Midterm 2 Flashcards
3 assumptions of Black’s Median Voter Theorem
Odd # group, full participation, sincere voting
Black’s Median Voter Theorem
Winset of medians ideal point is an empty set
Role of Rules Committee
Traffic cop rule, can allow amendments to legislation or not
Open rule
Allows all amendments
Closed rule
No amendments allowed
Modified/standard rule
Rules committee picks and chooses amendments
Variable
A characteristic that can vary in value amongst output
Mean
Sum of all #s divided by the # of items on the list
Median
that separates the higher half from the lower half; more useful in Poli Sci than mean because less sensitive to outliers
Mode
that occurs most frequently; most useful in large datasets
Variance
Squared deviation from the mean; tells us about spread, determines confidence
Standard deviation
Square root of variance
Outlier
Observation that falls from the rest of data, 2-3 standard deviations from the mean
Multi-dimensionality
3 hours people have to divide $1; majorities are cyclical, no stable winset
Indifference cirlce
I want $8, indifferent between $8.05 & $7.95
Plott’s theorem
2 dimensions will not find a medium voter theorem winner but can find radial symmetry
McKelvey’s chaos theorem
Plott’s idea is too sensitive to movement that you still get cycles; radial symmetry is a pipe dream
Multi-dimensionality solution
Agenda setting and voting rules
Rational choice
Positive political theorem, rely on assumptions of self interested rational actions
Normative vs Positive
Normative: what ought to be
Positive: how the world is
Rationality assumptions
People have complete, transitive preferences and we can assign utility/worth to outcomes
Expected utility
The probability of an event happening multiplied by utility
EU= p x u
Single peaked preferences
Want $7 so no difference between $8 and $9
Cohesion trade off
Trade off between cohesive preferences and fairness
Cohesive preferences
If simple majority agrees fairly; if less cohesive and more disagreement, less “fair”
Ideal point
Ideal thing for individual people
Winset
Set of winners
M&S data
Past SC nominations, ideological location of nominees 1949-1994
M&S dependent variable
Segal cover score of ideological scaling
M&S key independent variable
ACLU/ADA score and voting scores for current SC
M&S hypothesis
Unconstrained regime–> P
Semi constrained regime –> Is
Constrained regime –> J
M&S problems
Small sample size
What term of office the president is in could affect (ie, honeymoon period)
Assumes this is happening in a vaccuum
No infinite # of nominees
M&S regimes
Unconstrained: S–P–J
Semi-constrained: P–S–J
Fully constrained: P–J–S
Electoral systems
Used by larger groups to elect legislatures
Fundamental basis for 2 types of electoral systems
Governance v representation
Governance: how well members can act independently/decisively
Representation: stronger ideological representation
Single member district & first past the post
Electoral system
Each voter gets one vote
Candidate with the most votes wins
Single non-transferable vote
Electoral system
Each voter gets one vote
Multiple people can get elected out of a district
Limited vote
Electoral system
Voters get several votes
Multiple people can get elected out of a district
Must distribute votes among different individuals
Cumulative vote
Electoral system
Voters have multiple votes
Multiple candidates can get elected out of a district
Don’t have to distribute votes
Single transferrable vote
Electoral system
Mark entire preference ranking
Quota established, if candidate exceeds quota then votes go to next ranked candidate
Difference in PR systems
Is there a threshold?
How do systems deal with fractional seats?
Duverger’s law
Plurality leads to 2 party because don’t want to waste votes on a smaller party
Voting methods
Smaller scale than electoral systems
Single plurality voting
Voting method
Each voter casts a single vote for 1 option, the option with the most votes wins
Plurality runoff
Voting method
Each voter casts a single vote for 1 option, the top 2 go into a runoff
Sequential runoff
Voting method
Each voter casts a single vote for 1 option, lowest option gets eliminated until only 1 is left
Borda count
Rank options, points are tallied
Condorcet procedure
Pair off alternatives and determine if one can win majority against all others
Approval voting
Approve some and tally
