Metaphysics of Mind

Question 1

Explain the two broad types of argument for metaphysics of mind.

Answer 1

1. Dualist theories claim that the mind is distinct from the body such that a complete physical account of a human being will not be able to explain consciousness. I.e. mental properties are irreducible to physical properties.
2. Physicalist theories claim that ultimately we can explain the mind in terms of the physical.

Question 2

What are the two non-physicalist theories and key philosophers?

Answer 2

1. Substance Dualism. (Descartes)
2. Property Dualism. (David Chalmers, Frank Jackson)

Question 3

What are the four physicalist theories and key philosophers?

Answer 3

1. Behaviourism. (Gilbert Ryle, Carl Hempel)
2. Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory (J.J.C Smart)
3. Functionalism (Hilary Putnam)
4. Eliminative Materialism (Paul Churchland)

Question 4

What type of reduction does each physicalist theory use?

Answer 4

1. Behaviourism –> Analytic reduction
2. Mind-brain Type Identity Theory –> Ontological reduction
3. Functionalism –> Functional reduction
4. Eliminative Materialism –> No reduction

Question 5

What two characteristics of mental states must be accounted for by each theory of the mind?

Answer 5

1. Intentionality
2. Qualia

Question 6

Explain Intentionality

Answer 6

Mental states such as beliefs, fears and hopes are about something. It is not possible simply to believe, fear or hope; you must believe, fear or hope something. For example, I may believe it is raining. In this case, my belief points to or is about the rain. The quality that makes a mental state about something is called intentionality.

Question 7

Explain Qualia

Answer 7

Qualia are the subjective properties of experience – i.e. what something feels like inside. For example, the redness I experience when I look at a ripe tomato. Knowledge of qualia is sometimes called phenomenal knowledge – i.e. knowledge of what it is like to have a certain experience.

Question 8

What are the 5 properties of qualia?

Answer 8

1. Qualia have an intrinstic nature which is unanalysable. They cannot be reduced into simpler parts.
2. Qualia are directly accessible by introspection.
3. Qualia are private.
4. Qualia are ineffable, meaning that their nature cannot be put into worlds. They must be experienced to be understood.
5. Our apprehension of qualia is infallible (we cannot be mistaken about what our qualia are like).

Question 9

Define substance dualism

Answer 9

Dualism claims that mental properties are irreducible to physical properties. Substance dualism explains this by claiming that minds are made of a different type of substance from physical bodies. So you are composed of two substances - one physical, one mental - with distinct sets of properties, both of which can exist independently of the other but are linked together in some way. Mental substance is non-physical.

Question 10

What are Descartes’ two arguments for substance dualism?

Answer 10

1. The conceivability argument
2. The divisibility argument

Question 11

Outline Descartes’ conceivability argument.

Answer 11

Descartes’ argues that if he has the ‘clear and distinct’ idea of two things, it must be possible to seperate them because ‘clear and distinct ideas’ are fundemental ideas in their simplist terms. They are unalalysable.

P1. If I can clearly and distinctly recognise the natures of two things to be different then they must be different things.
P2. I clearly and distinctly recognise the nature of the mind to be a thinking thing that is not extended in space
P3. I clearly and distinctly recognise the nature if the body to be a non-thinking thing that is extended in space.
P4. It is concievable for mind and body to exist independently of each other.
C. Therefore the mind is a distinct substance from the body.

It is important to note that the conclusion here is hinges on Descartes’ defintion of clear and distinct ideas. For Descartes, clear and distinct ideas are known with absoute certainty.

Question 12

What three issues respond to Descartes’ conceivability argument?

Answer 12

1. Mind without body is not conceivable
2. What is concievable may not be metaphysically possible (masked man fallacy)
3. What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the real world

Question 13

Explain the critique that ‘mind without body is not conceivable’ against Descartes’ concievability argument.

Answer 13

Substance dualism claims that the mind is a non-physical substance. Since the mind does not exist in the physical realm, it is not detectable by empirical means. For verificationists (Ayer) this means that the claim of substance dualism is meaningless. So while the proposition that the mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body may appear concievable, actually it does not express a coherent thought and hence is not conceivable.

Question 14

Explain the critique that ‘what is concievable may not be metaphysically possible’ against Descartes’ concievability argument. How might Descartes’ respond.

Answer 14

This response critiques Descartes’ inference from the claim that mind without body is conceivable to the conclusion that mind is separate from body. The fallibility of this inference can be shown with the masked man fallacy:

P1. I can conceive of Batman as a caped crusader
P2. I can conceive of Bruce Wayne as a billionaire who is not a caped crusader.
C. Therefore, Batman is not Bruce Wayne.

However this is not possible because Batman and Bruce Wayne are the same person. Hence, what is conceivable may not be possible.

Reply: Descartes’ ideas of mind and body are clear and distinct. Clear and distinct ideas are unanalysable. They are true in the most basic form. Hence, if it were possible that mind and body were one substance; it would not be possible to analyse the idea of mind and body into separate parts.

Question 15

Explain the critique that ‘what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality’ against Descartes’ concievability argument. How might Descartes’ respond.

Answer 15

Even if we accept that mind without body is possible, we can still reject Descartes’ conclusion that substance dualism is true. Just because something is metaphysically possible doesn’t tell us anything about reality. For example, it’s logically possible for me to jump to the moon from earth - this does not lead to any kind of metaphysical contridiction. However, it is not possible in reality. Likewise, mind and body as seperate might be possible but this doesn’t garuntee it is true.

Reply: Descartes’ would likely accept that you can’t always infer from possible ideas to reality. However, in the case of body and mind Descartes’ claims that we have a clear and distinct idea of their properties. We know the nature of our body and mind purely through rational intuition. These ideas are certain and basic; they cannot be analysed any further. Hence, if it is possible to have both mind and body as separate clear and distinct ideas, mind and body must be clear and distinct in reality.

Question 16

Outline Descartes’ divisibility argument.

Answer 16

This argument makes use of Leibniz’s law, the principle that two things are only the same if they share exactly the same properties.

P1. The body is a divisible substance
P2. The mind is a indivisible substance
C. Therefore the mind and body are seperate substances

Question 17

What two issues respond to the divisibility argument.

Answer 17

1. The mind is divisible
2. Not everything physical is divisible

Question 18

Outline the critique that ‘the mind is divisible’ against Descartes’ divisibility argument and a possible reply.

Answer 18

One way we can respond to Descartes’ divisibility argument is to reject the premise that the mind is indivisible. For example, there are forms of mental illness where the mind is divided, such as multiple personality disorder (MPD). People with MPD have completely seperate parts of the mind that have different phenominal properties. Leibniz’s law states that they must be seperate substances and Descartes’ argument fails.

Reply: Even if the mind is divisible in some sense it is not divisible in the same way as a body. The physical body is spatially divisible. However, even in cases of MPD the mind is not divisible in extended space. Hence the properties of mind and body are still different and the divisibility argument holds true.

Question 19

Outline the critique that ‘nor everything physical is divisible’ against Descartes’ divisibility argument and a possible reply.

Answer 19

One way we can respond to Descartes’ divisibility argument is to reject the premise that all physical substances are divisible. If we continue to divide physical substances it is possible to reach a physical substance (sub atomic particles) that cannot be divided any further. Futhermore, physical properties such as hot or coldness are not divisible but definetly arn’t non-physical.

Question 20

What argument critique dualism (property and substance) in general?

Answer 20

The problem of other minds

Question 21

Explain how other minds create a problem for dualism and a possible reply.

Answer 21

I have direct and privledged access to my own mind via introspection. By contrast, I am not able to directly inspect the contents of anyone else’s mind. Because I cannot directly observe other minds, I can only infer that they exist from what I can observe (behaviour, bodies). However, this is not sufficient evidence that other minds exist. It in entirely conceivable that mental states other than my own do not exist.

Reply: Mill’s argument from analogy. I have a mind. My mind causes my behaviour. Other people have bodies and behave similarly to me in similar situations. By analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour: a mind. Therefore, other people have minds. Issues: Weak, dubious inference (Hume’s constant conjunction)

Question 22

Define property dualism

Answer 22

Property dualism claims that the mind is not a distinct substance from the body but that it is a property of the brain. According to this view the mind cannot exist on its own because it depends on the brain in the same way that wetness depends on water. However, it is still dualist because property dualism claims that mental properties are non-physical and cannot be ruduced to physical states or processes because they do not supervene the physical.

Question 23

Outline the distinction between Interactionalist and epiphenomenalist property dualism.

Answer 23

Interactionist dualism says that the mind can interact with the physical world (e.g. hunger makes you get food) and the physical world can interact with the mind (e.g. becoming hungry because you have not eaten). Mental and physical can interact in both directions.

Epiphenomenalist dualism says that the physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world. I.e. there is a one way causal interaction; physical to mental.

Question 24

Define supervenience and what it means for property dualism.

Answer 24

If X supervenes on Y, then X is dependent on Y and a change in Y will result in a change in X. Physicalism claims that everything (including mental states) is either physical or supervenes on the physical. However, property dualism claims that mental states do not supervene the physical. In other words, it is possible for two identical physical things to have different mental properties. Mental and physical do not have a supervenient correlation.

Question 25

What two arguments support property dualism?

Answer 25

1. David Chalmers: The zombie argument
2. Frank Jackson: The knowledge argument (Mary)

Question 26

Define a philosophical zombie.

Answer 26

A philosophical zombie is a person who is physically, functionally and behaviourally identical to an ordinary human, except they do not have any quaila.

Question 27

Explain the zombie argument for property dualism.

Answer 27

David Chalmers argued that philosophical zombies are entirely conceivable. After all, the there is no logical contradiction in the idea of a world populated by zombies. In this world, everyone would behave identically but there would be no associated phenomenal experience. Chalmers goes onto argue that if philosophical zombies are conceivable, then it is possible that qualia is non-physical. Therefore qualia is non-physical because if physicalism was true then it would not be possible to conceive of qualia as non-physical

Question 28

Explain the three replies to the zombie argument.

Answer 28

1. Zombies are not conceivable
   Physicalists can respond to the zombie argument by claiming that zombies are not conceivable. Physicalists argue that qualia is reducible to something physical. Therefore, a physical copy of the world will always have qualia. Philosophical zombies are not possible. REPLY: Assumes that a physical analysis of quailia exists, however this can be challenged by the knowledge argument for property dualism.
2. Zombies are not metaphysically possible
   Just because a statement “seems” conceivable does not mean it is metaphysically possible. For example, it seems conceivable that water is not H2O but rather H3O and therefore H3O is metaphysically possible. However we can reject the claim that H3O is possible by arguing that the chemical structure, H2O, is an essential property of what water is. Similarly, if qualia are essential properties of some physical substance then it is impossible for the same physical thing to exist without qualia. REPLY: Mental properties do not supervene the physical and thus can not be essential properties.
3. What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality
   Even if zombies were metaphysically possible, this cannot guarantee any fact in reality. For example just because it is metaphysically possible for me to jump to the moon from earth doesn’t make it possible in reality. No metaphysical possibility has the power to make truth claims about reality.

Question 29

Explain the knowledge (Mary) argument for property dualism.

Answer 29

Mary knows all the physical facts about colour. But, confined in a black and white room, Mary has never seen a colour before. Therefore, Mary does not know what it feels like to see a colour. Hence, what it feels like to see a colour is not a physical fact. Qualia are not reducible to physical facts. Therefore, physicalism is false.

Question 30

Explain the four replies to the knowledge argument for property dualism.

Answer 30

1. Mary would already know
   The knowledge argument assumes dualism to be true at the start. However, Physicalism argues that Mary’s experience of colour is reducible to a physical fact. Hence, if we take physicalism to be true, then Mary already knew what colours “feel” like in the first premise! REPLY: Even if Mary could imagine the colour red without seeing it, we know from our own experience that imagination is not the same as true perception. Perceiving the colour red has more information due to qualia.
2. The ability response
   The argument attempts to equivocate the propositional knowledge that Mary has in the first premise, with the ability knowledge Mary gains when leaving the room. When Mary leaves the room she gains ability knowledge about how to recognise or identify colour but she does not gain any new propositional knowledge.
3. The acquaintance response
   The argument attempts to equivocate the propositional knowledge that Mary has in the first premise, with the ability knowledge Mary gains when leaving the room. When Mary leaves the room she gains aquaintance knowledge of colour but does not learn any new propositional knowledge.
4. New knowledge, old fact
   Mary has gained knowledge of the physical properties of colour, however, this new knowledge is still reducible to the facts she already knew. For example, “I know that there is water in that glass” expresses knowledge of the same underlying fact that “H2O molecules occupy the volume of the glass”. Mary’s new knowledge is a composite fact reducible entirely to the physical facts she already new.

Question 31

What two arguments critique epiphenomenlist (property) dualism in general?

Answer 31

1. Qualia causes introspective self-knowledge
2. Evolution

Question 32

Explain the issue that qualia causes introspective self-knowledge and a response.

Answer 32

This issue affects epiphenomenalist dualism but not interactionalist dualism. Epiphenomenalist dualism claims that mental states can not cause physical states. Hence, this type of dualism avoids issues from causal interaction. However, epiphenomenalist dualism can instead be critiqued with introspective self-knowledge. If mental states can not cause physical states then how do I know that I am in pain, or that I am hungry. Why do I react physically to my phenomenal experiences?

The common response is that the physical brain causes both qualia and behaviour. I.e. qualia is just a by-product of physical processes. However, if this is the case then my qualia are redundant and introspective self-knowledge is redundant. Furthermore, this would seem to suggest that we do not have free will. If my phenomenal consciousness is just a byproduct then surely I cannot use it to make decisions and what “feels” like my decision is simply a physical process in my brain.

Question 33

Explain the issue of evolution for epiphenomenalist dualism and a reply.

Answer 33

Evolution by natural selection seems to rule out epiphenomenal qualia. Darwins theory of natural selection claims that all our genes have been selected because they benefit us in some way. For example, giraffes evolved to have long necks because long necks enabled giraffes to survive. However, epiphenomenal qualia, simply as a by-product, have no advantage. Why would humans develop phenomenal consciousness if it has no benefit to our survival. Hence if epiphenomenalism is true qualia would not have evolved so it must be false.

REPLY: Qualia have evolved by coincidence of beneficial physical properties. For example, Polar bears have particularly thick, warm coats. The theory of evolution explains this in terms of survival in cold conditions. But having a thick coat has the disadvantage of having a heavy coat. I.e. heavy coat is a coincidental byproduct of thick coat in the same way that qualia is a coincidental byproduct of complex brain processes.

Question 34

How does the problem of other minds create an issue for property dualism specifically?

Answer 34

Same as substance dualism, however, instead of asking how we know that other minds exist we can ask how we know other people have phenomenal consciousness (qualia).

Question 35

What arguments critique any kind of interactionalist (property and substance) dualism?

Answer 35

Arguments from casual interaction including:
1.The conceptual interaction problem
2.The empirical interaction problem

These arguments apply to interactionalist property dualism and substance dualism (which is also interactionalist).

Question 36

Explain the conceptual interaction problem and a possible reply.

Answer 36

Princess Elisabeth argued:

P1. Physical substance can only be interacted with via physical contact.
P2. A non-physical substance cannot make physical contact.
C1. Therefore, it is inconceivable for a non-physical substance to interact with a physical substance
P4. Substance dualism claims that the mind in non-physical
C2. Therefore it is inconceivable that the non-physical mind has a causal interation on the physical body
P5. What is inconcievable is impossible.
C3. Interactionalist dualism is false.

Reply: It is entirely possible for the non-physical to cause changes in the physical. Physical objects must be in contact to interact, however, there is no reason that this also applies to non-physical objects. It is concievable that the non-physical can interact with the physical with no contact. In fact, this idea is supported by Hume as there is constant conjunction between mental states and physical processes. For example, we always go to eat when we feel hungry. For hume, this constant conjunction is sufficient to prove a causal relationship.

Question 37

Explain the empirical interaction problem and a possible reply.

Answer 37

The law of conservation of energy says that: In a closed system, energy cannot be created or destroyed only transfered. However, in order for the mind to interact with the physical world, it must increase the amount of energy in the physical universe. This violates the law of conservation of energy and hence the mental cannot interact with the physical.

Reply: Epiphenomenalist dualism.

Question 38

How does Physicalism differ from both property and substance dualism?

Answer 38

Physicalism is the view that everything is ultimately physical. It rejects substance dualism on the basis that nothing is “non-physical” hence a distinct non-physical mind is impossible. It also rejects property dualism because physicalism claims that the mental supervenes the physical. What we call ‘mental properties’ depend on physical properties and ultimately be explains in terms of the physical.

Question 39

How can Ockham’s razor be used to support physicalism (all types). Give a response.

Answer 39

Ockham’s razor argues that if two theories have the same explanatory power, then we should favour the one that depends on the fewest entities. Physicalism and Dualism both have equal explanatory power to explain the mind, however, physicalism only involves one ‘entity’, the physical world. Whereas, dualism, depends on two entities, mind and body.

Response: Physicalism and Dualism do not have the same explanatory power because physicalism cannot explain qualia or intentionality to the same extent.

Question 40

Define Philosophical behaviourism.

Answer 40

Philosophical behaviourism is the view that a complete conceptual analysis of mental states, such as beliefs, desires and sensations, can be shown to be identical in meaning to behavioural concepts. In other words, behaviourists claim that the mind can be analytically reduced to behaviour.

Question 41

What three arguments support behaviourism?

Answer 41

1. Issues with dualism
2. Ryle: Category Error
3. Ockhams Razor

Question 42

Outline how three issues with dualism support behaviourism.

Answer 42

1. Problem of Causal Interaction.
   By denying that the mind is a distinct property or substance, the issue of how they interact dissolves. Behaviourism claims proper analysis of the language of the mind will show that it concerns observable behaviour, and not some immaterial substance that in causal interaction with the body.
2. Problem of other minds.
   According to behaviourists, if minds were indeed private and non-physical, we could not establish their existence by empirical means. But if this were true then we would be incapable of knowledge of other minds and condemned to solipsism.
3. Logical Positivism.
   According to dualism the mind is non-physical. Each person’s mind is private. However, if this is true language about the mental is meaningless because it is not analytic or empirically verifiable. Behaviourism can account for this because mental cognitions can be verified by physical behaviour. Behaviourism may better account for Qualia!

Question 43

Outline the distinction between soft and hard behaviourism.

Answer 43

Hard behaviourism (e.g. Carl Hempel): All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states using the language of physics

Soft behaviourism (e.g. Gilbert Ryle): Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions

In other words, hard behaviourism says you can give a complete account of the mind purely in terms of actual behaviours and bodily states. If you completely describe a person’s physical state and behaviours, you have described their mind – there’s nothing left over.

In contrast, soft behaviourism says that propositions about mental states (e.g. “he is in pain”) are propositions about behavioural dispositions. A disposition is how something will or is likely to behave in certain circumstances. Hence behaviour is not a complete analytic reduction of the mind but behavioural dispositions are.

Question 44

How does Ryle use ‘category error’ to support behaviourism.

Answer 44

Ryle argues that to think mental states are distinct from their associated behaviours (as dualism claims) is to make a category mistake – it confuses one type of concept with another. For example, to ask “how much does the number 7 weigh?” confuses the concept of number with the concept of things that have weight.

Ryle gives the following example to illustrate why dualism makes a similar such category mistake: Suppose someone were to visit Oxford to see the university. The visitor is shown the library, the lecture theatres, the teachers, and so on. After the tour is complete, he says: “but where is the university?”

In just the same way Oxford University is nothing more than the buildings, teachers, and so on, Ryle is arguing that the mental state of pain is nothing more than the various behavioural dispositions associated with pain.

Question 45

What are the four issues with behaviourism?

Answer 45

1. Asymmetry between self and other knowledge
2. Super Spartans
3. Issues with defining mental states (Circularity & Multiple realisability)
4. Dualist arguments (Zombie, Mary & Descartes’ arguments)

Question 46

Explain the Asymmetry between self and other knowledge and a possible response.

Answer 46

When I stub my toe, I have direct access to the feeling of pain it produces. But if I see someone else in pain – however bad – it isn’t as direct. I don’t literally feel their pain (even if it does feel painful to watch).

Further, when I feel pain, there’s no way I could be mistaken as to what I’m feeling. However, if I see someone else scream “ouch!”, I might mistakenly believe they’re in pain when they’re only acting. When it comes to other people’s mental states, I can be mistaken.

It’s clear there’s a big difference between how you experience your own mental states and other people’s. But if behaviourism were true, this shouldn’t be the case.

Possible response:

Ryle’s reply to this problem is to reject the asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. He argues that this apparent asymmetry is an illusion as a result of having far more evidence in the case of self-knowledge.

Question 47

Explain Super Spartans and a response.

Answer 47

Hard behaviourism seems implausible because we seem capable of being in a mental state without the need for behavioural manifestation. Ryle’s disposition analysis goes some way to meeting this concern. However, Putnam’s Super Spartans show that mind and behaviour are conceptually distinct.

Putnam asks us to imagine a race of Super-Spartans who feel pain like ordinary mortals but who are able to suppress any behavioural manifestation of their pain. Since the idea of such a race is not contradictory it would seem that pain cannot be reduced to behaviour.

Possible response:

The behaviourist could reply that without any sort of outward display it would be impossible to form the concept of pain. Without the concept of pain it impossible to distinguish which behaviour they were supposed to be suppressing in the first place. So Putnam’s example is incoherent.

OR

Ryle could respond by saying that pain is not the only behaviour disposition of the super spartan. They also have the he disposition to be stoic by nature. What we are really seeing here is what happens when behavioural dispositions react.

Question 48

Explain Issues with defining mental states from both circularity and multiple realisability.

Answer 48

1. Multiple realisability
   A Particular mental state may be realised by different behaviours. For example, if I were thirsty there is a number of behavioural dispositions I could take on. Perhaps I will become inclined to drink a bottle of water, or maybe a cup of tea. There is seemingly no limit on the ways a mental state can be realised. It is impossible to provide complete analysis of a process with indefinite options. Hence, behaviourism fails.
2. Circularity
   A behavioural analysis of mental states is circular. Multiple mental states are needed to explain certain behaviour. For example if I was really thirsty but refused to drink water, this would need to be explained by another mental state; for instance, a belief that the water is poisoned. This belief would also need to explained with more mental states. Hence, behaviourism does not reduce mental states to behavioural concepts, but rather reintroduces more mental concepts. Mental –> Behaviour –> More Mental. Circular.

Question 49

Define mind-brain type identity theory.

Answer 49

Mind-brain type identity theory claims that the mind is the brain and that all mental states and processes are identical with brain states and processes. This means that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states. Smart claims this relationship is a contingent identity and dependent on how the world happens to be, not on conceptual analysis. The relevant identities can be revealed through neuroscience.

For example, ‘Water is H2O’ is not an analytic reduction because water and H2O do not have the same meaning. Instead ‘Water is H2O’ is an ontological reduction because water happens to be identical to H2O. Similarly, brain states and mental states do not have the same meaning, but rather are identical. The mental state of ‘pain’ is not reducible to language or behaviour, instead it is identical to c-fires firing in the brain. This relationship between mind and body is contingent on how the world is. It could conceivably be false, but isn’t.

Question 50

What arguments support mind-brain type identity theory?

Answer 50

1. Ockham’s razor
2. Solves issues with dualism
3. Smart’s ‘Normological danglers’
4. Science and evolution

Question 51

Explain the four arguments supporting mind-brain type identity theory.

Answer 51

1. Ockham’s razor. Mind-brain type identity theory explains the mind with only one ‘entity’: the brain. It has explanatory power with the simplest theory, hence should be favoured.
2. Solves issues with dualism. No problem of other minds; if the mind is just a brain, we can know someone else has a mind by ensuring the physical processes of their brain are functioning. No causal interaction problem; there is no interaction between mind and body because mind and body are the same thing.
3. Smart’s ‘Normological danglers’. Smart argued that if states of consciousness could not be reduced to the physical, they would be ‘nomological danglers’, that is, they would have an ontologically peculiar states as the only thing in the universe that doesn’t follow the laws of physics.
4. Science and evolution. Type identity theory coheres with science. Throughout history we have been able to prove that seemingly mysterious properties of objects can be explained with the physical. For example, the behaviour of water can be explained by its ontological status as H2O and the molecules involved. Evolution also coheres with the theory. If consciousness is identical to physical states of the brain then the development of consciousness can be explained by the increased physical functionality of ther brain.

Question 52

What are the issues with mind-brain type identity theory?

Answer 52

1. Dualist arguments (Zombies, Mary, Descartes etc.)
2. The spatial location problem
3. Issues with intentionality
4. Multiple realisability (again)

Question 53

Explain ‘the spatial location problem’ for mind-brain type identity theory and a possible response.

Answer 53

This objection resembles Descartes’ divisibility argument. Brain states and processes have a spatial location, i.e. they have the property of activity within a specific location of the brain. However, mental states do not have a spatial location. For instance, the brain process of pain exists in the location where c-fires are firing, however, the pain I experience as a result has no such location. If mental and physical were truly identical, they would have all the same properties (Leibniz Law), hence they are not.

Response: Physicalists may argue that physical properties do not need a location. For example the property of ‘wetness’ that water has, does not have a location. Regardless, ‘wetness’ is still identical to the physical features of water that make it wet.

Question 54

Explain issues with intentionality for mind-brain type identity theory and a possible response.

Answer 54

We know that mental states have intentionality, i.e. our qualia are always “about” something, like a belief of something or desire for something. However, it is unclear how this property of the mental is identical to anything physical. It would seem that physical states cannot have intention in this way. It is metaphysically impossible for a collection of atoms or molecules to be about anything. They just exist.

Response: Intentionality is not a real property of the mind. Physicalists can argue that intentionality is an illusion that arrises out of the complexity of physical processes. In the same way, the ‘wetness’ of water would seem unexplainable by the physical but ultimately it is the same as the physical features of water that make it wet.

Question 55

Explain how multiple realisability creates an issue for mind-brain type identity theory.

Answer 55

Hilary Putnam argues that mental states, like pain, cannot be reduced to brain states, such as c-fibres firing, because mental states are multiply realisable. What this means is that the same mental state can come from many different brain states.

For example, an octopus has a very different brain setup to a human. Let’s say, for example, that octopuses have o-fibres instead of c-fibres.

If you stabbed an octopus and it writhed about, surely you would say that it’s because it’s in pain. But if type identity theory is true, this isn’t possible.

Question 56

Define Folk Psychology.

Answer 56

Folk Psychology involves the attribution of intentional states, such as qualia, to people and uses these theoretical concepts to explain and predict their behaviour. For example, ‘he believes it is raining’. We use folk psychology to explain why people exhibit particular behaviours.

Question 57

Define Eliminative Materialism.

Answer 57

Eliminative Materialism claims that ‘folk psychology’ is a scientific theory we use to explain the brain, but it is a false understanding of the mind and hence should be eliminated. Take the folk psychology ‘he believes it is raining’. Eliminative materialism, argues that this language was developed culturally to explain why the believer acts a certain way, for example, why ‘he’ might grab an umbrella. However, folk psychology is no longer the best theory of the brain because it is now known to be false. Folk psychology can and must be replaced by a more advanced theoretical account of the brain, provided by neuroscience. (Churchland)

Question 58

Explain two arguments support Eliminative Materialism?

Answer 58

1. Folk Psychology is an inadequate account of human nature. For example, it is unable to explain why we need to sleep, why we dream, or how we learn. Mental states such as ‘tiredness’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘desire’ are just placeholders for physical facts we do not yet understand. Hence, now that we are learning the physical facts, folk psychology must be eliminated and replaced with neuroscience.
2. The scientific model. Eliminating folk psychology can be likened to other scientific theories we have abandoned in the past. For example, we used to believe the sun orbited the earth because it had explanatory power. However, this was ultimately proven false once we learnt more about the solar system, hence the geocentric model was eliminated. Similarly, folk psychology is perhaps useful to explain peoples behaviour, but should now be eliminated because it is false. Our improved understanding of the brain is entirely physical and can develop with advancements in neuroscience. Therefore, concepts of folk psychology, such as qualia and intentional states will inevitably be replace by a sophisticated understanding of the physical facts.

Question 59

Explain the three issues with Eliminative Materialism.

Answer 59

1. Our direct awareness of folk psychology concepts. Through introspection, we are directly aware of our own mental states, such as our beliefs, desires and sensations. It would be absurd to deny the existence of what we are directly aware of. Therefore, eliminativism is wrong to deny the existence of concepts associated with folk psycology.
2. Folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power. Eliminative materialism likens folk psychology to other scientific theories we have abandoned in the past. However, folk psychology, unlike many other past theories, still has good predictive and explanatory power. The geocentric model of our solar system has been abandoned because it no longer explains the facts of the solar system or helps us predict how the universe may work elsewhere. However, at the time, the geocentric model was the best hypothesis as it explained the solar system sufficiently at the time. Whereas, folk psychology still has great explanatory and predictive power, perhaps better than neuroscience at the moment. Hence, folk psychology is still our best hypothesis, or at least for now.
3. Self-Refuting. Eliminative materialism claims that beliefs don’t exist – they’re a mistaken folk psychology concept. But, in arguing for eliminative materialism, Churchland is expressing his belief in the truth of this theory. After all, why would anybody argue that something is true if they didn’t believe it was true? Arguments are expressions of belief and so, if Churchland believes that eliminative materialism is true, then this disproves his own theory: Churchland has proved that beliefs exist.

Question 60

Explain a response to the three issues with eliminative materialism.

Answer 60

1. We are directly aware of folk psychology concepts. This response misunderstands eliminative materialism. Churchland is not denying that we have the mental phenomena we refer to as ‘beliefs’, ‘pain’, ‘thought’, etc., he’s just saying this folk psychology isn’t a correct understanding of them. Similarly, we do not deny that the sun may appear to orbit the earth, we just knowledge that this is not the correct theory of the solar system.
2. Folk psychology has good predictive / explanatory power. True. But, however useful a theory may be at the time does not mean it is correct. The geocentric theory of the solar system was useful to scientists in order to explain physical events and develop further science. However, it still was not correct. Folk psychology may be useful now, perhaps even more useful than neuroscience but it is not correct.
3. Self-Refuting. This argument begs the question. It assumes the very thing it’s trying to prove: that beliefs exist. The theory is not an example of belief if beliefs don’t exist in the first place. Churchland could just reply that what his opponent is calling a belief is actually something else (some neuroscience explanation). Further, Churchland does not deny the existence of phenomena we refer to as ‘beliefs’, he only claims folk psychology is not correct in how it explains them.

Question 61

Outline Functionalism.

Answer 61

Functionalism defines mental states as functional states within an organism.

For example, we might say the functional role of pain is an unpleasant sensation that causes the organism to get away from the thing that’s causing it harm. That function is what mental states, such as pain, are.

Functions should be understood within the context of the entire mind. So, the function of pain, for example, isn’t simply to cause behavioural dispositions (as behaviourism claims). Part of the function of pain is to cause other mental states – such as a belief that you are in pain, or a desire for the pain to stop. Though ultimately, mental states can be functionally reduced to functional states within the brain.

Question 62

Explain how Hilary Putnam responds to behaviourism with functionalism.

Answer 62

Behaviourism is restricted to analysing mental states solely in terms of behavioural dispositions, but this causes problems when we realise that the same mental state can be realised by pretty much any behaviour (given other mental states). Functionalism avoids this problem because the function of mental states is more than simply behaviours – mental states can also cause other mental states. My mental state of pain, say, could serve the function of causing other mental states such as a belief that I am in pain and a desire for the pain to stop.

Question 63

Explain how Hilary Putnam responds to type identity theory with functionalism.

Answer 63

This isn’t Putnam’s example, but think about what a knife is. A knife can be made from metal, or plastic, or wood – as long as it performs its function (to cut things). Similarly, Putnam would say that mental states such as pain can be experienced by a human, an octopus or an alien – the key feature of pain is its function. There are many different ways to do the same function, hence why the same brain state can be realised by different stimuli or different physical brain events. The mental state is a functional state and a functional state can occupy different physical forms.

Question 64

What are the three issues with Functionalism?

Answer 64

1. Inverted Qualia.
2. Mary Argument (again)
3. Ned Block: The China Brain

Question 65

Explain the three issues with Functionalism.

Answer 65

1. Inverted Qualia. Suppose two people have functionally identical visual systems. Hence, they both react identically to a visual stimuli. The colour red would cause the same functional processes in both and if both people were asked what the colour was, they would both say red. However, it is conceivable that they actually have inverted colour qualia. Although both said red, it is conceivable that one of the pair experienced green. There would be no functional difference because the input and output were identical, however, there would be a mental difference and hence a functional reduction cannot account for mental phenomena.
2. Mary argument can be adapted for functionalism. Mary knows all the functional facts about the brain and colour stimuli, even down to which neurones will fire and which won’t. However when she leaves the black and white room, she will learn colour experience.
3. Ned Block: The China Brain. The population of china is about 1 billion, around the same number of people as there are neurons in the brain. Suppose the people of china were all given radios and controlled a body in such a way that they realise an identical functional economy to a human brain. If the body they control stands on a nail, would there be any experience of pain or any other qualia / intentionality in the population? If the answer is no, functionalism fails.

Question 66

Explain a response to each issue with Functionalism.

Answer 66

1. Inverted Qualia. This begs the question. We have no reason to accept that inverted qualia are possible or even conceivable if we first accept that functionalism is true. If qualia can be reduced to functional states then different qualia cannot arise out of the same functional state. Alternatively, a functionalist may argue that qualia can differ under the same functional state and this is a feature of an advanced theoretical understanding of the brain’s function we do not yet know.
2. Mary would know. Ability / acquaintance objections. New knowledge, old fact. etc.
3. None. Perhaps a functionalist could argue that there is actually qualia, or maybe that it is impossible for the experiment to recreate the functional conditions of the mind because Chinese people are not neurones.