Metaphysics of Mind Flashcards
What do theories of mind need to account for?
Theories of mind need to account for two key characteristics of mental states (intentionality and qualia).
What is intentionality?
Mental states such as beliefs, fears and hopes are about something. It is not possible simply to believe, fear or hope; you must believe, fear or hope for something. For example, I may believe it is raining. In this case, my belief, in a sense, points to or is about the rain. The quality that makes a mental state about something is called intentionality.
What are qualia?
Certain mental states have a particular quality or ‘feel’. For the person experiencing it, there is a certain way it feels to taste a pineapple or see a red poppy etc. These qualities are intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible.
Explain Property Dualism
There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
It doesn’t go as far as substance dualism in claiming that the mind is completely non-physical, but it differs from physicalism in that property dualists believe a complete description of the physical universe would not be a complete description of the entire universe. Instead, property dualists believe that a complete physical description of the universe would miss out qualia.
Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David Chalmers).
Chalmers argues that property dualism is true because of the zombie argument.
A philosophical zombie is a person who is physically and functionally identical to an ordinary human – except they don’t have any qualia.
It can be outlined as follows:
P1. It is conceivable that there are zombies.
P2. If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
C1. Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
P3. If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.
C2. Therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.
C3. Therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true.
Physicalism is the view that ultimately consciousness is nothing more than the physical. This claim implies that any physical duplicate of you would have to be conscious. Therefore, it implies that zombies are not metaphysically possible. So if it can be shown that zombies are metaphysically possible, then physicalism will have been refuted. In order to show this, Chalmers begins by persuading us that philosophical zombies are conceivable.
Explain the response to philosophical zombies: a ‘philosophical zombie’/a ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable
Physicalists can argue that zombies are not, in fact, conceivable if we correctly understand consciousness. A physical duplicate of you is a functional duplicate of you, and consciousness can be analysed in physical and functional terms. Therefore, any physical, functional duplicate of you must also be conscious.
Explain the response: what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible (philosophical zombies)
Physicalists can also object that zombies are not metaphysically possible, even though they are conceivable. Conceivability is not always a reliable guide to possibility. For example, we can conceive that water is not H20 but this is not possible. Likewise, if phenomenal properties are physical properties, zombies are impossible.
Explain the response: what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (philosophical zombies argument)
A final response is that we cannot infer from what is metaphysically possible to what is physically possible. Even if we concede that there may well be possible worlds containing philosophical zombies, in the actual world the natural laws are such as to make zombies an impossibility here, and this is what matters
However if physicalism is true it is committed to the claim that consciousness is reducible to the physical in any possible world. Therefore, it is not metaphysically possible for zombies to exist and therefore cannot ever be physically possible.
Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson).
Frank Jackson presents the knowledge argument for property dualism which can be summarised as follows:
P1: Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour vision.
P2: But she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself.
C1: Therefore there is more to know about colour vision that what is given in a complete physical account of it.
C2: So physicalism is false.
The thought experiment supposes there is a scientist named Mary who has been confined to a black and white room all her life (she has never seen colours) but has learned all there is to know about the physical processes underlying colour vision. It questions whether upon seeing colour for the first time she learns something new. Jackson argues that she would as she would learn what it is like to see colour. In this case knowing everything that goes on physically when someone experiences colour vision doesn’t entail knowing everything about colour vision. Specifically, it cannot tell you what it is like to have qualia. And so physicalism is false.
How does the knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson) attack Mind-Brain Identity Theory?
The theory claims that sensations are just brain processes, so it follows that if Mary knows all about brain processes, she knows everything there is to know about sensations. This is precisely the claim that the knowledge argument attacks.
How does the‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson) attack Functionalism?
Functionalism claims that phenomenal properties are functional properties. When Jackson says that Mary knows all the physical facts, this includes the functional facts. Mary knows exactly how the brain functions during an experience of seeing red. But the argument is meant to show that Mary doesn’t know all there is to know about such an experience, so phenomenal properties are not just functional (+ physical) properties so functionalism is wrong.
How does the knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson) attack Hard Behaviourism?
Hard behaviourism claims we can reduce talk of colour experiences to the conditions of verification. But, the knowledge argument claims, Mary knows all about what conditions in someone’s brain would verify whether or not they had a particular colour experience, but she doesn’t know all about colour experiences, because she doesn’t know what it is like to experience color
How does the knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson) attack Soft Behaviourism?
Soft behaviourism - same as hard, just extends the knowledge MAry has to also include knowing how someone is disposed to behave when they experience a colour.
Explain the response: Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the ‘ability knowledge’ response).
A response is that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge (knowledge of facts, such as the knowledge that Paris is the capital of France) but does gain ability knowledge (knowledge of how to do things, such as tie shoelaces). When Mary sees colour for the first time, she acquires new abilities. For example, she now knows how to recognise ripe tomatoes by sight. But this new ability knowledge doesn’t mean she has learned any new facts about colour vision and so it is still true that she possessed all the factual knowledge before leaving the room.
Explain the response: Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge (the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response).
A response is that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge (knowledge of facts, such as the knowledge that Paris is the capital of France) but does gain acquaintance knowledge. Acquaintance knowledge is the knowledge that comes from encountering or experiencing something. For example, Mary might have acquaintance knowledge of the taste of black-eyed beans. This objection claims that the knowledge argument equivocates on these two types of knowledge. P1 is true of Mary’s propositional knowledge and P2 of her acquaintance knowledge. So C1 doesn’t follow: a complete physical account really does exhaust all the propositional knowledge about colour vision and Mary knew all this before leaving the room. On leaving the room she has become acquainted with the phenomenal character of colour vision, the qualia, but this new knowledge is not knowledge of new facts.
Explain the response: Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the ‘New Knowledge / Old Fact’ response).
Another objection with the knowledge argument is that Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way. Upon her release, Mary gains knowledge of what it is like to see colours and acquires new concepts, based on her new phenomenal experience. This means hse can now describe the processes of colour vision using concepts she didn’t possess before leaving the room.
However, these descriptions are not of any new facts. Rather they represent the same facts about colour vision she already possessed and spoke about in physical terms before. What is different is simply the way in which these same facts are presented, this time using phenomenal concepts. So Mary doesn’t learn any new facts about the world on leaving the room.
Explain the issue for epiphenomenalist dualism: the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge
An objection to epiphenomenalist property dualism is the challenge posed by introspective knowledge. Epiphenomenalism usually explains away the apparent causal effects of qualia by saying that it’s the brain that causes both qualia and behaviour. For example, when I burn my hand on a hot stove, my brain state causes me to pull my hand away and also causes the unpleasant qualia/mental state. Here, the qualia/mental state is just an effect of the brain state – it doesn’t actually cause anything itself.
But this explanation raises a problem in the case of self-knowledge: If qualia/mental states have no causal powers, then knowledge of qualia/mental states is impossible. If my brain state is all that causes my beliefs about my mental state, then I would have the same beliefs about my mental state even if the qualia was completely different.
When I have the brain state of pain, for example, my pain qualia could be like my red qualia, or swap places with my pleasure qualia, or disappear entirely, and I would still form the same belief “I am in pain”. This means that, at best, we could only ever have knowledge of our brain states, never knowledge of our mental states/qualia.
So, if property dualism is true, it seems to imply that introspective self-knowledge (of mental states) is impossible – which seems wrong as knowledge of mental states is possible (such as knowing “I am in pain”).
Explain the issue for epiphenomenalist dualism: the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical)
Dualist interactionists appeal to the phenomenology of our mental life to reject epiphenomenalism. It is part of our experience of having mental states that our mental states, e.g. feeling pain or wanting chocolate or believing that Paris is the capital of France, cause other mental and physical states and events. Most obviously, mental states can cause our behaviour, such as wincing or going to the food cupboard, and they can be part of a causal mental process, such as thinking about how to get to Paris. The ‘phenomenology of our mental life’ involves the experience of such causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical which makes epiphenomenalism counter-intuitive.
Explain the issue for epiphenomenalism dualism: the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution.
We can object that epiphenomenalist property dualism is incompatible with evolutionary theory because evolution only selects properties that make a difference to the survival and reproductive success of the animal. For example, having long neck genes enables a giraffe to reach food and survive. The causal effects of long neck genes clearly explain why giraffes have long necks: They are beneficial for survival in the physical world. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, there would be no evolutionary benefit to having qualia because epiphenomenal qualia don’t have any causal effect. It makes sense why animals would evolve brain states – for example, the brain state of pain would cause the animal to get away from things that might damage its body or kill it. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, the brain state alone would cause the animal to move away from whatever is damaging its body – the brain state alone would cause it to behave in exactly the same way whether it had qualia or not. So, there would be no evolutionary benefit of having epiphenomenal qualia in addition to the brain state. And so, if minds are the product of evolution, it would suggest that epiphenomenalism is false: Qualia does have some useful causal role, otherwise, we wouldn’t have evolved it.
What is physicalism?
Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist).
What is hard behaviourism?
Philosophical behaviourism argues that the meaning of mental concepts can be analysed or understood in terms of ‘behaviour’. It is a form of physicalism because it rejects the idea of a distinct psychological reality. Behaviourists claim the mind can be analytically reduced to behaviour. An analytical reduction concerns the meanings of the terms involved, so a successful reduction can be conducted through an analysis of language alone without any investigation of how the world is.
Hempel argues that the meaning of a statement is established by the conditions of its verification. This entails that statements using mental concepts can be translated, without any loss of meaning, into statements about the conditions of verifying such claims in terms of behaviour, where ‘behaviour’ includes not only bodily movements but also physiological and neurological states and processes, described by physical concepts.
To use his example, to say that ‘Paul is in pain’ is equivalent to a series of statements such as ‘Paul weeps and makes gestures of a certain sort’, ‘At the question “What is the matter?” Paul utters the words “I have a toothache”, and so on.
What is soft behaviourism?
Philosophical behaviourism argues that the meaning of mental concepts can be analysed or understood in terms of ‘behaviour’. It is a form of physicalism because it rejects the idea of a distinct psychological reality. Behaviourists claim the mind can be analytically reduced to behaviours. An analytical reduction concerns the meanings of the terms involved, so a successful reduction can be conducted through an analysis of language alone without any investigation of how the world is.
In soft behaviourism, Ryle defends a non-reductive form of philosophical behaviourism, arguing that mental states can be understood as behavioural dispositions. This is because a mental state does not always have to be manifested in any actual behaviour (e.g. you could have a toothache and not necessarily weep). Instead, Ryle suggests we are only disposed to behaving in certain ways. ‘Behaviour’ has its usual meaning in ordinary language. A disposition is how something will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances, and can be expressed in hypothetical propositions of the form “If…then…’.
For example, ‘You are thirsty” would be translated into “If you were in the right circumstances, then you would have a drink”. The dispositional analysis of a mental state must include a series of antecedent conditions expressed in a range of hypothetical propositions to capture the range of potential behaviours a disposition might lead to. IN this way, Ryle is able to say that mental states can be rendered not just in terms of actual behaviour, but also in terms of potential behaviour: what the person would do as well as what the person is doing.
Explain the issue with behaviourism: dualist arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism (introspection; irreducibility and indivisibility arguments)
maybe add: view from nowhere/somewhere and Nagel stuff
Dualists will urge that I am aware from my own experience that mental states have a subjective and private dimension. The experiences of qualia, in particular, have a specific quality which I am directly acquainted with.
this subjective quality is not something that can be rendered in terms of behaviour. Any description of my behaviour cannot include what it is like for me to experience a toothache, for example.
So while behaviourism might seem plausible as an account of how we ascribe mental states to others, it cannot do justice to the lived experience of mental life as it is experienced from the subjective point of view.
Explain the issue with behaviourism: the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ and perfect actors)
It seems that many mental states and processes have an ‘inner’ aspect that can’t be captured by behaviour and behavioural dispositions. We can argue that statements about behvaiour or conditions of verification only tell us about how to know about mental states. They don’t give us the ‘intrinsic nature’ of mental states and what they are ‘in themselves’.
Hilary Putnam asks us to imagine a community of Super-Spartans who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behaviour has been suppressed. They no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour yet they could still be in pain. Pain is conceivable without any associated pain behaviour, it is distinct from such behavioural dispositions so philosophical behvaiourism is false.
In the perfect actor’s example, someone could pretend to be in pain yet not be in pain. The above explanation applies.
