lecture 5

Question 1

solving dictator commitment problem

Answer 1

Formal Institutions as Monitoring Devices
When the party controls access to office – including the leader position itself – the dictator has good reasons to fulfill his promises, because he can be removed from office

Question 2

svolik (2012) two monitoring mechanisms

Answer 2

1. Transparency through Regular Interaction
   - prevents misperceptions about the dictator’s intentions and actions that could escalate into conflict.
2. Detection of Non-Compliance
   - Formal institutional rules about membership, jurisdiction, protocol and decision making , violations are more easily detected than under informal arrangements.

Question 3

to ensure detection:

Answer 3

• must also be a credible threat to replace him
• The power of institutions to alleviate credible committment issues relies on the balance of power between the allies and the dictator.

Question 4

Ruling a country involves several important problems:

Answer 4

→ Implementing the policy decided by the ruling elite
→ Monitoring of local officials to ensure their cooperation
→ Gathering accurate information about opposition

Question 5

To solve some of their problems to the outside world..

Answer 5

establish seemingly democratic institutions, such as parties, legislatures and mass elections that engage citizens for support

Question 6

When studying a table, look for:

Answer 6

*s (astericks) → tells us if the figure is significant
Positive or negative figure (greater than or smaller than 1, there are not always negative signs (-))
The size of the figure

Question 7

Why Are There Elections in Autocracies?

Answer 7

1. signal of dictators strength
   - strongest signals of regime strength
   - show that the dictatorship has the resources and organizational capacity to ensure mass voting
2. incentives for party officials
   - extend their patron–client and information-gathering networks to the grassroots, which helps authoritarian regimes to survive.
   - Ruling-party candidates face real competition –> puts pressure on to distribute benefits

ultimately, solves the principal-agent problem between the regime leaders and party officials when monitoring is expensive or impossible

Question 8

Single-candidate or Single-list Elections

Answer 8

• No choice at all.

Question 9

Semi-competitive Electoral Systems (aka Electoral Authoritarianism or Competitive Authoritarianism)

Answer 9

61%
Permit some opposition parties to compete
→ but use control of the media, interference with opposition campaigning, fraud, violence, and large-scale state spending to bias outcomes.

Question 10

support for military dictatorships

Answer 10

led by junior officers should create more support parties than those led by higherranked officers.

Question 12

dictatorships that create a new support party are more likely to:

Answer 12

• establish new paramilitary forces
• control internal security services