Metaphysics of mind Physicalism - Type Identity Theory

Question 1

what’s type identity theory

Answer 1

mental states reduce to physical brain states and are the same things as each other e.g c-fibres firing is the same thing as the brain state associated with pain

Question 2

why are mental and brain states the same

Answer 2

mental states of pain and brain states may seem different because one is a subjective private experience (qualia) and one is an observed objective physical thing , but type identity theorists say they’re one in the same - the mind is the brain, mental states are brain states, pain is c-fibres firing

Question 3

whats j.j.c smarts theory of sensations and brain processes

Answer 3

he argues mental states are ontologically reduciable to brain states in the same way that water is h20, lighting is electrical discharge and pain is c-fibres firing - these relationships arent just correlations, electrical discharge happens at the same time as lightning or causes it, theyre the same thing. its the same story with pain and c-fibres

Question 4

why arent ontological reductions the same as analytical reducations

Answer 4

these reductions arent the same as analytic ones like ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’ as the opposite idea (a married bachelor) is a contradiction whereas even though lightning is an electrical discharge is true, there’s no contradiction if u said lightning isnt electrical discharge. therefore pain ontologically reduces to c-fibres firing but doesnt analytically

Question 5

whats analytic reduction

Answer 5

shows language of one term can be reduced to the language of another term without loss of meaning e.g term ‘bachelors’ being reduced down to ‘unmarried men’ without loosing its meaning and so theyre analytically reduciable to eachother

Question 6

whats ontological reduction

Answer 6

concerned with nature of beings or existence - entities of a certain kind are just combinations of entities of a smaller more basic kind, theyre numerically identical and share the same spacial and time qualities

Question 7

whats ockham’s razor

Answer 7

principle that says the simplest explaination is the best and so if two theories make the same prediction, the theory with the least number of entities is likely to be more accurate

Question 8

whats an example of ockham’s razor

Answer 8

before it was widely accepted that the earth revolves around the sun - astronomers used complex orbit patterns and forces to explain why stars and planets appeared in the sky. however a heliocentric model made the same accurate predictions with fewer entities and so ockhams razor correctly says the earth revolves around the sun not the other way

Question 9

how is ockhams razor used against dualism (jjc smart)

Answer 9

type identity theory can make same predictions that dualism can but with one entity rather than two, the brain and not the brain and the mind. with no overwhelming proof for dualism, we shouldnt bring in extra entities to explain the mind as we can explain mental states enough by just referring to the brain - e.g when feeling pain, brain scans show the c-fibres get activated and vice versa, we dont need more substances.

Question 10

whats the location problem against type identity theory

Answer 10

its often difficult to precisely describe where pain is - even if an area is given, theres no precise location. we can locate c-fibres firing in a precise location through an MRI scan, yet this doesnt always correspond with our mental sensations of pain as it would seem its located elsewhere. so even if you locate my c-fibres, touch them, point to them, it doesnt show where my subjective mental sensation of pain is. you cant touch or point to my mental state of pain

Question 11

how does leibniz law of indiscernibility relate to the location problem

Answer 11

my brain state of c-fibres firing has the property of having a physical location, but my mental state of pain doesnt have this same property. using leibniz’s law, mental state of pain cant be the same thing as my brain state as they have different properties and therefore arent the same

Question 12

whats the zombie response to type identity theory

Answer 12

type id t says pain is identical to c-fibres firing, yet we can imagine a zombie with the brain state (c-fibres firing) without the mental state (pain). so if zombies are possible then pain and other mental states arent the same as brain states

Question 13

whats the concievability argument response to type id theory

Answer 13

mental states without brain states are concievable
so mental states without brain states is possible
so mental states arent brain states
therefore type identity theory is false

Question 14

whats the divisibilty argument response

Answer 14

my brain is divisible
my mind is indivisible
therefore my mind and body are seperate substances and so mental states cant be the same as brain states

Question 15

whats hilary putnams mutliple realisability response

Answer 15

mental states cant be reduced to brain states because theyre multiply realisable - the same mental state can come from many different brain states

Question 16

whats hilary putnams mutliple realisability octopus example

Answer 16

octopi have very different brain setups to humans e.g lets say they have o-fibres rather than c-fibres. however if you stabbed an octopus and it squirmed around, surely youd say that means its in pain. but typeidth would disagree, octopuses cant feel pain because pain is simply c-fibres firing, and they dont have c-fibres

Question 17

whats hilary putnams mutliple realisability silicone based alien example

Answer 17

if type identity theory is true then an alien and human cant have the same belief that grass is green because an aliens brain is made from silicone and humans from carbon. but this seems wrong- we both share the same mental state , a belief that grass is green, despite different physical states