Mixed Questions - Set 24 Flashcards
A law student was sued by a student loan provider in federal court for failing to pay back her student loans. At the close of a federal civil trial, the court held in favor of the student loan provider for the full amount plus post-verdict interest at 8%. When the court clerk typed up the final order to send to all parties, she accidentally typed in 9% as the post-verdict interest rate. The law student did not notice the error until 14 months after the judgment was entered. She immediately filed a motion for relief from judgment based on a clerical mistake to correct the order to reflect the accurate interest rate.
Will the court likely grant this motion?
A No, because motions for relief from judgment to correct clerical mistakes must be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year.
B No, because motions for relief from judgment to correct clerical mistakes must be made within 28 days of the order.
C Yes, because motions for relief from judgment to correct clerical mistakes must be made within a reasonable time.
D Yes, because motions for relief from judgment to correct clerical mistakes can be made at any time.
D
The court will likely grant the motion. There is no time limit to file a motion for relief from judgment to correct clerical mistakes, and the court order correcting the error dates back to the time judgment was entered. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a)] A clerical error is one arising from oversight or omission and may occur in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record. Since there is no time limit, the only issue is whether the error constitutes a “clerical mistake.” Here, the clerk clearly made a clerical error in recording the incorrect interest rate at 9% instead of the 8% interest rate actually ordered by the court. Therefore, the motion will likely be granted. (A) is wrong because it is an incorrect statement of law. There are several different grounds for obtaining relief from judgment, with different time limits. Other grounds besides correcting clerical mistakes include: (i) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (ii) newly discovered evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (iii) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (iv) the judgment is void; (v) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; a prior judgment on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated; or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (vi) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. For grounds (i), (ii), and (iii), the motion must be made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year; for the other grounds, the motion must be made within a reasonable time. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)] (B) and (C) are wrong because they incorrectly state the time frame for a motion to correct clerical mistakes, which can be filed at any time. Choice (B) states the time frame to file a motion to reconsider a final order under Rule 59(e). Choice (C), as stated above, states the time frame for a motion for relief from judgment on the grounds that the judgment is void, which are not the grounds asserted in the question.
A State A citizen and a State B citizen were in a car accident in State C. The State A citizen filed a negligence action against the State B citizen in a State C state court, seeking $500,000 in damages.
If the State B citizen wishes to remove the action to federal district court, in which federal district should the State B citizen file a notice of removal?
A In either the district in State C in which the accident took place or the district in State B in which the State B citizen resides.
B In either the district in State C in which the accident took place or the district in State A in which the State A citizen resides.
C In only the district in State C in which the State C state court is located.
D In only the district in State B in which the State B citizen resides.
C
The notice of removal should be filed in the district in State C in which the State C court is located. The federal removal statute provides that the notice of removal should be filed in the federal district court for the district that geographically encompasses the state court from which the action is being removed. Thereafter, copies must be sent to the parties and filed with the applicable state court. Thus, (A), (B), and (D) are incorrect. (A) describes the general venue rule-i.e., an action may be filed in the judicial district in which any defendant resides (if they are all from the same state) or in which a substantial part of the events took place-for actions filed originally in federal court. (B) incorrectly states that venue may be affixed based on the residence of the plaintiff. This is incorrect even under the general venue rule. For federal venue purposes, the residence of the plaintiff is irrelevant. (D) incorrectly provides one-half of the general venue rule, not the venue rule for removed actions.
A landowner owned a large parcel of land that he divided into two equal parcels. Thirty years ago, the landowner deeded the eastern parcel to a purchaser by warranty deed, including an easement over the south 25 feet of the western parcel for access to the navigable river that ran along the westerly boundary of the western parcel. The landowner acknowledged the deed and easement, and the purchaser recorded the document. The recording officer maintains an alphabetical grantor-grantee index, but no tract index.
The purchaser made no use of the easement until five years ago, one year after her neighbor had purchased the western parcel from the landowner. The neighbor had paid at least market value for the western parcel and was not aware of the purchaser’s easement. The neighbor objected to the purchaser’s use of the easement shortly after she began using it, but the purchaser paid no attention. The neighbor sues the purchaser to quiet his title and to restrain the purchaser from using the easement over the western parcel. The purchaser has reasonable access to a public highway on the easterly boundary of the eastern parcel.
If the purchaser is successful, what is the likely reason?
A The absence of a tract index requires that the neighbor make inquiry regarding the riparian rights of owners abutting his property.
B The neighbor and the purchaser trace their title to a common grantor, the landowner, whose covenants for title run with the land and estop the neighbor from denying the purchaser’s title.
C An easement is a legal and incorporeal interest that is not just attached to an estate in the land, but runs with the land itself and therefore binds successive owners of the servient estate regardless of notice.
D The easement is a legal interest in the neighbor’s chain of title even though there is no tract index.
D
If the purchaser prevails, it will be because the easement is a legal interest in the neighbor’s chain of title. This is a recording act problem. Even though the neighbor had no actual or inquiry notice, the recorded easement by his grantor, the landowner, would give him constructive notice of the purchaser’s interest in the western parcel, regardless of the absence of a tract index. (A) is a misstatement of the law. The absence of a tract index does not require a purchaser to inquire about the riparian rights of abutting landowners. (B) is incorrect because covenants for title are those contained in a general warranty deed. Although the future covenants for quiet enjoyment, warranty, and further assurances run to successive grantees, the present covenants of seisin, right to convey, and against encumbrances are breached, if at all, at the time of conveyance. (C) is incorrect because a bona fide purchaser of the servient parcel with no notice of the easement takes free of the easement.
A doctor and a lawyer owned adjoining parcels of land. Ten years ago, the doctor installed a swimming pool on her land. The doctor obtained the lawyer’s oral consent to run plumbing from the pool across part of the lawyer’s land. Last year, the lawyer sold his land to a buyer. The buyer wants to plant a garden on the land under which the doctor’s plumbing runs, and wants to eject the doctor and quiet title. The statute of limitations for ejectment is seven years.
With respect to the land under which the plumbing was laid what, if anything, has the doctor acquired?
A The doctor has acquired title by adverse possession.
B The doctor has acquired a prescriptive easement.
C The doctor has acquired both title by adverse possession and a prescriptive easement.
D The doctor has acquired neither title by adverse possession nor a prescriptive easement.
D
The doctor has acquired neither title by adverse possession nor a prescriptive easement in the land under which the plumbing was laid. To establish title by adverse possession, the possession must be (i) actual and exclusive, (ii) open and notorious, (iii) adverse (hostile), and (iv) continuous throughout the statutory period. Exclusive possession generally means not sharing possession with the true owner or the general public. Possession is open and notorious when it is such as the usual owner would make of the land and is sufficient to put the true owner on notice of the fact of possession. Possession is hostile when it is without the owner’s consent. Continuous possession is possession that the average owner would make of the property under the circumstances. Acquiring a prescriptive easement is analogous to acquiring property by adverse possession; however, the use need not be exclusive. Here, although the doctor’s use and possession of the lawyer’s land was actual, exclusive, open, notorious, and continuous throughout the seven-year statutory period, the doctor used the land with the lawyer’s consent, and there are no facts to indicate that the doctor in any way manifested an intention to claim the land as her own. Therefore, the “hostile” requirement is not met and (A), (B), and (C) are wrong.
A trial judge presiding over a lawsuit plans to call a witness to the stand and question her.
May the judge do so?
A Yes, but only if the witness has already been called and examined by one of the parties.
B Yes, but only if the witness is not testifying as an expert.
C Yes, but the parties are entitled to cross-examine the witness.
D No, because only parties may call and examine witnesses.
C
The judge may call and examine the witness, but the parties are entitled to cross-examine the witness. A court is entitled to examine any witness called by any party, and may also call a witness on its own or at a party’s request. Therefore, (D) is wrong. (A) is wrong because the court may call a witness on its own, even if the witness has not been called by any of the parties. (B) is wrong because the court may call any witness, even an expert. Although the court has wide discretion to call and examine witnesses, each party is entitled to cross-examine the court’s witness. A party may also object to the court’s examining or calling a witness either at that time or at the next opportunity when the jury is not present (to spare counsel the potential embarrassment of objecting to the judge’s questions in front of the jury).
During the trial of a personal injury case, the plaintiff calls a witness to testify that he saw the defendant spill a slippery substance in the roadway. Following the testimony of the witness, the defendant calls the witness’s neighbor, who testifies that the witness has a poor reputation for truthfulness in the community. The plaintiff’s attorney then cross-examines the neighbor, asking her, in good faith, if she committed the crime of false pretenses last year. Last year, the neighbor had in fact been charged with and convicted of the crime of false pretenses. The defendant’s attorney objects to this question.
Should the objection be sustained?
A No, because the neighbor was convicted of the crime of false pretenses.
B No, because the plaintiff’s attorney asked the question in good faith.
C Yes, because an impeaching witness cannot be impeached on collateral matters.
D Yes, because such an inquiry is not proper on cross-examination.
B
The question by the plaintiff’s attorney should be allowed because he was acting in good faith. A witness may be impeached by means of being interrogated upon cross-examination, in the discretion of the court, with respect to any act of misconduct that is probative of truthfulness (i.e., an act of deceit or lying). The cross-examiner must act in good faith with some reasonable basis for believing that the witness may have committed the bad act inquired about, but it is not required that the witness have been convicted of a crime. Here, the plaintiff’s attorney is attempting to cast an adverse reflection on the truthfulness of the neighbor. The commission of the crime of false pretenses involves the making of a false representation and is therefore an act of misconduct that is probative of the actor’s truthfulness. Thus, because the plaintiff’s attorney inquired as to this matter in good faith, his question is a permissible method of impeachment, and the objection of the defendant’s attorney should be overruled. (A) is incorrect because it implies that the objection could be sustained if the neighbor was not convicted of the crime. As noted above, such an inquiry can be conducted regardless of whether the witness was convicted. Therefore, the objection to the plaintiff’s attorney’s good faith inquiry would be overruled even if the neighbor was not convicted of false pretenses. (C) is incorrect. Although impeaching witnesses who testify to a witness’s reputation for truth and veracity are often impeached by asking the “Have you heard” and “Do you know” questions, that is not the only method of impeachment available. Any witness who takes the stand puts her character for honesty and veracity in issue and may be impeached by evidence that might show her to be unworthy of belief. Instances of misconduct may properly be inquired into only if they are probative of truthfulness. By taking the stand, the neighbor has put her character for honesty in issue. The crime of false pretenses is probative of truthfulness and is a proper subject for impeachment. (D) is incorrect because a specific act of misconduct offered to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness can be elicited only on cross-examination of the witness. Extrinsic evidence is not permitted. Thus, (D) states the opposite of the correct rule.
A state set up an intrastate message routing system to carry messages to and from the various state agency offices located throughout the state. This proved to be cheaper and more efficient than the United States Postal Service. The message service worked so well that the state offered the messenger service to its employees as a fringe benefit. Moreover, it expanded delivery options beyond state offices to any address in the state and permitted the employees to use the service for personal correspondence as well as for official business.
Are the state’s actions constitutional?
A Yes, because the messenger service operates entirely within the state borders.
B Yes, because the Commerce Clause does not prohibit states from acting as a market participant.
C No, because the Equal Protection Clause prohibits this singling out of state employees for special benefits.
D No, because it violates the federal postal monopoly.
D
The legislation is unconstitutional because it violates the federal postal monopoly. Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to establish post offices and post roads. This power grants Congress a monopoly over the delivery of mail. No other system for delivering mail-public or private-can be established absent Congress’s consent. Congress has delegated to the Postal Service the power to decide whether others may compete with it, and the Postal Service has carved out an exception to its monopoly for extremely urgent letters. However, this exception would not apply to the state messenger service here since the state service extends to every letter or package of an employee deliverable within the state. (A) is irrelevant because the postal monopoly applies even to wholly intrastate competing systems. The rationale is that the Postal Service must be protected from companies that would deliver only on profitable routes at a low cost, leaving the Postal Service only expensive, money-losing routes. (B) also is irrelevant. While it is true that there is a market participant exception to the Commerce Clause, the Commerce Clause is not the controlling law here; the controlling law is the federal postal power. (C) is incorrect because the Equal Protection Clause would not prohibit the special treatment here. Because no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, the program would be judged under the rational basis standard. Under this standard, a law is upheld if it is rationally related to any legitimate government interest. Here, the law would be upheld because there is a conceivable rational basis for the program (e.g., to make government employment more attractive), and the law is rationally related to that interest.
An attorney was employed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services in a regional office located in a tobacco-growing state. A labor contract between the agency and the clerical workers union contained a policy providing for termination of union employees only for certain specified grounds. The attorney, however, was not a member of the union and not covered by such a policy. The attorney was angered by the regional director’s refusal to adopt a no-smoking policy for employees and visitors in the office. She posted a notice in the employee cafeteria ridiculing what she called the hypocrisy of an agency promoting health issues and nonsmoking programs while refusing to provide its employees with those same opportunities. The notice prompted a great deal of debate among the employees and was brought to the attention of the regional director, who was very displeased.
Which of the following statements is most accurate regarding the director’s right to dismiss the attorney?
response - incorrect
A The attorney has a liberty interest in the exercise of her First Amendment rights that entitles her to a hearing to contest the grounds of her dismissal.
B The attorney has a property interest as a public employee that precludes her from being fired without notice and an opportunity to respond.
C The attorney has no right to a hearing because her statements were not an expression of views on public issues.
D The attorney has both a liberty interest and a property interest that entitles her to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.
A
If the attorney is fired, she has a right to a hearing to determine whether her First Amendment rights were violated by her dismissal. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a person has a liberty interest in the exercise of specific rights provided by the Constitution, including freedom of speech. If a government employer seeks to fire an employee for speech-related conduct when the speech involved a matter of public concern but is not made pursuant to her official duties, the courts must carefully balance the employee’s rights as a citizen to comment on a matter of public concern against the government’s interest as an employer in the efficient performance of public service. Under the Court’s expansive interpretation of what is a public issue in this context [see Rankin v. McPherson (1987)], the attorney’s statement would probably qualify. At the very least, she can make a sufficient showing that her termination violates her free speech rights to be entitled to a hearing on the issue under procedural due process principles. [See Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District (1979)] (B) is wrong because the attorney does not appear to have a property interest in her job. A public employee who is subject to removal only for “cause” has a property interest in her job and generally must be given notice of the charges against her that are to be the basis for her job termination, and a pre-termination opportunity to respond to those charges. Here, however, the attorney did not have a property interest in her job; she could have been dismissed for no reason at all. She was not covered by the labor contract between the agency and its clerical workers, and there appears to be no other basis for her to claim an entitlement to continued employment. (C) is wrong because the attorney is entitled to a hearing as long as she can raise a prima facie claim that her speech, which was regarding an important health issue and the perception of her agency, was on a public issue and therefore protected by the First Amendment. (D) is wrong for two reasons. As discussed above, the attorney does not have a property interest in her job. Also, due process does not necessarily entitle her to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing; a post-termination evidentiary hearing is probably sufficient. [See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985)]
Even though the gambling laws of the state prohibit gambling on professional sports games, the defendant placed a bet with a bookie on the outcome of a football game. There was a disputed call near the end of the game that resulted in the defendant losing the bet. However, later films showed that in fact the call should have been for the defendant’s team, which would have changed the outcome. The bookie refused to pay the bet to the defendant. Later that night, the defendant broke into the bookie’s home and took the amount he would have won.
What is the defendant’s best defense to a charge of common law burglary?
A He was so enraged that he had an irresistible impulse to take the money and could not control his actions.
B Since the original gambling agreement was illegal, the defendant’s gambling winnings cannot be the subject of larceny.
C He lacked the specific intent necessary for burglary because he believed that the bookie owed him the money.
D He had a reasonable but mistaken belief that the definition of burglary would not apply to a dispute over gambling winnings.
C
A belief that the money was rightfully his is the defendant’s best defense, because the definition of common law burglary requires that the defendant break into the dwelling place with the intent to commit a felony. If the defendant actually believed that the bookie owed him the money, he could not have been committing larceny because there was no intent to deprive another of his property. Absent the intent to commit a felony, the defendant would not have had the specific intent necessary to be found guilty of burglary. (A) is incorrect because the “irresistible impulse” must be a product of some mental disease as opposed to anger. (B) is incorrect because any personal property may be the subject of larceny, regardless of its origins. (D) is incorrect because a mistake as to the law is not an excuse for an act otherwise criminal. This is true even if the mistake was reasonable.
A homeowner and a carpenter entered into an oral agreement, under which the carpenter agreed to construct an addition to the homeowner’s home, using materials supplied by the homeowner, in exchange for $20,000. After the work had been completed but before the homeowner had made any payment, the carpenter called the homeowner and instructed him to pay the $20,000 due on the addition work to a creditor of the carpenter.
If the homeowner fails to pay the creditor, and the creditor thereafter brings an action against the homeowner for $20,000, is the creditor likely to prevail?
A Yes, because the creditor was the intended beneficiary of the contract between the homeowner and the carpenter.
B Yes, because there has been a proper assignment by the carpenter.
C No, because personal service contracts are not assignable.
D No, because the performance was not executory on both sides at the time of the assignment.
B
The creditor will prevail because the carpenter has made a valid assignment of his right to payment from the homeowner. The general rule is that all contractual rights can be assigned, and all the carpenter assigned here was his right to payment. (A) is wrong because it is contrary to the facts; nothing indicates that payment to the creditor was contemplated in the original contract. (C) is a misstatement of the law; the assignment of a right to receive payment is permitted, even in a personal service contract. (D) is irrelevant. There is no requirement that the performance of the contract be executory on both sides for a valid assignment. The carpenter could validly assign his right to payment even though he had completed his performance.
A young woman went to her local shoe shop and selected a pair of shoes. She gave the salesperson cash for the shoes. As the salesperson was putting the shoes into a bag, a robber brandishing a gun entered the store, forced the salesperson to put all of the money in the register into the bag with the shoes, and fled with the bag, the money, and the shoes. After the police had come, the young woman asked the salesperson to get her another pair of shoes. He told the young woman that she would have to pay for them again. The young woman refused.
If the young woman sues the shoe shop for another pair of shoes, who will prevail?
A The young woman, because she did not yet have possession of the shoes.
B The young woman, because the purpose of the contract had been made impossible by an unforeseen event.
C The shoe shop, because title to the shoes had already passed to the young woman.
D The shoe shop, because the contract goods had already been identified.
A
The young woman will prevail. Where the seller is a merchant, the risk of loss does not pass to the buyer until the buyer takes physical possession of the goods. (B) is wrong because performance was not impossible; the young woman had already performed and the shoe store could perform by tendering another pair of shoes. (C) is wrong because passage of title does not shift the risk of loss in this case. (D) is wrong because while a buyer gains some rights once the goods are identified, identification does not shift the risk of loss.
A homeowner contracted for construction of a custom-built, elevated deck in his backyard. The deck’s designer supervised the construction, which was carried out by several employees of a local building company. The homeowner was pleased with the appearance of the deck, but the first time he stepped on it, a support on one side of the deck gave way, causing the homeowner to fall and be injured. The homeowner brought an action joining the building company and the deck’s designer as defendants, alleging negligence. In his complaint, he alleged that he does not know which of the defendants is responsible for the damages.
Which of the following doctrines would be most helpful against the designer?
A Respondeat superior.
B Res ipsa loquitur.
C Contribution.
D Indemnity.
B
Res ipsa loquitur will be most helpful against the designer. Res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is appropriate in situations where an injury does not usually occur unless someone was negligent and the plaintiff does not know which of the defendants caused the injury. While res ipsa loquitur is sometimes not available where more than one person may have been in control of the instrumentality causing the injury, it is available in a case where a particular defendant had the power of control over the site of the injury. Even if the homeowner does not know why the deck collapsed, the deck’s designer would be responsible because he designed the deck and was supervising the construction. Hence, res ipsa loquitur likely could be used. (A) is not correct because the doctrine of respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability on an employer for the tortious conduct of its employee. That doctrine would be helpful against the building company for any negligence by its employees but not against the designer, because the workers were not the designer’s employees. (C) and (D) are incorrect because the doctrines of contribution and indemnity pertain to how the responsibility of the loss is apportioned or shifted among the defendants after the plaintiff has recovered his judgment. They are not relevant to the homeowner’s right to recover.
After being notified by a doctor that her employment with his office was terminated, a nurse applied for a position with a hospital. In her application, the nurse listed her former employment with the doctor, with the understanding that the doctor might be contacted. The doctor, in response to a telephone inquiry from the hospital, stated that the nurse “lacked professional competence.” Although the doctor reasonably believed that to be a fair assessment of the nurse, his adverse rating was based on an episode of malpractice for which he blamed the nurse but which in fact was chargeable to another doctor. Because of the doctor’s adverse comment on her qualifications, the nurse was not employed by the hospital.
If the nurse asserts a claim based on defamation against the doctor, will the nurse prevail?
A Yes, because the doctor was mistaken in the facts on which he based his opinion of the nurse’s competence.
B Yes, because the doctor’s statement reflected adversely on the nurse’s professional competence.
C No, because the nurse authorized the hospital to make inquiry of her former employer.
D No, because the doctor had reasonable grounds for his belief that the nurse was not competent.
D
(D) is correct. The nurse will not prevail because the doctor had reasonable grounds for his statement. As a former employer responding to queries of a prospective employer about a job applicant, the doctor has a qualified privilege. Such a privilege is not absolute; it exists only if exercised in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose. The privilege may be lost if the speaker made a statement not within the scope of the privilege or if the speaker acted with actual malice (i.e., knowledge that the statement was untrue or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity). Because the doctor had reasonable grounds for his belief, he was not acting with actual malice. (A) is incorrect because of the reasons stated in the analysis above. A statement of opinion may be actionable if it appears to be based on specific facts which, if expressly stated, would be defamatory. However, because of the qualified privilege, the doctor will not be liable for his mistake as long as his belief was reasonable. (B) is incorrect because the fact that the statement was in a category that is slander per se (i.e., adversely reflecting on the nurse’s abilities to practice her profession) goes to whether the nurse must plead special damages. It does not, however, undermine the qualified privilege. (C) is incorrect because permission to make inquiry is not tantamount to consent to be defamed.
An underworld informer advised a police investigator that his neighbor was running an illegal bookmaking operation in his apartment, and that the informer had placed bets with the neighbor at this location. The officer obtained a search warrant, based on his affidavit reciting the foregoing facts, and further stating that the underworld informer was a person who had given him accurate information in previous cases, but whose identity could not be revealed because it might jeopardize other criminal investigations being carried on by the police. Armed with the search warrant, police officers went to the neighbor’s apartment. They entered when the neighbor opened the door and searched the apartment. They seized various wagering slips and bookmaking apparatus (described in the search warrant) and placed the neighbor under arrest for illegal gambling. Prior to trial, the neighbor challenges the validity of the search warrant.
Was the search warrant valid?
A No, because it was based on hearsay information.
B No, because the officer failed to disclose the identity of the informer, so that the accuracy of his information could not be verified.
C Yes, because the identity of the informer is never required.
D Yes, because the affidavit accompanying it is sufficiently detailed to allow a determination of probable cause.
D
The search warrant is valid because the affidavit accompanying it is sufficiently detailed to allow a determination of probable cause. A warrant must be based on a showing of probable cause. Along with a request for a warrant, a police officer must submit to a magistrate an affidavit setting forth sufficient underlying circumstances to enable the magistrate to make a determination of probable cause independent of the officer’s conclusions. The affidavit may be based on an informer’s statements. The sufficiency of the affidavit is evaluated according to the “totality of the circumstances.” There must be sufficient information for the magistrate to be able to make a common sense evaluation of probable cause. Among the factors determinative of probable cause are the informer’s reliability, credibility, and basis of knowledge. Here, the officer’s affidavit indicates that the informer has previously proved to be reliable by providing accurate information in other cases. This, in turn, enhances the credibility of the informer. Also, the informer’s knowledge is based on his having personally placed bets with the neighbor at his apartment. Thus, the officer’s affidavit is supported by sufficient underlying circumstances to allow a magistrate’s finding that there was a showing of probable cause. (A) is incorrect because probable cause for issuance of a search warrant may be based on hearsay, if the information comes from a reliable informer. (B) is incorrect because the failure to disclose the identity of the informer does not necessarily invalidate the search warrant. The identity of an informer does not have to be revealed to allow the magistrate to make a determination of probable cause. The magistrate may make this determination based on the police officer’s information about the informer showing reliability, credibility, and knowledge. The magistrate need not personally question the informer. (C) is incorrect because it is overbroad. An informer’s identity need not be revealed only if there is sufficient other evidence to make a probable cause determination.
