Financial System Reform Flashcards

1
Q

Goals of Financial Reform

A
  • Discourage excessive risk taking
  • Make financial system more resilient to losses
  • Without impairing the system’s function of providing credit
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2
Q

Dealing with the financial sector

A
  • Regulation
    Rules that financial institutions need to follow
  • Supervision
    Monitoring of financial institutions’ adherence to rule and risk taking
  • Regulation has become tighter and supervision has become more intrusive, and extended to a wider range of institutions
  • Note: “The regulators” often refers to both those whose design regulation and supervise it
  • Stress tests are used to see how resilient banks are in stressful in situations
  • Regulators May encourage banks to create capital by issuing shares
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3
Q

Micro v “Macro-prudential” supervision

A
  • Traditionally: only “micro” supervision of individual banks
  • Since crisis: also “macro-prudential” supervision of the system as a whole
  • Usually banks have had own regulators/supervisors

FPC - macro
PRA - micro

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4
Q

Compensation reform

A
  • Traditional structure of compensation
    Base salary + asymmetric bonus based on annual performance -> recipe for extensive risk taking
  • Incentives not aligned with shareholders/taxpayers
    Fully participate on the upside - sheltered on the downside
    Short-term vision
  • Guidelines for reform
    Less asymmetric
    Less based on short-term performance
  • Example:
    Claw-back clauses based on long-term performance -> if something bad happens which is traced back, can demand money back
  • Aside:
    Overall level of compensation also a hot topic but fairly irrelevant to excessive risk taking
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5
Q

Constraints on asset allocation

A
  • Some commercial banks got in trouble by trading risky securities
    Risky: bitcoins, no backing, speculative)
    Traditional: Bonds, Mortgages, Backed
  • Volcker rule (USA); Ring-fencing (UK)
    Deposit-taking institutions restricted from trading in risky assets

-Why focuses on commercial banks?
Depositors economically more vulnerable
Critical for loans to small and medium firms
Taxpayers on the hook through deposit insurance

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6
Q

Bail-in Rule

A
  • Implicit bailout guarantee fro banks “Too big to fail”
    This makes them safer compared to non-financial or small firms
    Cheap bank funding encourages high leverage, risk taking and further growth
  • Bailout = Gov buys banks that fail -> moral hazard -> risky investments -> paid for by gov (taxpayers
  • Bail-in Rules
    Public recapitalisation conditional on losses imposed on bond holders
    E.g. new Eurozone bank resolutions mechanisms
    Bank expected to pay first
  • Solutions:
    Break up banks/size limit
    But, banking lobby resistance
    Scale of economies for large banks = cheaper lending
    Cheaper and more effective securities (little evidence)
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7
Q

Capital Requirements

A
  • Minimum buffers that financial institutions must have
  • Example:
    Leverage ratio: compares equity to total assets
  • How much should be increases?
    Makes banks safer so less fall in lending due to crises
    Bank lobby: increased cost of funding and hence less lending in normal times
  • Also:
    Increase capital requirement -> reduce lending
    Leverage is where profits come from?
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8
Q

Housing Price Bubbles: Originate and Distribute

A

Some lenders buy bonds (to generate loans) with the intention of selling them to other people, instead of holding them until maturity

  • Contributed to the crisis as borrowers had strong incentives to issue large quantities of loans once they could sell them after insurance
  • Boosted lending and borrowing activities; people were just passing time bombs around
  • Lending and borrowing amplified the house prices since borrowing was easier, and it leads to an increase in demand

TLDR; There are financial institutions that buy loans, and repackage to sell them in secondary loan markets, and booms when the bombs explode

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9
Q

Banks Balance sheet

A

Asset: Reserves, Loans, Securities, Residential Mortgages

Liabilities and Equity: Deposits, Debts (ST, LT), Capital

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10
Q

Terminology (solvency)

A

Solvent: Asset >= Liabilities (able to to back loans)
Insolvent: Asset < Liabilities
Insolvent does not equal liquidity; but illiquid assets can lead to insolvency
- They are not causal: you can have illiquid banks that are solvent (mor illiquid assets, and higher liabilities) or liquid banks that are insolvent

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11
Q

Liquidity of Assets

A

The liquidity of an asset: how easily is the asset converted to cash => the easier it is to convert the asset, the mor liquid it is considered
E.g.
Liquid: Currencies, commodities, stocks, shares, equity traded in major exchanges - a lot of buying and selling going on frequently

Illiquid: Mortgages (houses), arts, collectibles, debts and equity from private loans

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12
Q

How can Illiquidity crash the financial system?

A

1) Insolvency: Fall in asset prices, and it is harder to convert houses into cash. For fast sales, banks probably reduce the prices of assets
2) Bank-run: If everyone wants to withdraw their deposits, withdrawals have to be match in cash. For example, houses are hard to convert into cash overnight

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13
Q

Capital (Equity)

A

Raise capital - Issuing shares
- Shares is an investment and it is not risk-free: so it should have a positive rate of return by divided (a compensation for taking risk)

  • However, share’s dividend is costlier than bank deposits (i.e., deposits pay interest that is usually lower than a share’s dividend), so issuing shares to raise capital is an expensive thing to do!
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14
Q

High Capital Requirement

A

Why is it good?

  • Limit the damage of balance-sheet shrinkage
  • Allows bank to honour its liabilities even in times of asset losses
  • Prevent the bank from going bankrupt (i.e., capital = 0), bankrupt when all capital is gone
  • Makes a bank less likely for a failure in financial crises
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15
Q

Why can having high capital be bad?

A
  • Reduce the amount of lending by banks: Cost to issue loans is high (Capital can still be landed by just at a higher cost, less supply of capital to loan)
  • Opportunist cost for holding more capital is high (could be used for other investments), banks make profits by lending out
  • High Capital requirement may mean banks might engage in riskier activities to increase return - may not result in safer investments
  • Generally inefficiency to the economy and can harm growth
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16
Q

Countercyclical Capital Requirement

A

It is required by law for banks to have an additional cushion of capital to absorb potential losses

  • A macro-prudential tool that enables the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) to maintain stability and enhance resilience of the financial system
  • The objective is to rescue systematic (overall) risk
  • FOC increases rate when it judges that risk are building
  • Reduced the extent which economic shocks will be amplified in the financial system
  • Rate caries with the economic status
  • Current rate by FPC is 1%
17
Q

The nature of the requirement

A

Contrary to the name, it is not countercyclical in nature (reduce capital in booms), however it is a countercyclical tool, want to increase lending during bad times

  • Save capital during booms since there are ample investments with a good economy
  • Release Capital during recession because that is the time the economy needs a boost and lending
18
Q

Policy Response: Direct Aid

A

Depositors become concerned about the solvency of banks during a financial crisis: This may induce a bank run.

Even if banks are solvent, they may face an issue of illiquidity in assets.

During such times of uncertainty and insolvency issues, banks are also more reluctant to lend to each other inducing a credit crunch

19
Q

Government can help by

A

1) Getting. Neutral bank to make emergency loans: Prevent bankruptcy of banks if assets are illiquid
2) Take ownership of banks by recapitalisation
3) Subsidies loans to alleviate severity of credit crunch: so banks are more willing to lend to each other

20
Q

Policy response: Are banks too big to fail?

A

Bail out: recapitalisation of banks using tax revenue

Distortion 1: Investors do not care about what the bank is doing because the government will save them anyway

Distortion 2: Big Banks can borrow at lower rates and may encourage more riskier behaviour

Bail-in: Recapitalisation that occurs only after the bond holders suffer a “haircut”

21
Q

Firm’s Response: Mitigating individual moral hazard

A

Risk-taking is often for short-term gains, so bank should think of ways to prevent, discourage short-term objectives:

1) Cap bonuses
Bonuses are paired with wage, and usually depend on short-term performance

2) Making pay conditional on long-term profit
Reducing incentive for short-term gains

22
Q

In Sum:

A

1) Lonaing-go-around can be dangerous: Especially when we have information asymmetry about borrower’s ability to finance loans
2) The financial system is highly interconnected: Someone sneezes, everyone catches a cold
3) Saving for rainy days is smart: buffer for additional support
4) Prevention is better than cure: always true
5) Nothing is too big to fail
6) Gains can be costly to others, bank failure may eat into clients savings