MBE Questions Flashcards
Last year, Congress enacted legislation providing for funding opportunities to eligible secular and religiously affiliated colleges and universities. The funding will be available through individual counties as each county’s funding limitations allow. The legislation does not require that each county apply standard guidelines nor does it provide any suggested guidelines other than a statement that “all counties should track funding and compile guidelines in the event of a federal audit.”
A county awards a large grant to a religiously affiliated college that employs a substantial number of residents. The grant contract, signed by representatives from both the county and the college, states as follows: “All grant monies must be used in compliance with county regulations. Further, the college must track the allocation of grant monies throughout the grant term.”
Is the county’s award of the grant constitutional?
A) No, because the county provided grant monies to a religiously affiliated college.
B) No, because it does not require that the aid be used only for nonreligious purposes.
C) Yes, because the college is required to track funding.
D) Yes, because the college may be the subject of a federal audit.
B) No, because it does not require that the aid be used only for nonreligious purposes.
Governmental financial assistance to religious institutions is permitted IF
1) the aid is secular in nature/ used only for secular purposes, and
2) when the aid is distributed among secular and religious institutions, the distribution criteria must be religiously neutral.
A state enacted a law that prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors and imposed a fine for each violation. The legislative history demonstrated a concern that there was a correlation between playing such games and subsequent violent behavior. A maker of video games brought suit contending that this law violated its First Amendment right of free speech. Is this law unconstitutional?
A) Yes, because the costs of such a restriction on speech outweigh its benefits.
B) Yes, because the state law is a content-based restriction.
C) No, because video games do not qualify for First Amendment protection.
D) No, because states have the power to protect children from harm.
B) Yes, because the state law is a content-based restriction
The state law = content-based restriction
subject to strict scrutiny = regulations must be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest
A public university adopted the following policy: In order to be recognized as a student organization with rights to school facilities and funds, an organization must permit any student to be a member regardless of the student’s status or beliefs. One student organization was a local chapter of a national organization that restricted membership in local chapters to members of a particular religious sect and denied membership to homosexual individuals. May the university apply its policy to the student religious group?
A) No, because the policy violates the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.
B) No, because the policy violates the First Amendment Freedom of Association Clause.
C) Yes, because a public university is free to allocate its funds among student groups in any rational manner it sees fit.
D) Yes, because a public university is a limited public forum and the policy is viewpoint neutral.
D) Yes, because a public university is a limited public forum and the policy is viewpoint neutral.
A state airport commission adopted a regulation prohibiting the solicitation of money inside airport terminals, but permitted the solicitation of money on the pathways outside the terminals where travelers were accessible. The commission adopted the regulation due to the disrupting effect solicitation had on travelers attempting to reach their gates, causing delays and congestion in the terminals. Fundraisers from an organization devoted to raising money to help cure cancer attempted to solicit donations in the airport terminal, and were detained for violating the regulation. The organization has challenged the constitutionality of the regulation. Is the regulation constitutional?
A) No, because a ban on all solicitation is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.
B) No, because the regulation preventing solicitation in airport terminals is not content neutral.
C) Yes, because the ban on solicitation is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
D) Yes, because the regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for communication on the sidewalks outside the airport terminals.
C) Yes, because the ban on solicitation is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
government may regulate speech-related activities in nonpublic forums as long as the regulation is
(i) viewpoint-neutral and
(ii) reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
An airport terminal is considered a nonpublic forum.
Here, the ban on solicitation in the airport terminals is viewpoint-neutral because it prohibits all types of solicitation; it does not target solicitation based on the specific cause. The ban is also reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of avoiding a disruptive effect for travelers inside an airport terminal.
The President issued an executive order in an effort to encourage U.S. citizens to use the metric (Celsius) system of temperatures. Section 1 of the executive order requires the U.S. Weather Bureau, a federal executive agency, to state temperatures only in Celsius in all weather reports. Section 2 of the executive order requires all privately owned federally licensed radio and television stations giving weather reports to report temperatures only in Celsius. No federal statute is applicable.
Is the President’s executive order constitutional?
(A) Section 1 is constitutional, but Section 2 is not.
(B) Section 2 is constitutional, but Section 1 is not.
(C) Sections 1 and 2 are constitutional.
(D) Sections 1 and 2 are unconstitutional.
(A) Section 1 is constitutional, but Section 2 is not.
The President, as the chief executive officer of the U.S. government, has authority to direct the actions of federal executive agencies, so long as the President’s directives are not inconsistent with an act of Congress. (The facts state that there is no applicable statute here.) Section 2 of the executive order is unconstitutional. At least as a general rule, the President does not have authority to direct the actions of persons outside the executive branch unless the President’s direction is authorized by an act of Congress. There are no circumstances presented in the facts (such as a sudden attack on the United States) that might justify an exception to this general rule.
The childhood home of a former U.S. president is part of a national park located in a city. The National Park Service entered into a contract with an independent antique collector to acquire items owned by residents of the city during the former president’s lifetime. According to the contract, the collector purchases items and then sells them to the Park Service at a price equal to the collector’s cost plus a 10% commission. Purchases by antique collectors are ordinarily subject to the sales tax of the state in which the city is located. The collector has filed suit in state court to enjoin collection of the tax on these purchases for the Park Service, claiming that the sales tax is unconstitutional as applied to them.
Should the state court issue the injunction?
(A) No, because as the purchaser of the antiques, the collector, rather than the federal government, is liable for the tax.
(B) No, because the suit is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
(C) Yes, because the federal government is contractually obligated to pay the amount of the sales tax when the government covers the collector’s cost of the antiques.
(D) Yes, because under the supremacy clause, the federal program to acquire the antiques preempts the state sales tax on he purchase of these items.
(A) No, because as the purchaser of the antiques, the collector, rather than the federal government, is liable for the tax.
The responsibility for the state sales tax on the collector’s purchases of antiques is on the collector, who is independent of the National Park Service. The fact that the collector passes the cost of the tax on to a federal agency when the collector sells an item to the agency does not change the responsibility for the tax on the collector’s purchase
Note: There is no indication in the facts that the sales tax on the collector’s purchases conflicts with any federal law governing the Park Service’s program. Moreover, the responsibility for the state sales tax on the collector’s purchases of antiques is on the collector, who is independent of the National Park Service.
Congress enacted a federal statute providing that any state may “require labeling to show the state or other geographic origin of citrus fruit that is imported into the receiving state.” Pursuant to the federal statute, a state that produced large quantities of citrus fruit enacted a law requiring all citrus fruit imported into the state to be stamped with a two-letter postal abbreviation signifying the state of the fruit’s origin. The law did not impose any such requirement for citrus fruit grown within the state. When it adopted the law, the state legislature declared that its purpose was to reduce the risks of infection of local citrus crops by itinerant diseases that have been found to attack citrus fruit. A national association of citrus growers has sued to have the state law declared unconstitutional. The association claims that the law is prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Which of the following is the best argument in favor of the state’s effort to have this lawsuit dismissed?
(A) Any burden on interstate commerce imposed by the state law is outweighed by a legitimate state interest.
(B) Congress has the authority to authorize specified state regulations that would otherwise be prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause, and it has done so in this situation.
(C) The state law does not discriminate against out-of-state citrus growers or producers.
(D) The state law furthers a legitimate state interest, the burden it imposes on interstate commerce is only incidental, and the state’s interest cannot be satisfied by other means that are less burdensome to interstate commerce.
(B) Congress has the authority to authorize specified state regulations that would otherwise be prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause, and it has done so in this situation.
Congress may use its commerce power (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution) to permit states to discriminate against interstate commerce. The federal statute here explicitly authorizes states to enact state-of-origin labeling requirements on imported citrus fruit.
The President created an office to encourage the improvement of local communities through faith-based organizations. The office was funded from monies appropriated by Congress for the general discretionary use of the President. The office provided support only to religious organizations. A taxpayer brought suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of this office. The federal government has moved to dismiss this suit.
Should the court allow the taxpayer’s suit to proceed?
A) Yes, because the funding of the office violates the First Amendment establishment of religion clause.
B) Yes, because the source of the funds for the office is a congressional appropriation.
C) No, because the plaintiff as a taxpayer lacks standing.
D) No, because the First Amendment establishment of religion clause does not apply to the executive branch.
C) No, because the plaintiff as a taxpayer lacks standing.
A taxpayer has standing when the taxpayer’s suit
(1) challenges legislation enacted under Congress’s taxing and spending power and
(2) alleges a violation of a specific constitutional limitation on that power
Here, the taxpayer has challenged the President’s expenditure of general discretionary funds—not the legislation enacted under Congress’s taxing and spending power that allocated those funds to the President
Note: The question is not asking about substantive law, but if the taxpayer has standing!
In response to growing concerns about the overcrowding of landfills with scrap metal nationwide, Congress passed a statute requiring all unwanted vehicles to be disposed of at federally licensed auto-recycling facilities. These facilities were able to recycle more components of vehicles than most other recycling facilities. However, due to the high operating costs of these facilities, the cost of disposing of the vehicles was much higher than the cost of disposing of them at general-purpose recycling facilities. A state wants to dispose of its fleet of decommissioned trucks at a state-operated recycling facility. However, this facility is not federally licensed.
Is the state permitted to dispose of its decommissioned trucks at the state-operated facility?
A) No, because the federal statute was passed pursuant to Congress’s power to legislate for the general welfare.
B) No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce.
C) Yes, because the market-participant exception applies.
D) Yes, because states are given broad discretion in areas governed by the state’s police power.
B) No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce.
The commerce clause gives Congress broad authority to regulate interstate commerce—including in-state activities that substantially impact interstate commerce, singly or in the aggregate.
Here, the aggregate is an important issue
Note: The taxing and spending clause permits Congress to tax and spend (not legislate) for the general welfare
Note: The DCC does not authorize states to violate a federal statute (as seen here).
The Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives initiated impeachment proceedings against a federal district court judge. The President, a lifelong friend of the judge, considered the grounds for impeachment that were being discussed to be politically motivated and without substantial merit. Prior to any hearing on the matter by the House committee, the President pardoned the judge.
What effect does this pardon have on the impeachment proceedings against the judge?
A) The proceedings must stop, because the President’s power to pardon is plenary.
B) The proceedings must stop, because the President acted in good faith in granting the pardon.
C) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President’s power to pardon does not extend to impeachment.
D) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President may not pardon a person until that person has been convicted.
C) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President’s power to pardon does not extend to impeachment.
The President has the plenary power to grant reprieves and pardons to persons who commit federal offenses—except in cases of impeachment.
A small, struggling, formerly industrial city in one state was only 30 miles from the border of a neighboring state and only 40 miles from a booming city in the neighboring state. In an effort to entice more citizens of the neighboring state to come to the small city to shop, dine, and otherwise spend money, the small city passed an ordinance relieving out-of-state citizens from paying the small city’s sales tax. A group of small-city citizens properly brought a suit against the city, challenging the ordinance.
Of the following constitutional provisions, which would be the basis on which the citizens could most effectively challenge the ordinance?
A) The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
B) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C) The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2.
D) The privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1) Equal protection: Discriminatory treatment of similarly situated people
Here, the small city’s ordinance is discriminatory because out-of-state citizens are relieved from paying the small city’s sales tax while in-state citizens are not.
2) Due process:
+ Substantive – deprivation of life, liberty, or property without adequate justification
+ Procedural – deprivation of life, liberty, or property without adequate process
3) Privileges or immunities: Interference with rights of national citizenship – RARELY THE RIGHT ANSWER!
Note: The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the federal government give individuals notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard when depriving them of life, liberty, or property. Here, the citizens are challenging a city ordinance, so this clause does not apply.
Faced with poorly performing public schools in a city, the state instituted a state-funded voucher program for parents with school-age children who lived in the city. The state gave parents a voucher for each school-age child that could be used either toward tuition for the child to attend a private school in the child’s school district, whether parochial or not, or be presented to the child’s public school, which would receive the same amount in additional funding. The choice of whether to attend a private or public school was solely left to the parents and their child. Over 95 percent of the vouchers were used by parents toward tuition payments to parochial schools. The program contained no restrictions as to how the schools could use the funds.
Is this program constitutional?
A) No, because the primary effect of the program is to provide state aid to parochial schools.
B) No, because the program contains no provisions to prevent the use of state aid to fund religious instruction at the parochial schools.
C) Yes, because governmental financial assistance that benefits both religious and secular educational institutions is constitutional.
D) Yes, because the purpose of the program is secular and funding is only directed to religious institutions through individual choice.
D) Yes, because the purpose of the program is secular and funding is only directed to religious institutions through individual choice.
The government can provide indirect funding to religious institutions if the funding program comports with historical practices and understandings of the establishment clause—i.e., when funding flows to religious schools through individual, not government, choice.
A religious leader ran a temple in honor of his sect’s gods. For weeks, the religious leader solicited numerous offerings from the community, including some cash donations, and explained to donors that the offerings would be “put toward the temple’s efforts to combat global warming.” After he collected these offerings, the religious leader burned all of them, including the cash, in a ritual offering to one of the gods to request divine assistance to counter the effects of global warming. The state charged the religious leader under a state statute that makes it a crime to make fraudulent claims in order to solicit monetary donations. The charge was based on the assertion that “the defendant should have known that the god does not exist and burning cash donations as a pious offering would have no effect on global warming.” The state has never brought a similar charge against leaders of other religions who collected donations.
Which of the following is the religious leader’s strongest constitutional defense to the charge?
A) The charge denies the religious leader’s free exercise of religion because the charge depends on the reasonableness of his sincerely held beliefs.
B) The charge denies the religious leader’s rights under the obligation of contracts clause because it criminalized the collection of voluntary monetary donations.
C) The charge violates the equal protection clause because no leaders of other religions have been charged under this statute.
D) The ministerial exception protects the religious leader from criminal liability under this statute based on the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.
A) The charge denies the religious leader’s free exercise of religion because the charge depends on the reasonableness of his sincerely held beliefs.
A state highway administration, acting pursuant to statutory authorization by the state legislature, has promulgated rules for large electronic billboards located along roads maintained by the state. These rules stem from concern about the potential for driver distraction and the ensuing adverse consequences for highway safety. Among the rules is one that bans the graphic display of violence. The producer of a movie wants to promote the movie through a short clip from the movie on billboards subject to this rule. The clip contains a graphic display of violence. The producer has filed an action in the appropriate federal court challenging the state highway administration’s rule as a violation of the First Amendment as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
By which of the following standards should the state highway administration’s rule be judged?
A) As a rule that deals with a matter traditionally subject to regulation, it must be upheld unless it is arbitrary or irrational.
B) As a regulation of commercial speech, there must be a reasonable fit between the government’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.
C) As a time, place, or manner restriction, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.
D) As a content regulation, it must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
D) As a content regulation, it must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid and will be upheld only if they survive strict scrutiny—i.e., if the government proves that the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
Here, the state highway administration’s rule prohibits the graphic display of violence on large electronic billboards, so it should be judged as a content regulation
Concerned with the proliferation of signs about upcoming events and the failure to remove those signs after the event, a city enacted an ordinance specifying that “all signs concerning upcoming events may not be placed more than 14 days before the event and must be removed within 7 days after the event; no more than 10 signs per event are allowed on city property.”
A social organization wants to display signs about its monthly dinner, which is held to attract new members, in greater number and for a longer period than permitted by the ordinance. The organization has filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Of the following, by which standard will this ordinance be judged?
A) It must be narrowly tailored to further a significant government interest and leave open alternative channels of communication.
B) It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
C) It must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
D) It must not have a negative impact on the organization’s freedom of assembly.
B) It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid and will only be upheld if they survive strict scrutiny— restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
Here, the ordinance restricts the time period during which signs about upcoming events may be placed. It also restricts the number of those signs that may be placed on city property. Since the ordinance imposes these restrictions on one subject (upcoming events) but no others (e.g., candidacy for public office), it is a content-based restriction that is subject to strict scrutiny review.
Note: since the ordinance here is a content-based restriction, strict scrutiny applies.
A professional basketball player who was a citizen of one state sued an artist who was a citizen of another state. The artist had created multiple oil paintings of the player’s image from which limited-edition prints were created and sold without the player’s permission or consent. The player sought damages in excess of $80,000 for violation of his state statutory right to publicity.
The state trial court ruled in the player’s favor, but the state appellate court overturned this decision on the basis that the free speech clause of the state constitution created a privilege that protected the artist from this action. In making its decision, the appellate court relied on a recent decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court. The appellate court decision denied the player recovery on his state-based cause of action. The state’s highest court declined to hear the appeal. The player then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
Can the Supreme Court grant this petition?
A) No, because the player seeks to recover damages from the artist under a state statutory cause of action.
B) No, because the state’s highest court did not render a decision in this case since it declined to hear the appeal.
C) Yes, because diversity of citizenship exists between the player and the artist and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
D) Yes, because the state court decision relied on a recent decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.
D) Yes, because the state court decision relied on a recent decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court can choose to review final state-court decisions by certiorari unless the decision rests on adequate (state law fully resolves the matter) and independent (no federal precedent used) state grounds.
A man was charged with violating a state criminal statute in state court. While prosecution was pending, the man filed a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court, alleging that the state statute as applied to him violates the U.S. Constitution. The man sought an injunction against the state’s prosecution of him.
Should the federal district court hear the man’s claim?
A) No, because the man lacks standing since he has not been convicted and sentenced for a violation of the state statute.
B) No, because the man seeks an injunction against a pending state criminal proceeding.
C) Yes, because a federal court may enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
D) Yes, because the man has alleged that the state statute violates the U.S. Constitution.
B) No, because the man seeks an injunction against a pending state criminal proceeding.
Younger abstention doctrine: applied in declaratory or injunctive relief is sought in federal court. Requires abstention when such relief would interfere with a pending state proceeding on any criminal matter or a particular civil matter* that:
1) involves an important state interest and
2) provides an adequate opportunity to litigate the federal issue(s).
A state legislature passed a law requiring employers to provide their employees with health insurance that covered certain prescription drugs. Violation of this statute was considered a crime that subjected the offender to fines, which were described in detail in the statute. The law was effective immediately.
An employer did not provide her employees with insurance that covered the required drugs and argued that such drugs were prohibited by the religion practiced by the employer. The employer filed a complaint in federal court asserting that the law was unconstitutional and asked for a preliminary injunction against the attorney general to prevent him from enforcing the statute while the case was being heard. The attorney general filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
How should the federal court rule on the attorney general’s motion to dismiss?
A) Deny the motion, because the employer has taxpayer standing due to the imposition of fines.
B) Deny the motion, because the employer’s injury is imminent.
C) Grant the motion based on prudential grounds.
D) Grant the motion based on the doctrine of abstention.
B) Deny the motion, because the employer’s injury is imminent.
A plaintiff has standing to sue in federal court if he/she allegedly
(1) suffered an injury-in-fact;
(2) was caused by the defendant’s challenged conduct; and
(3) is redressable by a favorable judicial decision.
Here, the state statute requires employers to provide employees with health insurance that covers certain prescription drugs. Employers who violate the statute are subject to monetary fines. As a result, the employer here will suffer imminent financial harm (injury-in-fact) when she is fined for violating the statute (causation). The court can prevent this injury by granting her request for a preliminary injunction (redressability).
In order to discourage the transfer of electrical products that could threaten national security and to raise revenue, Congress enacted a statute that imposed a tax on the export of electrical products containing military-grade technology to countries that were determined to be hostile to the United States.
Is the federal tax likely constitutional?
A) No, because Congress does not have the power to tax exported goods.
B) No, because the tax unduly burdens foreign commerce.
C) Yes, because the commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce.
D) Yes, because the taxing and spending clause gives Congress the power to tax for any public purpose.
A) No, because Congress does not have the power to tax exported goods.
Congress has broad power to tax and spend for the general welfare. However, Congress can never impose taxes on exported goods or services or on services and activities closely related to the export process.
A violent storm resulted in severe property damage and extreme loss of life in States A, B, and C, which all became the subjects of emergency declarations by the President. The National Guard was present for three months in each state while recovery occurred. A year later, most of the damaged property had been reconstructed, and no current threat to life or property remained.
During a time of year when similar storms are common, the President instructed the National Guard to set up a presence within various points in all three states. Congress had previously enacted legislation allowing the President to deploy the National Guard in such a way. The President neither requested nor received authority from the governor of State C, the smallest state of the three, but he did receive authority from the governors of States A and B.
Was the President’s action constitutional?
A) No, because an emergency situation no longer existed at the time of the President’s order.
B) No, because the governor of State C did not authorize the presence of the National Guard.
C) Yes, because the President sent the National Guard to all three states.
D) Yes, because the President’s actions were aligned with permissible Congressional authority.
D) Yes, because the President’s actions were aligned with permissible Congressional authority.
Congress has the power to authorize the President to deploy the National Guard into action without the approval of the state governor to execute federal laws, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions.
A federal statute established a life insurance exchange that allowed U.S. citizens and noncitizens to purchase affordable life insurance policies through it. U.S. citizens were immediately eligible to participate in the exchange, but resident noncitizens were not eligible to participate in it until they had resided in the U.S. for at least five years. A resident noncitizen who has resided in the U.S. for four years was denied eligibility pursuant to the statute and has filed suit in federal court challenging the statute on constitutional grounds. Specifically, the resident noncitizen claims that the statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
Is the resident noncitizen likely to prevail?
A) No, because Congress has plenary authority over immigration and naturalization under Article I of the Constitution.
B) No, because the statute violates the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C) Yes, because national origin is a suspect classification that triggers strict scrutiny.
D) Yes, because the statute is not substantially related to an important government interest.
A) No, because Congress has plenary authority over immigration and naturalization under Article I of the Constitution.
The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment requires federal laws based on U.S. citizenship to satisfy rational basis scrutiny. This level of scrutiny places the burden on the challenger to prove that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress has a legitimate interest in providing benefits only to citizens because U.S. citizens have closer ties to the U.S. than noncitizen
The District of Columbia government has the power to levy an income tax. In an effort to encourage nonresidents to conduct business in the District of Columbia, Congress enacted a federal statute that prohibits the District of Columbia from imposing an income tax on individuals who work there but reside elsewhere.
Is the statute likely to be found constitutional?
A) No, because it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
B) No, because it violates the uniformity clause of Article I, Section 8.
C) Yes, under the enclave clause in Article I, Section 8.
D) Yes, under the Sixteenth Amendment.
C) Yes, under the enclave clause in Article I, Section 8.
The Enclave clause gives Congress plenary (i.e., exclusive) legislative power to govern the District of Columbia.
Note: The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to impose an income tax without apportioning it among the states on the basis of population. However, the amendment does not apply here since the statute prohibits the imposition of an income tax on nonresidents who work in the District of Columbia.
There has been a recent surge in the profitability of the agave nectar industry because more food and beverage manufacturers are utilizing agave in their food products instead of cane sugar. As a result, the cane sugar industry has been suffering economically. Agave plants are grown primarily in Mexico and South America. Congress recently enacted a statute placing a tariff on agave imported into the United States, causing the overall price of agave to increase.
An importer of agave into the United States has challenged the constitutionality of this statute because he lost significant business in the United States after having to raise the price of his imported agave products due to the import tariff.
Is the importer likely to succeed in his action?
A) No, because Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce.
B) No, because the tariff does not place an undue burden on interstate commerce.
C) Yes, because the benefits of the tariff are clearly exceeded by the burden it places on interstate commerce.
D) Yes, because the tariff impedes the importer’s constitutional right to free trade.
A) No, because Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce.
Commerce clause gives Congress plenary (i.e., absolute) authority to regulate foreign commerce, including power to impose tariffs (i.e., taxes) on imported goods like agave
A tenured professor who had been employed for 30 years at a state university was dismissed. A week before the dismissal took effect, the professor was informed that she was being dismissed due to allegations of plagiarism in several of her published works. The professor was not given the opportunity to respond to the allegations against her prior to her dismissal. Shortly after her dismissal, the professor contested her termination in a post-termination evidentiary hearing, at which her termination was upheld. The professor then filed an action in federal court, arguing that her termination was unconstitutional as she was denied due process of law.
Was the professor’s termination constitutional?
A) No, because the professor was not granted a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination.
B) No, because the professor was not provided with a pre-termination opportunity to respond to the allegations of plagiarism.
C) Yes, because the professor could be terminated without cause, so no due process was required.
D) Yes, because the professor received notice of her dismissal and a post-termination hearing.
B) No, because the professor was not provided with a pre-termination opportunity to respond to the allegations of plagiarism.
A public employee who can only be terminated for cause has a property interest in such employment—and termination is a serious deprivation of that interest—due process requires that the employee receive:
1) notice of his/her alleged misconduct
2) a pre-termination opportunity to respond to that allegation and
3) a post-termination evidentiary hearing to determine if the termination was warranted.
A policyholder sued her casualty insurance company for failing to timely pay a claim. The case reached the highest court of the state. The sole issue before the court was whether the policyholder was entitled to punitive damages. The company timely moved to recuse one of the appellate judges on the ground that the judge was pursuing a similar action against the insurance company seeking punitive damages in a state district court. Relying upon a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision to interpret state law, the judge determined that she did not need to recuse herself. As a result, the company’s motion was denied. The judge later cast the deciding vote in the court’s punitive damages decision in favor of the policyholder.
The company timely and properly filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking a review of the judge’s decision not to recuse herself.
Is the U.S. Supreme Court likely to review the state court’s judgment?
A) No, because the justice’s refusal to recuse herself was based on adequate and independent state grounds.
B) No, because the suit is moot.
C) Yes, because the judge’s refusal to recuse herself violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
D) Yes, because the Supreme Court may correct any erroneous ruling by a state judge.
C) Yes, because the judge’s refusal to recuse herself violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14th Amendment Due Process:
A judge must recuse him/herself from a case when
(1) the judge has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in it or
(2) a serious, objective risk of actual bias exists.
A state legislature enacted a statute that prohibits anyone convicted of a felony from voting in state elections. A group of released felons who had completed their sentences and paroles filed a class action in federal court, seeking a declaration that the statute violated their constitutional rights.
Is the court likely to uphold the statute as constitutional?
A) No, because it infringes upon the fundamental right to vote.
B) No, because it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C) Yes, because it is permitted by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
D) Yes, but only pursuant to the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2.
C) Yes, because it is permitted by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits states to prohibit felons—even those unconditionally released from prison—from voting in elections.
n an effort to counteract a steep increase in fire-related injuries and deaths, a state legislature enacted a law that prohibited more than seven people over the age of 18 from residing in the same home unless those people were members of the same immediate family. Violation of the law was punishable by a monetary fine and imprisonment. The legislature enacted the state law based on a study that found relatives who reside with another are more likely to be injured or killed during a fire because they attempt to rescue one another before escaping to safety. The study alternatively recommended offering fire prevention and safety training to the public as an effective means of reducing fire-related injuries and deaths. A homeowner charged with violating the state law has filed suit in federal court to challenge its constitutionality.
Is the state law constitutional?
A) No, because family membership is not a suspect classification.
B) No, because the law is not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
C) Yes, because a state’s police power authorizes it to punish criminal behavior with appropriate sanctions.
D) Yes, because the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
B) No, because the law is not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
Laws that substantially impair a fundamental right—e.g., related persons’ right to reside together in a single household—can be challenged on substantive due process grounds. Such laws are reviewed under strict scrutiny and rarely survive.
A state legislature enacted a statute that required land-based casinos and riverboats to pay a 35 percent tax rate on the revenue generated by the slot machines they operate in the state. Several years after the statute was enacted, the state’s riverboat industry suffered a severe financial depression. In an effort to aid the riverboat industry, the legislature lowered the revenue-tax rate on slot machines operated by riverboats to 20 percent because the revenues from slot machines represented a significant portion of the industry’s income. An owner of a land-based casino has filed an action in federal court that challenges the statute’s constitutionality.
Is the owner likely to prevail?
A) No, because the different tax rates are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
B) No, because the subsidy exception to the dormant commerce clause applies.
C) Yes, because the statute violates the geographic uniformity requirement of Article I.
D) Yes, because the tax discriminates against intrastate commerce.
A) No, because the different tax rates are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Equal protection challenges are generally subject to rational basis scrutiny. This requires the challenger to prove that the discriminatory government action has no rational relation to a legitimate government interest.
Here, the legislature lowered the revenue-tax rate paid by riverboats on the slot machines they operate to 20 percent. This modification of the tax rate was discriminatory because on-land casinos were still required to pay a 35 percent revenue tax on the slot machines they operated. However, since the riverboat industry was in financial peril and the slot revenue represented a significant portion of its income, the different tax rates were rationally related to the state’s interest in aiding the riverboat industry.
A state agency that issues licenses to real estate agents adopted a rule setting aside 10% of all licenses approved by the agency to racial minority groups. The purpose of the rule was to help redress the historical discrimination against these groups in the state and to help them achieve economic parity with other groups in society. An applicant who is not a racial minority and whose license application was denied has filed suit in federal court, arguing that the rule is unconstitutional. Assume that no federal statute applies.
Is the agency’s rule constitutional?
A) No, because it is not substantially related to an important governmental interest.
B) No, because it only remedies a general societal injustice.
C) Yes, because it is intended to help remedy past race-based discrimination.
D) Yes, because it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
B) No, because it only remedies a general societal injustice.
The constitution of State X grants the state legislature the power to redraw state legislative districts every 10 years. In the last redistricting cycle, the legislature created a “majority-minority” district for the state senate in which the black population comprised a majority of the voters who resided in the district. The legislature’s intent in creating this district was to increase the representation of black voters in the state senate because they had historically been disenfranchised in the state. A white resident of the legislative district is a registered voter. He filed suit in the appropriate court against the state legislators who drafted the redistricting map, challenging the district’s creation as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seventy percent of the state’s population is white.
If the court agrees to hear the plaintiff’s claim, is strict scrutiny the appropriate standard of review for the court to apply to this constitutional issue?
A) No, because 70 percent of the state’s population is white.
B) No, because the redistricting favors voters who have historically been disenfranchised in the state.
C) Yes, because the plaintiff is a racial minority in the majority-minority district.
D) Yes, because race was the predominant factor in creating the majority-minority district.
D) Yes, because race was the predominant factor in creating the majority-minority district.
Race cannot be the predominant factor used to draw boundary lines for state or federal legislative districts.
An employee of a large nondenominational church served five years as the minister for the church’s youth program. During the past year, the minister regularly missed work because he suffered from chronic migraine headaches. As a result of his frequent absences from work, the church’s governing body voted to terminate the minister’s employment. The minister filed suit against the church for monetary damages, alleging that its decision to terminate him violated a federal law that prohibits discrimination against public and private employees based on disability. In response, the church has filed a motion for summary judgment.
How should the court proceed?
A) Deny the motion, because the federal law is a law of general applicability.
B) Deny the motion, because the minister’s due process rights were violated.
C) Grant the motion, because the free exercise clause requires dismissal of the suit.
D) Grant the motion, because the minister does not have standing to sue.
C) Grant the motion, because the free exercise clause requires dismissal of the suit.
Ministerial exception protects religious organizations from civil liability for employment discrimination when they hire or fire employees who serve in ministerial roles.
Since the minister’s primary function was to advance the church’s religious mission, the church was immune from civil liability for its decision to terminate him.
A defendant was on trial for the murder of a police officer, which was allegedly ordered by the kingpin of a drug cartel known to be operating in the city. Because of the highly publicized nature of the case, the prosecution requested that the trial court issue a gag order that prohibited the publication of information about the proceedings. The purpose of the gag order was to prevent the release of sensitive information that might impair ongoing undercover investigations of other cartel members. The prosecution also requested that the court issue an order for a closed trial to protect the identities of witnesses, who feared violent repercussions if they testified.
After hearing arguments by the prosecution and the defense, the trial court issued the requested gag order and order for a closed trial. The court issued findings on the record and concluded that the publication of information about the proceedings might impair undercover investigations and that public attendance would endanger the lives of those witnesses who testified at trial.
Several newspapers that sought to attend and report about the trial appealed the orders, arguing that they were unconstitutional.
How should the appellate court rule?
A) Overturn both orders.
B) Overturn the order for a closed trial but uphold the gag order.
C) Uphold the order for a closed trial but overturn the gag order.
D) Uphold both orders.
A) Overturn both orders.
The First Amendment protects the right to publish lawfully obtained, truthful information about matters of public significance and the right to attend a criminal trial. Government actions that abridge those rights must survive strict scrutiny—i.e., they must be the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.
A student joined a small national organization during her freshman year of college after several of her friends, who were active in the organization, told her about the organization’s annual all-expenses paid ski trip for its card-carrying members. The student attended a recruitment drive, signed a pledge of loyalty, paid her annual dues, and received an organization pin. The student later joined other members of the organization at the ski resort. During a meeting around the ski lodge fireplace, the student learned for the first time that the organization was a radical organization. The organization’s members were preparing to use subversive means to achieve their objective of installing the organization’s spiritual leader as Supreme Dictator of the United States. To this end, the organization was stockpiling mind-control serum and planned to poison the nation’s water supply. After returning home, the student consciously avoided members of the organization and never participated in the organization’s activities again. However, the student’s name remained on the organization’s active-member roster, and she did not report the organization’s illegal objectives to the authorities.
Three years later, the student was offered employment at a federal agency. However, the agency rescinded the offer before the student accepted it because a background check revealed that she was still an active member of the organization.
Was the agency’s action constitutional?
A) No, because the student did not intend to install the organization’s spiritual leader as Supreme Dictator of the United States.
B) No, because the student did not personally participate in the organization’s subversive plot.
C) Yes, because the student continues to be listed as an active member of a subversive organization.
D) Yes, because the student had knowledge of the organization’s illegal objectives and failed to report them to the authorities.
A) No, because the student did not intend to install the organization’s spiritual leader as Supreme Dictator of the United States.
First Amendment Right of Association - not absolute, so government can punish (deny public employment) to people who:
1) are active members of a subversive organization
2) know of the organization’s illegal objectives and
3) specifically intend to further those objectives.
Congress enacted a statute that awards federal funds to school districts that provide adequate educational services to children with special needs. The statute grants a cause of action to parents against a school district that fails to provide adequate services to their children in accordance with the statute, and contains an inseverable condition requiring the award of attorney’s fees to parties that prevail in lawsuits based on violations of the statute. However, the statute is silent about whether expert fees must be awarded to parties that prevail in these lawsuits.
The parents of a child with special needs successfully sued their local school district for violating the federal statute. The court awarded damages, including attorney’s fees and expert fees.
Which argument provides the strongest constitutional basis for the school district to challenge the court’s award of expert fees?
A) Conditions imposed by Congress in the exercise of its spending power must be set out unambiguously.
B) Congress can only exercise its spending power to carry out another enumerated power.
C) The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits by private citizens against local governmental entities.
D) The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers that the Constitution does not expressly grant to the federal government.
A) Conditions imposed by Congress in the exercise of its spending power must be set out unambiguously.
Conditional federal funding is binding only if the conditions are clearly stated and unambiguous so that potential recipients of federal funds (e.g., local governments) may make an informed decision.
Note: spending clause grants Congress the power to enact laws that incentivize local governments to act in certain ways by placing conditions on their receipt of federal funds
A federal law provides that a U.S. citizen who votes in a foreign election forfeits U.S. citizenship. An individual who is a naturalized citizen of the United States votes in a national election held in her birth country. Based on the law, the State Department has refused to renew the individual’s passport. The individual has filed an action in federal court for a declaratory judgment that the law is unconstitutional because it deprives her of U.S. citizenship.
Is the court likely to find that the law is constitutional?
A) No, because Congress may not revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen that is obtained in good faith and without fraud.
B) No, because the law violates the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV.
C) Yes, because Congress has exclusive authority over naturalization.
D) Yes, because of the elections clause in Article I, Section 4.
A) No, because Congress may not revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen that is obtained in good faith and without fraud.
Congress has plenary (i.e., exclusive) power to regulate naturalization—i.e., the process through which noncitizens obtain U.S. citizenship. But the Fourteenth Amendment limits this power by prohibiting Congress from revoking the citizenship of any U.S. citizen without his/her consent unless that citizenship was obtained by fraud or in bad faith.
In order to save money, a state adopted a law restricting voting times and reducing the number of polling sites on Election Day. The law does not significantly impact the ability of voters to cast their ballots. The law applies to all state, local, and congressional elections occurring on Election Day.
Does Congress have the authority to override the law?
A) No, because the limitations are unrelated to the suppression of ideas.
B) No, because the voters’ ability to cast their ballots is not significantly impacted.
C) Yes, because the state cannot limit state or federal voting practices.
D) Yes, because the state law regulates congressional elections.
D) Yes, because the state law regulates congressional elections.
State legislatures have the power to enact laws that regulate the time, place, and manner of congressional elections (e.g., by establishing voting sites). But the clause also grants Congress the power to override those state laws by supplanting them with federal law.
Congress recently enacted a federal statute creating a five-member commission whose purpose is to identify and prevent threats to national security. The statute grants the members of the commission broad discretion and administrative and enforcement powers to conduct investigations into possible security threats. Commission members are required to report the results of their investigations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who was appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Upon receiving the investigation results, the Secretary advises the President on what, if any, action should be taken to address potential national security threats. The statute permits the President to appoint the members of the commission, which she did without seeking Senate approval.
Was the appointment of the commission members by the President constitutionally permissible?
A) No, because Congress cannot delegate this appointment to the President.
B) No, because the President needs the consent of the Senate to make these appointments.
C) Yes, because Congress can appoint members with administrative and enforcement powers.
D) Yes, because Congress can delegate these appointments to the President without Senate approval.
D) Yes, because Congress can delegate these appointments to the President without Senate approval.
The appointments clause grants Congress the power to delegate the appointment of inferior federal officers to the President alone (i.e., without Senate approval), the heads of executive-branch agencies, or the federal courts.
Congress recently enacted a federal statute that created a 10-member board with the authority to investigate methods to preserve endangered species of fish. The statute authorizes the board to issue and enforce rules that are necessary to prevent endangered species of fish from becoming extinct. The statute provides for four of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Three members are to be selected by the Majority Leader of the Senate and three by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Each member serves on the board during good behavior and can only be removed for good cause.
Is the statute unconstitutional?
A) No, because the congressional power to legislate for the general welfare permits Congress to delegate rulemaking authority to the board.
B) No, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress.
C) Yes, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.
D) Yes, because Congress cannot delegate rulemaking authority to the executive branch without providing clear guidelines.
C) Yes, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.
Federal officers:
(1) hold a continuing public office and
(2) have significant discretionary authority to administer and/or enforce laws (i.e., executive powers).
Must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the Article II appointments clause, which does not permit congressional appointments.
The United States Department of State adopted a rule that required passports issued to U.S. citizens born in a disputed territory to list their city of birth, rather than the country of birth, because the President had not formally recognized the foreign government that occupied the disputed territory. In response, Congress enacted legislation that required the Department of State to issue passports that listed the disputed territory as the birthplace of U.S. citizens who were born there.
A U.S. citizen born in the disputed territory applied for a passport, which was issued by the Department of State. Though the citizen listed the territory on his application, the Department of State listed the citizen’s city of birth as his birthplace. Wanting his passport reissued with the territory listed, the citizen seeks to enjoin enforcement of the Department of State’s rule in an appropriate federal district court.
How should the court respond?
A) Deny the injunction, because the President has exclusive power to recognize foreign governments.
B) Grant the injunction, because Congress may override the President’s decision to recognize foreign governments.
C) Refuse to hear the matter as a nonjusticiable political question.
D) Refuse to hear the matter because the citizen lacks standing.
A) Deny the injunction, because the President has exclusive power to recognize foreign governments.
When the President does not share power with Congress over a particular area—e.g., recognizing foreign governments—the President can exercise that exclusive Article II power without congressional interference.
Congress enacted and the President signed into law a federal statute that delegated the primary responsibility for developing and administering a toxic waste disposal program to a federal agency based on intelligible standards set forth in the statute. The statute also authorized the creation of a toxic waste fund that imposed the cost of disposing toxic waste onto the creators of such waste through a statutorily fixed fee. The statute requires the secretary of the federal agency to annually evaluate the fees that are collected to ensure that they offset the costs of the waste disposal program. If not, the secretary is required to adjust the amount of the fee accordingly. The statute provides that the secretary’s adjusted fee becomes effective 90 days after publication unless both houses of Congress adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving of the adjustment.
This year, the secretary proposed a fee increase pursuant to statutory authority. Both houses of Congress disapproved of the increase by resolution.
Is a challenge to the constitutionality of this provision likely to be successful?
A) No, because the President approved of the provision by signing the statute into law.
B) No, because the principle of bicameralism has been satisfied.
C) Yes, because the provision provides for a legislative veto of an executive action.
D) Yes, because the statute violates the nondelegation doctrine.
C) Yes, because the provision provides for a legislative veto of an executive action.
Once Congress delegates power to an executive agency, it cannot interfere with the agency’s functions without satisfying the legislative-action process. Any attempt to bypass this process is an unconstitutional legislative veto.
Bicameralism = Bill passes in both houses
Presentement = Bill goes to President for further action
State A derived much of its business from tourism based upon privately owned cruise lines incorporated in State A. State B, which is located just north of State A, recently enacted a statute creating an annual licensing requirement for any cruise line not incorporated in State B that uses State B’s ports. The licensing process was costly, and the licenses were difficult to obtain. There was no similar licensing requirement for State B cruise lines using the ports in State B. The cruise lines in State A typically travel north and must use the State B ports in order to maintain the facilities and services they offer.
Congress has not enacted legislation regarding the regulation of cruise lines using out-of-state ports.
If a cruise line located in State A challenges the constitutionality of the State B licensing requirement, which of the following would provide the strongest argument against the requirement?
A) The Article I commerce clause.
B) The Article IV privileges and immunities clause.
C) The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
D) The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.
A) The Article I commerce clause.
Here, the State B statute discriminates against out-of-state commerce by imposing an annual licensing requirement on cruise lines that are not incorporated in State B but use its ports. And there is no indication that the statute furthers a legitimate noneconomic interest—e.g., ensuring the competency and safety of cruise lines that operate in State B. Therefore, the Article I commerce clause provides the strongest argument against the constitutionality of the State B licensing requirement.
Note: The Article IV privileges and immunities clause prohibits states from discriminating against citizens of other states by denying them a right of state citizenship. But corporations (like cruise lines) are not considered citizens under this clause, so this clause does not apply.
Congress enacted a statute authorizing states to regulate and tax the financial services industry, even if the regulation or taxation otherwise discriminates against out-of-state commerce. A state enacted a statute that taxed all out-of-state financial services entities doing business in the state but did not tax in-state financial services entities doing business in the state. The purpose of the tax was to encourage the growth of the in-state financial services industry.
Assuming that the state statute is consistent with federal statutes regulating the financial services industry, is it constitutional?
A) No, because it violates the dormant commerce clause.
B) No, because it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C) Yes, because a state may tax a corporation doing business in the state.
D) Yes, because Congress specifically permitted this type of statute.
B) No, because it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Equal protection challenges to discriminatory state taxes are subject to rational basis review. Although encouraging the growth of an industry within a state is permissible, promoting domestic (i.e., in-state) business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is unconstitutional.
Note: Even when Congress has authorized conduct that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause, states must comply with other constitutional provisions when engaging in that conduct. This includes the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, which subjects discriminatory state taxes to rational basis review. This level of review requires that the discriminatory state tax rationally relate to a legitimate government interest.
A patient at a government-licensed, private nursing facility received financial assistance from the government for the medical care he received. The patient’s status was reviewed by a committee of physicians working at the facility to determine whether his level of care was appropriate and whether his continued stay in the facility was justified. The committee determined that the patient no longer needed the level of care provided by the facility and ordered his transfer to another nursing facility that offered a lower level of care.
Since the patient received financial support through a government-funded program, the committee notified the appropriate governmental official who administered the program. The official in turn contacted the patient and informed him that due to the decision of the committee of physicians, his medical financial assistance would be terminated unless he accepted the transfer. The patient was properly notified of an administrative hearing by the governmental agency that administered the program, and the hearing confirmed the official’s decision to terminate the patient’s medical financial assistance unless he accepted the transfer.
The patient sued the nursing facility for injunctive relief, contending that he was unconstitutionally denied his procedural due process rights with regard to the initial review of his status by the committee of physicians because he did not receive notice of the review or an opportunity to be heard.
Is the court likely to rule in favor of the patient?
A) No, because the decision was made by a committee of physicians working at a private nursing facility.
B) No, because the patient’s procedural due process rights were satisfied by notice and the administrative hearing.
C) Yes, because the nursing facility received substantial funding from the government.
D) Yes, because the nursing facility was licensed by the government.
A) No, because the decision was made by a committee of physicians working at a private nursing facility.
Private actors are treated as government actors when they perform a traditional government function or the government is significantly involved in their activities. BUT government funding (however substantial) or licensing does not trigger this doctrine.
Note: The state satisfied the patient’s procedural due process rights when the government agency provided him notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (i.e., an administrative hearing) before terminating his financial assistance. But this is not a basis for the court to rule in the patient’s favor since his due process challenge is based on the nursing facility’s decision to discontinue his care—not the state’s decision to terminate his benefits.
Condominiums located within a particular city block were known to be the center of illegal narcotics sales. Many individuals living within that city block had been arrested multiple times in connection with the illegal sales, and neighbors were outraged that the local police department did not attempt to do something more severe than individual, sporadic arrests.
The city took action by filing an action in the appropriate federal district court seeking the forfeiture of real and personal property involved in the illegal narcotics sales. After an ex parte hearing at which only the city was present, the court properly issued a warrant of arrest authorizing the seizure of private property. The city seized all condominiums that were located within the city block and any car that was known to have transported illegal narcotics.
A man whose condominium and car were seized in connection with the alleged crimes filed suit, alleging that he was not given prior notice of the city’s intent to seize his condominium and vehicle.
Were the seizures of the condominium and the vehicle proper in light of the principles of procedural due process?
A) The seizure of the condominium and the vehicle were both improper.
B) The seizure of the condominium was proper, but the seizure of the vehicle was improper.
C) The seizure of the vehicle was proper, but the seizure of the condominium was improper.
D) The seizure of neither the condominium nor the vehicle was improper.
C) The seizure of the vehicle was proper, but the seizure of the condominium was improper.
In civil forfeiture actions, procedural due process requires that the government satisfy certain conditions when it seizes real or personal property prior to providing notice and a hearing.
Here, the city seized the man’s car without providing him notice and a hearing. The car was known to have transported illegal narcotics, so the seizure served the city’s significant interest in preventing the car from being used for illegal activity in the future. That interest would have been frustrated by providing advance notice of the seizure since the car could have been moved or concealed before it was seized.
The city also seized the man’s condominium without providing him notice and a hearing. To determine whether real property may be seized by the government prior to providing notice and a hearing, the court must balance three factors
1) the private interest affected by the deprivation
2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through current procedures and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and
3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that other safeguards would entail.
