Lecture: Groups Flashcards

1
Q

Social facilitation

A

Groups do well for learned (skilled) tasks
Groups impair novel (complex) tasks

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2
Q

What are possible explanations for social facilitations?

A

Arousal due to the mere presence of others
Distraction-distract little bit, makes you be on autopilot
Evaluation apprehension still produces arousal but different

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3
Q

Social loafing

A

If you can hide in a group, you may slack off
Then, better at complex tasks, worse at simple tasks

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4
Q

Deindividuation

A

No longer an individual accountable of their actions (prompting something anti-social)

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5
Q

False consensus

A

Our choices are the common ones
I think my choices are more common than those who make the opposite choice

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6
Q

Game

A

Outcome depends on choices by me and another

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7
Q

Zero-sum game

A

One player’s loss equals another player’s gain

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8
Q

Non zero-sum game

A

Everyone wins
Prisoner’s Dilemma

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9
Q

Prisoner’s Dilemma game

A

Defection > cooperation but Mutual Defection < mutual cooperation
Can make sense to defect but that can lead both sides to always defect, never cooperate

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10
Q

Why defect in Prisoner’s dilemma?

A

Greed
Distrust
Pessimist can lead to self-fulfillment
Expectation of others: Kelley & Stahelski (1970)- defectors expect everyone to defect, do they defect first and miss opportunities to cooperate

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11
Q

What is the winning strategy for PD strategy?

A

Tit for tat strategy
Play cooperation on the first round
In subsequent rounds, play what other players played on the previous round
Never beats but always ends in a tie but the best in making the most money

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12
Q

Why does the Tit for Tat works the best?

A

Nice - starts with cooperation
Even though the best it can do is tie
Not very exploitable
Forgiving - comes back to cooperation

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13
Q

Asch 1940

A

Rank professions on usefulness, including politician
But before people are told what their peers rate politician
Some were told that politicians were at the top, and others were told it was at the bottom of the list.
Fake consensus info: top or bottom of the list
Result: 4 vs 8
Asked who they thought of when they think of politicians some say Statesman (the rate at the top of the list) vs Slimy Ward Boss (the rate at the bottom of the list)

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14
Q

Naive realism (objectivity illusion)

A

I’m construing reality objectivity (people believe this)
We believe that others will agree since I am making so much sense

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15
Q

What are the consequences of disagreement?

A

Attribution (explanation)
To what do I attribute our disagreement?
How come you don’t agree with me
Bias
Something wrong with them/preventing to see reality

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16
Q

Reactive devaluation

A

Rate proposal as less attractive when offered
Mindless assessment of “good for them, bad for us”
Reactance (reverse psychology): want what we can’t have
Don’t like to have our freedom restricted

17
Q

How can you overcome reactive devaluation?

A

Self-affirmation: write about important personal values before rating concessions
Acknowledge the other side’s influence