because the mother is a State B resident and the former girlfriend is a State A resident.
A plant nursery sued the owner of a nearby factory in federal court, alleging that the factory was emitting toxic fumes that were harming the nursery’s plants. The nursery sought an injunction and damages. During the hearing for the preliminary injunction, the factory’s owner correctly pointed out that there was conflicting federal precedent as to whether injunctive relief was appropriate under the facts. Nonetheless, the court granted a preliminary injunction against the factory, ordering it to stop operations until a final judgment was reached in the case. It further refused to certify the issue for appeal. The damages issue has not yet been addressed. The factory owner files an appeal against the injunction.
Can the court of appeals hear the factory owner’s appeal?
A Yes, because there is conflicting federal precedent whether an injunction is appropriate under the facts.
B Yes, because injunctions are reviewable on appeal before there is a final judgment.
C No, because the granting of a preliminary injunction is not a final order.
D No, because the judge did not certify that the order has a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
B
The court of appeals can hear the factory owner’s appeal because injunctions are reviewable before there is a final judgment. Generally only final orders are reviewable, but certain interlocutory orders, including those involving injunctions, are immediately reviewable. (A) and (D) are incorrect for similar reasoning. Under the Interlocutory Appeals Act, a trial court judge may certify that the order has a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation, and the appellate court may, as a discretionary matter, hear the appeal. However, that Act also allows appeals of orders relating to injunctions regardless of whether there is unclear case law or whether the judge has certified the issue. Thus, is does not matter that there is conflicting federal precedent or that the trial judge has not certified the order as described above. (C) is incorrect because a final judgment is not required when a party appeals an order granting, modifying, or denying an injunction.
A seller put her house and lot on the market for $200,000. After receiving several offers within $5,000 of her asking price, the seller entered into a contract to sell the house and lot to a buyer for $200,000. The contract provided that the buyer put up $4,000 in earnest money, which the seller could treat as liquidated damages unless:
The seller fails to tender marketable title to the buyer by the agreed-upon closing date, the seller commits a material breach of this contract, or the buyer dies prior to the closing date, in which case the earnest money shall be reimbursed to the buyer’s estate.
The contract was signed on July 24, and the closing date was set for September 12.
On August 5, the buyer was seriously injured in an accident. On September 10, the buyer was released from the hospital in a wheelchair. He determined that a ranch-style house would make his life much more bearable, but the seller’s home was two stories. The buyer asked the seller to cancel the contract and to refund the $4,000 earnest money. The seller refused. The buyer did not appear on the closing date. On September 16, the seller contracted to sell the home to a purchaser for $198,000. The closing occurred as planned on October 20. The buyer files suit against the seller, praying for a refund of the $4,000 earnest money.
How much is the buyer likely to recover?
A The entire $4,000, because the buyer had a justified medical reason for his failure to perform.
B $2,000, because the diminution in value of the property was only $2,000.
C $2,000 less any of the seller’s out-of-pocket costs involved in remarketing the home.
D Nothing, because at the time the contract was entered into, $4,000 represented a reasonable estimate of damages in the event of breach.
D
The buyer will most likely recover nothing because, at the time of the contract, $4,000 represented a reasonable estimate of damages in the event of breach. When a sales contract provides that a seller may retain the buyer’s earnest money as liquidated damages, courts routinely uphold the seller’s retention of the money upon breach if the amount appears reasonable in light of the seller’s anticipated and actual damages. Many courts uphold retention of earnest money of up to 10% of the sales price without inquiry into its reasonableness. In this case, the earnest money represented 2% of the purchase price. Given the fact that the seller had received other offers within $5,000 of the price offered by the buyer, $4,000 would be a reasonable estimate of damages if the seller were forced to accept another offer. (A) is wrong because the fact that the buyer had a good reason for not performing does not change the fact that he is in breach. The contract is not impossible for the buyer to perform; it is just not as attractive a purchase as it was before the accident. He cannot escape liability on this basis. (B) and (C) are wrong because if there is a valid liquidated damages clause, it will be enforced and actual damages are irrelevant. (If the liquidated damages clause were not enforceable, (C) would be a better choice than (B) because the seller would be entitled to her expenses in remarketing the property.) Thus, because the liquidated damages clause is enforceable, the buyer will not be able to recover any of the $4,000 he paid as earnest money.
An entrepreneur entered into a written lease-option to purchase an office building. The option to purchase the building could be exercised at any time during the five-year term of the lease by giving the building’s owner a written 30-day notice of the intent to exercise the option. A few months later, the entrepreneur assigned his lease-option to a dentist looking for office space by written agreement.
If the dentist fully performs under the lease, can the dentist exercise the option to purchase that was given to the entrepreneur?
A Yes, because both the burden and benefit of the covenant to convey run with the land.
B No, because the covenant to convey does not touch or concern the land.
C No, because the option to purchase was personal to the entrepreneur.
D No, because the burden of the covenant to convey given in a lease does not run with the land.
A
The dentist can exercise the option to purchase. A covenant to convey touches and concerns both the leasehold and reversion, and therefore runs with those respective interests in the land. Thus, (B) is incorrect. (C) is incorrect because there is nothing about the option in the facts that shows it to be personal. (D) is incorrect because, as explained above, the burden of the covenant to convey does run with the land.
A sportscaster on a local television show interviewed the parent of a child on a high school football team. The interviewee told the sportscaster that the head football coach “openly condones the use of steroids by team members.” The coach, who had always conducted a strong anti-drug program for his football players, watched and recorded the show daily. He was outraged when he saw the live broadcast, and filed suit for defamation against the interviewee, the sportscaster, and the television station. At the trial of the suit, the coach wishes to testify as to what the interviewee said on the television show. The defense objects.
Should such testimony be admitted?
A Yes, because the coach saw the live television broadcast.
B Yes, because the matter goes to the ultimate issue of the case and is thus highly relevant.
C No, because a videotape of the broadcast is available.
D No, because such testimony would be hearsay, not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
A
The coach should be allowed to testify as to what the interviewee said because he observed the interviewee making the statements in the television broadcast. To be a competent witness, the witness must have personal knowledge of the matter and be willing and able to testify truthfully. The first requirement is satisfied if the witness observed the matter and has a present recollection of his observation. Thus, the coach would be a competent witness if he observed the publication of the defamation, which occurred through the television broadcast. Even though (B) is a true statement, (A) is a better answer because there are many instances where relevant evidence going to the ultimate issue is excluded (e.g., hearsay). Furthermore, (A) is a better answer because the coach must have personal knowledge to testify, regardless of how relevant the subject matter of his testimony is to an ultimate issue in the case. (C) is incorrect because the availability of the videotape does not preclude independent oral testimony of the statements that the interviewee made. The best evidence rule does not apply here because the fact to be proved (the defamatory statement) exists independent of the recording and the coach’s knowledge of the fact was not derived from the recording. (D) is incorrect because the allegedly defamatory statement is not hearsay. The interviewee’s out-of-court statement is a verbal act or legally operative fact. It is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that the coach condones steroid use by his players), but rather merely to show that the legally actionable statement was made.
A defendant calls a secretary present at a meeting between the defendant and the plaintiff in which attempts were made to negotiate a settlement. The secretary offers to testify that the plaintiff said at the meeting, “Well, maybe it wasn’t fraud—I’ll settle for refund of the purchase price plus $50,000.” The plaintiff objects.
Is the offered testimony admissible?
A Yes, as a statement by a party-opponent.
B Yes, because statements made in the course of settlement negotiations are admissible where relevant, even though offers to compromise are excluded.
C No, because of public policy.
D No, because the statement was made in the office of the defendant, an attorney, and hence privileged.
C
A defendant calls a secretary present at a meeting between the defendant and the plaintiff in which attempts were made to negotiate a settlement. The secretary offers to testify that the plaintiff said at the meeting, “Well, maybe it wasn’t fraud—I’ll settle for refund of the purchase price plus $50,000.” The plaintiff objects.
Is the offered testimony admissible?
response - correct
Press Enter or Space to submit the answerAYes, as a statement by a party-opponent.BYes, because statements made in the course of settlement negotiations are admissible where relevant, even though offers to compromise are excluded.CorrectCNo, because of public policy.DNo, because the statement was made in the office of the defendant, an attorney, and hence privileged.
In an effort to protect the dwindling California condor population, Congress enacted the Condor Preservation Act, which made it illegal to take or sell any part of a California condor. The constitutionality of the Act is challenged by a seller of gifts and artifacts, including artifacts made out of California condor feathers.
Is the statute valid?
A No, the statute violates due process because the absolute prohibition on sale is an effective taking under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause without just compensation.
B No, because the statute is discriminatory as applied.
C Yes, because the statute is rationally related to interstate commerce.
D Yes, because the statute is designed to protect a dwindling national resource.
C
The statute is valid because it is rationally related to interstate commerce. Regulating the sale of an item made from a California condor clearly affects commerce. Thus, Congress can act under its broad commerce power. The regulations do not compel surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint on them. Neither does the statute prohibit all economic uses of the property (e.g., the artifacts can be displayed in the store, admission can be charged to view them, etc.). Thus, there is no taking of a property right without just compensation. Therefore, Congress’s power to regulate is proper, even though it diminishes the opportunity to make a profit. Thus, (A) is incorrect. (B) is not supported by the facts—there does not appear to be a discriminatory application of the statute. (D) states the right conclusion, but for the wrong reason. The statutory authority here lies in Congress’s broad power to regulate interstate commerce.
A state study indicated that an inordinately high percentage of homeless in the state were afflicted by alcoholism or addiction to illegal drugs. The legislature therefore decided to levy a special tax, with all proceeds marked for rehabilitative services for the homeless. However, the legislators determined that direct taxes on alcoholic beverages would be resented by the citizenry. Lobbyists from the state’s growing wine industry also objected to anything that would retard the industry’s development. There were no breweries or distilleries within the state. Thus, a tax was eventually passed requiring newspapers and magazines of general circulation published in the state to be taxed at a rate of 20% on all advertising space sold for beer or distilled spirits promotions.
For certain historical reasons, a high proportion of the advertising revenue of a particular small newspaper within the state came from beer and wine ads. The publisher of the small paper filed suit to have the tax declared unconstitutional. A major wholesale beer and liquor distributor located within the state and several out-of-state brewers and distillers who sold and advertised their products in the state also joined in the suit as plaintiffs.
If the tax is declared unconstitutional, what is the most likely reason?
A The tax burdens interstate commerce by exempting advertisements for the local wine industry from the tax, while the ads of out-of-state brewers and distillers are subject to the tax.
B The tax infringes on freedom of the press, which is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
C The tax is unconstitutional because it is not properly apportioned.
D The tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it does not treat all alcoholic products equally.
B
The tax unconstitutionally burdens the freedom of the press. Press and broadcasting companies can be subject to general business taxes, but a tax applicable only to the press or based on the content of a publication will not be upheld absent a compelling justification. Mere need for revenue probably is not a sufficiently compelling interest. (A) is incorrect because there is no unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce here. The law treats all businesses subject to the tax (namely breweries and distilleries) equally, and so is not protecting local business against out-of-state competition. The fact that the law treats breweries and distilleries differently from wineries and that the state has no breweries or distilleries but does have wineries probably does not change this, because a court will probably find these to be distinct businesses for purposes of advertising. (C) is incorrect. When a sales tax is imposed on a sale taking place entirely within one state, there is no apportionment problem because the sale cannot be taxed by any other state (because no other state has a sufficient nexus). (D) is incorrect because there is no equal protection violation here even though brewers and distillers are being treated differently from wine makers. Because no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, nor is a quasi-suspect class involved, the tax will pass constitutional muster as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and the tax here certainly seems to be related to revenue production.
A customer selected a new wallet at a local department store that the salesperson said was made of the finest calfskin and was stitched by hand. The customer bought the wallet and left the store. A few moments later, he took out the wallet to transfer his cash and credit cards into it. On close inspection, he noticed a small nick in the leather. He immediately went back to the department store and demanded a refund. The salesperson refused.
If the customer sues for a refund, who will prevail?
A The customer, because there was a breach of contract.
B The customer, because he had a reasonable time after purchase in which to inspect.
C The department store, because the customer accepted the goods.
D The department store, because the customer did not give written notice of the breach.
C
Once a buyer has accepted goods, his right to reject for nonconformity generally lapses and his only remedy is a suit for damages. Acceptance usually occurs when the buyer takes possession of the goods. In some cases, the buyer can revoke acceptance, but the breach must be substantial and the buyer must have a good reason for accepting the goods (i.e., something more than not taking the time to carefully inspect). Here, the customer accepted the goods and the breach appears minor. (A) entitles the customer only to damages, not a full refund. (B) is a misstatement of the law. (D) is wrong because written notice is not required; oral notice is acceptable.
A wealthy sportsman purchased a large old wooden sailing ship for $200,000. Although the boat was a classic, the sportsman wanted it to be modernized and made more comfortable. To that end, the sportsman entered into a written contract with a marine architect-engineer to draw up and then execute the modernization plans, for $7,500.
At the time the parties entered into the agreement, the sportsman told the architect-engineer that his modernization plan would be subject to the approval of the sportsman’s sister, that they would, in fact, have no deal unless the plans meet with her approval. The architect-engineer agreed to this. He finished his drawings and submitted them to the sportsman, who was enthusiastic about the designs. The sportsman’s sister, a famous yachtswoman, was engaged in a trans-Pacific yacht race at the time and was not expected home for a number of weeks. Cheered by the sportsman’s enthusiasm, the architect-engineer went ahead and modernized the ship according to his designs. When he finished the work, he submitted a bill to the sportsman, who refused to pay, pointing out that his sister had never approved the designs.
If the architect-engineer sues the sportsman, which of the following issues of contract law is most likely to be decisive in determining the outcome of the case?
A Statute of Frauds.
B Parol evidence rule.
C Rules of construction.
D Conditions precedent.
D
Approval of the modernization plans by the sportsman’s sister is a condition precedent because without such approval the parties have no agreement. Where there is an oral condition precedent, evidence of the condition falls outside the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule provides that where the parties to a contract express their agreement in a writing with the intent that it embody the final expression of their bargain, any other expressions, written or oral, made prior to the writing, as well as any oral expressions contemporaneous with the writing, are inadmissible to vary the terms of the writing. Certain forms of extrinsic evidence are deemed to fall outside the scope of the parol evidence rule. For instance, a party to a written contract can attack the validity of the agreement. One way of doing so is by asserting that there was an oral agreement that the written contract would not become effective until the occurrence of a condition. Such a condition would be deemed a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the agreement, and evidence of the condition will be freely offered and received. Here, the sportsman and the architect-engineer have entered into a written agreement that apparently embodies the full and final expression of their bargain. However, the sportsman’s statement at the time of entering into the agreement indicates quite clearly that the parties had no agreement absent the approval of his sister, and the architect-engineer agreed with this statement. Thus, there is an oral agreement that the written contract would not become effective until the occurrence of a condition precedent. As discussed above, evidence of this oral condition does not come within the purview of the parol evidence rule and is therefore admissible. Consequently, the sportsman can assert the nonoccurrence of a condition precedent as a way to avoid liability on the contract. (B) is incorrect because, as explained above, the nature of the oral agreement takes it outside the scope of the parol evidence rule. Therefore, the rule will not be decisive in determining the outcome of this case. (A) is incorrect because the agreement at issue here is not of a type that is covered by the Statute of Frauds; i.e., it does not involve a promise: (i) by an executor or administrator to pay the estate’s debts out of her own funds; (ii) to answer for the debt of another; (iii) made in consideration of marriage; (iv) creating an interest in land; (v) that by its terms cannot be performed within one year; or (vi) for the sale of goods at a price of $500 or more. Therefore, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable to these facts. (C) is incorrect because the term “rules of construction” refers to rules used by courts when interpreting contracts; e.g., contracts are to be construed as a whole, words are to be construed according to their ordinary meaning, or custom and usage in the particular business and locale should be considered. The facts and issues presented here do not call for the application of any such principles of contract interpretation.
The owner of a small fleet of taxicabs had his cabs serviced by a national chain of auto service centers. One of his cabs went through a stop sign when its brakes failed without warning. The ensuing collision seriously injured the passenger. An investigation revealed that brake repairs had been made on the cab a week before, but the service center’s mechanic had used the wrong parts and had made numerous errors in reassembling the brakes.
If the passenger sues the cab company owner for her injuries, who should prevail?
A The passenger should prevail, unless the jury determines that the owner exercised a high degree of care in selecting the service center for maintenance of his cabs.
B The passenger should prevail, because the owner breached his duty to her to provide a safe vehicle in which to ride.
C The owner should prevail, because he had no reason to know that the service center’s mechanic would be negligent.
D The owner should prevail, because he is not vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor.
B
The passenger will recover against the owner for her injuries because the owner, a common carrier, owed her a nondelegable duty to provide a safe vehicle in which to ride. The general rule is that a principal will not be liable for tortious acts of his agent if the agent is an independent contractor. However, a major exception to this rule applies when the duty, because of public policy considerations, is nondelegable. In these cases, the principal is vicariously liable for the agent’s negligence despite the principal’s own exercise of due care. A common example of these types of duties is the duty of a business to keep its premises and instrumentalities safe for its customers. This includes the duty of a common carrier, such as a taxi company, to keep its vehicles in safe working order. Thus, the owner’s duty to the passenger, a passenger in his cab, was nondelegable. The negligent conduct of the mechanic is deemed to be that of the owner. The negligent conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the passenger’s injuries. Thus, the owner is vicariously liable to the passenger for those injuries. (A) and (C) are wrong because the passenger will prevail regardless of how careful the owner was in selecting the service center to maintain his cabs. As a common carrier, the owner owes his passenger, the passenger, a very high degree of care; i.e., he will be liable for slight negligence. However, because his duty to provide a safe taxicab is not delegable, the fact that he was careful in selecting the mechanic is irrelevant. Even though the owner had no reason to know that a service center mechanic would be negligent, he is vicariously liable for that negligence because it caused injury to the passenger. (D) is wrong because, as stated above, the situation here falls within an exception to the general rule of no liability for the torts of an independent contractor.
A worker who missed his ride home because he was working late walked across the street to a tavern to get a drink. He chatted with a patron of the tavern and discovered that he lived only a short distance from the patron. The patron offered to give the worker a ride home. Although he knew the patron was probably too drunk to drive, the worker reluctantly agreed. On the way home, the patron, driving in a dangerous manner, was involved in a collision with another car, whose driver was also driving negligently, and the worker was injured.
If the worker sues the patron to recover for his injuries and the above facts are established at trial, will the worker’s recovery be reduced?
A Yes, because the worker knew that the patron was drunk.
B Yes, because the other driver involved in the collision was also negligent.
C No, because the negligence of the patron and the other driver were the proximate causes of the accident.
D No, as long as the worker joins the other driver in his lawsuit.
A
The worker’s recovery will be reduced because the worker knew that the patron was drunk. The worker impliedly assumed the risk of injury when he voluntarily allowed the patron to drive him home knowing that the patron was drunk. In jurisdictions applying pure comparative negligence (which you are to assume is the rule unless otherwise stated), implied assumption of risk is usually treated as a variant of contributory negligence. If the plaintiff unreasonably assumed the risk of injury, as the facts indicate here, he will be considered contributorily negligent and his damages will be reduced. (B) is incorrect because the negligence of the other driver will not reduce the worker’s recovery. Under joint and several liability rules, each tortfeasor is liable for the entire damage incurred. Thus, aside from the assumption of risk issue, the worker could recover all of his damages from the patron. (C) is incorrect. While the patron and the other driver were both proximate causes of the accident, the worker’s fault in accepting a ride from an intoxicated driver also contributed to the injuries he suffered, and the jury will reduce his recovery accordingly. (D) is incorrect because the worker’s recovery will be reduced to reflect his fault, as discussed above. If the worker were not at fault, he could recover all of his damages even if he did not join the other driver in his lawsuit. Under joint and several liability, he could obtain a full recovery against the patron, and it would be up to the patron to proceed against the other driver for contribution.
A woman was late for an appointment with her doctor across town. Because of this, she was driving recklessly through traffic at a high speed and ran through a red light. There were a number of people crossing the street at the time, and the woman accidentally hit one of them. The person she hit was seriously injured and was rushed to the hospital, but recovered. The woman was arrested and charged with attempted murder.
Will the woman likely be convicted?
A No, because she did not intend to hit anyone with her car.
B No, because she had not gone far enough in her actions to constitute attempt.
C Yes, because a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of her act.
D Yes, because from her recklessness, the intent to inflict serious bodily harm will be presumed.
A
Although the woman may have been guilty of murder had the pedestrian been killed, it does not necessarily follow that she is guilty of attempted murder when she almost killed the pedestrian. Murder does not require the intent to kill; an awareness of an unjustifiably high risk to human life will suffice. Like all attempt crimes, attempted murder is a specific intent crime. Thus, the intent to kill is required. Because the woman did not intend to kill the pedestrian, she cannot be convicted of attempted murder. (B) is wrong because, although the woman can avoid guilt for attempted murder, she cannot do so for the reason given here. Attempt requires an act beyond mere preparation for the offense. If the woman had the required intent to kill, her act of running down the pedestrian would be sufficient for attempted murder. (C) is wrong. It is often loosely said that one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of her act. This is not to be taken literally. It means that if a particular result is a natural and probable consequence of what a defendant does, the fact finder may draw the inference from such circumstance that the defendant intended that result. Here, however, it is likely that the jury would infer that the woman, who wanted to keep a doctor’s appointment, never intended to kill a pedestrian. (D) is wrong for the same reason. It is simply another phrasing of (C). But, as explained above, attempted murder requires an actual intent to kill, not a fictitious, imputed, or constructive one.
Acting on information from reliable informants that drugs were being sold by residents at a certain fraternity house, the police obtained a search warrant that entitled them to search the entire premises for illegal narcotics. The police arrived at the house when a party was in progress and were admitted to the house by the fraternity president after showing the warrant. Officers proceeded to search the house. In an upstairs bedroom, they found a young woman who was a guest of a fraternity member sleeping on the bed. No one else was in the room. The police found a footlocker under the bed and opened it, finding a variety of illegal drugs. The police then awakened the woman and seized her purse from her. They found a small quantity of marijuana in the purse. The woman was charged with a drug possession offense. At her trial, the prosecution seeks to admit the marijuana seized from her purse over the objection of her attorney.
Should the court admit the marijuana?
A Yes, because the footlocker was within the woman’s reach.
B Yes, because the woman was present in a room where drugs were found.
C No, because the woman had no possessory interest in the premises.
D No, because the police had no reason to believe that the woman had drugs on her person.
D
The court should not admit the marijuana into evidence because it was obtained as a result of an unreasonable search of the woman. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is not admissible to establish the guilt of the defendant at trial. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by criminal law enforcement agents. To have a protected Fourth Amendment right, a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the place searched or the item seized. For a search based on a search warrant to be constitutionally valid, the warrant must be based on probable cause and must describe with reasonable precision the place to be searched and the items to be seized. A search warrant does not authorize the police to search persons found on the premises who are not named in the warrant. However, if the police have probable cause to arrest a person discovered on the premises to be searched, they may conduct a warrantless search of her incident to the arrest. If a person is not named in the warrant and circumstances justifying an arrest of that person do not exist, the police may search her for the objects named in the search warrant only if they have probable cause to believe that she has the named objects on her person. Here, the search warrant was issued on the basis of information from reliable informants, and it stated precisely the premises (the fraternity house) to be searched and the items (illegal narcotics) to be seized. Thus, the warrant is valid. However, the search warrant (which did not name the woman) did not authorize the police to search the woman’s purse. The search cannot be justified as incident to a valid arrest because: (i) the police searched the purse before they arrested the woman, and (ii) the police did not have sufficient probable cause to arrest the woman prior to searching the purse. Because the police had no reason to believe that the woman had drugs on her person, they cannot successfully claim that they were searching for the drugs mentioned in the warrant. The woman can challenge the search because she had a possessory interest and a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse, which was the object of the search. Thus, because the marijuana was seized pursuant to an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it must be excluded from evidence. (B) is incorrect because mere presence at a place for which the police have a search warrant does not authorize a search of a person not named in the warrant. Only if the police obtain probable cause to arrest a person on the premises may the person be searched (as incident to the arrest). (A) is incorrect. The footlocker was properly searched pursuant to the warrant, not because it was within the woman’s reach. However, the marijuana at issue here was seized as a result of a search of the woman’s purse. Thus, the proximity of the woman to the footlocker is of no consequence to the admissibility of the marijuana found in her purse. (C) is incorrect because the woman’s lack of a possessory interest in the premises does not invalidate a search of her purse. For example, if the police had probable cause to believe that the woman had drugs on her person, they could have searched her for the drugs, regardless of the fact that she had no possessory interest in the fraternity house.
