Meta-Ethics Flashcards
What is the first way of thinking about meta-ethics?
One way of thinking about meta-ethics is to understand the topic as two connected debates. First, meta-ethics is a discussion about the meaning of ethical words such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Are they statements that can in some sense be true or false, or do these words have some other function? If we state that ‘he is wearing a green hat’ or ‘Liverpool is further north than London’ it is clear that these sentences will be either true or false. Other things we say are not making claims about the world, however. When we shout ‘hurray!’ or utter a swearword, it would be strange if someone asked us whether our cheer or curse was true or not!
How do some philosophers see moral language?
Some philosophers see moral language as cognitive - when we say ‘Murder is wrong’, we are saying something that can be shown to be either true or false, in the same way that ‘It is raining outside’ can be true or false.
Other philosophers disagree and suggest that moral language is non-cognitive - when we make a moral statement, we are merely expressing our feelings on an issue. It is not in any sense true or false.
What is the second way of thinking about meta-ethics?
The second, related debate in meta-ethics is about reality and existence. Some philosophers are realists and argue that moral truths actually exist and are real features of the world. Other philosophers, known as anti-realists, reject this, claiming that there are no moral truths in the world.
These two debates, and the one about meaning and the one about existence - are connected in this topic.
What are the three main theories?
- Naturalism
- Intuitionism
- Emotivism
What is naturalism?
Naturalism suggests that ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ can be observed and discovered empirically - using our senses - in the same way that we find out other factors about the world around us. Naturalism is a realist and cognitive theory. Moral claims are able to be either true or false. It agrees with intuitionism that facts exist about what is right and wrong.
The distinctive point that naturalism makes is that these moral truths are able to be discovered by observation of the world around us. They are thus empirical facts. Moral values can be empirically discovered.
What is intuitionism?
Intuitionism suggests that good, bad, right and wrong, actually exist but cannot be seen or discovered in the same as other facts. Moral truths are self-evident and are known by intuition. Intuitionism is a realist and cognitive theory.
What is emotivism?
Eomtivism rejects the view that good, bad, right and wrong actually exist. When we make moral statements, we are simply showing our opinions and feelings. Emotivism is an anti-realist and non-cognitive theory.
How is naturalism right to say that moral values are a feature of the world?
- Mill argues that we are able to know what is good or desirable as these are things that people actually desire. The very fact that people all want happiness is enough to show that happiness is actually a good thing.
- Naturalists point out that there is an agreement on moral values throughout the world. The fact that we largely agree on what is right and wrong suggests this is a factual matter (similar to us agreeing that bricks are a solid and not a liquid or a gas) rather than a matter of opinion (such as discussion of whether an artist’s music is good).
- Reducing morality to a matter of taste or opinion reduces the significance of ethical debates. Discussing whether or not killing is wrong is not the same as discussing food preferences.
How is naturalism wrong to say that moral values are a feature of the world?
- Hume rejects the conventional wisdom of his day that right and wrong can be observed. There is a fact-value distinction or gap. He is concerned that we move too easily from factual statements (‘is’ and ‘is not’) to moral statements (‘ought’ and ‘ought not’). When we consider an action that is wrong, we cannot empirically detect the vicd or wrongness.
- G.E. Moore offers a criticism of Mill’s naturalism. Pleasure cannot be the same thing as goodness as it is still possible to ask if the pleasure is truly good. For example, eating chips is a pleasure, but we can still ask whether this is truly good.
- Some forms of naturalism, particularly Aquinas’, make the assumption that there is a purpose or telos for humans, and this may ultimately require the existence of God. Many modern philosophers, including Sartre with hus existentialism, would reject these assumptions. If there is no definite purpose, there cannot be any definite ideas on goodness,
What did Hume say further about naturalism?
Hume said that a moral statement is not the same as a factual statement. You cannot treat them same or assume that one naturally equals the other. For example, abortion is a termination of a pregnancy. This is a factual statement. You cannot move from the factual statement to the moral statement as the moral statement is about opinion and therefore uses subjective evidence to back it up.
A naturalist might well provide evidence to prove that abortion is wrong. But a different naturalist might provide evidence to suggest that abortion is right under certain circumstances.
What did Moore say about intuitionism?
‘If I am asked “What is good?” my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked “How is good to be defined?” my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it’. - G.E.Moore.
Intuitionism is mainly associated with Moore. Moore acceptd Hume’s point that there seems to be a gap between facts and values, hence naturalism is wrong to suggest that moral values can be discovered.
How does Moore explain why there is a gap between facts and values?
Moore explains this problem with his open question argument:
- Closed questions are questions where only one answer is actually possible. For example, if we are told that someone is a bachelor, the question ‘Is he married?’ only has one possible answer (it is like asking if a particular triangle happens to have 3 sides).
- Open questions are questions where several different answers are possible. For example, asking if a bachelor’s hair is brown could have several possible answers. Likewise, the question ‘Does the triangle have a right angle?’ has more than one possible answer.
Moore uses this to reject naturalism. If Mill is right that pleasure is good, then it ought to be a closed question to ask if something that brings pleasure is really good. This is not the case, however. Something that brings us pleasure may or may not be good; it is an open question. This problem arises whenever we try to define what is good in terms of something that is observable in the world.
Understanding good
Although Moore thinks ‘goodness’ cannot be defined, he is a cognitivist and realist. There are truths about what is right and wrong. Goodness is known intuitively; it is indefinable but soef-evident. To explain what this means, Moore makes a comparison with the colour ‘yellow’. We would struggle if we were asked to define what yellowness, is, yet each of us knows and recognises the colour and is able to point to it. Similarly, goodness cannot be described but we can point to many examples that we ‘just know’ are good.
Moore argues that ‘good’ is a simple idea. Like the concept of yellow, it cannit be broken into parts or proerties. A complex idea might be something like a horse, where we could list the parts or break the idea down into components list the parts of tellowness or goodness because they are simple ideals.
What did H.A.Pritchard say?
It is not only the idea of good that cannot be defined but also working out what one’s obligation is. We know that we have obligations to society. For Prtichard, intuitionism was the joining of reason and human intuition to help people to decide what to do based on facts. Reason collects the facts concerned and intutition determines which course to follow. Therefore we know what is right/good and also what we ought to do.
He believed that everyone has a different moral intuition - some more developed and clearer than others. In a situation where moral obligations clashed he simply said examine the situation and choose the greater obligation.
There course of action X might be best, but why should I bring such a course of action about? Duty and the good are separate things. Duty is something beyond the good thing to do.
“Suppose we ask ourselves whether our sense that we ought to pay our debts or to tell the truth arises from our recognition that in doing so we should be originating something good, e.g. material control in A or true belief in B, i.e., suppose we ask ourselves whether it is this aspect of the action which leads to our recognition that we ought to do it. We, at once, and without hesitation answer ‘No’ […]” - Pritchard
In deciding whether to give to a charity, reason collects all of the data on the charity and the alternative uses of the resource, the people concerned and the various possible outcomes. Intuition determines what we should do. Ethical dilemmas are about making a choice between different actions were there are conflicting moral obligations. In the case of giving to charity, which charity? Should the money be used for other purposes? Intuition identifies which obligation is greater. Moral obligations are not linked to the intrinsic goodness of any action. One simply considers the different obligations in the situation at hand.
However, Pritchard does not explain how we discriminate between different options when different people have different intuitions about what is right. We might be required to use our imagination to hypothesise what we would think if we were in the same situation before we can intuit the correct course of actions
What did W.D.Ross?
W.D.Ross agreed that ‘good’ and ‘obligations’ are intrinsically undefinable. He believed that a set of basic moral principles are apparent prima facie (at first appearance). Our moral obligations are apparent and must be followed unless there is another greater obligation that exists. He saw this as intuitionism at work, as our intuition identifies our prima duties and we then make our moral decisions based on this intuition that we have. Ross’ approach tells us to obey the greater prima facile duty; however he doesn’t expand this to tell us which duties are the greater one.
Principles can sometimes conflict. For instance, to keep a promise, I may have to tell a lie. For example, ‘Promise you won’t tell him I am hiding in the attic’, says the younger sister. ‘Tell the truth now, where is she hiding’, says the older brother. Another problem is that principles may change from one culture to another. Consider this sentiment, which might seem odd in one culture and normal in another: ‘Take the husband your parents have chosen for you. Your personal freedom is not as important as an experienced judgement that the whole family approves of’. Ross argues, therefore, that principles should not be taken as absolute.
Ross and Moore argued that moral theories are lists of principles from which we deduce courses of action Utilitarianism, natural law and Kantian ethics offer different lists of moral principles that operate in this way.
