Epistemology

Question 1

What is acquaintance knowledge?

Answer 1

Knowing ‘of’; for example knowing a person.

Question 2

What is ability knowledge?

Answer 2

Knowing ‘how’ to do something; for example knowing how to ride a bike.

Question 3

What is propositional knowledge?

Answer 3

Knowing ‘that’ something; e.g. knowing Paris is the capital of France. This is the kind of knowledge that can always be expressed in language, makes a claim about the world and is the knowledge that is primarily what epistemology is concerned with.

Question 4

How does Linda Zagzebski describe the nature of definition and how should propositional knowledge be analysed/defined?

Answer 4

Zagzebski argues that the nature of definition depends on the different natures of the concepts or objects involved. Some objects have what Locke called a real essence (a real, underlying cause that makes it the way it is) e.g. water has a real essence as it is a chemical composition of H2O. If an object has a real essence, it can have a real definition. On the other hand objects such as ‘weeds’ have no underlying cause that makes them them. The classification is culture-specific and therefore the definition is not real.

Zagzebski is sceptical if knowledge has a real essence as the term has varied so much in its use historically, suggesting it is a socially constructed one. However, she recommends we treat knowledge as if it does have a real essence, so should seek a real definition. We should only give up if we are defeated in the project.
Zagzebski outlines that definitions should no be:
circular (not include the term being defined, for example saying that knowledge is gained when someone knows something)
obscure (terms in the definition should not be more obscure than the original term
 negative (defining a term bu what it does not do not help e.g. a good act is one that is not wrong)
ad hoc (coming up with a definition that is specific to meeting a particular problem (e.g. defining knowledge as a justified true belief that is not a Gettier counter-example)

Question 5

What is the tripartite view of knowledge?

Answer 5

The tripartite view of knowledge - attributed to Plato - aims to provide us with a real definition of knowledge (i.e. what conditions must be met for X to be knowledge). According to the tripartite view of Knowledge, A (an agent) knows p (a proposition) if and only if:
Propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief: S knows that p if and only if:
P is true
A beliefs p,
And A has a justification (good reason) for believing p,

As implied, the tripartite view of knowledge claims that each condition (justification, truth and belief) is individually necessary but only collectively sufficient for A to know P. Hence, knowledge is a justified true belief. An example is Alex knows Rome is the capital city of Italy because
Rome is the capital city of Italy (i.e. that is how things are)
Alex believes that Rome is the capital city of Italy
And Alex has a justification for believing Rome is the capital city of Italy (e.g. he consulted a reliable Geography textbook).

Question 6

Explain the issue with the tripartite view that the conditions are not individually necessary (specifically how might one object to the belief condition as necessary for knowledge)?

Answer 6

It is necessary to assert something. It would seem incoherent to say “I know it is raining, but I do not believe it”. However, beyond asserting something, belief may not be needed for knowledge.
Weak response: We can know something without believing it as some equate knowledge with successful action E.g. In an exam, Jon writes that Descartes wrote the meditations but is not sure. He is right. In this case, he knew it but didn’t really believe it.
Strong response: In The Republic, Plato claims knowledge and belief are separate. He reasoned that knowledge is infallible and belief fallible, they must be fundamentally different ways of viewing the world. Knowledge is going beyond what you believe. He uses the allegory of prisoners in a cave, watching puppet shadows their whole life. They think this is real but in actual fact, they just can’t see the whole truth. Modern examples could be that we are all stuck in a simulation etc. so our belief does not necessarily bring us knowledge.
Responses: a) Jon doesn’t actually know the answer – he doesn’t believe what he remembers, or b) tacit beliefs

Question 7

Explain the issue with the tripartite view that the conditions are not individually necessary (specifically how might one object to the justification condition as necessary for knowledge)?

Answer 7

Reliabilism claim that knowledge is a true belief that has been reliably generated - a conscious justification may not be necessary. Consider the scenario of Brian who has a rare gift. If you give him any date in the future, he is able to tell you what day of the week it will be. He is unable to say how he does this but is incredibly accurate. This is a case of true belief, but with no rational justification. How brian gets his answers right is a mystery but he is reliable. Therefore, justification may not be always necessary for knowledge.

Question 8

Explain the issue with the tripartite view that the conditions are not individually necessary (specifically how might one object to the truth condition as necessary for knowledge)?

Answer 8

Often, one can claim to know something that turns out to be false. For example, Raquel, a cavewoman believes the earth is flat, based on the evidence at the time. In fact, many scientific beliefs have changed over time but it can be argued that people before also had knowledge, even if their beliefs were false. Therefore, knowledge does not have to be true (as what we believe to be true changes) and can be a justified belief.

Response: Whether she had knowledge depends on how we define truth. The correspondence theory of truth says that truth consists of a correspondence between a claim and a relevant fact. Her claim that the world is flat does not correspond to the fact, so it is not true and she does not have knowledge. The coherence theory of truth has different varieties, but one kind proposes that a belief is true if it is one of the webs of beliefs held by society to be true. This web of beliefs is internally coherent with the beliefs supporting one another. So in Raquel’s day, her belief would be true.

Although these theories of truth differ, you can still argue that truth is one of the conditions of knowledge. IT is just using the coherence theory we are more inclined to allow people to have known things in the past, things we no longer count as knowledge. And this is because the concept of truth was bound to the belief system of the time. On the other hand, correspondence theory claims that facts don’t change over time so Raquel never has knowledge. But both theories require knowledge to be true.

Question 9

Explain the issue with the tripartite view that the conditions are not sufficient - cases of lucky true beliefs (including Edmund Gettier’s original two counterexamples) - the job one

Answer 9

Gettier objects to the tripartite view of knowledge on the grounds that justified, true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. He uses counter-examples to demonstrate his point, such as the following.

Counterexample 1: Smith and Jones are applying for the same job. After the interview, the employer tells Smith that Jones will get the job. Previously, Smith had counted the coins in Jones’ pockets as he emptied them, and there were ten. Based on this information, Smith deduces that a man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. His reasoning is as follows:
Jones will get the job (justified by the employer’s statement)
Jones had ten coins in his pockets (justified by Smith’s observation)
A man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job.
As it turns out, the employer made a mistake, and Smith actually gets the job. In addition, unknown to Smith, like Jones he also appends to have ten coins in his pocket. So, despite Smith thinking of Jones when he made his deduction, the conclusion is justified, it is true and it is believed by Smith. Therefore, we have a justified true belief. However, as Gettier points out we should not consider Smith’s belief that ‘A man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job’ to be an example of knowledge, as it is true by chance or coincidence. Thus, the conditions of the tripartite view of knowledge would appear to be insufficient as we can conceive of a justified, true belief that isn’t knowledge.

Question 10

Explain the issue with the tripartite view that the conditions are not sufficient - cases of lucky true beliefs (including Edmund Gettier’s original two counterexamples) - car one

Answer 10

Gettier objects to the tripartite view of knowledge on the grounds that justified, true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. He uses counter-examples to demonstrate his point, such as the following.

Counterexample 2: Smith knows that Jones owns a Ford since he has seen it and he also knows Brown isn’t in Barcelona as he has seen him that day. Based on this information and using the principle of disjunctive induction, smith deduces that the statement “Either Jones owns or a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is true. His reasoning is as follows:
Jones owns a Ford (justified by seeing it)
Brown is not in Barcelona (justified by Smith’s observation)
Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona
As it turns out, Jones happened to sell his Ford that day so he no longer owns it and Brown has made a quick trip to Barcelona. So despite Smith thinking the statement is true because “Jones owns a Ford’ when he made his deduction, the conclusion is justified., it is true because “Brown is in Barcelona” and it is believed by Smith. Therefore, we have a justified true belief. However, as Gettier points out we should not consider Smith’s belief that ‘Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona’ to be an example of knowledge, as it is true by chance or coincidence.
Thus, the conditions of the tripartite view of knowledge would appear to be insufficient as we can conceive of a justified, true belief that isn’t knowledge.

Question 11

Explain Infallibilism (strengthen the justification condition)

Answer 11

According to infallibilism, one knows p if and only if:
P is true
One believes in p
P is justified
The justification leaves no doubt
Infallibilism allows something to be classified as knowledge if the justification is adequate enough to know without doubt. Most things we claim to know can be doubted, for example, the external world exists (e.g. an evil demon could be tricking us). Descartes gives an example of what we can know without doubt and that is that we exist (in the Meditations he concludes that he thinks and therefore must exist).

The Gettier case would not be considered knowledge. Even though Smith has good reasons for his beliefs in the Gettier case, they’re not good enough to provide certainty. Smith might have misheard the interviewer saying he was going to give Jones the job. Or, even more extreme, Smith might be a brain in a vat and Jones may not even exist! Either of these scenarios – however unlikely – raises the possibility of doubt. Therefore it is not true belief where the justification is certain so it does not count as knowledge.

Question 12

Explain Infallibilism (strengthen the justification condition)

Answer 12

According to infallibilism, one knows p if and only if:
P is true
One believes in p
P is justified
The justification leaves no doubt
Infallibilism allows something to be classified as knowledge if the justification is adequate enough to know without doubt. Most things we claim to know can be doubted, for example, the external world exists (e.g. an evil demon could be tricking us). Descartes gives an example of what we can know without doubt and that is that we exist (in the Meditations he concludes that he thinks and therefore must exist).

The Gettier case would not be considered knowledge. Even though Smith has good reasons for his beliefs in the Gettier case, they’re not good enough to provide certainty. Smith might have misheard the interviewer saying he was going to give Jones the job. Or, even more extreme, Smith might be a brain in a vat and Jones may not even exist! Either of these scenarios – however unlikely – raises the possibility of doubt. Therefore it is not true belief where the justification is certain so it does not count as knowledge.

Question 13

Explain no false lemmas (J+T+B+N)

Answer 13

A proposition p is knowledge if and only if
P is true
You believe that p,
Your belief that p is justified, and
You did not infer that p from a false belief
The no-false lemma view takes that tripartite view of knowledge and adds an extra condition of not being based on a false lemma that is necessary for something to be knowledge. A false lemma is a false premise that the belief is based on. These conditions and individually necessary and jointly sufficient to classify something as knowledge.

Question 14

Explain reliabilism (replace ‘justified with ‘reliably formed’)

Answer 14

Reliabilism claims we know p if and only if:
P is true
One believes that p
The belief is formed using a reliable cognitive process
Reliabilism replaces the justification condition with a reliable cognitive process – a process that outputs a high number of true beliefs e.g. sight. This allows animals and babies to have knowledge as a justification is not required. The conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to claim something is knowledge.

Question 15

Explain virtue epistemology (replace ‘justified’ with an account of epistemic virtue)

Answer 15

According to virtue epistemology, we know p if and only if:
P is true
One believes in p
One’s belief is justified in terms of the intellectual virtues and vices of the knower
An act of knowledge occurs when the belief is successful (it is true) and where its success stems from intellectual virtue (so it is not luckily true). Sosa’s version of virtue epistemology compares cases of knowing with athletic performances including archery. In accurately shooting an arrow one must have accuracy (whether it hits the target or in knowing if it is true); adroitness (how skilful it is and an adroit belief is formed by an intellectual virtue) and aptness (accurate because it is skilful). Therefore Sosa defines knowledge as an apt belief.

Question 16

What is direct realism?

Answer 16

The immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties. Direct realism states that we directly perceive physical objects which exist independent of our experience. These physical objects existed before our minds and continue to exist in the absence of a perceiver while retaining their properties. Objects are perceived immediately not indirectly through sense data.

Question 17

Explain the argument from illusion?

Answer 17

The argument from illusion against direct is presented as follows (with an example of a straw in water to illustrate it):
1. When subject to an illusion an object appears to a perceiver to have a particular property (for example, a straw hat appears to be bent)
2. The perceiver is directly aware of this apparent property (of a bent-looking straw)
3. But the object doesn’t have this property in reality (the real straw is not bent)
4. So what the perceiver is directly aware of (the bent straw) and what is real (the straight straw) are distinct
5. So direct realism is false: we do not perceive objects directly.
If the way the world appears to us in such cases is not the way the world actually is, then one can conclude that the immediate objects of perception cannot be material objects and therefore direct realism is false. Indirect realists argue that what we perceive instead is sense data.

Question 18

Explain a response to the argument from illusion?

Answer 18

Direct realism can respond by introducing the idea of relational properties (one that varies in relation to something else). For example, being to the left or right of something (e.g. ‘the cupboard to the left of the fridge’) is a real property that something can have – but it varies relative to other objects. Similarly, we could say that appearing bent is a real property a straw can have when in water. Therefore, we are still directly perceiving the objects relational properties and thus there is no reason to posit sense data.

Question 19

Explain the argument from perceptual variation

Answer 19

The argument of perceptual variation as proposed by Russell as follows:
P1: Direct realism claims that the immediate objects of perception are material objects and their properties (e.g. colours, textures and shapes)
P2: But when we perceive physical objects the appearance of their properties can vary
P3: The properties of the objects themselves don’t vary
C: So direct realism is false: the apparent properties are not the same as the real properties of physical objects

Russel uses the example of a table looking different colurs (white or brown) depending on the lighting. Since there is no reason to be privileging one coulour over the other, then the table cannot be said to have a particular colour. Similar arguments can be made for the shape of the table changing when observed at different anges. Russell concludes that ‘The real table…is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known’. Therefore what we perceive is not the real properties of physical objects directly and therefore direct realism is false.
Indirect realists such as Russell would then conclude that the immediate objects of perception are appearances or sense data and that we must infer the existence of the real properties of objects on the basis of direct acquaintance with the sense data.

Question 20

Explain a response to the argument from perceptual variation

Answer 20

Direct realism can respond by introducing the idea of relational properties (one that varies in relation to something else). For example, being to the left or right of something (e.g. ‘the cupboard to the left of the fridge’) is a real property that something can have – but it varies relative to other objects. Similarly, we could say that appearing different colours is a real property a table can have relative to certain perceivers. Therefore, we are still directly perceiving the object even if its relational properties change and thus there is no reason to posit sense data.

Question 21

Explain the argument from hallucination

Answer 21

The argument from hallucination is summarised as follows:
1. Hallucinations occur when a person perceives something which doesn’t exist outside the mind
2. So what they perceive, the hallucination exists only in their mind
3. Hallucinations can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical (truthful) perceptions
4. But if hallucinations and veridical perceptions are subjectively indistinguishable, then the person must be aware of the same thing in both cases
5. Thus, what they are directly aware of during veridical perception must also be in the mind
6. Hence. we perceive the world indirectly and direct realism is false.
The argument from hallucination argues that since hallucinations are only in the mind and can be indistinguishable from veridical perceptions, one is perceiving the same thing in both. Indirect realists would conclude that we are directly perceiving sense data in both cases. An example is Macbeth hallucinating the dagger which he is perceiving but does not exist in real life. Therefore, he must be directly perceiving sense data.

Question 22

Explain a response to the argument from hallucination

Answer 22

If the person is aware of a hallucination in the mind, what they are aware of during veridical perception must also be the mind, thus we perceive mind-dependent objects and not mind-independent objects.
Disjunctivists argue that hallucinations are a completely different type of mental state to perception. They can seem the same but that doesn’t prove that they are the same. The fact that hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions tells us nothing significant about what perception is. In hallucination, we don’t perceive anything, we imagine it. To imagine something is not to perceive something mental, such as sense-data, but not to perceive anything at all. For example, Macbeth is not perceiving any real dagger but is imagining it due to malfunctions in his brain. Perception is a relation of the subject to the world, a form of ‘cognitive contact’ whilst hallucination is not. So we cannot generalise from cases of hallucination to claim that in perception, we see sense-data.

Direct realists can also argue that hallucinations have a different causal history from veridical perceptions. Rather than being caused by a physical object impacting the sense organs, hallucinations are produced by some sort of malfunction in the brain. Since hallucinations and veridical perceptions are not identical phenomena it does not follow from the fact that hallucinations occur in the mind.

Question 23

Explain the time-lag argument

Answer 23

According to direct realism a mind-independent world composed of physical objects exists, and we directly perceive this world. As a consequence, we are completely open to the world, and there is no intermediary (i.e. sense data) that stands in the way between our mind and physical objects (i.e. no veil of perception). How we perceive the world is how it is.

However, according to the time-lag argument, this cannot be correct. This is because it takes time for light waves to travel from an object to our eyes before it is perceived by our brain/mind. Therefore, we cannot be perceiving physical objects directly as they are, as we are always perceiving things as they were. This temporal disconnect means we must perceive something separate and distinct from the physical objects themselves (i.e. sense data).

This is most clearly illustrated by the fact that it takes at least eight minutes for light waves to travel from the sun to our eyes. This means that if the sun disappeared our ‘perception of the sun wouldn’t disappear until at least eight minutes later. Therefore, our perceptions of the sun must be separate and distinct from the actual sun.

Question 24

Explain a response to the time-lag argument

Answer 24

Whilst this is true that there is a time lag, never claims that we perceive objects simultaneously with the object. In all cases, we are still directly perceiving objects, but just as they were.
Stronger objection:
Direct realism can reply that this is a confusion between how we perceive and what we perceive. Compare these two pairs of questions:

1. ‘Can you see the lake?’ and ‘Can you see the light reflecting off the lake?’
2. ‘Can you see the paper?’ and ‘Can you see the light reflecting from the paper?’

In (1), we can turn our attention from the lake to the light reflecting off it. So we can talk, literally, about seeing the light. But in (2) there is no difference in what one is supposed to see. To ‘see’ the light that the paper reflects is just to see the paper. In fact, you cannot see the light itself – only the paper. So, direct realism can argue, except in special conditions, we don’t perceive light waves directly and physical objects indirectly. Light waves are part of the story of how we see physical objects.

The time lag involved in how we perceive means we see the physical object as it was a moment before, not as it is now. This means that we literally see (into) the past. This does not mean we are not perceiving objects directly and does not require to posit sense-data, it is just how we perceive means we perceive the world directly in the past.

Question 25

Explain indirect realism

Answer 25

The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
Indirect realism states that we do not perceive objects directly instead we perceive mind-dependent sense-data (Caused by and represent physical objects). We must infer, on the basis of these sense data, the nature of that reality, Because perception involved this inference, it is indirect.

Question 26

Explain John Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction

Answer 26

Primary qualities exist in an object regardless of what we do. They are ‘utterly inseparable from the object regardless of the changes that it does go through. These are things like density, mass and volume. They are the properties of an object that are not related by definition to perceivers.
Secondary qualities only exist if someone perceives them, making them mind-dependent. They are ‘nothing but powers to produce various sensations in us’ like colours and sounds. They are the quality that an object can only have in relation to its being seen by someone and are relational to the object.

Question 27

Explain the issue for indirect realism: the argument that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects.

Answer 27

A criticism of indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects. This is because we are only ever aware of our sense data with which we must infer and are never directly in contact with reality. It is a possibility that our senses are deceiving us. For example, Descartes argues in the Meditations that there could be an evil demon tricking us about our reality and therefore our senses and sense data may not correlate with what is actually three, leading us to question whether mind-independent objects exist.

Question 28

Explain the response: Locke’s argument from the involuntary nature of our experience

Answer 28

Locke responds to this by arguing that we cannot choose whether we experience objects in the way that we can choose to imagine a particular object. If I can’t control what sensations i have then they ‘must be produced in my mind by some exterior cause’. Thus we do not need to be sceptical about the existence of mind-independent objects.

Question 29

Explain the response: the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Locke and Catharine Trotter Cockburn (attrib)

Answer 29

They argue that our sensations can often confirm each others’ reports concerning the existence of perceptible things outside us. Our sense of sight and touchback each other up, for example. We can check if an object is thereby touching it. We have knowledge of an objective reality, as we can learn which experiences coincide and once that association is made we can accurately infer one experience to another. Thus we do not need to be sceptical about the existence of mind-independent objects.

Question 30

Explain the response: Bertrand Russell’s response that the external world is the ‘best hypothesis’

Answer 30

A response from Bertrand Russel’s ‘Problems of Philosophy’ is that the external world is the ‘best hypothesis’. He proposes two hypotheses:
1. Physical objects exist and cause my sense-data
2. Physical objects do not exist and therefore are not the cause of my sense-data
He admits we cannot ever prove either and therefore should pick the one that is the simplest and is in tune with our intuition unless it leads to inconsistency. The possibility that there is an external world aligns with our common sense and is simple as it doesn’t require positing other ideas such as an evil demon. This means the existence of an external world is the ‘best hypothesis’ and should be accepted and therefore avoids scepticism in indirect realism.

Question 31

Explain the response: the argument from George Berkeley that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects.

Answer 31

Berkeley argues that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects. He attacks the primary and secondary qualities distinction by disagreeing with the fact that primary qualities in an object resemble our experience of them.

We cannot separate the idea of something from its secondary qualities. We cannot think of an object with only primary qualities and thus there is no distinction.

Berkeley’s Likeness Principle states that ideas or sense data can only resemble other ideas and therefore we can make no sense of the claim that our ideas could be like or resemble the primary qualities of objects.

Question 32

Explain the meaning of ‘intuition’ and ‘deduction’ and the distinction between them.

Answer 32

Intuition and deduction are a priori methods for gaining knowledge: (Rational) intuition: The ability to know something is true just by thinking about it E.g. Descartes’ cogito argument below. Deduction: A method of deriving true propositions from other true propositions (using reason)

Question 33

Explain René Descartes’ notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’.

Answer 33

The basic or self-justifying ideas that Descartes hopes to use as the foundations for his system of knowledge. Clear and distinct ideas are truths of reason, truths that can be known with the mind alone. Descartes’s examples of clear distinct ideas are the basic claims of logic, geometry and mathematics. These resist any sceptical attack since we recognise the truth immediately using our faculty of ‘intuition’.
For example, it is vain to ask how I know that triangles have 3 sides. Such knowledge is given in the very act of understanding the terms involved. There is no further evidence you need to appeal to in order to justify such knowledge.

Question 34

Explain Descartes’ cogito as an example of an a priori intuition.

Answer 34

In the meditations, Descartes doubts his beliefs until he finally reaches a point of certainty. He concludes he cannot be deceived about his existence using the cogito:
P1: I am thinking
P2: (hidden premise) All thinking things exist
C: Therefore, I exist.
However, Descartes explicitly denies the cogito is a deduction, but rather ‘a simple intuition of his mind shows it to him as self-evident’. In the Meditations, Descartes needs the cogito to work as a simple intuition as he is still working under the assumption that a demon may be deceiving him, and this could affect the validity of his memory (Which is required in a long argument). The argument transcends doubt since if you doubt, you must exist. It is also self-verifying as the claim “I do not exist: is self-defeating - it is an assertoric inconsistency. Therefore, Descartes uses a priori intuition to prove his existence.

Question 35

Trademark argument:

Answer 35

From his clear and distinct ideas of God and himself, Descartes attempts to deduce God’s existence using a priori reasoning in the trademark arguement. The argument can be summarised as follows:
P1: The cause of anything must be atl least as perfect as its effect.
P2: My ideas must be caused by something.
P3: I am an imperfect being.
P4: I have the idea of God, which is that of a perfect being.
IC1: I cannot be the cause of my idea of God (from P1, P2, P3 and P4)
IC2: Only a perfect being such as God can be the cause of my idea of God (from P1 and P4)
C: God must exist (from P4 and IC2)
Descartes uses the causal principle that ‘total cause of something must contain at least as much reality as does the effect’ to show that an idea of a perfect being must have a cause as real as that effect and therefore must be caused by a perfect being i.e. God.

Question 36

Contingency argument:

Answer 36

Descartes argues that his own existence is enough to prove there is a God. His argument can be summarised as follows:
P1: The cause of my existence as a thinking thing must be a)myself, b) I have always existed c) my parents or d)God
P2: I cannot have caused myself to exist for then I would have created myself perfect,
P3: Neither have I always existed for then I would be aware of this.
P4: My parents may be the cause of my physical existence, but not of me as a thinking mind.
C: Therefore, only God could have created me.

Question 37

Ontological argument

Answer 37

Descartes argues that his mind can tell any intelligible object and work out which features are essential to it. Ontological arguments claim that from a careful analysis of the concept of God we can know a priori that God must exist. Therefore according to proponents of the ontological argument it is an a priori, analytic truth that God exists.
Secondly, Descartes also outlined an ontological argument to prove the existence of God. His argument is:
I have the idea of God
The idea of God is the idea of a supremely perfect being
A supremely perfect being does not lack any perfections
Existence is a perfection
Therefore, God exists
Descartes’ argument is presented within the context of radical doubt and from ‘searching’ his mind he notes he has the idea of a God (P1) which he defines as a ‘supremely perfect being’. God can’t lack any perfections as then He wouldn’t be ‘supremely perfect’. Descartes argues existence is a perfection as it is entailed by omnipotence being a perfection, for to be omnipotent a being could not depend on anything else to exist and therefore must possess necessary existence. Therefore, the ontological argument proves the existence of God.

Question 38

Explain Descartes’ proof of the external world as examples of a priori deductions

Answer 38

Having proved the existence of God, Descartes overcomes his doubts about whether all clear and distinct ideas can be known with certainty and of the material world by arguing that God would not allow him to make incorrigible errors as God is not a deceiver. Therefore, he can trust his clear and distinct ideas and the external world must be caused by material reality.

Question 39

Explain the empiricist response: responses to Descartes’ cogito

Answer 39

What does it mean to say ‘I exist’ or ‘I think? Descartes claims that he is a thinking thing. He is the same thing from one thought to another. But can Descartes know this? The evil demon may deceive him: perhaps there is only a succession of thoughts, nothing that persists between thoughts which is a single thing.

In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume develops the argument as follows: we don’t experience a continuing mental substance over time, we only experience a continually changing array of thoughts and feelings. So what is the basis for thinking that there is a thing that thinks? In coming up with the idea of a ‘thinking thing’ – a mental substance – we confuse similarity for identity. We’ve confused our experience of the similarity of our thoughts and feelings from one moment to the next with the idea that there is one identical ‘thing’ persisting through such thoughts and to which they belong.

Question 40

Explain the empiricist response: responses to Descartes’ cogito - What is Descartes Response

Answer 40

Descartes’ response to this objection, in an appendix to the Meditations called ‘Objections and Replies’, is to say that thoughts logically require a thinker. But is this something Descartes could be deceived about?

Perhaps it is true that there can’t be thought unless something thinks it. But that doesn’t entail that the ‘thinker’ is a subject that persists from one thought to another. Hume argues that even if we experience thinking as active in this way, how does our experience enable us to move to the claim that I am one and the same active substance, persisting through time and different thoughts?
As soon as Descartes says that to be a thinker is to doubt, will imagine, and so on, he assumes we can say these activities belong to the same subject, that he (the same thinker) does all this. But perhaps the evil demon is simply creating a series of false thoughts, among which is the thought that a thinker, a substance, an ‘I’, exists. Descartes’ claims about what he is could be false.

Is the cogito an example of knowledge by rational intuition? Descartes will argue that it is, because it is a clear and distinct idea. But first, we have just questioned whether it is clear and distinct that I am a mental substance. Second, Hume argues that we can know immediately about our minds through impressions of reflection. This will be a priori knowledge and intuitively certain, but impressions of reflection don’t provide us with knowledge of our existence as a mental substance.