Metaphysics II - Universals & substance

Question 1

What is a particular?

Answer 1

Individual spatio-temporal entity that can only be/occur in one palce at the same time

Question 2

What is a universal? What forms do they usually take?

Answer 2

Entity that can be in more than one place at the same time, over many particulars

Usually referred to as properties of individuals & relations between individuals

Question 3

What is the problem of the one-over-the-many?

Answer 3

Metaphysical problem of universals: how can one single universal appear in many particulars at the same time?

Question 4

What are the six solutions to the one-over-the-many problem?

Answer 4

1. Plantonic universals
2. Aristotelian univerals
3. Predicate nominalism
4. Class nominalism
5. Resemblance nominalism
6. Trope nominalism

Question 5

What is realism about universals?

Answer 5

View that there are universals in the mind-independent world

Question 6

What is nominalism about universals?

Answer 6

Anti-realism with respect to universals -> tries to explain commonality between particulars without postulating universals

Question 7

What is the basic difference between Platonic and Aristotelian universals?

Answer 7

Contrasting conceptions of universals and theor ontological status

Question 8

Plato is a [realist/antirealist] when it comes to universals

Answer 8

Realist

Question 9

What are the properties Platonic universals? (4)

Answer 9

1. Mind-independent
2. Transcendent
3. Ideal
4. Self-predicative

Question 10

Where are Platonic universals located?

Answer 10

The world of forms/ideas -> transdencent

Question 11

What is transcendent?

Answer 11

Outside space/time

Question 12

Are all forms in the world of forms materialized in the actual world?

Answer 12

No, there are forms that remain subsisting in the world of ideas (as opposed to existing)

Question 13

What does it mean for Platonic universals to be self-predicative?

Answer 13

“Circularity is circular” –> the predicate is part of the universal

Question 14

What is the status of instantiations of the world of forms in the actual world, according to Plato?

Answer 14

These are always imperfect

Question 15

What is the danger of self-predication of Platonic universals?

Answer 15

It leaves his theory open to the Third Man Argument: the manhood that two men instantiate, constitutes a third man, and the commonality that these instantiate, instantiate a further man, and so forth -> leads to an infinite regress

Question 16

What are the properties of Aristotelian universals? (3)

Answer 16

1. Mind-independent
2. Immanent
3. Not self-predicative

Question 17

What is immanent?

Answer 17

Located in space and time

Question 18

What is the status of universals in Aristotle’s view?

Answer 18

They exist as ‘the set of all things’ with an exactly resembling property in a very specific respect
Universals are one and the same property/relation over many particulars

Question 19

What is the objection to Aristotelian universals?

Answer 19

General regress problem: each ontology that differentiates between universals and particulars has to appeal to and explain instantiation, leaving it open to an instantiation regress

Question 20

What is instantiation?

Answer 20

The relation between a property and an object having the property

Question 21

What is the instantiation regress faced by Aristotle?

Answer 21

Having to explain commonalities of properties and relations in terms of universals, two instances of instantiation share a universal instantiation, and so on -> infinite regress

Question 22

Which instantiation does Plato invoke?
Which instantiation does Aristotle invoke?

Answer 22

Plato: particulars ‘imitate’ or ‘participate in’ universals/forms
Aristotle: commonalities of properties/relations instantiate a universal

Question 23

What is a Bradley’s regress?

Answer 23

The instantiation regress faced by any ontology differentiating between universals and particulars

If instantiation is a relation, then in case a particular instantiates a universal, there must also be a relation between the particular and the instantiation relations, and another relation between the universal and that instantiation relation, ad infinitum

Question 24

What is predicate nominalism?

Answer 24

“The banana is curved because the predicate applies to/is true of the banana”

Reverses the order of explanation as opposed to Plato and Aristotle (who say that the banana is curved and the actual world and we give the predicate to it)

Question 25

What is the main objection to predicate nominalism? What is the reply of predicate nominalists?

Answer 25

This is 'ostrich nominalism' -> it buries its head in the sand for the one-over-the-many problem Predicate nominalists: realism about universals sees a problem when there are no problems -> the one-over-the-many problem does not exist

Question 26

What is class nominalism?

Answer 26

If two or more particulars have the same property, it is because they are members of the same class/set of particulars = reductive explanation of properties in terms of classes/sets of entities

Question 27

What are the objections to class nominalism? (2)

Answer 27

1. Co-extensive properties -> if all objects in a class share two or more properties, these properties would equate to one another -> this is counterintuitive 2. Non-instantiated properties should be all identical, because they constitute a class without any members = null class

Question 28

What are non-instantiated properties? How are they relevant to class nominalism?

Answer 28

Non-instantiated properties = properties that do not apply to any particular in the real world All non-instantiated properties belong to the class of non-instantiated properties = the null class, making them effectively identical to one another, while they are used do designate very different things

Question 29

What is resemblance nominalism?

Answer 29

If two or more particulars have the same property, it is because they are members of the same class/set of particulars that resemble one another

Question 30

What is an important property of the resemblance in resemblance nominalism?

Answer 30

It is primitive -> otherwise we would have to specify in what respect they resemble one another, which would constitute a universal

Question 31

How does resemblance nominalism differ from class nominalism? (2)

Answer 31

1. Resemblance nominalism is based on the resemblance between individuals, whereas class nominalism groups into broader classes 2. Class nominalism presupposes the existence of classes

Question 32

What is an important problem for resemblance nominalism?

Answer 32

The problem of uniquely instantiated property -> a property that only one object has cannot be accounted for through resemblance

Question 33

What is trope nominalism?

Answer 33

If two or more particulars have the same property, it's because they are qualitatively identical, but have numerically distinct abstract particulars -> each property is uniquely instantiated

Question 34

What is the advantage of every property being uniquely instantiated in trope nominalism?

Answer 34

Allows for qualitative identity without quantitative identity -> two/more things can have exactly the same property, without that property being quantitative

Question 35

What is a trope?

Answer 35

An abstract property/relation that is uniquely instantiated by the object(s)

Question 36

What is numerical identity?

Answer 36

Being one and the same entity

Question 37

What is qualitative identity?

Answer 37

Being the same in one or more respects

Question 38

What is the biggest critique on trope nominalism?

Answer 38

It generates a new regress problem -> every resemblance between the tropes of two objects constitutes another (relational trope) -> this will go on ad infinitum

Question 39

How do trope nominalists argue that they don't up with a problematic regress problem?

Answer 39

The regress in trope nominalism is not vicious, but virtuous -> the relationship is always unique

Question 40

What is the metaphysical binding problem?

Answer 40

Question how an object in the mind-independent world integrates/assembles its properties

Question 41

What is the problem of individualization?

Answer 41

If two objects have exactly the same properties, what differentiates them?

Question 42

How does Aristoteles solve the problem of individualization?

Answer 42

Through matter: the matter that constitutes one particular is different from the matter that constitutes another particular

Question 43

How does Duns Scotus (=scholastic philosopher) solve the problem of individualization?

Answer 43

Each object has haecceity = primitive thisness -> the properthy that makes an individual thing an individual

Question 44

What are contemporary solutions to the metaphysical binding problem?

Answer 44

1. Substance-attribute theories 2. Bundle theories 3. Compresence 4. Factualism

Question 45

What are substance-attribute theories?

Answer 45

View that an object is constituted by attributes/properties and substances (=bearers of properties)

Question 46

What is a substratum?

Answer 46

An object with all its properties stripped away (the substance of the object, without its attributes)

Question 47

What is the problem when stripping away all of an object's properties to obtain the substratum?

Answer 47

The property of the substratum to be able to bear properties still remains -> still leaves us with the substratum to explain

Question 48

How can we deal with explaining substrata? (3)

Answer 48

1. The notion of substrata is inexplicable -> notion of substrata has to be dropped 2. Substrata are to be explained further in subsubstrata -> yields an infinite regress 3. Conceive of substrata as 'bare particulars'/'naked substrata' = entities that do not have any properties

Question 49

How does bundle theory deal with the metaphysical binding problem?

Answer 49

An object is nothing more/less than a bundle of properties, with properties conceived of as either universals or tropes If we strip away all properties, there is no substratum left

Question 50

What are the advantages of bundle theories over substance-attribute theories? (2)

Answer 50

1. They do not face an infinite regress, since there is no need to invoke an instantiation relation between two fundamentally different kinds of being, since there is only one kind of being 2. They evade a choice between explaining why substrata can bear properties in terms of other properties or rendering the notion of substrata unintelligible

Question 51

What is the problem of bundle theories?

Answer 51

They don't explain what causes certain properties to bind in a bundle; even if this is explained in term's of co-location, it still does not explain why these properties are colocated

Question 52

What is Russell's answer to the question why properties in bundles stick together?

Answer 52

Compresence: simultaneous presence together of properties or experienced qualities in a unique way -> no other object can have exactly the same bundle of properties

Question 53

How does Russell solve the problem of individualization?

Answer 53

He precludes two objects from having exactly the same bundle of properties -> there is always a property that differentiates the objects

Question 54

What is the most contemporary proposal to the metaphysical binding problem?

Answer 54

Factualism: the world is a world of states of affairs or facts

Question 55

Who are the main proponents of factualism? (3)

Answer 55

1. Wittgeinstein 2. Armstrong 3. Russell

Question 56

What are facts?

Answer 56

States of affairs = universals and thin particulars bonded together

Question 57

What is a thin particular?

Answer 57

Particulars without their properties

Question 58

What is the ontological status of facts in factualism? What does this mean?

Answer 58

They are ontologically basic -> they are the truth-makers of the true propositions

Question 59

What are states of affairs?

Answer 59

Facts = universals and thin particulars bonded together

Question 60

How does factualism see universals?

Answer 60

Universals are abstractions from facts/states of affairs -> it results from thinking about properties in isolation from their particulars

Question 61

What are thick particulars?

Answer 61

Particulars with their properties

Question 62

What are the advantages of factulism, according to Armstrong?

Answer 62

1. The solution of universals for the one-over-the-many problem 2. The solution of thin particulars to the binding problem/problem of individualization

Question 63

How does factualism yield a solution to the one-over-the-many problem?

Answer 63

Factualism allows for abstract individuals -> they do not exist as such in the world (because they can never be torn from their particulars) and thus do not face a regress problem, but can explain how abstract universals occur in many particulars Only conceptual thinking -> does not occur in the real world

Question 64

How does factualism yield a solution to the metaphysical binding problem/problem of individuation?

Answer 64

Abstract thin particulars -> do not exist as such in the world (because their properties can never be torn from them), but they are responsible for individuation/binding

Question 65

What does Armstrong call his factualism? Explain every term.

Answer 65

Non-relational immanent realism Non-relational: there is no need to explain a relation between universals & particulars -> they can never be torn from one another Immanent: facts exist in our world Realism: universals are the bycatch of facts/states of affairs in the external world

Question 66

What are the critiques on Armstrong's factualism?

Answer 66

1. Armstrong makes use of ontologically basic facts without explaining how he got by them, nor how particulars and universals are bound together in these facts 2. It does not take into account change over time -> only applies to the facts as they are in one particular snapshot/exact moment

Question 67

What is meant with 'ontological free lunch'?

Answer 67

Solutions to metaphysical problems without postulations, because they are implied by more basic postulations

Question 68

What is conceptualism about universals?

Answer 68

View that universals exist as mind-dependent entitiesw

Question 69

What is the cognitive binding problem?

Answer 69

Question of how our minds integrate/assemble disparate experiential inputs into a unified experience as of a discrete object

Question 70

What is the semantic problem of universals?

Answer 70

Problem that since general terms cannot name particulars, they must name universals