Lecture 8 Flashcards

1
Q

This is a list of items and possible problems in the process that must be checked

A

Process hazards checklists

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2
Q

This can be as simple as an inventory of hazardous materials, or it can be as detailed as the Dow indexes

A

Hazards surveys

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3
Q

are a formal rating system, much like an income tax form, that provide penalties for hazards and credits for safety equipment and procedures

A

Dow indexes

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4
Q

This approach allows the mind to go free in a
controlled environment. Various events are suggested for a specific piece of equipment with
the participants determining whether and how the event could occur and whether the event
creates any form of risk.

A

Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies

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5
Q

An effective but less formal type of HAZOP study. The results are highly
dependent on the experience and synergism of the group reviewing the process.

A

Safety review

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6
Q

is a formal procedure to identify hazards in a chemical process facility

A

HAZOP Study

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7
Q

when to use HAZOP in new plants

A

when design is nearly firm and documented

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8
Q

when to use HAZOP in existing plant

A

review current process or a major redesign is planned

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9
Q

requirements for HAZOP

A

Technical data
Technical experts

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10
Q

Principles of HAZOP

A

Concept
Reference/Basis
Method

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11
Q

locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated for deviations. these nodes are points where the process parameters have an identified design intent

A

study nodes

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12
Q

defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations at the study nodes

A

intention

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13
Q

these are departures from the intention which can be discovered by systematically applying the guide words.

A

deviations

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14
Q

HAZOP MODEL

A

guide words
|
causes - deviation - consequences

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15
Q

guide word: no forward when there should be

A

NONE

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16
Q

guide word: more of any relevant physical property than there should be

A

MORE OF

17
Q

guide word: less of any relevant physical property than there should be

A

LESS OF

18
Q

guide word: composition of system different from what it should be

A

PART OF

19
Q

guide word: more components present in the system that there should be

A

MORE THAN

20
Q

guide word: what else can happen apart from normal operation

A

OTHER THAN

21
Q

guide word: flow reverses against intended direction

A

REVERSE

22
Q

risk is defined mathematically as:

A

consequences x likelihood
or
severity x frequency

23
Q

the systematic development of numerical estimates of the expected frequency and consequence of potential accidents associated with a facility or operation based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques

A

QRA

24
Q

complexity of QRA depends on

A

objectives of the study
available information

25
Q

major steps of QRA

A
  1. defining potential event sequences and potential incidents
  2. evaluating the incident consequences
  3. estimating the potential incident frequencies using event trees and fault trees
  4. estimating the incident impacts on people, environment, and property
  5. estimating the risk by combining the impacts and frequencies, and recording the risk.
26
Q

a semi-quantitative tool for analyzing and assessing risk

A

LOPA

27
Q

the protection layers may include

A

inherently safer concepts
basic process control system
safety instrumented functions
passive devices (dikes/blast walls)
active devices (relief valves)
human intervention

28
Q

primary purpose of LOPA

A

determine whether there are sufficient layers of protection against a specific accident scenario

29
Q

protection layers of LOPA are often depicted as an

A

onion skin

30
Q

the major steps of a LOPA study include

A
  1. identifying a single consequence
  2. identifying an accident scenario and cause associated with the consequence
  3. identifying the initiating event for the scenario and estimating the initiating event frequency
  4. identifying the protection layers available for this particular consequence and estimating the probability of failure on demand for each protection layer
  5. combining the initiating event frequency with the probabilities of failure on demand for the independent protection layers to estimate a mitigated consequences frequency for this initiating event
  6. plotting the consequence versus the consequence frequency to estimate the risk
  7. evaluating the risk for acceptability (if unacceptable, additional layers of protection are required)