lecture 6

Question 1

The power sharing bargain must be credible to both sides

Answer 1

allies must believe that the dictator will comply,
and the dictator must believe the allies will support him if he keeps his promises.
Problem: The allies (military officers) cannot credibly promise to be loyal if they are internally factionalized.
Solution: Instead of getting rid of members of the inner circle, bring in new civilian allies for support!

Question 2

credibility problems in the military

Answer 2

if factionalised/undiscipined;
It cannot prevent ‘rogue’ coups, i.e. coups by factions that are often lead by lower-ranked officers.
survival techniques:
- Give more money to the military
- Promote loyal officers and retire or exile opponents
- Create and control security police and paramilitary force

Question 3

Alternative survival strategy:

Answer 3

create a civilian support group – a new party – to decrease the dependence on
the military.
Parties can mobilize mass civilian support in form of demonstrations and elections.
- Party official and party members have an interest in the dictator’s survival because they benefit in terms of
positions, resources, and privileges.

Question 4

Is the Creation of a New Party Initiated by the Dictator/close relative

Answer 4

Yes, in three-quarters of all autocratic regimes

Question 5

Pre-Seizure Parties

Answer 5

• help overcome the dictator’s credible commitment
  problem.
• When the party controls access to office – including the leader position itself – the dictator has good reasons
  to fulfill his promises, because he can be removed from office.

-Party allies have reason to remain loyal, because they can expect benefits, including higher offices in the
future.

Question 6

Post-Seizure Parties

Answer 6

(only works if the dictator delegates power to the party – which is unlikely if the dictator is
strong and is the one who created the party in the first place)
cannot, does not want /need to commit

Question 7

main effect of parties on autocracies

Answer 7

even parties that do not solve the dictator’s credible commitment problem increase
autocratic survival

Question 8

paradox of party creation

Answer 8

• What looks like a broadening of the support coalition by including civilians, is actually a move
  toward greater power concentration in the hands of the dictator
• Threatening military supporters are replaced by less threatening civilian supporters – who depend entirely on
  the dictator.

Question 9

candidates in elections have incentives to:

Answer 9

• convey the grievances and problems of their districts to party leaders
  -build clientele networks to reach the grassroots
• comply with regime leaders

Legislative and local elections thus solve the principal-agent problem between the regime leaders and party
officials when monitoring is expensive or impossible.