L1_Declaration of State Principles

Question 1

Recite the case of Pamatong v. Comelec on Art 2 Sec 26: Equal Access for Public Service.

Answer 1

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong’s contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Doctrine: This provision does not contain a judicially enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many as possible into public office. The privilege may be subjected to limitations. One such valid limitation is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.

Question 2

Recite the case of Basco v. PAGCOR on Art 2 Sec 25 on Autonomy of Local Governments

Answer 2

FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and granted a franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because of the following issues:

ISSUES:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov’t’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law.

(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs’ right to impose local taxes and license fees, and thus contrary to the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.
(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but also prohibits other gaming acts.
(4) WON it violates the Cory gov’t’s policy of being away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind is not violative of the principle of local autonomy. LGUs’ have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs’ power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they are mere creatures of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(2) No. LGUs’ right to impose license fees on “gambling”, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise, licenses or permits” was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs’ have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov’t such as PAGCOR which exercises governmental functions of regulating gambling activities.
(3) No. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. On the issue of monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be “regulated” or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only intervene when there are violations of the statutes passed by Congress regulating or prohibiting monopolies.

Question 3

Recite the case of Ass. of Phil Coconut Desiccators v. Phil Coconut Authority in relation to Sec. 20, Art II on role of private sectors in economy.

Answer 3

Facts:

            PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities.  The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.

Issue:

            whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation

Held:

            Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

Question 4

What is the Doctrine of Incorporation?

Answer 4

By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.

Question 5

What are deemed incorporated?

Answer 5

1. Treaties duly ratified
2. Norms of general or customary laws
3. Treaties which have become part of customary law

Question 6

What are the ways by which Int’l law can become part of the sphere of domestic law? Define each

Answer 6

1. Transformation – requires that an international law principle be transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation.
2. Incorporation – applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Question 7

What are the rules in case of conflict between an international law principle and provisions of the Constitution or Statute of the local state?

Answer 7

1. Harmonize – so as to give effect to both

2. If irreconcilable – domestic law prevails.

Question 8

What is the doctrine in Chavez v. Romulo?

Answer 8

The right to bear arms t is a statutory right, and not a constitutional one. It is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.

Question 9

What are the exceptions to Art 2 Sec 5: The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable?

Answer 9

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Question 10

What is the doctrine in People v. Larin in relation to Art 2 Sec 13?

Answer 10

RA 7610 which penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to “provide protection to children from all forms of abuse”.

Question 11

What is the doctrine in Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC in relation to Art 2 Sec 14?

Answer 11

While a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried may be justified as a “bona fide occupational qualification” where the particular requirements of the job would demand the same, discrimination against married women cannot be adopted by the employer as a general principle.

Question 12

Recite the case of Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC

Answer 12

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods. De Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.

When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy including a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company and Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed de Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. It was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

RULING:

No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Thus, could not be a ground to terminate her services.

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work.

Question 13

What is the doctrine in Oposa v. Factoran in relation to Art 2 Sec 16?

Answer 13

Petitioners, minors duly joined by their respective parents, had a valid cause of action questioning the continued grant of Timber License Agreements (TLAs) for commercial logging purposes, because the cause focuses on a fundamental legal right – the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Question 14

What is the doctrine in PRC v. De Guzman in relation to Art 2 Sec 16?

Answer 14

While it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements, the exercise of this right may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety and general welfare.

Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, in order to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance.

Question 15

What are the essential features of Republicanism?

Answer 15

1. Representation

2. Renovation

Question 16

What are the 6 manifestations of Republicanism?

Answer 16

1. Bill of Rights
2. Ours is a government of law, not of men
3. Rule of majority
4. Accountability of public officials
5. Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws
6. Reparation of Powers

Question 17

What is the purpose of separation of pwers?

Answer 17

To prevent concentration of authority in one or a group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse its exercise to the detriment of republican institutions.

Question 18

Recite the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez and the doctrine.

Answer 18

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Doctrine: In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the SC with regard to the former’s certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the SC’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the separation of powers.

Question 19

What is the principle of blending powers?

Answer 19

Powers are not exclusively w/in on department but are shared by several departments (i.e. enactment of appropriation law)

Question 20

What is the Principle of Checks and Balances

Answer 20

Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments (i.e. veto power of the President)

Question 21

What is the role of the judiciary?

Answer 21

To check for any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Question 22

What is meant by Doctrine of Necessary Implication

Answer 22

The grant of express power carries with it all other powers which although not expressly conferred or implied therefrom, are inherent or incidental (i.e. President’s power to deport undesirable aliens, which may be exercised independently of constitutional or statutory authority, because it is an “act of State”

Question 23

Differentiate Justiciable Question from Political Question

Answer 23

Justiciable question Implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right. (Casibang v. Aquino)
while Political questions are Questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. It concerns issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. (Tanada vs. Cuenco)

Question 24

Doctrine in Tanada v. Cuenco

Answer 24

Petition seeking nullification of the Senate concurrence of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO, was held to be a justiciable controversy, because where an action is alleged to infringe the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute

Question 25

Recite the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona and its doctrine

Answer 25

Facts: The Senate convening on 27 July 1998, Senator Marcelo Fernan and Francisco Tatad were nominated for president. Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2 and declared President of Senate. Senator Ople was president pro tempore and Senator Drilon as majority leader were likewise elected. Senator Tatad manifested that he will assume minority leader. This was contested by Senator Flavier stating that their party being the minority group will determine the holder of the said post. Thereafter, they voted for Senator Guingona. Hence the petition for quo warranto by Tatad.

Issue: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the constitution in the election of Senate officers?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The term “majority” simple means “the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the Senators.

Senator Santiago questioned the election of Senator Guingona as Minority Floor Leader. The SC said “it has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul the constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold.

Doctrine: The scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Sec 1, par 2, Art 8 – “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

Question 26

“Potestas delegata non potest delegare” means

Answer 26

Delegated authority may not be further delegation.

Question 27

Recite the case of Jesus Garcia v. Hon. Ray Alan Drilon

Answer 27

Barangay Protection Order (BPO) issued by the Punong Brgy merely orders the perpetrator to desist from causing physical harm to the woman or her child. Such function of the Punong Brgy is purely executive in nature, consistent with his duty under the LGC “to enforce all laws and ordinances” and “to maintain public order in the barangay”. Thus petitioner cannot challenge as undue delegation of judicial power the provision in RA 9262 which authorizes barangay officials to issue BPOs.

Question 28

What are 5 permissible delegations of power?

Answer 28

1. Tariff Powers to the President Art 6 Sec 28
2. Emergency Powers to the President Art 6 Sec 23
3. Delegation to the LGUs
4. Delegation to Administrative Bodies
5. Delegation to the People

Question 29

Recite Section 28 (2), Article 6 of the Constitution

Answer 29

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Question 30

Recite Section 23 (2), Article 6 of the Constitution

Answer 30

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Question 31

What are the conditions laid down in Section 23 to delegate emergency powers to the President?

Answer 31

(VLRPA)

1. The delegation must be validly done in times of war or national emergency
2. It should only be for a limited period
3. It is subject to restrictions as may be imposed by Congress
4. It is subject to the condition that when the President is given such emergency powers, he should only perform such powers to carry out a declared national policy
5. There has to be a law authorizing the President to exercise such emergency powers

Question 32

What is the distinction between President’s authority to declare a ‘state of emergency’ and to exercise emergency powers?

Answer 32

a) Authority to declare a state of emergency – no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
b) Authority to exercise emergency powers – manifold constitutional issues arise.

Question 33

Recite the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo and the doctrine

Answer 33

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Doctrine: The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately-owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress. Section 17, Art 12 must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause, and the State in said provision, refers to Congress, and not the President.

Question 34

Recite Art 6 Section 32 of the Constitution

Answer 34

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Question 35

Differentiate Referendum from Plebiscite

Answer 35

Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose.

1. Referendum on statutes
2. Referendum on local law

while Plebiscite is The electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people

Question 36

The DELEGATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS is found in?

Answer 36

RA 7160 or the Local Government Code.

Question 37

T/F The power to tax of LGUs is no longer a delegated authority from Congress. It is expressly conferred upon the LGU by the Constitution

Answer 37

True. (Section 5, Article 10)

Question 38

What is Power of Subordinate Legislation’ ?

Answer 38

confers upon the administrative bodies the power and authority to fill in the details which are lacking in the law and which Congress may not have the competence or opportunity to fill in.

Question 39

Recite the doctrine in Pelaez v. Auditor General

Answer 39

Facts:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippin… es,… pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders No… creating thirty-three (33)… municipalities… etitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives… and agents,… from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present… action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because the latter have… taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivision intervened in the case.

Hence, since

Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in the… areas affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.” Petitioner argues, accordingly: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is… composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order.

Issues:

President has… power to create a municipality by executive order.

Ruling:

Wherefore the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive

Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.

The power to create a municipality is legislative in character.

Doctrine: Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, authorizing the President to create municipalities through executive orders was declared unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power.

Question 40

Recite the case of Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez and the doctrine

Answer 40

FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality and that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

Doctrine: E.O. 353 creating the Municipality District of San Andres was not declared unconstitutional because it was only after almost 30 years of existence, the municipal district has exercised the powers and authority of a duly created LGU, and the State had at various times recognized its existence.

Question 41

What are the TESTS FOR A VALID DELEGATION and define each

Answer 41

1. Completeness Test – when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it.
2. Sufficient Standard Test – A sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The standard is usually indicated in the law delegating legislative power.

Question 42

Recite the case of Chiongbian v. Orbos and the doctrine.

Answer 42

Facts

The Congress passed the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA 6743)
pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some provinces which resulted to 4 provinces (
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi
) in favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says that those provinces and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing administrative regions
provided, however,
that the President may merge the existing regions through administrative determination.
President Cory then issued the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be “merged,” transferring
provinces from their existing region to another. The petitioners who are
members of the Congress
representing legislative districts protested the Executive Order, saying that there is
no law which authorizes
the President to pick certain provinces and cities within existing regions and
restructure
them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one province under its current region to another (ex: Misamis Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of
reorganization,
an alteration of the existing structures of the government. The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to
merge

existing regions
and cannot be construed as
reorganizing
them.

Issue

W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioner’s stand) in
character or executive as the respondents contend

●

Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through administrative determination or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated
●

Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of power to
fill up
or provide the details of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide for them
Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law
. In conferring on the President the power to merge the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972
. (RA5453)

This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied
.
Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of
power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:“to promote
simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for acceler
ated social and economic development.”

Doctrine: The legislative standard need not be expressed, it may simply be gathered or implied; neither should it always be found in the law challenged, because it may be found in other statutes on the same subject.

Question 43

Recite art 2 sec 2

Answer 43

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with nations.”

Question 44

T/F What is renounced is aggressive war, and not defensive war.

Answer 44

True

Question 45

Explain the Doctrine of Incorporation

Answer 45

By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. (Tanada v. Angara)

Question 46

What are deemed incorporated?

Answer 46

1. Treaties duly ratified
2. Norms of general or customary laws
3. Treaties which have become part of customary law

Question 47

What are the 2 methods by which Int’l law can become part of the sphere of domestic law and define each

Answer 47

1. Transformation – requires that an international law principle be transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation.
2. Incorporation – applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Question 48

What are the Rule in case of conflict between an international law principle and provisions of the Constitution or Statute of the local state.

Answer 48

1. Harmonize – so as to give effect to both

2. If irreconcilable – domestic law prevails.

Question 49

Recite the case of Ichong v. Hernandez and the doctrine

Answer 49

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade 
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. 

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. 
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business 

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process 
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title 
the Act violates international and treaty obligations 
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession 

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

Doctrine: Exercise of police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or contract. Courts are organs of municipal law and accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

Question 50

Recite the case of Philip Morris v. CA and the doctrine

Answer 50

Facts:

Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not doing business in the Philippines and registered owners of symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’ and ‘LARK’ used in their cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin respondent Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the symbol ‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical or confusingly similar with their trademarks. Petitioners relied on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to bring their suit and the Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The court denied the prayer for injunction stating that since petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines, respondent’s cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner. CA granted the injunction but on a subsequent motion, dissolved the writ.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded protection under said laws;
(2) Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive relief.

Ruling:

(1) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been acknowledged in La Chemise. Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.

Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.

2) NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as well as in the very petition filed with this Court indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines, for these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached. Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the facts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right. On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respondent’s “MARK” cigarettes who might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the case before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status quo is maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines. In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.

Doctrine: The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.

Question 51

Recite Sec. 3, Art. II

Answer 51

Civilian Authority is at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

Question 52

Recite Sec. 4, Art. II

Answer 52

The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfilment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.

Question 53

Recite Sec. 5, Art. II

Answer 53

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Question 54

T/F Right to bear arms is a mere statutory right

Answer 54

True.
The right to bear arms t is a statutory right, and not a constitutional one. It is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties. (Chavez v. Romulo )

Question 55

Recite Sec. 6, Art. II

Answer 55

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Question 56

Sec. 6, Art. II are reinforced by what provisions in the constitution?

Answer 56

1. Sec. 5, Art. III (Freedom of Religion Clause)
2. Sec. 2 (5), Art IX-C (Religious sect cannot be registered as political party)
3. Sec. 5 (2), Art. VI (No sectoral representative from religious sector)
4. Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI (Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit)

Question 57

What are the Exceptions to Sec. 6, Art. II ?

Answer 57

1. Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI (Churches, parsonages, etc., actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious purposes shall be exempt from taxation)
2. Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI (Prohibition against appropriation or sectarian benefit, except when priest or ecclesiastic is assigned to the armed forces, any penal institution or gov’t orphanage or leprosarium)
3. Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV (Optional religious instruction for public elementary and high school students)
4. Sec. 4 (2), Art. XIV (Filipino ownership requirement for educational institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards)

Question 58

Recite Sec. 7, Art. II

Answer 58

The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.

Question 59

Recite Sec. 8, Art. II

Answer 59

The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Question 60

Recite Sec. 9, Art. II

Answer 60

Sec. 9, Art. II
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Question 61

Recite Sec. 10, Art. II

Answer 61

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Question 62

Recite Sec. 11, Art. II

Answer 62

The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

Question 63

Recite Sec. 12, Art. II

Answer 63

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.”

Question 64

Recite Sec. 13, Art. II

Answer 64

The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Question 65

Sec. 14, Art. II

Answer 65

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.