Interstate war Flashcards

Question

Levy and misperceptions as a cause of war

Answer 1

misperception is meaningful only if there exists in principle a correct perception. war provides an objective test of actual capabilities. It

Answer 2

numerous intangibles that are particularly subject to misperception. In addition to such things as morale, leadership, and the quality of military intelligence, the nature of the adversary's military doctrine is especially important. Uncertainty or ignorance regarding the adversary's doctrine and its impact on the conduct and outcome of the war is a major source of misperception of overall capabilities misperceptions of existing military capabilities are important because of the common expectation of a short, victorious war with minimum losses, misperceptions of military potential are also significant since they may determine the outcome of a protracted war… Hitler believed, for example, that the Russian people would embrace his National Socialist ideology.

Answer 3

decision-makers could expect gains even from a losing war- to only is the expectation of victory not absolutely necessary for war… even a weaker state that perceives war as the least favorable alternative may rationally choose to initiate war if it expects that a preemptive strike will minimize its costs in a war that it perceives to be inevitable. This generally occurs at the final stages of a conflict spiral that is driven by an action-reaction process and fueled by further misperceptions, including the perception of the inevitability of war.

Answer 4

Exaggeration of the hostility of the adversary's intentions is the most common form of misperception. It derives from system-induced worst-case analysis, the tendency to define intentions in terms of available capabilities, diabolical images of the adversary, and psychological constraints on information processing. In the extreme case, perceptions of unmitigated hostility generate belief in the inevitability of war

Answer 5

* Contributing to the misperception of the adversary's intentions is the misperception of the adversary's conception of his vital interests and his perception of one's own capabilities and intentions, as well as the threat these pose to his interests. o The Korean War is a good example: because the United States failed to understand China's perception of the threat imposed by a unified Korean regime associated with the U.S., it failed to anticipate the Chinese intervention in response to the crossing of the 38th parallel.

Answer 6

The underestimation of an adversary's hostility can also lead to war, but by different paths than the exaggeration of hostile intent. Underestimation of the adversary's resolve in crisis is more common because of its tendency to be linked with (and generated by) military overconfidence, and its path to war is more direct. Such misperceptions may generate a refusal to compromise, an increase in one s commitment, or the initiation of new coercive moves. This process may lead directly to war.

Answer 7

Evolutionary not necessarily rationalist do not doubt that conventional explanations such as rational choice, misperceptions, or domestic politics may play a role in the causes of conflict missing contributory factor is humans’ evolutionary legacy of territoriality. 1648-1989, 79% of wars involved territorial issues. * An overall decline in war does not mean that human territoriality has vanished, or changed. On the contrary, the strong international concern to preserve existing state boundaries is itself evidence of a robust human penchant for territoriality

Answer 8

Maybe changes the stakes of war/ incentive to misrepresent/ lowers bargaining range – conflated by Fearon’s theory. Also dislikes traditional rational theories Agree with Fearon: If states were rational actors, options to resolve conflicts short of war should always be available. * But: They say that If military victory can deliver more than any negotiated solution could, other states may calculate that the benefits of war will exceed the costs, but because wars do erupt even where such conditions are absent, they have to be explained in terms of imperfect processes that prevent rational actors from avoiding costly fights . In response to Fearon who downplays the role of indivisible issues- In territorial disputes, however, both sides can often view the same location as indivisible; examples include Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and al-Aqsa Mosqu

Answer 9

Biologists note a “dear enemy” phenomenon in some settings, whereby animals recognize the territorial holdings of neighbours and do not fight them.+ material interests are often at stake, “symbolic” factors are also invoked as a powerful driver of war over territory, leading to conflict even over land “that for all practical purposes is devoid of value.” territoriality might be loosely considered not as “hard-wired” but as “soft-wired Territory holders are therefore especially likely to adopt hawkish strategies, responding aggressively to threats, provocation, or incursion. linked to economic benefit too - * Territoriality may be beneficial in one place and costly in another, and it is an effective strategy only where and when the benefits outweigh the costs, Some species are highly territorial during the breeding season, vigorously excluding rivals from their territory around the clock, only to abandon their territories in the winter

Answer 10

o (1) “resource holding potential” (RHP), which can be equated with military power in international relations; o (2) “value asymmetry” (VA), which can be equated with the value that states attach to a given piece of territory; This familiarity helps to account for how residents with lower RHP are able to defeat intruders with higher RHP Territories have particular terrain, veg- etation, paths, dangers, and escape routes with which long-time residents are familiar, unlike interlopers. On home ground, therefore, residents may be more effective fighters + adjusts the stakes- greater value owners attach to their territory than intruders o (3) “economic defensibility” (ED), which can be equated with a rational cost-benefit analysis of the utility of fighting over territory.

Answer 11

* widespread deadly violence within species — including humans — has been found to be the norm in nature. Competition over resources is a prime cause of aggression and deadly violence. The reason for this is that food, water, and, to a lesser degree, shelter against the elements are tremendous selection forces * The more resource-rich a region is, the more people it attracts from outside, and the greater the internal population growth that takes place. As Malthus pointed out, a new equilibrium between resource volume and population size would eventually be reached, recreating the same tenuous ratio of subsistence that was the fate of preindustrial societies throughout history. * Among social animals, possessing higher rank in the group promises one a greater share in the communal resources, such as hunting spoils, and better access to females. For Rivalry for rank and domination in nature is, then, a proximate means in the competition over resources and reproduction

Answer 12

* Revenge is one of the major causes of fighting cited in anthropological accounts of pre-state societies. o does not pay back an injury, one may signal weakness and expose oneself to further injuries. A process of victimization might be created. This rationale applies wherever there is no higher authority that can be relied upon for protection, that is, Is so-called anarchic systems o The offender cannot always be eliminated. Furthermore, the offender has kin who will avenge him, and it is even more difficult to eliminate them as well. In many cases tit-for-tat becomes a negative loop of retaliation and counter-retaliation from which it is very hard to exit. o Arms races often have paradoxical results. The continuous and escalating effort to surpass one’s rival may prove successful, in which case the rival is destroyed or severely weakened. However, in many cases, every step on one side is matched by a counter-step on the other. Consequently, even though each side invests increasing resources in the conflict, neither gains an advantage. * the basic motivation on both sides is defensive The sides may choose to actively pre-empt, that is, take not only defensive precautions but attack in order to eliminate or severely weaken the other side. Indeed, this option in itself makes the other side even more insecure, making the security dilemma more acute. Warfare can thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Answer 13

* As conditions have changed — indeed, only for those for whom they have changed, most notably within the world’s affluent and democratic ‘zone of peace’ — the violent option, the ‘hammer,’ in the human behavioural tool kit seems to have declined in utility for attaining desired aims

Answer 14

o Concern for reputation for resolve drove Spartan and Athenian tensions leading to the Peloponnesian War. leaders, policy elites, and national populations are often concerned, even obsessed, with their status and reputation * concern for reputation for resolve will be greater when states face a challenger they are likely to face again in the future, specifically states that are “(1) geographically close, (2) militarily powerful, or (3) have a demonstrated history of aggression.” o Conflict can therefore arise when status hierarchies are unclear, such as when there are multiple dimensions on which actors may be ranked, or when an actor challenges the hierarchy * A reputation for resolve is a reputation for being unlikely to back down in a certain class of dispute: of theories of deterrence is that an actor can deter others by building and maintaining a reputation for resolve. Reputation can also make compellent threats more credible. o If a state repeatedly behaves in some manner, for example, fighting hard against every challenge to its colonies, then the state will eventually get a reputation for behaving in that manner. If the reputation is sufficiently valuable and will be damaged by a failure to uphold it, then the state will have incentives to maintain its commitment; if others perceive these incentives, then others will perceive the state’s commitment to be credible… The failure of an actor to maintain one such expectation can affect the actor’s reputation or social role, thereby influencing expectations about other behaviours.

Answer 15

* Reputation arises from persistent beliefs about an actor's past actions. o Second-order beliefs: Collective beliefs held by a group about an actor.  prestige” as a second-order belief: “prestige means that everyone thinks that everyone thinks” that an actor has some good quality.  First- and second-order beliefs need not agree.

Answer 16

an attribute of an individual or social role that refers to position vis-a`-vis a comparison group. o Status can be dichotomous (membership) or rank-based (hierarchy). o A change in an actor’s status implies a change in at least one other actor’s status, o high-status actors are those about whom it is common knowledge that they will stand firm against lower-status actors

Answer 17

o Studies suggest no significant difference between democratic and non-democratic states in war involvement frequency or severity. * Democratic states don't engage in wars with each other. * Liberal states resolve economic conflicts through market forces, minimizing interstate conflicts. * Centralized economies politicize economic conflicts, adding tensions to interstate relations. * Nationalism has created the sense of a common interest in the nation, a concept of the national interest as the highest value and an intense commitment to the well-being of the state. Nationalism and national myths can be manipulated by elites to advance their interests. * Mayer- Political elites might use foreign wars as diversions from internal problems. * War can be a strategy to maintain or increase domestic support.

Answer 18

o Democratic decision-making flaws may affect foreign policy conduct. o De Tocqueville noted that democratic qualities are often deficient in foreign politics. o Morgenthau emphasized the challenge of obtaining popular support versus successful foreign policy pursuit. o Democratic public opinion can impede alliances with ideologically hostile states. o Public demands for transparency hinder delicate negotiations with adversaries.

Answer 19

* for conflict to occur, one state must select another state as a relevant comparison that leaves it dissatisfied with its status; it must then choose an identity-maintenance strategy in response that brings it into conflict with another state that is also willing to fight for its position. capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. and the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. * Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action . Status conflict is thus more likely in flat, ambiguous hierarchies than in clearly stratified ones. the more closely matched actors are materially, the more likely they are to experience uncertainty about relative rank. They experience status inconsistency and face incentives to resolve the uncertainty.

Answer 20

Unipolarity= under the condition of international anarchy, a state enjoys the preponderance of power and faces no competitor states

Answer 21

o Cold war- bipolarity contained material sources of status uncertainty. while the Soviet Union was equal to or stronger than the United States in conventional military and raw industrial capabilities, the United States dominated all other categories of power. the perception in moscow was that the United States had emerged from world war ii with rights and privileges that the Soviet Union did not possess. resentment of this perceived status inequality and an intense desire to achieve real superpower “parity” showed up Soviet leaders knowingly took security risks in pursuit of status. o two superpowers relatively certain of their core security engaged in a series of expensive militarized disputes involving proxies in the developing world.

Answer 22

o post–cold war U.S.- country’s status of primacy. o official U.S. strategies from the dawn of unipolarity in 1991 through the Clinton administration to the pre-9/11 Bush administration call explicitly for “maintaining U.S. predominance.” U.S. administrations continue to make massive investments in areas where no plausible competition exists perhaps most notably in maintaining nuclear primacy. o under unipolarity U.S. diplomats have frequently adopted policies to enhance the security of the identities of russia, China, Japan, and india as great eg US have urged a much larger regional role for Japan; and they have deliberately fostered india’s status as a “responsible” nuclear power. Russia, the country whose elite has arguably confronted the most threats to its identity, has been the object of what appear to be elaborate U.S. status-management policies that included invitations to form a partnership with nato, play a prominent role in middle east diplomacy (from which washington had striven to exclude moscow for four decades) the United States is free to buttress the status of these states as second-tier great powers and key regional players precisely because it faces no serious competition for overall system leadership.

Answer 23

19th and first half of 20th century - half of all interstate wars were accompanied by declarations of war. From 1950 on, by contrast, the number of wars remained about the same, but the number of wars accompanied by declarations declined dramatically—to three

Answer 24

o The domestic legal implications of declaring war vary by country. o The Iranian Constitution stipulates election delays during a time of war. o Israel’s Basic Law requires full governmental participation in a declaration of war and allows for the suspension or alteration of laws and taxes when a state of emergency is declared. o India’s Constitution empowers the federal government effectively to take over state governments following a proclamation of a state of emergency, which is the Indian equivalent of a declaration of war.

Answer 25

o Historically, the content of declarations of war also serves as the justifications for war and the statement of war aims, roles that are important for international as well as domestic consumption. Typically, a declaration of war is also accompanied by: a break in diplomatic relations a termination of commerce and suspension of treaties; and the coming into force of laws governing the conduct of war, such as the Geneva Conventions.

Answer 26

o Alliance obligations may be invoked. Neutral states must act with complete impartiality and without discrimination toward belligerents by respecting contraband lists and shipping routes, or risk having their vessels and cargo seized, not to mention subjecting citizens on these vessels to attack.

Answer 27

* state parties to war would prefer not to be held to their obligations to comply with jus in bello because achieving compliance has become increasingly costly. One way of avoiding liability is to create ambiguity as to whether they are in a state of war.

Answer 28

o The 1937 Sino-Japanese War: Japan, which had ratified practically every jus in bello treaty at the time of the conflict, decided against declaring war on China because doing so would activate the US Neutrality Act, thereby severely hampering Japan’s ability to trade with the United States. Japan’s invasion of China was labeled an “incident,” rather than a war. Moreover, “the Japanese argued that because they were not waging a war, they did not need to obey international law in their treatment of Chinese prisoners. The infamous Rape of Nanking that occurred during the 1937 Sino- Japanese War is one case consistent with this hypothesis.

Answer 29

o When, in June 2011, the US Congress informed President Barack Obama that, under the terms of the War Powers Act, he must either terminate US involvement in the intervention in Libya or request an extension from Congress, the Obama administration responded by exploiting a definitional ambiguity of the War Powers Act. The US role in Libya, argued Obama, did not constitute “hostilities” and, therefore, did not fall under the jurisdiction of the act.

Answer 30

o Following India’s intervention in what was then East Pakistan, Pakistan declared war on India on 22 November 1971. India responded in kind two weeks later, making the Bangladesh War a rare example of a post-Geneva declared war. Although both parties were mainly compliant with jus in bello for the duration of the fighting, the Indians were clearly noncompliant with the Third 1949 Geneva Convention relating to treatment of prisoners of war. They refused to repatriate tens of thousands of Pakistani prisoners of war in a timely manner, effectively holding them hostage in order to gain leverage at the peace table. o After a year of fruitless talks led to a breakdown in negotiations, Pakistan brought the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Within three months, India and Pakistan quickly resolved all but a few hundred of the most egregious of the POW cases. The potential cost to India was reputational loss in the eyes of the international community.

Answer 31

* Powerful states can condition others’ ability to access resources they need in order to invest their own resource endowments efficiently. They can also condition the terms under which others can trade their products and services internationally. When powerful states fear their security will be undermined by the economic growth of weaker states, they will be willing to impose such constraints, hamstringing the economic growth of weaker states . If this economic hold- up problem is sufficiently severe, the weaker state may opt for war. Although fighting is costly and the state’s relative weakness makes victory less likely, winning would allow it to invest its resources efficiently, maximizing future growth. * Certainly, a weak challenger is less likely to prevail in war. By the same token, however, a weak challenger cannot use the threat of war effectively to obtain favourable terms of peace. The decision to go to war for economic reasons is based on whether peace or war offer better prospects for future growth; not on whether the state is rising or declining.

Answer 32

o In 1938, its last year at peace, the German economy represented a mere 43% of the US economy, at the time the largest in the world. this was also after a rise from 31% in 1929 o The 1919 Versailles Treaty required Germany to pay substantial reparations to Allied powers for causing World War I- Germany received more in private loans than they had to pay in reparations- “German dependence on American capital seemed to be an inevitable fact of life”. o in late 1928, the US credit market tightened and interest rates rose, ending long-term loans to Germany- Germany couldn’t pay reparations and were on verge of economic collapse o The clearest articulation of Hitler’s views on the United States can be found in his Zweites Buch of 1928- military conflict in Eastern Europe aimed at acquiring sufficient Lebensraum for the German people. These arguments are presented as merely a means to an end: a struggle for world domination between a German-controlled Europe and the United States o in his December 11, 1941, speech declaring war on the United States, Hitler refers back to FDR’s quarantine speech of four years earlier as part of his justification for war, arguing that Washington was intent on interrupting Germany’s development path

Answer 33

* the post– World War II global economic regime of institutionalized open trade supports peace o multi- lateral trade institutions—such as the World Trade Organization—can mitigate the economic hold-up problem of the hegemon by increasing the cost it pays for imposing resource- access restrictions and punishing terms of trade on individual weaker member states. International economic institutions, therefore, decrease the odds of conflict even when they partially reflect the power distribution of their member states, as long as even the most powerful of them would pay a higher cost for discriminating vis-à-vis weaker states than would be the case if the institution were not to exist.

Answer 34

Classical realism, also known as traditional or classical realism, emphasizes the role of human nature, individual leaders, and historical context in shaping international relations. Classical realists argue that states are driven by inherent qualities such as power-seeking, security concerns, and a desire for survival. They focus on the subjective perceptions of decision-makers and the importance of factors such as ideology, culture, and morality in shaping state behavior.

Answer 35

Monteiro and Debs

Answer 36

Fazal: * states have all but stopped issuing formal declarations of war because the rise of the codified law of war governing belligerent conduct (jus in bello) has generated significant costs for states that declare war

Answer 37

“theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox)

Answer 38

* Conventional theory, problem-solving theory, takes the prevailing social/power relationships and institutions as a given framework, and works to deal with specific sources of trouble within it.

Answer 39

questions the origins of the current order exploring it, and considers whether they might be undergoing change denounces these practices which effectively strip the South of agency in the self-definition of their international identities and goals. * Global South’s identity is constructed in deference to the North and its perspective of itself stripping the south of agency

Answer 40

* Irrational - leaders miscalculation, concern for reputation Southern US presidents who are unique to other president’s due to the culture of honour in the South. They find that “militarized interstate disputes (mids) that have occurred under southern presidents have been twice as likely to involve the use of force, lasted on average twice as long, and have been three times more likely to be won by the United States” (Dafoe, Alan, and Caughey 2014). This evidence is an indication that a leader’s attitude can cause them to care highly about the reputation for resolve their country has, and president’s who value resolve highly are likely to fight longer, more violent wars rather than conceding.

Answer 41

critical theory, specifically post colonialism. That school basically says that conventional IR is western centric (in its focus and scholars) and why that is problematic. It is the basis for arguments that the weak have the right to use forms of resistance other than conventional warfare but that IR theory delegitimizes them from doing so

Answer 42

states compete for power/security and this causes conflict theoretical propositions regarding how states respond to the affairs of other states in dealing with power inequality based on the assumptions of groupism, egoism and power-centrism and operates under the scope condition that these dynamics take place under anarchical and underordered international conditions o Physical survival is the paramount concern o International system is “self-help” o Relative military power is essential to survival

Answer 43

Realists- states will check dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own capabilities” (Wohlforth 41). states balance against a rising power to avoid power concentrations that can threaten their survival

Answer 44

realist - that “powerful states tend to seek dominance over” (Wohlforth 41) all parts of an international system. unipolarity is the most stable order o Hegemons use their preponderant power to sustain economic and political structures as well as norms of conduct that enhance stability

Answer 45

realist - lesser states will be more likely to content leader “as they become stronger relative to the dominant state”. o Hegemony is not permanent: power transitions can end the stability afforded by unipolarity (and by bipolarity)  WWI partly explained by the rise of German naval power, which challenged British supremacy o The challenger initiates war to unseat the hegemon or the declining hegemon initiates a preventive war to block the challenger

Answer 46

condition of anarchy.

Answer 47

* liberalism rejects the insignificance of a state’s internal affairs, and argues that when states adopt structures of liberal democracy, it is possible to create a more peaceful and ordered international system. This is partially based on the belief that liberal democracies treat each other peaceably, known as democratic peace theory, and partially based on liberalism’s emphasis on global free markets and the economic cooperation/interdependence this creates o States’ interests are essentially aligned – “harmony interests”

Answer 48

o Defensive realism: states seek to maximise security (Waltz) o Offensive realism: states seek to maximise power (Mearsheimer)

Answer 49

o States co-existing in anarchy cannot be certain about the intentions of other nations, with two important implications: o Assume the worst possible intentions o Focus on adversaries’ capabilities, rather than their intentions o Security is zero-sum: the growing security of one state ensures the o growing insecurity of others o This vicious logic has produced outbreaks of war even when the main contenders wished to avoid it o By themselves they cannot tell us why war broke out in any given context - Only that war could break out

Answer 50

liberal : liberal democracies do not fight each other * - Commercial trade incentives * - Institutional and electoral restraints * - Democracies bound in a community of shared values

Answer 51

* - Realists’ warning: even if the DPT is true, in the anarchic jungle there are no assurances that liberal democracies will remain so * State leaders are more interested in relative gains than in absolute gains * Effects of trade on war are limited; more important are considerations about relative security gains and losses

Answer 52

DPT does not explain why wars happen with illiberal states * Between 1816 and 1991, democracies fought 155 wars with non- democracies

Answer 53

o The intervention of the individual decisionmaker and policymaker is required and essential in explaining outbreaks of war. o Even if material interests and conditions are fixed, individuals will interpret them differently, or they might implement different strategies and policies in pursuing them o More than just the material world, what matters is human nature, individuals’ belief systems, emotions, and the psychological processes through which individuals acquire and process (often under conditions of cognitive stress) imperfect information  Lack of empathy among European leaders helped to produce WWI

Answer 54

individual level  War is rooted in the evils of human nature (Thucydides, Morgenthau)  Human nature drives humans to seek greater power and to dominate others

Answer 55

individual level o Focuses on the effects of individual choice under conditions of risk to account for anomalies in rationalist utility theory o Assumes that individuals evaluate outcomes on the basis of a reference point or goal rather than according to net-asset values o Individuals overemphasise certain outcomes over probable ones and problem outcomes over improbable ones o The resulting asymmetry in actor evaluations regarding expected gains and losses means that how people frame their reference point in any given context is vital o Moreover, people tend to adjust psychologically to gains more quickly than to losses o E.g.: After seizing gains, leaders adjust their reference points and take excessive risks to defend those gains, while the loser takes excessive risks to recover the loss.