Midterm 2 Flashcards

0
Q

3 assumptions of Black’s Median Voter Theorem

A

Odd # group, full participation, sincere voting

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1
Q

Black’s Median Voter Theorem

A

Winset of medians ideal point is an empty set

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2
Q

Role of Rules Committee

A

Traffic cop rule, can allow amendments to legislation or not

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3
Q

Open rule

A

Allows all amendments

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4
Q

Closed rule

A

No amendments allowed

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5
Q

Modified/standard rule

A

Rules committee picks and chooses amendments

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6
Q

Variable

A

A characteristic that can vary in value amongst output

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7
Q

Mean

A

Sum of all #s divided by the # of items on the list

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8
Q

Median

A

that separates the higher half from the lower half; more useful in Poli Sci than mean because less sensitive to outliers

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9
Q

Mode

A

that occurs most frequently; most useful in large datasets

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10
Q

Variance

A

Squared deviation from the mean; tells us about spread, determines confidence

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11
Q

Standard deviation

A

Square root of variance

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12
Q

Outlier

A

Observation that falls from the rest of data, 2-3 standard deviations from the mean

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13
Q

Multi-dimensionality

A

3 hours people have to divide $1; majorities are cyclical, no stable winset

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14
Q

Indifference cirlce

A

I want $8, indifferent between $8.05 & $7.95

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15
Q

Plott’s theorem

A

2 dimensions will not find a medium voter theorem winner but can find radial symmetry

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16
Q

McKelvey’s chaos theorem

A

Plott’s idea is too sensitive to movement that you still get cycles; radial symmetry is a pipe dream

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17
Q

Multi-dimensionality solution

A

Agenda setting and voting rules

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18
Q

Rational choice

A

Positive political theorem, rely on assumptions of self interested rational actions

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19
Q

Normative vs Positive

A

Normative: what ought to be
Positive: how the world is

20
Q

Rationality assumptions

A

People have complete, transitive preferences and we can assign utility/worth to outcomes

21
Q

Expected utility

A

The probability of an event happening multiplied by utility

EU= p x u

22
Q

Single peaked preferences

A

Want $7 so no difference between $8 and $9

23
Q

Cohesion trade off

A

Trade off between cohesive preferences and fairness

24
Q

Cohesive preferences

A

If simple majority agrees fairly; if less cohesive and more disagreement, less “fair”

25
Q

Ideal point

A

Ideal thing for individual people

26
Q

Winset

A

Set of winners

27
Q

M&S data

A

Past SC nominations, ideological location of nominees 1949-1994

28
Q

M&S dependent variable

A

Segal cover score of ideological scaling

29
Q

M&S key independent variable

A

ACLU/ADA score and voting scores for current SC

30
Q

M&S hypothesis

A

Unconstrained regime–> P
Semi constrained regime –> Is
Constrained regime –> J

31
Q

M&S problems

A

Small sample size
What term of office the president is in could affect (ie, honeymoon period)
Assumes this is happening in a vaccuum
No infinite # of nominees

32
Q

M&S regimes

A

Unconstrained: S–P–J
Semi-constrained: P–S–J
Fully constrained: P–J–S

33
Q

Electoral systems

A

Used by larger groups to elect legislatures

34
Q

Fundamental basis for 2 types of electoral systems

A

Governance v representation
Governance: how well members can act independently/decisively
Representation: stronger ideological representation

35
Q

Single member district & first past the post

A

Electoral system
Each voter gets one vote
Candidate with the most votes wins

36
Q

Single non-transferable vote

A

Electoral system
Each voter gets one vote
Multiple people can get elected out of a district

37
Q

Limited vote

A

Electoral system
Voters get several votes
Multiple people can get elected out of a district
Must distribute votes among different individuals

38
Q

Cumulative vote

A

Electoral system
Voters have multiple votes
Multiple candidates can get elected out of a district
Don’t have to distribute votes

39
Q

Single transferrable vote

A

Electoral system
Mark entire preference ranking
Quota established, if candidate exceeds quota then votes go to next ranked candidate

40
Q

Difference in PR systems

A

Is there a threshold?

How do systems deal with fractional seats?

41
Q

Duverger’s law

A

Plurality leads to 2 party because don’t want to waste votes on a smaller party

42
Q

Voting methods

A

Smaller scale than electoral systems

43
Q

Single plurality voting

A

Voting method

Each voter casts a single vote for 1 option, the option with the most votes wins

44
Q

Plurality runoff

A

Voting method

Each voter casts a single vote for 1 option, the top 2 go into a runoff

45
Q

Sequential runoff

A

Voting method

Each voter casts a single vote for 1 option, lowest option gets eliminated until only 1 is left

46
Q

Borda count

A

Rank options, points are tallied

47
Q

Condorcet procedure

A

Pair off alternatives and determine if one can win majority against all others

48
Q

Approval voting

A

Approve some and tally