Metaphysics of mind Physicalism - Behaviourism

Question 1

What’s physicalism?

Answer 1

Everything in existence including the mind and mental states are either physical or supervene on the physical - each physicalist theory believes in different mental states

Question 2

What’s behaviourism?

Answer 2

mental states such as pain, sadness and pleasure mean behaviour and behavioural dispositions

Question 3

What’s hard behaviourism?

Answer 3

a complete account of the mind can be given just in terms of bodily states and behaviours - mental states are reduced to behaviours

Question 4

What’s soft behaviourism?

Answer 4

Soft behaviourism analyses behavioural dispositions, not just behaviours. e.g if you have toothache, you might not decide to show or complain about it, instead hiding that you’re suffering

Question 5

What’s a disposition?

Answer 5

The tendecy to act in a certain way in certain circumstances - a glass has the disposition to break if dropped on the floor and still has this disposition even if it hasn’t been dropped yet. Hypothetically if you did drop the glass, it would break. Similarly, someone with mental state of pain has the disposition to say ‘ouch’ even if they don’t in every instance

Question 6

what’s the general argument against non-physicalists?

Answer 6

if mental states like pain were referred only to non-physical and private mental state, how is it possible that we can talk about them - you cant be shown exactly whats going on in someones mind, so how can I know what you mean when you say you’re in pain? if this is true it would be impossible to know anything about others mental states because theres no way of experiencing it

Question 7

what does ryle argue for behaviourism?

Answer 7

any theory that believes mental states are distinct from their associated behaviours is to make a category mistake

Question 8

what is ryle’s oxford university example?

Answer 8

-someone wants to know what oxford university is
-you show them the theatres, library, teahers, etc
-after the tour, the person says ‘You’ve shown me the lecture theatres, etc, but where is oxford university?
to ask this question is to make a category mistake - oxford uni isnt anything over and above the buildings and people, etc that its made up of, you cant select one thing and say that is oxford uni

Question 9

what is ryles alien example when applying category mistakes to dualism?

Answer 9

if you show an alien people stubbing their toe and saying ouch and the alien then asks, ‘what is pain’, it would also be a category mistake. To show behavioural dispositions associated with pain is to show what the mental state of pain is, there’s nothing over and above these to show as you can’t point to one single thing and say that is pain

Question 10

how does ryle apply oxford uni example to behaviourism?

Answer 10

non behaviourists make this category mistake when talking about mental states like pain - they’re nothing over and above the behaviours and behavioural dispositions that represent it

Question 11

responses - whats the zombie response

Answer 11

When a philosophical zombie stubs its toe, it will say ouch, flinch, have all the associated behaviours with pain just without the feeling. Without this feeling, it doesn’t seem right to say that a philosophical zombie is really in pain just because it seems to be

Question 12

responses - what are hilary putnams super spartans

Answer 12

super spartans are imagined group of people who supress any outward demonstration of pain in that they dont say ouch, wince, flinch under any circumstances. they never have any dispositions towards pain despite probably feeling it internally

Question 13

responses - how do super spartans disprove behaviourism

Answer 13

we can imagine the spartans feel pain internally, despite not showing it externally, theyd still experience subjective experience of pain if they were e.g tortured. behaviourism says pain is a disposition to act a certain way, yet this is an example of the mental state of pain without the associated behavioural dispositions therefore pain and pain dispositions must be seperate things.

Question 14

(1)

responses - whats the asymmetry between self and other knowledge

Answer 14

behaviourism analysis of mental states may work for understanding other people’s mental states, but it doesnt apply to the case of self-knowledge

Question 15

(2) indirect knowledge of others

responses - what are the differences between self knowledge and knowledge of others (aysmmetry)

Answer 15

I only have indirect knowledge of others’ mental states e.g, when I see someone stub their toe, I have to infer from their behaviours that they’re in pain. In contrast, when you stub your own toe, you’re immediately aware of the fact you’re in pain and are directly conscious of your own mental states in ways others can’t be

Question 16

(3) own mental states

responses - how can other peoples mental states be mistaken (asymmetry)

Answer 16

i cant be mistaken by own mental states - when i feel pain theres no way i could be mistaken as i cant think im in pain then realise im not. however if i hear someone scream ouch i can mistakenly form the belief theyre in pain only to find out they were acting, not in pain at all. so i can be mistaken about others mental states

Question 17

(4)

responses - how does the asymmetry argument therefore disprove behaviourism

Answer 17

if mental states are just behavioural dispositions as behaviourism insists, then direct knowledge of your own mental states wouldn’t be possible as supposedly, you’d only know you’re in pain if you saw yourself displaying behaviour associated with pain.

Question 18

whats ryle’s response to the aysmmetry argument

Answer 18

rejects that there’s difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others and actually we gain self-knowledge the same way we gain knowledge of others, only that we have more information available with self-knowledge.

Question 19

what does ryle say is a conscious experience - ryles response to asymmetry argument

Answer 19

a conscious experience means paying attention to something, e.g when we stub our toe, our attention is on our silent inner voice that says ‘ouch’, letting us know we’re in pain. This self-knowledge is more direct, but is more or less similar to seeing someone say ‘ouch’ when they realise they’re in pain.

Question 20

their experience lacks pain qualia

whats the Response to ryle’s response to asymmetry argument

Answer 20

there’ll always be differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. When you see someone else in pain their experience lacks the pain qualia you’d experience if you’d hurt yourself. No matter how much you understand someone else’s pain, you can’t actually feel their qualia, only assume that theirs is the same as your own qualia when you hurt yourself.

Question 21

why cant we know other peoples qualia - response to ryles response to asymmetry

Answer 21

its still impossible to know as you can’t look into other people’s minds.
facts surrounding qualia can only be known to the person experiencing them. Facts about self-knowledge can’t be known by someone else, showing it’s impossible to know someone else’s mental state just from their behaviour the same way someone knows their own mental state.

Question 22

responses - whats the concievability argument response

Answer 22

mental states without behavioural dispositions can be concieved (super spartans)
so theyre possible
so mental states arent behavioural dispositions
so behaviourism is false

Question 23

endless cycle

responses - whats the multiple realisability response

Answer 23

the same mental states can be realised through multiple behaviours depending on other mental states, all which also need to be identified with behavioural dispositions. this leads to endless cycle that behaviourism can never give a proper account of what mental states are

Question 24

responses - whats an example of multiple realisability

Answer 24

being thirsty - behavioural disposition of drinking a drink. but if someone didnt drink because they had the belief it was poisoned, also had to be analysed through behaviour (not drinking) but then someone could drink it while also knowing the drink was poisoned if they had the mental state of feeling suicidal, which would also have to be analysed in behavioural dispositions and so on

Question 25

responses - whats the circularity response

Answer 25

process of analysing mental states in terms of behaviour becomes circular as behaviourism must assume other mental states in order to give analysis of them in terms of behavioural dispositions. but if this analysis keeps going, youll eventually end up defining those mental states in terms of the original mental states attempted to be defined

Question 26

behaviourism plan

Answer 26

intro - behaviourism is wrong (define key terms)
ryle’s category mistake, oxford uni example
response - zombies & super spartans
response 2 - h30
problem 2 - aysmmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of others
response - ryle says this symmetry is an illusion
response to response - qualia is impossible to know so therell always be a difference