L5: Price Discrimination Flashcards

1
Q

price discrimination

A

charging different prices for the same good
- form of non-linear pricing

idea to charge higher prices when consumers have higher valuations

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2
Q

why would firms want to price discriminate?

A

to transform consumer surplus and deadweight loss into producer surplus through price discrimination

monopolist will be better off

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3
Q

conditions for price discrimination

A

market power
- price-taker cannot set price for products

firms have to be able to identify high WTP consumers

firms can prevent resale or else consumers work around discrimination

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4
Q

types of price discrimination

A

first degree
- firm identifies each individual and observes WTP
- every consumer is offered a different price

second degree
- firms unable to identify individuals or groups
- firm offers a menu of price schedules and consumers self-select

third degree
- firm cannot identify individuals but identifies groups with different demand
- price discrimination according to different groups/characteristics

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5
Q

efficiency in first-degree price discrimination

A

outcome is socially efficient
- every consumer willing to pay > MC gets the product
- quantities are the same as quantities under perfect competition with no DWL

distribution is not fair but still efficient
- issue is that all the consumer surplus disappears
- socially efficient in an aggregate welfare measure but all consumer surplus goes to the producer

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6
Q

two-part tariff

A

fixed fee A and variable fee p per unit

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7
Q

optimal two-part tariff with homogenous consumers

A

p* = c

firms can set A to be as large as consumer surplus

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8
Q

optimal two-part tariff with heterogeneous consumers

A

p* = c

firms now set Ai = CSi to match cnosumer surplus of each consumer
- demand for each consumer is different

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9
Q

Consumer Information and Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities? Morton, Zettlemeyer and Silva-Risso, 2003

A

bargaining as important in the car dealing industry

minorities pay higher prices and this can be explained by income, education, search costs, area, etc. but 35% difference in prices still not explained by these factors

price that people end up paying in dealerships changes with demographics

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10
Q

third degree price discrimination

A

discrete version of first degree price discrimination
- firm cannot observe individual WTP but can relate average differences in WTP to observable attributes
- segmenting the market based on observable characteristics

MR is equal across segments but not prices
- price as a function of elasticity of the two groups at the point of the demand curve
- charging higher prices to less elastic consumers

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