Lecture 8 (Altruism) - Slides

Question 1

Altruism

Answer 1

• Action whose average effect is to benefit someone else at some cost to the actor.
• Both costs and benefits measured in expected fitness
• Altruism among non-kin can occur through:
  1) Reciprocity
  2) Costly Signalling

Question 2

Reciprocity

Answer 2

• Altruism among non-kin
• Can be direct or indirect

1) Direct Reciprocity: Preferentially help those who have provided help in return.
- Video: Blood meals in vampire bats. Bats who refuse to give a neighbor a blood meal, receive less in return. Reciprocal altruism in non-related organisms by proximity
- Linguistic evidence: Many phrases that represent this idea (tit for tat, quid pro quo, etc…
- Prisoner’s Dilemma, Tit for Tat, Emotional regulation
- Common Pool Resources: Does not explain cooperation in the context of common/public goods (see slide)

2) Indirect Reciprocity: Altruistic acts that are unlikely to be directly reciprocated, but may be rewarded via reputational effects. People like those who are altruistic, even to others.
- 2nd order punishment, game, costly signalling (hunting and hunter-gatherers), eyes, charity

Question 3

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Answer 3

• Pay-off matrix and game
• Illustrates how direct reciprocity sustains cooperation
• Both cooperate = 1 year of prison each, one defects:one cooperates 10:0, Both defect = 5 each
• Player A should defect, but so should B
• When both defect they get a worst payoff, so in the long run (multiple games with the same individual) it pays off to cooperate
• Because you don’t want your defection to come and bit you later and also it sustains cooperation longer

Question 4

Tit for Tat

3 keys and what it can be called

Answer 4

• Can also be called direct reciprocity
  1) Never be the first to defect
  2) Retaliate only after the other has defected
  3) Resume cooperation when the other does

Question 5

Emotional Regulation

Answer 5

• How reciprocity is sustained
• Cooperation is regulated by emotions and our feelings about others:
  Emotions that influence reciprocity include: Friendship/emotions of liking and disliking
• Moralistic aggression
• Gratitude & sympathy
• Guilt
• Trust & suspicion

Question 6

Problem with Reciprocity

Answer 6

• Reciprocity doesn’t usually happen simultaneously, so we have to hold information of individuals who we know owe us and who we might owe
• This can lead to cheating
• Cheating can be advantageous in a population with lots of cooperators
• Cheater detection necessary for evolution of altruism in non-kin
• Oda et al. 2009, Barclay 2008

Question 7

Oda et al. 2009

Can we detect altruists?

Answer 7

• Males asked how often they performed altruistic acts
• The 7 highest/lowest scorers were video taped and sound was removed.
• Used questions which had the greatest difference in response used to determine altruism
• Another group took the altruism survey and watched the videos and rated how altruistic the video participants were
• Results: High altruists gave higher altruist scores to videos. Altruists were ranked as more altruistic that non-altruists
• Altruists were judged as more socially active, generous, responsible, friendlier and kinder
• But NO difference in: discreetness, hurriedness, and intelligence. Intelligence is important because it shows it’s not a halo effect.

Question 8

Barclay 2008

Can we detect cheaters?

Answer 8

• Trust game: P1 can not trust P2 and give $10 to each participant, or trust and P2 will share a $30 pot equally.
• P2 is computer with photo
• P2 either: 1) cooperate which gives $15 each, or defect which gives P2 20 and P1 5
• Encoding phase: 40 random opponents, did not repeat the same opponent and defection rate of opponents varied by 20/50/80%
• Distractor task: 10 minute demograhpic survey
• Recall phase: Unexpected facial recognition task (40 previous faces, 40 new faces), asked to classify as: Novel/Recognize and Cooperator/Defector

Results: When defectors are rare (20%), they are recalled more accurately than are competitors. Effect reverses when cooperators are rare.

• Suggests that when a strategy is rare, we are more likely to remember those who employ that strategy. We remember rare more.
• Because: Whatever behaviour is more common, it’s likely to represent the social norm (reduces cognitive load since you have to remember more)
• When defectors = 50%, our memory for cooperators has an advantage. Could be a bias towards seeking cooperators, but most people cooperate more anyways.
• From brief silent video clips, we can identify unknown altruists at rates higher than chance

Question 9

Common Pool / Public Goods

Answer 9

• A resources that gets depleted with each use and used by a large group of people
• No direct reciprocity possible: use you are not helping in return or expecting to help in return.
• About how you -allocate- those common goods
• Invite cheaters
• Tragedy of the commons
• Economic rationality vs. enlightened self-interest

Question 10

Tragedy of the Commons:

Answer 10

• Common ground where livestock can graze and each herder can bring some, but not all livestock
• The more you use it the more it’s depleted and the damage is shared by the group
• Economically rational: graze without regard of what is left over
• Enlightening self-interest: by limiting your own profits, you are helping yourself. Because if you all graze at once, it precludes your ability to graze in the future.
• Those who pay are “suckers”/tragedy of commons, so its in the cooperators best interest to develop ways to detect cheating.

Question 11

Tragedy of the Commons in the Lab

Game, 2 effects and manipulations

Answer 11

• Groups of 4 subjects play a game where they receive $20 to keep or donate to the common pool.
• Donations doubled the pot and were equally distributed among players.
• Example: If all donate $20, pool = 80*2 = 160, Each get 40
• But if 1 free-rides, Pool = 60*2 = 120, each get $30 but 1 gets 30+20=50
• Reputation, Punishment effect manipulations (see slides)
  proximate mechanism (emotions).
• Results: Most donate most of their money %50
• Donations fall over successive rounds, especially final round when end-game is known.

Question 12

Reputation Effect

and game

Answer 12

• Commons game manipulation
• Reputation Effect: manipulated anonymity and reputation (one group was anonymous, one met their group and were told their results would be told to the others later.
• Participants gave in non-anonymous/reputation manipulation

Question 13

Punishment Effect

game and order

Answer 13

• Punishment Effect: After each round participants could pay 1 to reduce payout to other player by 3.
• Free riders will never punish or cooperate because both are costly, without benefit
• Free rider punishment is altruistic because it will never benefit the punisher, only future players who play them
• 6 rounds, different players, anonymous (no reputation/reciprocity effects)
• Results: 84% punish at least once, 74% were imposed on free riders by cooperators
• Punishment was harsh, group spent on average, $10. - The less contributed/cheated, the greater the punishment (reflective of our criminal justice system)
• Punishment created more cooperators and no dip at the end of rounds
• Without punishment there was reduced cooperation and a decline to later rounds.

Question 14

Proximate mechanisms for cooperation & punishment

Answer 14

• Emotion
• Experiment: Scenario where a school project member contributes significantly less to the project, how angry would you be? (1-7). 84% > 5.
• Free-riding makes people angry and the exclusion of a social group may maintain cooperative behaviour.

Question 15

2nd Order punishment

Answer 15

• Costly punishment maintains contributions to public good and without it, contributions decline over time.
• Problem: Temptation to let others punish while keeping your share (2nd order). Do we punish non-punishers?
• Experiment: the more they contribute collectively, the more they get in return shares, they see how much every player gives, and are allowed to punish. 50% punish, in the next round, only 2% punish. No 2nd order punishment effect.

Question 16

Dictator Game

Indirect Reciprocity

Answer 16

• Share money with another player, no chance for reciprocity with a second round, but you have a reputation because your donation history is displayed.
• Never repeated rounds with the same person.
• Image score = reputation score (higher score = more donations and more often)
• 7/8 donated more to those who donated
• More altruism = more helping

Question 17

Costly Signalling

Answer 17

• Expensive signals are designed to convey honest information (because of how expensive it is, it must take away from other things)
• Example: Facial masc. is a costly signal that conveys info about the male
• Signals must convey reliable info (about underlying quality)
• Must impose a cost on signaler that is linked to the quality being advertised
• Either lower quality signalers pay higher cost, or reap lower benefits
• Sport hunting, turtles, eyes,

Question 18

Sport Hunting

Answer 18

• Underlying psychology of modern hunting may come from costly signalling in sport hunting. (To hunt for a trophy is useless and not for survival. Demonstrates proficiency of animal-killing).
• Displays expertise, prowess, vigor
  : Conditions required: Difficult to succeed, success in public information,rep. built on success, and benefits the hunter

Question 19

Traditional Hunting

and turtles + alternative explanation

Answer 19

• Traditional hunting is unreliable & dangerous and provides fewer calories than foraging
• Meat is typically shared without preference to family or hunter (Divided and given to community)
• Success as a hunter doesn’t predict DIRECT reciprocity
• Turtle Hunting: 2 types (jumper/captain)
• Turtle hunters donate meat to public feasts in an uncontrolled manner and hunters are not compensated
• Hunters reap reproductive benefits (more surviving offspring, more mates, harder working mates and younger partners)
• A lot of gossip goes on about who was a successful or good under and the group find outs quickly.
• Leaders have more children than hunters but hunters more than non-hunters across all ages
• At younger ages, not much differences between leaders and hunters
• Alternative explanation? Hunters are higher genetic quality?
• No effect of genetic quality = non-hunting brothers have significantly lower reproductive success even though they should have similar genetic quality and RS
• All that matters is you are a hunter for your RS, not any genetic value
• Seems to really be about reputation.

Question 20

Costly Signaling
(eyes, charity work)

Answer 20

• Eyes: Unattended coffee was placed on campus, asked people to pay for what they take
• Had pictures of eyes and flowers in front of coffee
• Measured how much people paid with eyes/flowers in front of them
• Gave more when there were eyes instead of flowers
• More free-riding when people think they are being watched
• Which eye photo it was did not matter.
• Charity Work: In seminar groups (people knew each other but were not friends so there was a higher likelihood of future encounters)
• Asked them to sign up for charity work anonymously/publicaly.
• Charity tasks varied with degrees of commitment (giving blood to health care for mentally disabled children)
• An audience effects what kind of charity you will do:
• If you were forced to volunteer publically, more individuals volunteered for costly activities, if anonymous, smaller activities.

Question 21

Psychopathy

Personality Disorder and Epidemiology, Impairment

Answer 21

• Personality Disorder: Antisocial behaviour, lack of empathy, manipulative, violent, selfish (many traits antithetical to altruism)
• Epidemiology:
  Rare (1%), mostly males, and over-represented in psychiatric and prison populations
• Examples: John Wayne Gacy, and Kenneth Bianchi
• Not classified in the DSM. Different than antisocial personality disorder
• Can be a psychopath with no criminal record (CEO)

Impairment

1) Behavioural: higher criminal violence
2) Physiological: impaired startle response
3) Emotional: Lack of empathy/remorse/guilt
4) Cognitive: Emotions (see experiment)

Question 22

Psychopathic offenders

compared to non-psychopaths

Answer 22

• More likely to commit crimes in the future when they are let out
• Commit different kinds of crimes (never crimes of passion)
• Mostly instrument crimes: 93% commit homicides vs. 78%, involve weapons and violence and more likely to kill non-kin and complete strangers (because not passion)
• 2.5x more likely to get conditional release (implies manipulation and dangerous because they also have a higher likelihood to re-offend)

Question 23

Psychopath Experiment

Hare 1991

Answer 23

• Experiment: Measured criminal psychopathy with 20 item checklist score ranges from 0-40 (25+ = psychopath)
• Items include glibness/superficiality, impulsive behaviour, etc.
• Measured selfishness/callous/manipulativeness and emotional factors
• Looked at pictures of eyes and asked what emotions those people were feeling
• People with the highest psychopath scores were less accurate at determining the emotion (less ability to empathize and understand what others are feeling)
• Controlled for gender, IQ, attention, working memory
• Can mimick emotion without having anything underneath to understand it. Might be why they can be manipulative without understanding it.

Question 24

Psychopathy vs. Antisocial Personality Disorder

Answer 24

• Considerable overlap between constructs
• APD is over-inclusive, and if scored similarly, they correlate highly
• Differences are: Psychopathy includes APD but places less emphasis on age of onset and other specific criminal behaviours

Question 25

Psychopathy vs. Sociopathy

Answer 25

- Not synonymous with psychosis - Sociopathy differs with regard to etiological underpinnings - Differences may be linguistic - Sociopathy seems to have more lack of being in touch with reality and implies an environmental effect as opposed to genetic

Question 26

2 Explanation of Psychopathy

Answer 26

1) Psychopathy as psychopathology (developmental/environmental effects influencing behaviours) - Treat psychopaths as people with disturbed development - But improving emotional/social functioning for them can increase violent recidivism - Because they are taught how to better manipulate individuals (learning the rules = seeing it as a game to be won) - Evidence: 1) Developmental delay - EEG patterns are more similar to children - Early brain damage/dysfunction evidence to frontal lobes - Correlations between poor socialization/physical trauma (poverty, emotional instability, inconsistent punishment/abuse) 2) Psychopathy as an special design: - Characteristics are not deficits or impairments - Organized, functional phenotypic features - Could be an ESS: cheaters are successful when they are difficult to detect, highly mobile, verbally skilled (especially when persuading females to mate), AND rare. - Sexual coercision aspect of psychopathy can explain why it could have been maintained in evolutionary history - Lalumier et al, 2001

Question 27

Lalumier et al. 2001 | What the 2 explanations would predict

Answer 27

- Psychopathology: Should show signs of developmental pertubations - Special design: Should not -Measured facial FA, and obstetrical problems (difficulties during pregnancy: during pregnancy pre-post delivery, labor, birthweight) - all are good predictors of developmental problems in general) - Analyzed clinical/medical records of 800 male offenders - Gave them a psychopath test (PCL-R) - Psychopaths have less developmental (obstetrical problems) than non-psychopaths signficiantly - FA is significantly different in non-psychopath offenders to non-offenders but no difference in psychopaths to non-offenders - Problem: Doesn't directly support psychopathy as a special design

Question 28

Altruism Summary

Answer 28

- Reciprocity: We help those who help (us or anoyone else) and punish those who don't - Costly signalling: Generosity serves as signal to phenotypic quality - Psychopathy: Successful cheater strategy a frequency-dependent solution