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Social Psychology > Lecture Three - Helping and Altruism > Flashcards

Lecture Three - Helping and Altruism Flashcards

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1
Q

Warnehen and Tomasello (2006)

A

We are born predisposed to help others

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2
Q

Baby Jessics

A

An 18 month old from Texas that got stuck in a well. The story got lots of donations and worldwide help.

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3
Q

Countries and giving

A

Most countries and governments only donate a small percentage of their GDP to helping overseas victims (less than 0.8% in the UK).
Only 6 countries in the G20 group also in the top 20 for giving. Wealth does not always predict international helping

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4
Q

UN OCHA (2012, 2013)

A

Disasters occur everyday and in 2012 over 4 billion people needed aid. Humanitarian disasters are on the increase due to climate change and political conflict.

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5
Q

FAO (2015) statement

A

Around 800 million people suffering from hunger, starvation and malnutrition.

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6
Q

Alpizar et al (2008)

A

Donors in a national park donated more when they were with friends and when the situation wasn’t anonymous

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7
Q

Rayniers and Bhalla (2013)

A

Reluctant altruism - Participants seem to follow social norms when it comes to helping behaviour and care about reputation

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8
Q

Cialdini et al (1997)

A

Negative state relief model - people help because they don’t want to feel bad.

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9
Q

Bateson et al (1983) - Defining altruism

A
  1. Participants see confederate take 10 ‘painful’ electric shocks
  2. Dishevelled confederate tells participant that they had a traumatic childhood experience with shocks
  3. Participants report how they feel and split into two groups, egoistic concern vs empathetic concern
  4. Experimenter asked participant if they want to take remaining shocks and stay until end of experiment
  5. Those high in egoistic concern left when able, those high in empathy stayed even if they didn’t have to.
  6. Bateson et al argue that this is evidence of altruism
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10
Q

Fulz, Bateson et al (1986) - manipulate empathy experiment

A
  1. Participants read two notes by student confederate about themselves
  2. In note 1 the confederate says they feel out of place, in note 2 they say they need a friend and ask if the participant wants to hang out (same sex)
  3. Empathy manipulated (participants either told to read objectively or to focus to how other person felt)
  4. Participants responses were either anonymous or not anonymous
  5. Regardless, there was a main effect of empathy – Participants in the empathy condition were more likely to volunteer for the confederate (presumably as a buddy/mentor)
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11
Q

Caldini (1997) - Empathy

A

Empathy motivations may be motivated due to a knowledge that they’ll feel bad afterwards, rather than a completely selfless motivation. There need to be more variables added to the study to make it more accurate.

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12
Q

The Identifiable Victims

A

IVE has demonstrated repeatedly that participants prefer to donate to a single identifiable victim (like Baby Jessica) than to a group of victims.

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13
Q

Kogut and Ritov (2005)

A

Participants shown a charity advert to raise money for Israel children. They were more likely to donate more money to sick ‘Rokia’ rather than 8 children. They were also more concerned when shown the advert about ‘Rokia’ compared to the group.

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14
Q

Kogut and Ritov (2007)

A

Replicated the Rokia study by asking participants to donate to tsunami victims. They gave names to all the victims but participants donated more and had more concern when one victim was mentioned.

Effect only present when victim was an in-group member

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15
Q

Small et al (2007)

A

Removed the in-group effect of the IVE by telling them about the effect. Participants then choose whether to donate to a single identifiable victim or to a group of victims. Participants just gave less to both single victims and groups, i.e. became less pro-social

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16
Q

Jenni and Lowenstein (1997)

A

Replicated the IVE paradigm but measured a number of plausible explanatory variables, e.g. perceived impact of donating, vividness of the victim’s situation, and empathy. Found that the IVE effect was explained by a proportion effect rather than vividness, i.e. Participants were more likely to make a utilitarian decision for a group

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17
Q

Erlandsson et al (2015)

A

Found that the IVE effect was due to increased empathic concern towards a single victim. Argued that this was due to increased vividness of their plight

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18
Q

Weber’s Law/Mother Teresa Effect

A

The size of a stimulus increases, our ability to detect changes in that stimulus decrease eg a light that is four times as bright is only judged to be twice as bright by participants.

Applied to donations, this means many more victims need to suffer for us to notice the difference, ie to feel the same level of concern and distress for the victims.

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19
Q

Fetherstonhaugh et al (1997)

A

Participants were shown 3 medical interventions with differences in efficacy and number of lives effected changing. They were more likely to choose the more efficient medicine without looking at how many people could take the medicine. This means participants were more insensitive to human life when it was presented statistically.

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20
Q

Basil, Ridgeway and Basil (2006)

A

Manipulated guilt and empathy in a donation study with 2x2 design. Guilt had a strong effect on intention to donate. This meant having guilt increased responsibility and prosociality.

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21
Q

Basil et al (2008)

A

Guilt mediated empathy

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22
Q

James and Zagekfa (2017)

A

Predicted different process for helping in-group/outgroup members.

Ingroup perpetrator and in-group victim condition was most prosocial and main effect in victim in-group condition was empathy.

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23
Q

Why is guilt not account for all outgroup giving behaviour?

A
  1. It’s difficult to manipulate
  2. Participants can react defensively
  3. Not relevant in many cases
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24
Q

Clark (2002) - Reputation on giving

A

Asked Participants to make a small donation over 10 trials. Telling participants about the overall donation amount did not increase donations, but giving info on individual donations caused an increase.

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25
Q

Andreoni and Petri (2004)

A

Participants increased donations by 59% if their identity was visible alongside their donation amount. Just making identity known had no effect. Anonymity decreased donations.

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26
Q

Fehr and Gachter (2002)

A

Not donating in a cooperation game led to punishments and negative evaluations from other participants.

27
Q

Barclay (2004; 2012)

A

Making large donations leads to positive evaluations and is a sign of political leadership

28
Q

Grace and Griffin (2006)

A

Participants give more when asked to wear a charity ribbon. West (2004) calls this ‘conspicuous compassion’

29
Q

Alpizar et al (2008; 2013)

A

Donors in a park in Costa Rica donated more when with friends than alone. In general, donors donate less if situation is anonymous.

30
Q

Reyniers an Bhalla (2013)

A

Participants display ‘reluctant altruism’

31
Q

Thornton et al (1991)

A

Participants donate less (frequency and amount) if solicitation method is anonymous regardless of framing, e.g. whether an image was used.

32
Q

Strategic motives for helping the outgroup:

A
  1. Helping in an intergroup context places the groups needs in the forefront (SIT).
  2. SIT asserts that groups wish to maintain positive distinctiveness. However, group memberships are fluid and groups need to cooperate frequently if they wish to do well.
  3. The ingroup must often help the outgroup for the benefits such helping provides, e.g. benefits to the group’s reputation as being fair and trustworthy.
33
Q

Nadler and Halabi (2006)

A

Helping relations are inherently unequal. Helping is associated with resources, knowledge and skills ie power and status. The act of helping puts the helper in a position ‘above’ the person in need. Helping affirms/re-affirms the helper’s position

34
Q

Nadler (2002)

A

Two types of help:

  1. Dependency-orientated - a full solution to the problem is provided. The target is perceived as incapable.
  2. Autonomy-orientated - help is partial and temporary. The focus is on helping the target to help themselves.
35
Q

Social status and giving

A

High status groups may prefer to give dependency-orientated help, particularly when group hierarchies are unstable. Lower status groups may refuse such help (perceived as handouts).

36
Q

Van Leeuwen and Tauber (2010)

A

Three motives for in-groups helping outgroups:

  1. Power and autonomy
  2. Meaning and existence
  3. Impression formation
37
Q

Power and autonomy evidence

A

Power and autonomy refers to the ingroup wanting to maintain a hierarchical relationship, e.g. ‘over-helping’ (Gilbert & Silvera, 1999) which can cause more stress than not being helped (Schnieder et al. 1996).

38
Q

Meaning and existence evidence

A

Meaning and existence refers to the helping providing a sense of purpose, i.e. that one’s group is valued and needed, e.g. the ‘Scrooge effect’ (Jonas et al. 2002). Van Leeuwen (2007) – appeals to collective pride of Dutch Ps more effective than guilt appeals, especially for high-identifiers.

39
Q

Impression formation evidence

A

Impression management refers to ways that helping makes our group appear positive, e.g. by demonstrating that our nation is fair, egalitarian, and competent (Nick Hopkins Scots vs. English).

40
Q

Bateson, Nettle and colleagues

A

Various effect of stylised eyes on posters:
• Reduced bicycle theft
• Reduced littering
• Increased charitable donations at a supermarket

41
Q

Shariff and Norenzayan (2007)

A

Particpants donate more when moral concepts (religious or secular) were made salient. Trait religiosity not a significant predictor.

42
Q

Dan Ariely (in Predictably Irrational)

A

Participants are more honest and prosocial when they place their hand on the New Testament (even if they identified as atheist).

43
Q

Benjamin Franklin (1798)

A

“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes”

44
Q

Becker (1971; 1973; 1975)

A

“The very knowledge of our existential certainty is one of the most fundamental motivations that directs human behaviour”

45
Q

Greenberg et al (1986) - Terror Management Theory (TMT)

A
  • Humans are unique in our self-awareness. We are aware of life, and that one day we will die. How does this realisation affect us?
  • One option is to refute death and embrace religious beliefs that life continues (Becker, 1973)
  • Another option is to see ourselves as part of a bigger picture, eg that we continue through our children (Wiseman and Goldberg, 2005)
  • Another way is through symbolic immortality, ie through institutions and ideologies that we identify with eg legacies, democracy
  • TMT is strongly linked with mortality salience, it what happens when we think about our mortality
46
Q

Mortality Salience Hypothesis (Arndy et al, 1997)

A

If psychological structures provide protection against anxiety, then reminding people of the source of their anxiety, mortality, should therefore lead to an increased need for that protection structure.

47
Q

Mortality salience makes us:

A
  • Defend our nation (Greenberg et al. 1990)
  • Show commitment to our ingroup (Dechesne et al. 1990)
  • Punish those who defy our beliefs (Rosenblatt et al. 1989)
  • Reluctant to use a valued symbol for a mundane purpose (Greenberg et al. 1995)
48
Q

Rosenblatt et al (1989)

A

• Court judges were found to treat the legal transgressor significantly harsher after mortality was made salient.
• When reminded of their mortality, judges were more punitive to those who threatened a valued aspect of their beliefs, that being the engagement in illegal behavior by the prostitute.
• Example questions:
‘Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you’
‘Jot down as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead’

49
Q

Indirect Reciprocity (Alexander, 1987)

A

Cooperate -> seen as a cooperator by others -> receive one-off benefit from 3rd party

Decision about who to cooperate with

50
Q

Competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998)

A

Cooperate -> seen as a cooperator by others -> chosen as a partner for profitable relationship

Decision about who best to form a partnership with

51
Q

Assumptions and inferences of competitive altruism

A

Individuals vary in quality as potential partners
Behaviour provides public information
Individuals can choose platonic and romantic partners

52
Q

Differences in cooperative strategy and in abilities/resources

A 
◦ Cooperative strategies 
◦ Free-riders
◦ Conditional and unconditional co-operators
◦ Others
◦ Abilities
◦ Individual differences
◦ Personality type
◦ Cognitive attributes
◦ Skills
◦ Resources
◦ Shelter
◦ Food
◦ Trading opportunities
53
Q

Bereczkei et al (2007)

A

Humans do use information about others to make judgements

54
Q

Sommerfeld et al (2008)

A

Social preference scores of students who publicly announced their intention to volunteer significantly
increased and the scores of those who did not volunteer decreased

55
Q

Lyle et al (2009)

A

Players write more positively about cooperators than defectors (gossip)

56
Q

Children and altruistic behaviour

A

Humans engage in social interaction from infancy
Even before they can perform basic life functions like eating independently
Social connections change throughout an individual’s lifetime
Mate choice – vast research

57
Q

Differences between altruism and reciprocity

A
  • Benefits come from effect of signalling
  • Thus don’t expect direct reciprocation
  • Unlike indirect reciprocity don’t just give to people you observe giving
  • Can explain giving to charity and public goods
58
Q

If competitive altruism explains cooperation then we would expect to see:

A
  1. People altering their behaviour when observed/reputation matters
  2. Cooperative people are chosen more often as a preferred partner (and less cooperative are ostricised)
  3. Cooperative people benefit from their cooperative behaviour – benefits are returned during a partnership
59
Q

Public Goods Games

A

Each £20 contributed produces £40 for the group, of which each individual gets an equal share back, so contributing is costly. But if all contribute all make a profit (of £20). However you do even better by keeping while others contribute!

Game 1 (reputation building), using a PGG in groups of 3 or 4 with 10 rounds of the game. People choose who they want to play game 2 with leading to a partnered relationship and a paired game.

60
Q

What we expect to see in a Public Goods Game

A
  1. People altering their behaviour when observed/reputation matters
  2. Cooperative people are chosen more often as a preferred partner (and less cooperative are ostricised)
  3. Cooperative people benefit from their cooperative behaviour – benefits are returned during a partnership
61
Q

Public Goods Games evidence

A

Contributions increase when decisions are public and with partner choice
• Barclay (2004) Barclay & Willer (2007) Sylwester & Roberts (2010, 2013), Moffat-Knox (in prep)
• Importance of experimental design and procedures (Moffat-Knox)

62
Q

Cooperation and attractiveness (Farrelly, Lazarus and Roberts, 2007)

A

Both men & women cooperate more where we would predict cooperation could be used as a sexual display i.e. with more attractive members of the opposite sex, both in PD and Dictator games

Cooperation affects attractiveness judgements - perceived attractiveness of partners tended to increase when cooperative and decrease when uncooperative

Cooperation may be used as a way of showing off to potential mates, and kindness/cooperation is seen as an attractive characteristic

Male donors gave a larger donation when giving to an attractive female fundraiser and when responding to a large donation made by a male competitor than in any other case.

63
Q

Raihani and Smith (2005)

A

Male donors compete directly with other males in the presence of an attractive, opposite-sex audience, although no evidence for this in females.

Social Psychology (3 decks)

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