Metaphysics of God Flashcards

1
Q

What are the four divine attributes?

A
  1. Omniscience
  2. Omnipotence
  3. Omnibenevolence
  4. Eternal / Everlasting
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2
Q

Explain Omniscience.

A

Omniscience translates as ‘all knowing’.

This is to say God has perfect knowledge. He knows everything - or, at least everything it is possible to know.

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3
Q

Explain Omnipotence.

A

Omnipotence translates as ‘all powerful’.

God is imagined to be perfectly powerful. Although, some philosophers argue that omnipotence doesn’t mean God can do anything, only anything metaphysically possible. For example, God can’t make 1+1=5 or a 4-sided triangle.

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4
Q

Explain Omnibenevolence.

A

Omnibenevolence translates as ‘all loving’.

It’s best understood as the claim that God is perfectly good. God always does what is morally good - never bad or evil.

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5
Q

Explain the Eternal / Everlasting distinction.

A

Everlasting: God exists within time. This is to say that God was there at the beginning of time and will continue to exist forever.

Eternal: God exists outline of time. God has no beginning or end and perceives all of time simultaneously.

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6
Q

Outline Aquinas’ proof that God is eternal.

A

P1. Everything in time changes
P2. But God is immutable and does not change.
P3. Therefore God cannot exist within time.
C. Therefore God exists outside of time.

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7
Q

Outline Wolterstorff’s argument that God must be everlasting.

A

P1. God is without beginning and without end.
P2. God interacts with and has a personal relationship with the world.
P3. The world is temporal.
P4. Any being that interacts with the temporal world is itself temporal.
C. Therefore Gos is an everlasting being, existing within time.

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8
Q

Explain the T-simultaneity / E-simultaneity distinction.

A

This explains how an eternal God can perceive all of time simultaneously.

  • T-simultaneity: Applies to temporal beings, like humans, meaning ‘existing / occurring at the same time’.
  • E-simultaneity: Applies to eternal beings, like God, and means ‘existing / occurring in the same eternal present.

So it is possible for God to see everything simultaneously in the same eternal present and for humans (who have a different frame of reference) to see things simultaneously if they happen at the same time.

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9
Q

What are the three arguments for the incoherence of God?

A
  1. The paradox of the stone.
  2. The Euthyphro dilemma
  3. Omniscience vs Free will
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10
Q

Outline the Paradox of the stone argument.

A

The paradox of the stone argument asks the following question: “Can God create a stone so heavy that God cannot move it?”.

  1. If Yes, there is something God cannot do, namely lift the stone, thus God is not omnipotent.
  2. If No, there is something God cannot do, namely create the stone, thus God is not omnipotent.

Therefore, the concept of omnipotence cannot coherently be ascribed to God. Definitions of God that include omnipotence are invalid.

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11
Q

Explain a response to the Paradox of the stone argument.

A

George Mavrodes replies to the paradox of the stone by arguing that “a stone an omnipotent being can’t lift” is not metaphysically possible; it involves a contradiction. It is not a real limit on God’s power to say that God can’t do what is logically impossible because what is logically impossible is meaningless.

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12
Q

Outline the Euthyphro dilemma.

A

The Euthyphro dilemma looks at whether morality is created by, or independent of, God.

  1. If morality is independent of God, then God is not omnipotent. The major problem with this view is that it holds that there is something outside of God, over which God has no control — that is, God is not fully omnipotent.
  2. If morality is created by God, then God’s omnibenevolence is ‘meaningless’. If morals are created by God, then they are arbitrary. God is therefore only ‘supremely good’ under his own definition. This is a tautology and would make omnibenevolence a meaningless quality.

Therefore, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are not coherent attributes and definitions that include both involve a contradiction.

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13
Q

Explain two responses to the Euthyphro dilemma.

A
  1. God has created morality based on his other attributes, such as love. Therefore, we can reject the notion that morals are arbitrary or that omnibenevolence is a tautology because both can be defined in terms of God’s other attributes, such as God’s love for humanity.
  2. We can reject the claim that ‘God is good’ is a tautology by arguing that “God’s will” and “good” are two different concepts for the same thing. Similarly, “water” and “H2O” are the same thing but “Water is H2O” is not a tautology and definitely not meaningless.
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14
Q

Outline the ‘omniscience vs free will’ argument.

A

P1. Humans have free will and some of their actions are genuinely free.
P2. God is omniscient and so knows beforehand everything that will happen.
P3. Therefore God knows beforehand in all cases what humans will do.
P4. If God knows what humans will do then their actions must be predetermined.
C. Therefore human free will (P1) and God’s omniscience (P2) are incompatible.

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15
Q

Explain two responses to the ‘omniscience vs free will’ argument.

A
  1. God exists within time (everlasting). Omniscience only includes knowing what it is possible to know. Knowing something that it is impossible to know is a contradiction and thus not a true limit on God’s power. Therefore, God does not know what humans will do but is still omniscient.
  2. God exists outside of time (eternal). God sees everything simultaneously from outside of time (E-simultaneity). This is a different frame of reference to temporal simultaneity and they are compatible together. In other words, God perceives all of time simultaneously from an external perspective.
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16
Q

What are the four types of argument concerning God’s existence.

A
  1. Ontological arguments
  2. Teleological arguments
  3. Cosmological arguments
  4. The problem of evil
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17
Q

Outline the distinction between deductive, inductive and abductive.

A

Deductive: The argument is logically structured such that the premises (if true) guarantee the conclusion.

Inductive: The argument provides strong evidence for the conclusion by moving from a number of limited cases to all cases.

Abductive: The argument attempts to conclude the best explanation of a cause by examining the cause.

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18
Q

Define an ontological argument.

A

Ontological arguments are deductive arguments that attempt to prove that God must exist by definition. In the same way that a triangle must have three sides by definition. The premises of ontological arguments are a priori.

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19
Q

Outline Anselm’s ontological argument.

A

P1. God is defined as the greatest possible being that which nothing greater can be conceived
P2. This is a coherent concept which exists in our understanding.
P3. It is greater to exist in the understanding and in reality rather than in the understanding alone.
C. Therefore the greatest possible being, God, must exist in reality.

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20
Q

Outline Descartes ontological argument.

A

Descartes argues that it is impossible to separate the predicate of existence from God’s essence. In the same way, it is impossible to separate the predicate of ‘having three sides’ from the essence of a triangle.

P1. I have an idea of God as a supremely perfect being.
P2. A supremely perfect being must have all perfections.
P3. Existence is a perfection.
C. Therefore God exists

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21
Q

What are the three issues with Anselm & Descartes’ ontological arguments.

A
  1. Gaunilo’s island.
  2. Hume: “God does not exist” is not a contradiction.
  3. Kant: Existence is not a predicate.
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22
Q

Outline ‘Gaunilo’s island’ against Anselm and Descartes’ ontological arguments.

A

Gaunilo argued that if either ontological argument was deductively valid, then anything can be defined into existence. For example,

P1. The perfect island is, by definition, an island greater than which cannot be conceived.
P2. We can coherently conceive of such an island.
P3. It is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the mind.
C. Therefore, this island must exist.

If Anselm’s argument was truly deductive, this adaption should hold true, but it’s conclusion is obviously false, hence ontological arguments are invalid.

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23
Q

How does Anselm reply to ‘Gaunilo’s island’.

A

Anselm argues that existence is a necessary predicate of God, but not of islands. Islands exist contingently on the physical world, however, God, by definition is not contingent on anything. Hence why God can exist necessarily.

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24
Q

Outline Hume’s objection to Anselm and Descartes’ ontological arguments.

A

Both Descartes and Anselm conclude that ‘God exists’ is true by definition, or an analytic truth. But, Hume argues that an analytic truth (or in Hume’s terms a relation of ideas) cannot be denied without a contradiction. For example, ‘Triangles don’t have three sides’ is a contradiction because what it is essentially saying is ‘a three sided shape doesn’t have three sides’. Not possible. However, in the case of the proposition “God doesn’t exist”, this seems just as conceivable as the proposition “God does exist”. Therefore God’s existence is not a relation of ideas but rather a matter of fact and ontological arguments fail.

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25
Q

How does Descartes’ reply to Hume’s ontological objection?

A

Descartes would respond that even though it might seem that “God does not exist” is conceivable, closer examination reveals it is not”. For example, we would appear to be able to coherently conceive that 4783/36=94 is true but when analysed it becomes incoherent. It is like saying “a being that has the predicate of existence does not exist”.

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26
Q

Outline Kant’s objection to Anselm and Descartes’ ontological arguments

A

Kant argues that existence is not a predicate (i.e. a property) of things in the same way say, “green” is a property of grass. If you were to conceive of grass in black and white, and then add the property of greenness to it, our conception changes. However, adding the property of ‘existence’ doesn’t change our conception because ‘existence’ is not a genuine predicate.

This undermines Anselm’s and Descartes’ ontological arguments because in order for God to exist by definition (analytically), the arguments rely on existence featuring in the definition of God. However, if existence can not be assigned as a property, it cannot define anything. Thus the arguments are invalid.

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27
Q

Outline how Norman Malcolm refines ontological proof of God to avoid issues.

A

Norman Malcolm accepts that Anselm’s and Descartes’ arguments are not deductively valid. However, he provides his own ontological argument as follows:

P1. God cannot come into existence (as nothing can cause God to exist).
P2. So, if God does not exist, then his existence is impossible.
P3. God cannot cease to exist (as nothing can cause God to cease to exist)
P4. So, if God does exist, then his existence is necessary.
C1. Therefore God’s existence is either impossible or necessary.
P5. Something is only impossible if it involves a self-contradiction
P6. God’s existence is not self-contradictory
P7. Therefore God’s existence is not impossible
C2. Therefore God’s existence is necessary and God exists.

Malcolm argues that necessary existence IS a predicate, it adds something to the concept.

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28
Q

Outline two possible responses to Malcolm’s ontological proof of God.

A
  1. The concept of God is self-contradictory. All ontological arguments are hinged on how we define God. However, there a many issues with the definition of God as perfect.
  2. Fallacy of equivocation. At the beginning of his argument, Malcolm is talking about necessary existence as a property of the concept of God. This is valid, however, in the conclusion Malcolm switches, talking about how ‘God exists’ is a necessary truth. This does not follow. The only valid conclusion Malcolm can make is that the concept of God has the property of ‘necessary existence, but not that God exists.
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29
Q

Define a Teleological argument.

A

Teleological (design) arguments attempt to show that God exists on the basis of observations about the world and the specific properties it appears to have. These properties include the incredibly law-like functioning of the universe (temporal order and regularity) as well as the way that parts of the world fit together and interact (spacial order and purpose).

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30
Q

Which teleological arguments concern spacial order?

A
  1. Hume’s design argument
  2. Paley’s design argument
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31
Q

Outline Paley’s design argument.

A

Paley presents an inductive argument for the existence of God. He claims that we can infer the existence of God by comparing man-made objects to features of the natural world. For example, a man-made watch has the following properties:

A - The watch has several parts
B - These parts have been made with exactly the right materials.
C - These parts work together for a purpose - to produce regulated motion.

Paley argues that these (spatial) properties are the hallmark of design (I.e. we know a watch has been designed because it has these properties). It should then follow that any object with hallmark of design must have a designer. Aspects of nature, such as the human eye, have the hallmark of design thus it follows that they too have a designer. Given the complexity of nature, this designer must be God.

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32
Q

Outline Hume’s design argument.

A

In Hume’s dialogues concerning natural religion, Cleanthes puts forward a version of the teleological argument from spatial order. It can be summarised as follows:

P1. The ‘fitting of means to ends’ in nature resemble the ‘fitting of means to ends’ in human design.
P2. Similar effects have similar causes.
P3. The cause of human designs are minds.
C1. So, by analogy, the cause of design in nature is also a mind.
C2. And this mind is God, given the grandeur of nature’s design.

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33
Q

What are the 5 issues with teleological arguments from spatial order.

A
  1. Hume: Problems with the analogy.
  2. Hume: Infinite time, finite matter.
  3. Hume: Causation.
  4. Spatial disorder
  5. Darwin: Evolution by natural selection.
34
Q

Explain Hume’s three responses to teleological arguments from spatial order.

A
  1. Problems with the analogy. Hume points out various problems with drawing an analogy between man-made objects and nature. For example, we have observed man-made objects being designed but we lack such evidence in nature. Even if there are examples of design within the universe, it is a fallacy to conclude that the universe itself is designed because we cannot generalise from such a restricted domain.
  2. Infinite time, finite matter. Hume also objects to the teleological arguments on the basis that there may be better explanations of the order within nature. Namely, Hume argues that finite matter given an infinite amount of time will inevitably organise itself in every way possible. Similarly, a monkey given an infinite amount of time to play with a typewriter will eventually type out the complete works of Shakespeare.
  3. Causation. Hume argues that it takes many instances (Hume calls this “constant conjunction”) of A happening, then B happening to conclude that A causes B. Otherwise, it could have been a coincidence. Hume thus argues that even if evidence suggests the universe has a designer in this instance, we can not conclude a causal relationship because the universe has only been created once. There is no constant conjunction.
35
Q

Explain the response from ‘spatial disorder’ against teleological arguments from spatial order.

A

We can object to teleological arguments by arguing that even if there are instances of order and apparent design within the universe (the eye), this apparent order is vastly outweighed by apparent disorder and randomness. For example, astronomers have never found any evidence of life on other planets. As far as we are aware, we are the only example of complex design in the universe! The existence of any spacial disorder is enough to weaken the analogy but if we are the only example in the whole universe, this must invalidate the argument.

36
Q

Explain Darwin’s response to teleological arguments from spatial order.

A

Following on from examples of spatial disorder in the universe, Darwin attempts to provide an explanation for the spacial order we do find on earth. Natural selection is the idea that random genetic mutations make up all of the functions of life. Functions that better fit means to ends have prevailed over those that don’t because it gives the organism a competitive advantage, making it more likely to survive and reproduce.

If the universe is mostly disordered and we can explain the few examples of spacial disorder. There seems to be no logic to teleological arguments.

37
Q

Which teleological arguments concern temporal order?

A
  1. Swineburne’s design argument
38
Q

Outline swineburne’s teleological argument.

A

Swinburne’s design argument hinges on the distinction between spatial and temporal order. Notably, Swinburne accepts that science, for example evolution, can explain examples of spatial order. However, temporal order can only be explained with science until we reach the fundemental laws of physics. Swineburne argues that, after this, science fails to explain any further and we must look at a personal cause. He draws the following analogy:

Temporal regularities resulting from a human action can be explained by the rational choices of free agents. E.g. That building exists because someone built it.

Temporal regularities resulting from the laws of nature must also be explained with reference to a rational agent. E.g. Gravity exists because someone created it.

We cannot explain why the laws of nature themselves exist using science. Therefore, our next best option is to infer that these laws are the work of a rational agent, analogous with the effects of our rational actions as humans.

39
Q

Explain two possible responses to swineburne’s teleological argument.

A
  1. Multiple Universes. We can adapt Hume’s “infinite time. finite matter.” argument to apply here. Instead of infinite time, take there to be infinite universes (this is a popular theory among some physicists as it explains certain quantum phenomena). There will inevitably be some universes that have the correct laws of nature to encourage temporal regularities. Therefore, our laws of nature could still be caused by something non-rational and random.
  2. Is the designer God? Even if we take the conclusion that a rational agent created the universe. Why does that agent have to be a perfect being? In fact, contradictions in the divine attributes would suggest it is not.
40
Q

Define a cosmological argument.

A

Cosmological arguments articulate, in a formal way, our intuition that the universe itself needs an explanation. These arguments start from the premise that everything is either caused by or depends on something else for its existence. This is coherent with our observations of the world, even down to the conservation laws of physics.

41
Q

Outline the distinction between cosmological arguments from causation and cosmological arguments from contingency.

A

Cosmological arguments from causation argue that everything has a cause and so the chain of causes that make up universe itself must have a cause, and that cause is God. These arguments are based on physical interactions between cause and effect.

Cosmological arguments from contingency argue that things that exist contingently cannot be explained without reference to a necessary being, and that being is God. These arguments are based on the metaphysical (logical) interaction contingency and necessity.

42
Q

What are the four cosmological arguments from causation?

A
  1. The Kalam argument
  2. Aquinas’ first way
  3. Aquinas’ second way
  4. Descartes’ cosmological argument
43
Q

Outline the Kalam argument.

A

P1. Everything with a beginning must have a cause. (Causal principle)
P2. The universe has a beginning.
C. Therefore the universe must have a cause.
(C2. That cause is God)

44
Q

Outline an issue specific to the Kalam argument and a response.

A

“P2. The universe has a beginning.” Kalam does not provide any evidence that this premise is true. There is no reason to say the universe could not have existed for an infinite amount of time.

Reply: Al-Ghazali demonstrated that the concept of infinite regress is not coherent:

P1. Jupiter has a 15-year orbit. Saturn has a 30-year orbit. Therefore Jupiter does twice as many orbits as Saturn in any time frame.
P2. If time is infinite then Jupiter has done exactly the same number of orbits as Saturn.
P3. This contradicts the first premise.
C1. Therefore time cannot be infinite and the universe must have a beginning.

45
Q

Outline Aquinas’ first way.

A

P1. Things change (‘are in motion’) in the world.
P2. Change / motion means moving from a potential state (e.g. cold objects have the potential to get hotter) to an actual state (e.g. an object that is now hot.
P3. This change from potential to actual can only be caused by something already in the actual state.
P4. Nothing can change itself, everything is caused to change by something else.
P5. This chain of motion cannot go back infinitely otherwise there would be nothing to cause the chain and the chain would not exist.
P6. But there is a chain, so the chain must have a ‘first mover’ that started it.
C. This first mover is God.

46
Q

Outline Aquinas’ second way.

A

P1. Everything in the universe is subject to cause and effect
P2. E.g. throwing a rock caused the window to smash
P3. C is caused by B, and B is caused by A, and so on
P4. If this chain of causation was infinite, there would be no first cause
P5. If there were no first cause, there would be no subsequent causes or effects
P6. But there are causes and effects in the world
C1. Therefore, there must have been a first cause
C2. The first cause is God

47
Q

Outline Descartes’ cosmological argument.

A

P1. I can’t be the cause of my own existence because if I was I would have given myself all perfections (e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, etc.)
P2. So, I am not the cause of my own existence
P3. I am a thinking thing and have the idea of God
(P3.5). The cause of an effect must have at least as much reality as the effect.
P4. Whatever caused me to exist must also be a thinking thing that has the idea of God
P5. Whatever caused me to exist must either be the cause of its own existence or caused by something else
P6. If it was caused by something else then this something else must also either be the cause of its own existence or caused by something else.
P7. There cannot be an infinite chain of causes
C1. So there must be something that caused its own existence
C2. Whatever causes its own existence is God

48
Q

What are the three objections to cosmological arguments from causation?

A
  1. The possibility of an infinite regress
  2. Hume’s objection to the causal principle
  3. Must the first cause be God?
49
Q

Explain the ‘possibility of an infinite regress’ critique against cosmological arguments (from causation) and a reply.

A

Cosmological arguments from causation rely on the idea that an infinite series of causes is impossible. Aquinas, for instance, argues that an infinite series leads to a logical contradiction: if causation went back infinitely, then there would be nothing to cause them and hence no subsequent causation. However, aquinas may be confusing a (very long) finite chain of causes, which requires a beginning, with an infinite chain of causes. It is the very definition of infinity that it has no beginning, or in other words, it does not need a cause.

Reply: Al-Ghazali demonstrated that the concept of infinite regress is not coherent:

P1. Jupiter has a 15-year orbit. Saturn has a 30-year orbit. Therefore Jupiter does twice as many orbits as Saturn in any time frame.
P2. If time is infinite then Jupiter has done exactly the same number of orbits as Saturn.
P3. This contradicts the first premise.
C1. Therefore time cannot be infinite and the universe must have a beginning.

50
Q

Explain Hume’s objection to the causal principle.

A

The causal principle (‘every event has a cause’) underpins the cosmological arguments from causation. However, Hume argues that it takes many instances (Hume calls this “constant conjunction”) of A happening, then B happening to conclude that A causes B. Otherwise, it could have been a coincidence. Hume thus argues that even if evidence suggests the universe has a cause in this instance, we can not conclude a causal relationship because the universe has only been created once. There is no constant conjunction.

51
Q

Explain the objection that some cosmological arguments from causation do not guarantee the conclusion. How does Descartes’ avoid this?

A

Kalam and Aquinas are critiqued by this claim. Even if we can conclude that there must be a ‘first cause’, neither argument provides any proof that this is God, not to mention a God with the divine attributes. These arguments are not deductive proof of God.

Descartes does not suffer this objection because Descartes’ expands on the causal principle to include the idea that “a cause must have at least as much reality as its effect”. Therefore, following a chain of causation, the cause of the idea of god in our minds must be as perfect as the cause, i.e. God.

52
Q

What are the cosmological arguments from contingency.

A
  1. Aquinas’ third way
  2. Leibniz: Sufficient Reason
53
Q

Why do cosmological arguments from contingency not suffer the same objections as that of causation.

A
54
Q

Outline Aquinas’ third way.

A

P1. Everything that exists contingently did not exist at some point.
P2. If everything existed contingently, then at some point nothing existed.
P3. If nothing existed, then nothing contingent could begin to exist.
P4. But since things did begin to exist, there was never nothing in existence.
C1. Therefore, there must be something that does not exist contingently, but that exists necessarily.
C2. This necessary being is God.

55
Q

Outline Leibniz’ argument from sufficient reason.

A

Leibniz’ argument hinges on his principle of sufficient reason that states: “No fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise”.

P1. The sufficient reason for necessary truths (e.g. 3+3=6) is revealed by analysis.
P2. But we cannot provide sufficient reason for contingent truths (e.g. “water boils at 100°” or “the universe exists”) without refering to other contingent truths, which also require sufficient reason.
C. So, in order to provide sufficient reason for contingent truths, we require a necessary substance: God.

56
Q

What are the two arguments against cosmological arguments from contingency?

A
  1. Russel: Fallacy of composition
  2. Hume: “God does not exist” is not a contradiction.
57
Q

Outline what Russel means by a ‘fallacy of composition’ and how the cosmological arguments can respond.

A

The fallacy of composition is an invalid reference that because the parts of something have a certain property, the entire thing must also have this property. For example, just because a sheet of paper is thin, doesn’t mean that things made out of a sheet of paper are thin. E.g. a book can be thick. Similarly, just because things in the universe are contingent doesn’t mean the universe itself is. Russel argues the universe ‘is just there, and that’s all’, or in other words, the universe is necessary - no need for God.

Reply: Russel makes the error of confusing physical and metaphysical properties. The thickness of a piece of paper is a physical property. I.e. it is dependent on the physical world and changes accordingly. Whereas, contingency is a metaphysical property. It is a matter of logic and does not change with reference to the physical world. If you group a number of contingent properties, the group is still contingent. If you group a number of physical properties, the new properties of the group as a whole are dependent of the laws of physics.

58
Q

Outline how Hume objects to cosmological arguments from contingency and a reply.

A

Hume argues that if God exists necessarily, i.e. this is a relation of ideas, then ‘God does not exist’ must involve a contradiction. However, we can coherently conceive of God not exisitng and therefore this does not lead to a contridiction. Thus, ‘God’s existance’ is not a relation of ideas.

Reply: Hume has misunderstood what is meant by necessary here. The arguments do not claim that ‘God exists’ is a necessary truth (a relation of ideas), but rather that ‘God must have the property of necessity’ deduced from the matter of fact that ‘things exist contingently’. The argument is therefore a matter of fact, not a relation of ideas.

59
Q

Outline the distinction between moral and natural evil.

A

Moral evil: Physical pain and mental suffering brought about by the deliberate actions, or neglect of humans.

Natural evil: Pain and suffering that are not brought about by any human beings.

60
Q

What are the two forms of the ‘problem of evil’ argument.

A
  1. The logical problem of evil
  2. The evidential problem of evil
61
Q

Explain the logical problem of evil

A

The logical problem of evil says that the existence of God is logically impossible given the existence of evil in the world. These arguments are deductive, a priori.

Mackie argued that the definition of God as an omnipotent, omnibenevolvent and omniscient being is incompatible with the synthetic truth that evil exists in the world. I.e. God knows if there is evil (all-knowing), would want to stop it (all-loving) and is powerful enough to do so (all-powerful) and yet evil still exists. These premises are logically incompatible with each other as they lead to a contradiction.

62
Q

Explain the evidential problem of evil

A

The evidential problem of evil says that, whilst it is possible that God exists, the amount and way in which evil is distributed in our world is strong enough evidence that God doesn’t exist. These arguments are inductive, a posteriori.

William Rowe argued this view. He claimed that there is evil in the world that could be prevented without losing some ‘greater good’. A god with the divine attributes would prevent this evil. Therefore, God does not exist.

63
Q

What are the two responses to the problem of evil?

A
  1. St Augustine / Plantinga: Free will defence
  2. Hick: Soul-making theodicy
64
Q

Explain the free-will defence proposed by St. Augustine, a reply from Mackie and one other reply.

A

Augustine argued that God created a perfect world, giving some creatures free will. Free will is part of what constitutes a ‘perfect’ world, and so these creatures must be given the choice to act for good or evil. So, for Augustine, evil is the consequence of a greater good ‘free will’.

Reply: Mackie argued that it is logically possible for God to have created a universe in which we still have free will, but we always choose to do good.

Reply: This does not solve the evidential problem of evil. Surely there is too much pointless evil to make this seem plausible.

65
Q

How does the ‘free will defence’ respond to Mackie’s objection and how might Mackie reply?

A

Alvin Plantinga refined the free will defence. The underlying premise is the same; God allows for evil in order to preserve a greater good, namely free will. However, Plantinga builds on the idea that God can only do what is logically possible. He argued that God cannot create a world in which humans have free will, but in which we are always caused to do what is right for the same reason that God cannot create a world that is not created by God. It leads to a logical contradiction. In other worlds, a world where we can only do good is never a world with ‘free will’. It is a contradiction.

Reply: This accounts for moral evil but what about natural evil?

66
Q

Explain Hick’s soul-making theodicy and a reply.

A

P1. A world in which free agents are imperfect but grow spiritually and ethically is a greater good than a world that is perfectly safe and pleasurable.
P2. God (who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent) aims to create a world for the greatest good.
P3. Responding to pain and suffering (evil) enables free agents to grow morally and spiritually.
C1. God created / permits a world with evil in order to for fill the greater good and enable free agents to grow.

Reply: This does not solve the evidential problem of evil. Surely there is too much pointless evil to make this seem plausible.

67
Q

Outline the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in religious language.

A

Cognitivism: Religious statements are meaningful in that they are expressions of our beliefs about the world, capable of being true or false.

Non-cognitivism: Religious statements are not propositions about the world and thus are not capable of being true or false. However, religious statements may still be meaningful in that they express an other type of mental state (e.g. emotions, commands, values, bliks…)

68
Q

What are the two arguments that religious language is meaningless?

A
  1. A.J Ayer: Verification principle (non-cognitive)
  2. Anthony Flew: Invisible gardener (
69
Q

Explain what is meant by falsifiability.

A

Falsifiable statements are meaningful and can be proven either true or false.
Unfalsifiable statements are meaningless and cannot be proven true or false.

A statement is falsifiable if it is inconsistent with some possible observation. For example, ‘water boils at 100°c’ is falsifiable because it could be proven wrong by observing water boiling at some other temperature. In contrast, the statement ‘everything in and including the universe doubles in size every 10 seconds’ is unfalsifiable because there is no method to disprove it.

70
Q

How is falsifiability used to discuss the meaning of religious language.

A

Some philosophers argue that unfalsifiable religious statements such as ‘God exists’ are meaningless because they cannot be proven. However, other philosophers argue that unfalsifiable statements can still have meaning because they express other mental states.

71
Q

Explain how A.J Ayer’s verification principle demonstrates religious language is meaningless.

A

The verification principle states that a statement is only meaningful if:

(a) It is an analytic truth (e.g. a triangle has three sides)
OR
(b) It is empirically verifiable (e.g. water boils at 100°c)

Applying the verification principle to religious language, Ayer argues that religious statements such as ‘God exists’ are not analytic truths (ontological arguments fail) and are not empirically verifiable because religious statements are unfalsifiable. So, accordering to ayer, ‘God exists’ and any other religious statement of this nature are meaningless.

72
Q

Outline two responses to A.J Ayer’s verification principle against religious language.

A

Reply 1: Ayer’s verification principle fails on its own criteria. The principle itself is not an analytic truth and nor empirically verifiable. So, the verificaiton principle is meaningless! (Ayer may respond that the verification principle is only intended as a definition of a meaningful statement and not a factual hypothesis about meaning.)

Reply 2: Alternatively, we can accept the terms of the verification principle and argue that religious statements (‘God exists’) are analytic truths (i.e. ontological arguments succeed) or they are empirically verifiable (i.e. eschatological verifiction / problem of evil).

73
Q

Outline Antony Flew’s invisible gardner analogy.

A

Two people find a clearing in a jungle; one sees evidence that there is a gardener, the other disagrees as there are weeds. They keep watch but see no one. ‘Prehaps it is an invisible gardener’ says the believer. They set up an electric fence, but there are no movements, no sounds. ‘Prehaps it is an invisible, intangible and inaudible gardener’. At this point, the skeptic despairs asking ‘How does your claim differ from there being no gardener at all’.

Here God is the gardener and prehaps spacial order or design is the evidence of God. The weeds represent evil. Just like the claim of the gardener, the existance of God is unfalsifiable. Thus ‘God exists’ is meaningless as is the claim of a gardener in this analogy.

74
Q

How can someone respond to Flew’s invisible gardener analogy?

A

Eschatological verification (Hick). In the example of the invisible gardener, there is no way to verify the presence of a gardener when in the clearing. However, might it be possible for the people to verify the gardener once they leave the clearing? Similarly, it may be possible to verify the existance of God after death.

75
Q

What are the three arguments that religious language is meaningful?

A
  1. Hick: Eschatological verification (Cognitive)
  2. Basil Mitchell: Resistance Fighter (Cognitive)
  3. Hare: Bliks (Non-cognitive)
76
Q

Explain Hick’s Eschatological verification.

A

Hick agrees with Ayer and Flew that ‘God exists’ is not empirically verifiable in this life. However, he argues that the idea of God is often accompanied by the idea of a reality beyond human life. Which argues that religious claims like ‘God exists’ are not verifiable in our lifetime, but are still meaningful because it is possible to verify them after we die.

If ‘God exists’ is false, then it is unfalsifiable.
But if ‘God exists’ is true then it can be verified after we die.

77
Q

Explain the analogy Hick uses to support Eschatological verification

A

Hick tells a parable of a “celestial city”:

Two men are travelling on a road - it is the only road there is, so they both must travel it. Traveller A believes the road leads to a celestial city, whereas traveller B believes the road leads nowhere and the journey is meaningless. As they travel along the road, they experience both “refreshment and delight” and “hardship and danger”. If traveller A is correct, they will eventually arrive at the celestial city and he will be proved right. If traveller B is correct, they will just keep going forever and neither will be proved right.

In this parable, traveller A is the theist and B is the atheist. If the theist is correct, his belief will be verified in the afterlife - this is the equivalent of reaching the celestial city. But most importantly, regardless of whether true or false, the theists belief is meaningful because it has the potential to be verified.

78
Q

How do Mitchell and Hare respond to Hick’s Eschatological verification.

A

Both Mitchell and Hare also argue that religious language is meaningful, however they are this is the case for different reasons.

Hare argues that Flew is wrong. Religious claims are not falsifiable but they are also not intended to be falsifiable. Hare argues that religious statements express non-cognitive expressions of fundamental or foundational attitudes to the world.

Mitchell also argues that Flew is wrong. Mitchell argues that religious claims can be falsified in a human’s lifetime (for example by the problem of evil), but believer faith ensures that they remain committed to their claims in spite of their doubts.

79
Q

Outline Basil Mitchell’s argument that religious language is meaningful.

A

Mitchell agrees with Flew and Ayer that in order for a statement to be meaningful it must be possible for some observation to count against it (must be falsifiable). However, mitchell argues that empirical evidence such as the existance of evil can be used to falsify the existance of God. Hence, God’s existance is falsifiable

However, just because some observations count against a belief doesn’t mean we must automatically withdraw from it. Mitchel argues that religious beliefs are not ‘provisional hypotheses’ like scientific statements. They are not beliefs that the believer is totally detached from and will abandon as soon as evidence of the contrary appears. But nor are they ‘vacuous formulae’ that the believer holds regardless of any evidence to the contrary.

Instead, Mitchel argues that religious statements are meaningful (can be falsified) ‘articles of faith’. They are a rational middle ground between ‘provisional hypotheses’ and ‘vacuous formulae’. Evidence for either side can be considered but the statement itself is always meaningful.

80
Q

Explain Mitchell’s analogy of the resistance fighter.

A

Imagine you are in a war, your country has been occupied by an enemy. You meet a stranger who claims to be the leader of the resistance. You trust this man. But, the stranger acts ambiguously, sometimes doing things that appear to support the enemy rather than your own side. Yet you continue to believe the stranger is on your side despite this and trust that he has good reasons for these ambiguous actions.

In this analogy, the stranger is God. There is no method to know definitively whether the stranger is on our side, however, our belief that he is still meaningful because it can be falsified by his actions against us. However, just because the stranger sometimes acts against us does not mean we must withdraw all belief. It just must be taken into consideration.

81
Q

Explain R.M. Hare’s argument that religious language is meaningful.

A

Hare differs from Mitchell and Hick because he argues that religious statements, such as ‘God exists’ are not at all falsifiable. But despite being unfalsifiable, Hare argues that religious statements are still meaningful in expressing our fundamental attitudes towards the world - what Hare calls ‘Bliks’.

A blik is non-cognitive, therefore it doesn’t need to be falsifiable to be meaningful. It simply is not the intention of the language. Instead religious language intends to express our attitude towards the world. We know Bliks are meaningful because they impact the believer behaviour.

82
Q

Explain Hare’s analogy of the paranoid student.

A

A student struggling with mental ill health is convinced that his university tutors want to murder him. His friends try to convince him that this is not true - and they introduce hum to the tutors to show him they are friendly and normal. However, despite this interaction the student is still entirely convinced that this is all a cunning plan to murder him.

No amount of evidence will convince the student otherwise, i.e. his belief (blik) is unfalsifiable. However, it is still meaningful as a non-cognitive expression of the students attitude. The blik clearly means something to the student because it has an effect on his behaviour.

The reason that evidence of the truth does not change the students belief is because the student’s belief was never about the truth. It was about his attitude / outlook on other people. It is non-cognitive and it is meaningful.