Lecture 12: Counter Narratives

Question 1

What is Harris-Hogan 2016. CVE about

Answer 1

Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) varies a lot throughout the world, so there are no specifics about what its task exactly is. At the beginning, counterterrorism was focused on coercion, but in the 2000s it focused on prevention, after realising the impact of radicalisation.

Currently, there is no consensus on CVE practices. The public health model identifies different solutions for different groups:
1. Primary prevention
 The primary level focuses on the prevention of radicalisation by working with at risk individuals
2. Secondary prevention
 The secondary level focuses on people that display symptoms of radicalisation and tries to prevent them from extremising.
3. Tertiary prevention
 The tertiary level aims to de-radicalise extremists.

Question 2

What is Schuurman (2013) research on public support about?

Answer 2

Public support is a great predictor of success or failure for terrorists. Big fluctuations in public support for the group or the government can cause escalation or de-escalation of violence

Question 4

What are the dimensions of public support

Answer 4

Fluctuations in public support have two dimensions:
1. Association with one or the other group
2. Legitimation of violence

Question 5

What are the five approaches to CT according to Miller

Answer 5

There are five approaches to counterterrorism:
1. Do nothing
a. Always ineffective
b. Which includes ignoring terrorism or refusing to apprehend terrorists who enter the country. Such inaction is unlikely to succeed, but that assumption is worth testing.
2. Conciliation
a. Used to resolve a crisis, or to forestall future crises by negotiating with terrorists.
3. Legal Reforms
a. Strengthening the government’s ability to deal with terrorism.
4. Restriction
a. Refers to measures that limit a group’s activities, or a sponsoring state’s support
5. Violence
a. Includes government uses of force to injure or kill terrorists or their supporters (domestic or international).

Question 6

What are the Kind of Group motivations according to miller 2007

Answer 6

Kind of group motivations:
1. National Separatist
a. These groups seek autonomy from an existing government, either to form an independent state, or to become part of another state.
b. These groups generally do not seek to change or to destroy an existing government, but to gain autonomy or independence, and they often claim to represent a specific ethnic population. Therefore, while much of society may not agree with their methods, nationalseparatist groups often have popular support for their goals.
c. For nationalist and separatist terrorism, the state needs to use conciliation, legal reforms and restriction.
2. Revolutionary
a. Left Wing
i. These groups use violence as a catalyst for societal change. These groups typically want dramatic change not only in how a country is run, but in society itself
ii. For revolutionary terrorism the states need to use legal reforms and restriction.
3. Reeactionary
a. Right Wing
i. These groups use violence to prevent or reverse societal change. They may or may not want government reform, depending upon whether they view the state as a cause of social change or a victim of it.
ii. For reactionary terrorism, the state needs to use legal reforms, and never restriction.
4. Religious
a. These groups often use extreme versions of mainstream religion to justify political violence, and typically want to replace secular governments with more fundamentalist regimes
i. Religious terrorism is problematic. Conciliation, legal reforms and violence are useless. Only restriction has some effect.

Question 7

What CT measures are effective on what group?

Answer 7

Question 8

What is CT, CVE, PVE

Answer 8

• CT - Counterterrorism
  o evokes images of ‘hard’ responses (special forces, drone strikes, arrest squads etc.)
• CVE/PVE - Counter/Preventing Violent Extremism
  o post WoT concepts with stronger emphasis on prevention & non-violent interventions

Question 9

What is the importance of context in CT?

Answer 9

• Leadership removal did not defeat AQ/IS, did end Sendero Luminoso
• Negotiations successful in Northern Ireland, not in Israel-Palestinian conflict
• Confessions from formers decimated Red Brigades, not PIRA
  No two conflicts the same! No one-size-fits-all solution

Question 10

What is the PPR model?

Answer 10

Prevent – Preempt – Respond

Prevent: people have not yet radicalized.
Preempt: people have already radicalized, but how do we make sure it doesnt get any worse.
Respond: people have committed attacks, all you can do is minimize the damage that has already been done and prevent people from following in their footsteps.

Question 11

Why wouldn’t you do nothing?

Answer 11

Case Study Ireland:
o “The Troubles” in northern Ireland
 The troubles 68-98 preceded by decades of unrest
 1968: Civil rights movement protests pervasive discrimination of catholic minority
 Marches erupt in violence , repressive police response leads to quick deterioration
 1969: British government sends army to deal with security situation
* British Army initially welcomed as neutral arbiters
* PIRA lacked necessary support to use violence
* But:
o Army lacked clear plan & was heavy-handed in policing role
o Protestant-dominated government NI left partly in charge
o British forces lose image of neutral arbiters
 Because of internment without trial
 Bloody Sunday
 British took drastic steps without thinking them through
 Missteps > paramilitary violence escalates
 (Republican) public support shifted to empower PIRA and ostracize the British

Question 12

Why would or wouldnt you use Conciliation?

Answer 12

• Conciliation (verzoening)
  o Conciliation as a CT measure requires:
   * Willingness to ‘talk to terrorists’
   * Meeting opponent’s minimum demands while retaining sufficient ‘home’ support
• Talking may trump fighting, but conditions not always favorable to concessions or negotiations
• May require onset of sufficient war-weariness

o Israel-Palestina Example
 Israel has faced interstate war & terrorism since achieving statehood in 1948
 During fight for self-determination, Israeli parties also used terrorism (e.g. Irgun and 1946 attack on British forces
 Palestinian terrorism especially pronounced since 1967 Israeli occupation West Bank & Gaza Strip
 1993-2000 Peace Process remarkable for breaking decades of violence
 The IPPP
* IPPP serious attempt at conflict resolution through dialogue * Mutual recognition exchanged (1993) * Creation Palestinian Authority with limited self-governance in West Bank and Gaza Strip
o But: extremist opposition on both sides and conflicting demands stalled progress:
 Many Israelis wanted an end to terrorism as a prerequisite to any concessions.
 Many Palestinians demanded concrete steps towards independence and autonomy before any compromise.
o ‘Spoilers’ fatally undercut the IPPP on both sides:
 Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin assassinated by ultra-orthodox Jew in 1995
 Hamas & PIJ launched sustained suicide-bombing campaign to undercut Fatah partners
 2000: Return to violence with al-Aqsa (second) intifada
 Ultimately, neither side could make required concessions without undercutting their own support

Question 13

Why would or wouldnt you use Legal Reforms as CT effort?

Answer 13

• Legal Reforms
  o 1970s and 1980s known as ‘years of lead’ in Italy
   Roots of Italian terrorism:
• Socio-economic changes 1950s-1960s
• Instability post-war Italian governments
• Vietnam War and NATO
• Rise of left- and rightwing extra-parliamentary opposition groups
• LWEX and RWEX
   Fight against LW terrorism most strongly associated with Red Brigades
• • ‘Cossiga’(1980) & ‘Penitence’ (1982-1983) laws proved very effective against Brigate Rosse
• • But Italian government was stained by allegations of collusion with neofascist forces and initially very slow to respond - How can success be explained?
     BR became more indiscriminately violent from ‘75
• Public Support BR began to slip
• Controversial legal reforms became more palatable -
• Government’s legitimacy increased as BR’s plummeted
   Early 1980s: BR isolated from public support and torn apart by internal dissent. Legal reforms provided last ‘way out’.