L2: Democracy and Autocracy Flashcards

1
Q

Views of democracy

A
  • Procedure-based (minimal view)

- Outcome-based (maximal view)

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2
Q

Levels of Polyarchy

A
  • Level of inclusion: Who among the governed get to participate in the political process, and how much?
  • Level of contestation: How easy is it for those who get to participate to organize themselves into competing blocs, each of which has a viable chance of winning power?
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3
Q

Definition of Polyarchy (Dahl)

A

a form of government in which power is invested in multiple people.

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4
Q

Factors of Level of inclusion

A
  • Low voting age requirements
  • Lenient citizenship requirements
  • No property requirements
  • No restrictions on convicted felons
  • No gender and minority group restrictions
  • Few ballot access or registration restrictions
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5
Q

Factors of Level of contestation

A
  • Freedom of speech
  • Freedom of assembly
  • Independent press
  • Ability to form political parties
  • Absence of (legal or illegal) opposition-suppressing practices or institutions (e.g., beating up opponents, gerrymandering)
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6
Q

Measures of Democracy and Autocracy

A
  • Polity IV (minimalist approach)

- Freedom House (maximalist approach)

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7
Q

Polity IV components

A
  • Regulation of chief executive recruitment
  • Competitiveness of executive recruitment
  • Openness of chief executive recruitment
  • Executive constraints: Are chief executives constrained in their decision making by other institutional actors (military, party apparatus, judiciary, legislature)?
  • Regulation of participation: Are there rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed?
  • Competitiveness of participation: May opposition compete for leadership positions?
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8
Q

Freedom House Components

A

1- Political rights
• Electoral process (free and fair?)
• Political pluralism and participation (freedom to form and join parties? viable opposition?)
• Functioning of government (transparency, corruption, accountability?)

2- Civil rights
• Freedom of expression and belief
• Associational and organizational rights
• Rule of law
• Personal autonomy and individual rights

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9
Q

Varieties of Autocracy

A
  • Totalitarianism
  • Authoritarianism
    -Modern approach: classify autocratic regimes based on institutional design:
    Based on executive selection
    Based on competitiveness of elections
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10
Q

Characteristics of Totalitarianism

A
  • No political pluralism
  • No social and economic pluralism
  • Elaborate ideology with “reachable utopia”’
  • Extensive mobilization, mandatory organizations, hostile to private life
  • Charismatic leadership with undefined limits and unpredictability
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11
Q

Characteristics of Authoritarianism

A
  • Limited political pluralism
  • Extensive social and economic pluralism
  • “Distinctive mentality” but no elaborate ideology
  • Not much mobilization
  • Ill-defined leadership; co-optation, rather than elimination, of pre-existing elite
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12
Q

Autocracies based on executive selection

A
  • Military dictatorships (C & S America in 1970s)
  • Single-party dictatorships (Mexico before 2000, China 1949–present)
  • Personalist dictatorships (Castro’s Cuba, Idi Amin in Uganda)
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13
Q

Autocracies based on competitiveness of elections

A

Democratic regimes:

• Executives and legislatures chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair (high contestation)

  • Most adults have the right to vote (high inclusion)
  • Extensive political rights and civil liberties

• No significant interference by non-elected officials (e.g., military, church)

Competitive authoritarian regimes:

  • Lacking some or all of the traits above;
  • Incumbent suppression of opposition through abuses of state power (jailing opposition)
  • Biased media coverage

but incumbents also not so powerful that they can completely eliminate opposition

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14
Q

Differences in Performance:

Economic Argument for Democracy (Olson 1993)

A
  • Lower taxation results in growth

- Rule of Law and stable property rights leading to growth (long-term view citizens)

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15
Q

Differences in Performance:

Economic Argument for Democracy (Olson 1993) story time

A

First, there is the state of nature: anarchy and roving banditry, where little is produced and later, stolen.
Then, ‘first blessing of the invisible hand’: replace anarchy by government, where the theft is the ruler. Stealing a little at a time through taxation, over a long period, they earn more. Citizens keep more surplus after theft, which they invest in production as they are aware of amount and timing of future tax/ theft.
However, ‘grasping hand’ issue: incentive to extract the maximum possible surplus from the whole society and to use it for his own purpose, thanks to his power monopoly.
The ruler won’t be completely predatory:
- Incentives to provide public goods (to increase production)
- to not set the tax rate so high that he discourages citizen incentives to produce
Autocrats have incentives to set tax rate at “revenue maximizing” rate — the point at which a higher rate would cause such a loss in productivity that the tax revenues for autocrat fall.
In democracies, citizen majority has incentive to set taxes at somewhat lower rate:
- Autocrats’ revenue = taxation
- Citizens’ revenue = taxation (as public goods) + reinvestment of their remaining post-tax earnings (which get larger as taxes get lower).

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16
Q

Economic Argument against Democracy (Melter-Richard Model)

A
  • Each citizen must pay portion of income as tax (t)
  • Democratic government redistributes tax revenue equally to
    all citizens
  • Because tax is function of income, but benefits equally shared, citizens with above-average income are net contributors to tax system, while below-average earners are net beneficiaries
  • The latter group want higher tax rate, while former group wants lower tax rate
  • Dictatorships give disproportionate influence to above-average earners (elites)
  • Democracy allows the poor (who are numerous) to have greater influence because leaders need larger support coalitions
  • Thus, higher tax rates because poor want greater transfers
  • Rich (assumed to also be more productive with higher skills) exert less effort, hindering economic growth
17
Q

Criticisms of the Melter-Richard Model

A
  • Low participation of the poor (turnout, financial contributions)
  • Structural dependence of the state on capitalism (higher taxation → less investment of labor and/or capital)
18
Q

Empirical Evidence on the performance of democracy

A

Rule of law and stable property rights are important to growth, but democracy is not necessary nor sufficient to create such conditions.

19
Q

Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siveron, and Morrow 2003), Components

A
  • Leader motivated by desire to gain and maintain office
  • Selectorate (S): Subset of population that gets to decide who the leader is (large in democracies, and in dictatorships with elections; small in monarchies, military dictatorships)
  • Winning Coalition (W): Subset of selectorate whose support is necessary and sufficient for leader to stay in power (large in democracies, small in all types of dictatorships)
20
Q
Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siveron, and Morrow 2003) 
story time
A
  • To keep W satisfied, leader distributes private goods, public goods, or both
  • Leader also chooses tax rate, which provides revenue, and affects incentives to produce
  • Challenger offers alternative mix of goods and tax rate in order to become leader
  • Meanwhile, members of W contemplating defection to challenger face risk of not being in the challenger’s winning coalition
21
Q

Selectorate Theory, risk ratio for W

A

W= W/S, probability of being a member of the S challenger’s winning coalition if he succeeds in becoming leader
• Small W/S means that member of W is likely to be very loyal to S the current leader (strong loyalty norm)

• Large W/S means that member of W is not likely to be loyal to S the current leader (weak loyalty norm)

22
Q

Poor Performers in a Selectorate Theory

A

If W/S is small and the size of W is small (e.g., in a dictatorship with rigged elections), leaders can distribute a few private goods to W, and keep the rest for himself; tax rate can be very high since not that many private goods are needed.

23
Q

Good Performers in a Selectorate Theory

A

If W/S is large and the size of W is large (e.g., in a democracy), leaders have to distribute public goods (as targeted private goods to such a large population is infeasible); tax rate must also be low since this is expensive and requires population to be productive.

24
Q

Middling Performers in a Selectorate Theory

A
  • If W/S is large and the size of W is small (e.g., in a monarch), leaders distribute lots of private goods (since members of W are not loyal); tax rate must also be low since this is expensive and requires population to be productive.