L1_Doctrine of State Immunity Flashcards
What is the doctrine of infallability or Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty?
Example: case of filing suit against Sec Simato on Manila Bay. Will this be a suit against the state? Will the state be liable? How shall the judgement be enforced?
Ruiz vs DND:
There is no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied.
-demands the inconvenience of litigation and diverts state’s time and resources to more pressing matters.
Case: Case against Roy Simato. This is not a suit against the state. If it’s an “Affirmative” act of the state, the state may be Affirmative act is required. Congress can’t be forced to appropriate money.
Is there SARO? You can’t force the state to appropriate.
What is the sovereign equality of states?
One state can’t control another or assert its jurisdiction over another.
T/F
The Head of State, who is deemed the personification of the State he heads, is inviolable and thus, enjoys immunity from suit.
True. Public international law principle ‘par in parem non habet imperium’
T/F
A foreign agent is immune at all times.
False.
What is the general rule on Immunity of diplomatic agents, heads of states, including consuls
A foreign agent is immune only if it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending State
What is the exception to the general rule on
Foreign agent is sued in his individual capacity, as when he acts with malice or bad faith or beyond his scope of authority.
Enumerate entities that enjoy immunity.
Entities that enjoy immunity:
- Warships, government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
- United Nations (UN)
- SEAFDEC (Southern Asia Fisheries Development Center)
- IRRI (Int’l Rice Research Institute)
What is the test to determine if suit is against the State
Affirmative act of the State, such as the appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy the judgment.
Recite the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry
Doctrine: Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant’s timber license, were acting within the scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that “this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression” (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant’s action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of the State. Accordingly, “the rule establishing State exception from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State’s immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant”
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.
Facts:
On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license of logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry which incidentally was the same date the license for petitioner was signed.
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the Court.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the license
Held:
Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked.
b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.
c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise.
Petition denied.
Incorporated GOVERNMENT AGENCIES in suits _____.
Possesses a juridical personality independent of the State. If its charter provides that it can sue or be sued, then suit will lie.
There’s no problem if you are suing an incorporated agency. They may be sued. There’s a law, a charter that specifically created it. Specifically created.
ex. PhilHealth, GSIS, UP
Give examples of Incorporated Government Agencies
a. Municipal Corporations
b. National Electrification Administration (NEA)
c. University of the Philippines (UP)
d. National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
Recite the case of Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Judge Firme
Doctrine:
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.” (United States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Baniña.
ISSUES:
- Are municipal corporations suable?
- Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?
HELD:
We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
- Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
- Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any liability.
Recite the case of Mobil Philippines Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service
Facts: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. “Leoville” sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages, alleging that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
issue: WON The Bureau of Customs is liable?
Held: We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
Recite the case of Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA
FACTS:
December 13, 1968: Ernest E. Simke , Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines, with several other persons went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law
In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
While walking on the terrace filled with other people, he slipped over an elevation about 4 inches high at the far end of the terrace.
He fell on his back and broke his thigh bone.
December 14, 1968: he was operated for 3 hours
RTC: favored Simke
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was negligent as the entity empowered “to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport
HELD: YES.
National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better practice there should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. CAA as an agency is not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and defective condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired through the years. It has observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep of the MIA terrace, typical of many government buildings and offices. Aside from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace, pot holes cause by missing tiles remained unrepaired and unattented. The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said witness, it is neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding. Article 1173 of the Civil Code, "(t)he fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care -none here
Recite the case of Lansang vs. CA
Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved. With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area. The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.
Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent. Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state. No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.
Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.
Doctrine: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
Recite the case of Republic vs. Feliciano
FACTS: Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The claim of ownership by Feliciano was derived from deed of sale of the property traced from informacion posesoria. However, the said property was subject of Proclamation No. 90 by President Magsaysay for resettlement purposes.The Proclamation contained the reservation clause” subject to private rights, if any there be. “Feliciano asserts that the subject property must be excluded from the coverage of the resettlement project. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of non-suability of the State.
ISSUE#1: Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in an action for recovery and possession of parcel of land?
HELD#1: YES.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
ISSUE#2: Would the invocation of Proclamation No. 90 be considered as a waiver of State Immunity?
HELD: NO.
No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Unincorporated GOVERNMENT AGENCIES in suits _____.
The test for filing a case is based on their functions: (governmental/proprietary)
Basis: State cannot be sued without its consent. It cannot be sued from which the right derives from.
Has no juridical personality independent of the government. To determine its suability, inquire into the principal functions of the agency, whether governmental or proprietary:
-did not exist by virtue of special law.
Unincorporated agencies are created under 1 general law: Revised Administrative Code. Unlike Incorporated (created by Special Law).
T/F In governmental functions, no suit without State’s consent
True
T/F In the exercise of propriety functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, an unincorporated agency still can be sued w/o its consent
False. Even in the exercise of propriety functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, an unincorporated agency still cannot be sued w/o its consent
T/F In proprietary (business) functions, suit will lie because the State is deemed to have descended to the level of a private individual.
True.
- state has divested itself of its immunity and descended to the level of a private individual.
Define Unauthorized and Ultra vires act
Not considered acts of the State, thus the public officer may be sued and held personally liable.
What are the 3 instances wherein SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS may be made
- Unauthorized and Ultra vires act
- Bad faith, malice, or gross negligence
- Where the public official is sued in his personal capacity
T/F the official is personally accountable, even if such acts are of Bad faith, malice, or gross negligence and claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties.
True
