Microeconomics Flashcards

1
Q

Definition of Centralised and Decentralised markets

A

Centralised market:

  • A financial market structure that consists of having all orders routed to one central exchange with no other competing market
  • Quoted prices listed represent the only price that is available to consumers seeking to buy or sell the good
  • No other competing market

Decentralised market:

  • A market structure without a centralised location
  • Price from around the world can be taken
  • Prices determined by local bargaining
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2
Q

Centralised and Decentralised market characteristics and implications

A

Centralised market:

  • Less dispersion in trade prices
  • Prices are close to CE prices
  • Trade volume is close to CE trade volume
  • Surplus is closer to CE surplus
  • Low cost units sold first, high valued units purchased first -> surplus increases
  • Efficient trade

Decentralised market:

  • Set of feasible transactions is constrained
  • Prices are determined by local bargaining
  • Trade limitations are a key determinant of price variation
  • Limited trade relative to CE
  • Higher prices relative to CE
  • Smaller total surplus relative to CE
  • Transaction costs sap surplus
  • Does not affect quantity of trade
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3
Q

Consumer surplus equation

A

Vi - nP
e.g. for 3 units
(V1 + V2+V3) - 3P
(for AD - the equation doesn’t change, only the quantities)

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4
Q

Producer surplus equation

A

nP - Ci
e.g. for 3 units
3P - (C1+C2+C3)

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5
Q

Tax incidence: on an ELASTIC supply curve and implications

A

ALL the incidence of a tax falls on the BUYER, regardless of wether the tax is imposed on the buyer or seller

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6
Q

Tax incidence: on INELASTIC supply curve and implications

A

ALL the incidence of a tax falls on the SELLER, regardless of whether the tax is imposed on the buyer or the seller

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7
Q

Tax incidence: ELASTIC demand curve and implications

A

ALL the incidence of a tax falls on the SELLER, regardless of whether the tax is imposed on the buyer or seller

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8
Q

Tax incidence: INELASTIC demand curve and implications

A

ALL the incidence of a tax falls on the BUYER, regardless of whether the tax is imposed on the buyer or seller (TRY IT!?)

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9
Q

Tax incidence: generalised rule

A

Tax revenue is: Unit tax x Quantity

The least elastic group bares more of the cost, BUT, the burden if equal if supply and demand in symmetrical

(When tax is imposed on the seller, price rises)
(When tax is imposed on the buyer, price falls)

A new function will be found, Sub in new P after tax into new function or the other function, don’t use the original!

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10
Q

Tax incidence: Lump-sum taxation and implications

A
  • A lump sum tax will not shift a supply a demand curve because it is unrelated to quantity produced or demanded
  • Equilibrium price and quantity stay the same
  • No dead-weight loss
  • If tax is imposed on producers, they bare all the burden
  • If tax is imposed on consumer, they bare all the burden????
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11
Q

Game theory: Nash equilibrium

A

Occurs when each player chooses an action that gives him/her the highest payoff, given the action taken by the other player in a game

  • Set of actions taken by both players
  • Arises from rationality assumption as players eek to maximise their own payoff
  • Self-enforcing, does not necessarily maximise collective payoff
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12
Q

Game theory: strict domination

A
  • An action dominates another action of a player if it always gives a better payoff to that player, regardless of what other players are doing
  • If a strict domination action exists, the player will always play that action, any other actions are thus dominated
  • When dominant actions exist for both players, they will only play their dominant action
  • If both players have a dominant strategy, it will generate a strict domination pure strategy Nash equilibrium
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13
Q

Game theory: pure strategies

A
  • Playing a single action such that the probability of them both playing their particular action is one
  • If no equilibrium exists in pure strategy, one must exist in mixed strategies
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14
Q

Game theory: mixed strategies

A
  • In the absence of a dominant strategy NE (may be a third NE)
  • An active randomisation, with given probabilities that determines the players’ decision
  • Player desires to be unpredictable so that his opponent can’t guess his decision
  • Both actions equally as good to the player
    E.g. set E(action 1) = E(action 2)
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15
Q

Game theory: probabilities

A

E(action) -> P(happening) x payoff + P(not happening) x payoff

E(A1) = E(A2) -> resolve

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16
Q

Game theory: 3 by 3 games

*IF P1, DO WE MULTIPLY IN ROWS OR COLUMNS?

A

P(happening) x payoff + P(happening 2) x payoff + (not happening) x payoff

R=r, P=p, S=1-r-p

As E(A) = E(B) = E(C)
Equate and make either r or p the subject
Sub into remaining equations to find answers
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17
Q

Monopoly: profit maximisation: price, quantity, profit

A

1) Using inverse demand
2) Using MR = a - 2bq
3) Set MR = MC
4) Resolve to find Q
5) Sub Q into original function (not MR) to find P
6) Sub (P-MC)Q to find profit

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18
Q

Duopoly: profit maximisation: reaction function, price, quantity, profit

A

1) Using inverse demand and cournot equation
2) Understand Q = q1 + q2 -> P = X-b(q1+q2)
3) Find reaction function
4) Invert q1 and q2 and then sub in
5) Find total quantity -> q1+q2
6) Sub into original function to find price
7) Sub into (P-MC)Q to find profit

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19
Q

Triopoly etc……..

A

Let Q = (q1+q2+….+qn)
Use the same method as before
*Remember it is always q1 x 2

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20
Q

Price setting with differing MC

A

Find reaction function for firm 1
This will be in form q1 = ……
For firm 2: it will be inverted for q2 = ….
But numbers will be slightly different because of differing MC
Solve simultaneously to find the 2 quantities

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21
Q

Monopoly vs CC**

A
  • MRcc > MRm because the elasticity of the entire demand is lower (more inelastic). When Firm 1 increases q, it doesn’t take into account that this reduces p for firm 2
    Because monopolies have power to restrict output they have less MR to act as an incentive to sell
  • CC produces more than a monopoly
  • CC charges lower prices
  • Shown in payoff matrix!!!
  • Monopoly has no supply curve because supply and demand are endogenously determined.
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22
Q

Perfect Competition vs CC**

A
  • Output will be LESS than in PC (MR<p></p>
23
Q

Price discrimination

A

i) First degree (perfect price) discrimination - when a monopolist sells different units of output for different prices, and these prices vary from customer to customer e.g. seller can extract entire consumer surplus
ii) Second degree price discrimination (Screening consumer) - when a monopolist sells output to different people at different prices, but every unit of output sold to a given customer sells for the same price e.g. scarce capacity discounted (bulk discount or loyalty discount)
iii) Third degree price discrimination (segmenting market) - when a monopolist sells output to different people at different prices, but everyone who buys the same amount of the commodity pays the same price e.g. time, geography

Only works if firms can prevent the re-sale from low price to high price

24
Q

Mergers**

A

If two firms merge into a single entity

  • Each firm’s profit will increase as a result of the merger
  • The total quantity produced will fall as a result of the merger

They join to form a monopoly essentially (split the profit?)
Duo-polists’ dilemma is to always increase quantity (game Theory - prisoner’s dilemma)

25
Q

Adverse selection: definition and characteristics

A
  • Asymmetrical information: information not known to all agents
  • Hidden characteristics
  • Different types of agents(HR/LR)
  • Adverse selection: one party knows more about its own attributes or characteristics than another party, and engages in a transaction with another party who doesn’t know that information
  • Downward sloping cost curves, unlike normal cost curves
  • Low cost consumers have less willingness to pay
  • Demand and cost curves tightly linked mainly due to risk (higher risk means higher costs
  • AC always above MC and always follow same slope
  • Competitive equilibrium (Q*) at D = AC
  • Efficiency (Qe) at D = MC)
  • Welfare cost is area between Q* and Qe (area where D crosses AC before meeting MC)
  • Q* will come before Qe
26
Q

Adverse selection: efficient and inefficient industries

A

Totally efficient:

  • Where D is always above AC
  • P = Qmax before P=AC, therefore everyone is supplied before firm finds competitive equilibrium

Totally inefficient:

  • Where AC is always above D
  • P = AC before P = Qmax so there is no gain for the producer in selling in this market
27
Q

Adverse selection: AASM

A
  • Upward sloping cost curves
  • Inefficiency will be over supply
  • This time, D crosses MC before AC
  • Welfare loss still between Qe and Q* (swapped round)
28
Q

Moral hazard: definition and characteristics

A
  • Hidden actions/different actions by agents
  • Agents do something AFTER contract
  • Informed person benefitting over less informed who does not know some relevant information, and that the less informed will bear the cost of the actions
29
Q

Moral hazard: difference to Adverse selection

A

1) Hidden attributes: (different types of agents)
Some attributes/characteristics of the person engaging in an exchange is not known to other parties
Agents know something that principal does not
= Adverse selection

2) Hidden actions: (different actions engaged by the agents)
Problem arises when some actions taken by one party to an exchange is not known or cannot be verified by others
Agents do something that principal does not = Moral Hazard

Example: Buying insurance

1) Adverse selection: at higher prices of insurance, those who buy are at a higher risk which insurer does not know
2) Buying an insurance policy may make the buyer more likely to take risks now that they are insured

30
Q

Moral hazard: principal-agent model

A

When agents act on behalf of a principal

i) Difference in preference
ii) Transaction market??
iii) Observation problems

Solution:
Shareholders tend to pay CEOs in shares so that they have the incentive to be more efficient
- Inverted U shape curve

31
Q

Moral hazard: two-person partnership

A

Observable and unobservable efforts (game theory used)
- efficient level of effort = 1

(1/N)Y = (1/N)(me1+me2…+men) —> unobservable
- efficient level of effort = 1, equilibrium will be 1/N

Solutions:
Make an effort observable
Dissolve the partnership - sole ownership

32
Q

Moral hazard: ‘insurance’ examples

A

AS - contracts supplied to agent without full knowledge of risk

Characteristics are fixed: talent, inherent riskiness, inherent healthiness

MH - agents change behaviour once in a contract with suppliers not having full knowledge of risk

Actions are chosen: effort, precaution

33
Q

Social preferences: affect of altruism on the market

A
  • Altruism won’t change the highest price that buyers are willing to pay
  • Won’t change the lowest price at which sellers are willing to sell
  • Trading behaviour looks identical - markets wrong place to look for altruism
34
Q

Social preferences: affect on two-person partnership

A
  • Partners exert less than the efficient level of effort - “free ride”
  • Receive only half of the marginal benefit of effort (partner receives other half)
  • But when partner’s care positively about each other’s share, each receives more than one-half of the benefits from their effort, thus increasing their desired effort level
35
Q

Social preferences: wages and workers’ payoffs

A
  • Wages exceed the level at which labour supply = labour demand because when firms pay higher wages, workers reciprocate by providing higher effort
  • Worker’s payoff: w-c(e)
  • Firm’s payoff: (n-w)e
  • Recognising this, firm offers lowest wage
  • Anticipating that workers give higher effort following higher wages, firms offer wages above the minimum
36
Q

H and S: status seeking

A
  • Animals display jealousy at what others get
  • People are willing to be poorer when that moves them from a lower position in a richer country to the top of a poorer country
  • Males, young individuals from wealthier families are more status orientated
  • People work too hard because they are engaged in status races with others
  • Higher income makes others jealous
  • Marginal taxation of income/labour could rectify this
37
Q

H and S: reference incomes

A
  • Individuals update their reference position depending on the incomes they themselves experience
  • Individuals’ utility/happiness derived of their own income depends on the income of others in society
  • Individuals’ utility/happiness increases their own income
38
Q

H and S: status races

A
  • Individuals are locked in status races where all work longer than optimal in order to keep up with material consumption of others
  • Relative concerns explain why individuals have not reduced the amount of working time by as much as was expected in the first half of the 20th century despite huge increases in average incomes
  • Status races would reduce in overall negative consequences (social unjust) if taxes were levied on status goods or on work-income levels (redistribution of wealth)
39
Q

H and S: GDP and happiness

A
  • As GDP increases, the more likely a country is happier
  • As wealth increase, happiness increases (people)
  • Increasing levels of happiness plateau at around 20,000 dollars GDP per capita PPP (Easterlin paradox)
  • Do not know what has increase UK happiness in the last five years
40
Q

H and S: policy implications

A
  • Forgetting the poor is not going to help aggregate happiness much
  • It is not all lost in childhood. Most kids can become happy adults
  • Income and good jobs are predetermined by childhood (Up to 30% variation explained)
41
Q

EoD: taste-based discrimination definition **

A

Preference for certain traits
MORE

Sacrifice profit in order to undergo taste based discrimination

42
Q

EoD: statistical-based discrimination definition **

A

Making inference from observing traits
MORE

Don’t sacrifice profits - use stats Discrimination to max profits

43
Q

EoD: hit rates

A

H = C/V

Hx = Cx/Vx or Hy = Cy/Vy

  • Cx < Cy, if police is prejudiced
  • Hx < Hy, as well
44
Q

EoD: Search rates

A

Sx = Wx/(Dx+Wx) and Sy = Wy/(Dy+Wy)

  • Nothing to do with Cx and Cy
  • The search intensity only reflects race-specific characteristics
45
Q

EoD: market implications**

A

????

46
Q

Competitive Equilibrium

A
  • Total surplus is maximised at CE prices
  • Cannot benefit some without hurting others at CE outcome

Total surplus is maximised at CE prices as:

  • low cost units are sold first
  • high clue units are purchased first
  • trade volume depletes gains from trade
47
Q

Tax equations

A

Tax buyer:
B: p+T
S: p

Sub into demand function e.g. n - (p+T)

Tax seller:
B: p*
S: p*-T
Sub into supply function e.g. (p-T) - n

48
Q

How to derive marginal cost

A
R(q) = P(q) x Q
= (a-bQ x Q)
= aQ - bQ^2
MR = dR/dQ
= a-2bQ
49
Q

Cournot shortcut

A

For Q=q1+q2
P=8-n(q1+q2)
Then 2 x q1

50
Q

Shareholder’s solution (maths)

A
(1-s)s is profit for shareholder 
So to maximise profit 
Find dy/ds = 0
Thus, 1-2s = 0
S = 1/2
51
Q

Altruism in the market (maths)

A

In equilibrium p=v=c

Marginal buyers’ utility is v-(v+1)+a(c+1-c) = a-1<0

Won’t pay > v

Never values the other party more than oneself

52
Q

How does segmentation and desegmentation/pooling provide solutions to improve efficiency in adverse selection

A

Segmentation: separates consumers with different risks and makes it more fair

De-segmentation: those with high risk gets lower costs (e.g. less healthy get reduced costs)
After pooling: cheaper for some, more expensive for others

Universal coverage: state pays for all

53
Q

Overview of EoD

A

Competitive Discrimination (Individuals maximising behaviour that may include discrimination):

i) Taste-based - Purely by individual preferences (tastes)
ii) Statistical-based - Using observable characteristics to conduct inference

Collective Discrimination (Groups act collectively against each other)