Epistemology I - Analysis and possibility of knowledge Flashcards

1
Q

Belief condition

A

S knows that p only if S believes that p

So: belief is a necessary belief for knowledge

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2
Q

Brain In a Vat

A

Skeptical alternative that you do not know you have hands because it is possible that all you are is not a person of flesh and bones, but rather a Brain In Vat stimulated in such a way as to have all your experiences

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3
Q

Cartesian skepticism

A

Defining skeptical problems in terms of skeptical alternatives

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4
Q

Causal analysis

A

S knows that p if and only if:
(1) S believes that p
(2) p is true
(3) the fact that p is causally connected in an appropriate way in S’s belief that p

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5
Q

Closure

A

If S knows that p, and p rules out q, then S knows that q is ruled out

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6
Q

Contextualism

A

View that if a skeptical alternative q is contextually salient, S doesn’t know that p

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7
Q

Defeater

A

True proposition q, such that if S were justified in believing that q, S would not be justified in believing that p

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8
Q

Epistemic luck

A

It is accidental/coincidental/fortuitous that S has a true belief that p

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9
Q

Epistemic subject

A

Person or group that believes or knows that p

Traditionally represented with S

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10
Q

Epistemology

A

Domain of theoretical philosophy that deals with the kinds, analysis, possbility, structure, value, sources and dimensions of knowledge

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11
Q

Gettier problem

A

The traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief is lacking because there are cases in which justified belief can stem from epistemic luck

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12
Q

Justification condition

A

S knows that p only if S’s belief that p is justified

So: justification is a necessary condition of knowledge

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13
Q

No defeaters analysis

A

S knows that p if and only if
(1) S believes that p
(2) p is true
(3) p is justified for S
(4) There is no true proposition q such that, if S were justified in believing that q, S would not be justified in believing that p

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14
Q

No false lemmas analysis

A

S knows that p if and only if
(1) S believes that p
(2) p is true
(3) p is justified for S
(4) S’s ground for believing p does not include any false proposition q

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15
Q

Relativism about truth

A

View that there are no absolute truths -> truth is always relative to a believer or group of believers

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16
Q

Relevant alternatives approach

A

View that S can only know that p only f S can rule out any alternative explanation q that is relevant in the context

Note: skeptical alternatives are never considered to be a relevant alternative

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17
Q

Sensitivity condition

A

S knows that p only if it is true -> if p were not true, S wouldn’t believe that p

18
Q

Skeptical alternative

A

q is a conceivable and thereby logically possible alternative explanation to p, which is incompatible with p, and cannot be ruled out

19
Q

Traditional analysis

A

Tripartite analysis/JTB-analysis:
S knows that p if and only if
(1) S believes that p
(2) p is true
(3) p is justified for S

Belief, truth and justification are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge

20
Q

Truth condition

A

S knows that p only if p is true

So: truth is a necessary condition of knowledge

21
Q

Plato does not agree with truth relativism, but employs another system to attain truth. What is this method?

A

Correspondence theory of truth -> something is true when it corresponds with reality

22
Q

What can be seen as a weakness of truth relativism?

A

It does not distinguish between holding something true and something being true

23
Q

How does Plato do away with truth relativism?

A

He points out the weakness of truth relativism:
-Either truth relativism is relatively true -> argument lacks for and is not convincing to those who were not already convinced in the first place
-Or truth relativism is absolutely true, in which case there is at least one truth that is not relatively but absolutely true, and the system of truth relativism breaks down

24
Q

What is the function of the justification condition in JTB analysis?

A

To rule out epistemic luck

25
What is the relevance of the Gettier problem to JTB analysis?
It shows that it is lacking
26
Which two strategies and four substrategies have been devised to deal with Gettier problems?
1. Adding extra conditions -No false lemma's -No defeaters 2. Replacing the justification condition -Causal analysis -Sensitivity condition
27
What is the problem of the no false lemma's analysis?
It can be both too loose and too strict: -To loose: think Nogot and his non-existing Ford -Too strict: think 99 true premises & one false lemma
28
What is the problem of the no defeaters analysis?
It is too strict -> there is always further (hypothetical) information that may undermine what is rational to believe -> there is no end to this condition Example: Mrs. Grabit
29
Who proposed causal analysis?
Goldman
30
What is the problem with causal analysis?
It still does not rule out certain cases of epistemic luck Example: Fake Barn Country
31
What is the problem with the sensitivity condition?
It raises the bar for knowledge very high -> if we take into account the existence of skeptical paradoxes that we cannot rule out, then we can never satisfy this condition
32
What is a standard form of a skeptical paradox?
(1) S knows that p (2) S doesn't know that not-q (3) If S knows p, then S knows that not-q We can neither know which of the premises is true -> we can never satisfy the truth condition of JTB analysis
33
What is the name for the last premise of a skeptical paradox?
Closure = if S knows that p, then S knows that not-q
34
What are the four strategies to solve skeptical paradoxes?
1. Skeptical approach: apply modus tollens and remove the first premise = S knows that p -> rejection of knowledge 2. G.E. Moore's modus ponens: remove the second premise = S doesn't know that not-q -> rejection of the skeptical alternative 3. Contextualism: based on the context and the salience of the skeptical alternative within that context, it is/isn't taken into account. Cannot deny closure. 4. Relevant alternatives approach: similar to contextualism, but can deny closure in such instances as the skeptical alternative q is not deemed relevant
35
Which modifications can and can't contextualism make to a skeptical paradox?
Modification: removing the first or second premise Can never be modified: third premise = closure
36
What determines whether the first or second premise is removed in contextualism?
Salience of the skeptical alternative in the given context
37
What is the difference between contextualism and the relevant alternatives approach?
Contextualism can never deny closure, while the relevant alternatives approach can
38
What is the general rule of the relevant alternatives approach?
Because it is not possible to exclude all alternatives in order to know something, we should only exclude relevant alternatives
39
What is the status of skeptic alternatives in the relevant alternatives approach?
They are never regarded as relevant
40
How does the relevant alternatives approach handle a relevant alternative q in the context?
S should know that not-q to know that p
41
How does the relevant alternatives approach handle a non-relevant alternative q in the context?
If q is not relevant, then S can know p regardless of knowing not-q = denial of closure
42
What is the main problem of the relevant alternatives approach? What could be a solution?
Who determines what is a relevant alternative? Solution: look at the objective probability of the alternative