Metaphysics of mind Physicalism - Functionalism Flashcards
whats functionalism
defines mental states at functional states. e.g functional role of pain is an unpleasant sensation to get the organism away from whats causing it harm
whats the function of pain
cause other interal mental states such as a belief youre in pain, a desire for the pain to stop
how does hilary putnam multiple realisability support functionalism
a knife can be made of multiple things as long as it peforms the function to cut things. similarly, mental states can be experienced by different organisms ( human, octopus, aliens) as the key feature of them is its function
how does functionalism overcome issues that are brought up for other mental states
pain in the human mind may be c-fibres, pain in the octopus may be o-fibres but as long as these states play the same functional role (belief im in pain, desire for it to stop) then theyre the same mental state. any theory that focuses on physical structure of mental states cant account for this
arguments against functionalism - how are zombies applied to functionalism
the brain of a philosophical zombie also reacts in the same way - c-fibres will fire and cause other brain states that have same functional role of a normal human and so zombies state is physically and functionally identical to pain but without qualia.
arguments against functionalism - how do zombies show functionalism is false (qualia)
it seems obvious that the zombie is not in pain because qualia (subjective feeling of pain) is essential to what pain is and you cant be in pain without it. therefore they show its possible to have a state thats functionally identical to pain but isnt pain.
how do functionalists respond to the zombie problem
idea of physically identical human that lacks qualia may seem concievable but doesnt mean its metaphysically possible (H30 example) qualia is an essential property of the brain and so the zombies arent metaphysically possible
ned
arguments against functionalism - whats ned block’s thought experiment
ned block creates set up that is functionally identical to a mind but isnt the same thing called the china brain
arguments against functionalism -whats the china brain
a human body is hooked up to the entire population of china & everyone in china is linked to others by 2way radios
-the population of china is about the same number of neurons in the brain.
-Imagine the Chinese population recreated the functions of the neurons
-So, the input leads to exactly the same output, and everything in between is functionally identical
-e.g if someone were to punch the body of the china brain, its state would be functionally identical to a human brain
arguments against functionalism - how does the china brain go against functionalism
despite it being functionally identical to pain in every way, it seems obvious that its not actually in pain as its just people with two way radios. we can also imagine the china brain in our physical world (not relying on metaphysically alternative worlds) therefore its a metaphysically possible example of a state thats functionally identical to pain but isnt pain
arguments against functionalism -whats the knowledge argument against functionalism
imagine a scientist called mary in a b&w room who learns all physical and functional facts about seeing purple. this knowledge comes from perfect understanding of pyhsics and neuroscience and so theres no facts about the mental state of seeing purple mary doesnt know. however, mary has never actually seen purple herself and so if she were to leave her b&w room, it seems plausible to say she’d learn something new - what its like to have the mental state of seeing purple
how does the knowledge argument defeat functionalism
if functionalism is correct, mary should know already what its like to have the mental state of seeing purple because funtionalism states theres nothing more to mental states than their functional roles, and marys learnt all the functional facts. shows theres more to mental states than their functional states bc the functional facts about mental state of seeing purple isnt sufficient to account for all the facts about the mental state of seeing purple
whats the inverted response to functionalism
what if my experience of purple was your experience of red or vice versa? e.g what if my qualia when i look at a plum is more like your qualia when you look at a cherry. when we both look at a plum, our mental states would be functionally identical , both causing us to believe ‘plums are purple’ and cause us to say purple when asked what colour are plums. since our mental states are functionally identical, functionalism must say theyre the same mental state - but clearly theyre not, my qualia is different from urs
functionalism plan
intro - functionalism is wrong
multiple realisability
problem 1 - metaphysical zombies
response - theyre not concievable
problem 2 - china brain is concievable
problem 3 - knowledge argument (marys room)
