L5: Price Discrimination Flashcards
price discrimination
charging different prices for the same good
- form of non-linear pricing
idea to charge higher prices when consumers have higher valuations
why would firms want to price discriminate?
to transform consumer surplus and deadweight loss into producer surplus through price discrimination
monopolist will be better off
conditions for price discrimination
market power
- price-taker cannot set price for products
firms have to be able to identify high WTP consumers
firms can prevent resale or else consumers work around discrimination
types of price discrimination
first degree
- firm identifies each individual and observes WTP
- every consumer is offered a different price
second degree
- firms unable to identify individuals or groups
- firm offers a menu of price schedules and consumers self-select
third degree
- firm cannot identify individuals but identifies groups with different demand
- price discrimination according to different groups/characteristics
efficiency in first-degree price discrimination
outcome is socially efficient
- every consumer willing to pay > MC gets the product
- quantities are the same as quantities under perfect competition with no DWL
distribution is not fair but still efficient
- issue is that all the consumer surplus disappears
- socially efficient in an aggregate welfare measure but all consumer surplus goes to the producer
two-part tariff
fixed fee A and variable fee p per unit
optimal two-part tariff with homogenous consumers
p* = c
firms can set A to be as large as consumer surplus
optimal two-part tariff with heterogeneous consumers
p* = c
firms now set Ai = CSi to match cnosumer surplus of each consumer
- demand for each consumer is different
Consumer Information and Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities? Morton, Zettlemeyer and Silva-Risso, 2003
bargaining as important in the car dealing industry
minorities pay higher prices and this can be explained by income, education, search costs, area, etc. but 35% difference in prices still not explained by these factors
price that people end up paying in dealerships changes with demographics
third degree price discrimination
discrete version of first degree price discrimination
- firm cannot observe individual WTP but can relate average differences in WTP to observable attributes
- segmenting the market based on observable characteristics
MR is equal across segments but not prices
- price as a function of elasticity of the two groups at the point of the demand curve
- charging higher prices to less elastic consumers