metaethics (7) Flashcards

1
Q

meta ethics

A

asks larger questions than both normative and applied. it asks whether right/wrong even exist.

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2
Q

two connected debates

A

first, meta ethics is discussion about meaning of ethical words like ‘good’. are they true or false but other things we say arent making claims but statements which would be weird to ask whether true.

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3
Q

language

A

some view it as cognitive, when we say ‘murder is wrong’ we are saying it can be true or false
others say non-cognitive, we are merely expressing our feelings on an issue.

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4
Q

second connected debate

A

meta ethics is about reality and existence. some argue that moral truths actually exist and are features of the world. anti-realists claim there are no direct moral truths.

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5
Q

three main theories

A

naturalism: suggests good/bad can be discovered empirically the same way we know facts about the world
intutionism: suggests they actually exist but cannot be discovered. they are self evident and known by intuition.
emotivism: rejects view they actually exist we are merely showing our opinion. this is anti-realist and non cognitive.

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6
Q

types of naturalism

A

appplying natural law: Aquinas views the world to have God given order that we can know through reasoning.
generally thought to lead to moral absolutism, fixed truths that are to be discovered.

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7
Q

John Stuart Mill

A

offers naturalism based on his utilitarinism. we can see that certain actions lead to pleasure/pain, letting us know what is right. human desire for pleasure must men there are things desirable.

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8
Q

naturalism is right to say that moral values are a feature of the world

A
  • Mill argues that we are able to know what is good through our desires.
  • naturaists point ti he fact there is agreement on moral values worldwide, suggesting it is fact
  • reducing morality to a matter of opinion reduces significance of ethical debates
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9
Q

naturalism is wrong to say that moral values are a feature of the world

A
  • Hume rejects conventional idea that they can be observed. says we move on too easly from factual statements to moral.
  • guilty of naturalistic fallacy. if something is natural, then it must be good
  • GE Moore criticses Mill saying pleasure does not equal goodness
  • asusmes that there is a set telos for human beings.
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10
Q

Intuitionism

A

associated with GE Mooe. He accepts Hume’s view that there is a gap between ‘is and ought’, so naturalism wrong to say morals can be discovered.

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11
Q

principle ethica

A

Moore’s book:
- closed questions are when there is only one answer possible.
- open questions have multiple probable answers.
this is used to reject naturalism, if Mill is right then it would be a closed question whether pleasure is good. however, pleasurable thins do bring good

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12
Q

‘goodness’

A

While Moor thinks it is undefinable, he is cognitivist and realist. there are truths to right.
goodness is known intuitivily and is self-evident. Moore argues that good is simple, not broken into properties.

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13
Q

yellow

A

Moore’s example. we would struggle to define what ‘yellow’ is but we recognise the colour and are able to point to it. we can do this with goodness.

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14
Q

intuitionism is right to say that moral values are self evident

A
  • takes the fact-value problem seriously. does not attempt to find moral value trough observation
  • recognises moral agreement
  • able to establish moral facts and ensure right/wrong arent opinion
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15
Q

intuitionism is wrong to say that moral values are self evident

A
  • moral agreement is not universal- difficult for intutionists who would claim all are self evident
  • seems unscientific and far fetched, no clarity on what the ‘power of intuition is’
  • if moral vales are not empirical, no difference between that and emotion
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16
Q

emotivism

A

comes from AJ Ayer, his verification principle is based on Hume and the 20th century Austrian philosopher ‘Vienna circle’.Hume sais there are 2 types of knowledge: Relation of ideas (priori, how facts link 3+2-5) and matters of fact (posteriori, what we can observe).

17
Q

Vienna circle

A

infuenced by Wittgensteins’s early philosophy and shared his view that aim as to analyse language. statements only true if able to be verified.

18
Q

Ayer’s verification principle

A

argues statements are meaningful if:
analytical statement- true by definition
synthetic statement- possible to say how it cold be verified
if a statement does not fit it is meaningless

19
Q

how to understand ethical statements

A

Ayer is concerned not with statements meaning, but what they are for. argues ethical statement are merely expressions of emotion.

20
Q

emotivism is right to suggest that moral statements merely show approval of actions

A
  • emotivism has an easier task in explaining why people have different moral views
  • avoids naturalistic fallacy- recognises that disputes in ethics are driven by desire rather than emotion
21
Q

emotivism is wrong to suggest that moral statements merely show approval of actions

A
  • renders debate useless. if both sides are expessing feeling there is no point
  • may trivialise ethical discussion. Phillipa Foot uses concentration camps- that must be ethically wrong
  • Hare argues that moral language is prescrptive and designed to change out mind.
22
Q

Mackie’s 3 arguments

A

relativism: there is too much disagreement about right/wrong for it to be factual
empiricism: Mackie supports Hume in arguing there is nothing available to senses which would give idea of right
Queerness: if good/bad exists then it would be weird. meaning unusual. moral ideas are action guiding and we behave because of them.

23
Q

ethical terms are meaningful

A
  • widespread agreement about what is good and broadly similar across cultures.
  • if ethical terms describe something real then we can speak about ideas of moral progress. if there we no such thing as ‘good’ no need to speak of progress.
  • no such thing as right/wrong then this would require we tolerate other answers
  • lack of values suggests lack of meaning, nihilism. Nietzche would see this as a possibility to replace things we do not like.
24
Q

Wittgenstein

A

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1919) made argument that misunderstanding language cause of many philosophical problems. philosophers were like flies in a jar, by paying close attention to language you could be freed. This led to people like Ayer focusing on misunderstanding.

25
MacIntyre and meta ethics
Alasdair MacIntyre 1981 book 'After Virtue' critiques meta ethics. argues society has dismantled ideas such as telos, but wants to use that to discuss morals. many have embraced existentalism, meaning moral ideas will fail. MacIntyre believes it is a distraction from real ethics.
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discussion of meta ethics is most important
- highest level of ethical discussion. it is important to address the question before proceeding - meaning is important and if not addressed danger of creating problems - prevents a descent into nihilism
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discussion of meta ethics is NOT most important
- little relevance for day to day moral thinking. - if meta ethics is felt to be important then futher discussion still remains. - After Virtue expresses how focus on meta ethics has been harmful to moral development
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