Interstate war Flashcards
what are rational explanations for war
Rationalist explanations for war in international relations focus on the rational calculations and strategic choices made by states and leaders that lead to conflict. Unlike psychological or emotional explanations, rationalist theories emphasize the pursuit of self-interest and the rational decision-making process of states in the international system.
neorealist explanation for war
structural characteristics of the international system rather than the motivations or behaviours of individual states. There is no central authority or governing body that can enforce rules or prevent conflicts between states. In this environment, states are primarily concerned with their own security and survival. states seek to maximize their power relative to other states to ensure their security and influence in the international system.
Neorealism and rationalist explanations
If no rationalist explanation for war is theoretically or empirically tenable, then neither is neorealism. The causes of war would then lie in the defects of human nature or particular states rather than in the international system, as argued by neorealists
Preventative war argument
if a declining power expects it might be attacked by a rising power in the future, then a preventive war in the present may be rational.
Positive expected utility argument
the expected benefits of fighting outweigh the expected costs. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argued in an influential formalization of this claim, war can be rational if both sides have positive expected utility for fighting; that is, if the expected utility of war (expected benefits less costs) is greater than the expected utility of remaining at peace.
security dilemma
States may perceive the actions of other states, such as military build-ups or alliances, as threatening to their security. In response, they may take preemptive or defensive measures that inadvertently escalate tensions and increase the risk of conflict.
Blainey’s argument for interstate war
wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength.”- a disagreement about relative strength-understood as conflicting estimates of the likelihood of military victory-can eliminate any ex-ante bargaining range
- emotional commitments could irrationally bias leaders’ military estimates. They might, for instance, come to believe nationalist rhetoric holding that their soldiers are more courageous and spirited than those of the adversary.
- the world is a very complex place, and for this reason military analysts in different states could reach different conclusions about the likely impact of different technologies, doctrines, and tactics on the expected course of battle.
- state leaders might have private information about militarily relevant factors-military capabilities, strategy, and tactics. if a state has superior information then its estimate of the probable course of battle may differ from that of an adversary
Miscalculation of opponents willingness to fight as an explanation for war
Many wars have been given the following so-called rationalist explanation: state A transgressed some interest of state B in the erroneous belief that B would not fight a war over the matter. Though rationally led, state A lacked information about B’s willingness to fight and simply happened to guess wrong, causing a war.
Blainey’s suggestion that a disagreement about relative power is necessary for war is incorrect-all that is necessary is that the states in dispute be unable to locate or agree on some outcome in the bargaining range. this argument is not a disagreement about strength but rather how far they can bargain - what is a dealbreaker. Since the bargaining range is determined not just by relative power but also by states’ values for the issues at stake relative to the costs of fighting
Fearon’s main issue with rationalist explanations for war
none resolve the central puzzle – war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentive to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war. they fail either to address or to explain adequately what prevents leaders from reaching ex ante (prewar) bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting. A coherent rationalist explanation for war must do more than give reasons why armed conflict might appear an attractive option to a rational leader
Fearon’s concept of ex-post as a critique of rationalist explanations for war
. As long as both sides suffer some costs for fighting, then war is always inefficient ex post-both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved the same final resolution without suffering the costs (or by paying lower costs). This is true even if the costs of fighting are small, or if one or both sides viewed the potential benefits as greater than the costs, since there are still costs. . Unless states enjoy the activity of fighting for its own sake, as a consumption good, then war is inefficient expost.
fearon’s concept of ex-ante bargaining emerging from ex-post inefficiency
the costs and risks of fighting open up a “wedge” of bargained solutions that risk-neutral or risk-averse states will prefer to the gamble of conflict. The existence of this ex ante bargaining range derives from the fact that war is inefficient expost
Fearon’s example for ex-ante bargaining
o Suppose that two people (or states) are bargaining over the division of $100. For a price of $20, they can go to war, in which case each player has a 50-percent chance of winning the whole $100. This implies that the expected value of the war option is $30 for each side, so that if the players are risk-neutral, then neither should be willing to accept less than $30 in the bargaining. But notice that there is still a range of peaceful, bargained outcomes from ($31, $69) to ($69, $31) that make both sides strictly better off than the war option.
Fearon’s critique of Neo-realist explanations for war
if using force is a costly option regardless of the outcome, then why is it ever employed even if there is no supernational authority to prevent it?
Fearon’s critique of security dilemma explanations for war
o Consider, a spiral scenario in which an insecure state increases its arms, rendering another so insecure that it decides to attack. If the first state anticipated the reaction producing war, then by itself this is a deadlock argument. If the first state did not anticipate war and did not want it, then the problem would seem to be miscalculation rather than anarchy, and we need to know why signalling and bargaining could not have solved it.
Fearon’s critique of preventative war explanation
do not consider whether the rising and declining powers could construct a bargain, perhaps across time, that would leave both sides better off than a costly and risky preventive war would.
Fearon’s critique of positive expected utility explanation
fails to address the question of how or under what conditions it can be possible for two states both to prefer the costly gamble of war to any negotiated settlement
Fearon’s ciritique of Blainey’s argument
if two rational agents have the same information about an uncertain event, then they should have the same beliefs about its likely outcome + even if leaders have such private information, they should understand that their own estimates based on this information are suspect because they do not know the other side’s private information. In principle, both sides could gain by sharing information, which would yield a consensus military estimate (absent bounded rationality). And, as shown above, doing so could not help but reveal bargains that both would prefer.
Question needs to be what prevents states from sharing private information about factors that might affect the course of battle.
How Fearon’s explanation for war goes further
In order to avoid war’s ex post inefficiency, leaders have incentives to share any such private information, which would have the effect of revealing peaceful settlements that lie within the bargaining range. and states can in principle communicate with one another. So, to explain how war could occur between states led by rational leaders who consider the costs of fighting, we need to explain what would prevent them from sharing such private information
Fearon- 2 reasons rational states cannot locate a bargain
(1) the combination of private information about resolve or capability and incentives to misrepresent these
(2) states’ inability, in specific circumstances, to commit to uphold a deal.
Fearon’s explanation of private information as a reason for going to war
incentives to misrepresent private information:
communication may not allow rational leaders to clarify relative power or resolve without generating a real risk of war. This is not simply a matter of miscalculation due to poor information but rather of specific strategic dynamics that result from the combination of asymmetric information and incentives to dissemble.
states wish to obtain a favourable resolution of the issues. This latter desire can give them an incentive to exaggerate their true willingness or capability to fight
States can also have an incentive to conceal their capabilities or resolve, if they are concerned that revelation would make them militarily vulnerable or would reduce the chances for a successful first strike.
. If cutting a deal in one dispute would lead other states to conclude the leader’s costs for using force are high, then the leader might choose a costly war rather than suffer the depredations that might follow from making concessions- a small state or group (for example, Finland or the Chechens) chooses to fight a losing war against a larger one (for example, the Soviet Union or Russia) in order to develop a reputation for being hard to subjugate.* Vicious circle of misrepresentation- incentives to misrepresent military strength can undermine diplomatic signalling, states may be forced to use war as a credible means to reveal private information about their military capabilities.
Example of Fearon’s argument
July crisis of WW1
Soon after German leaders secretly endorsed Austrian plans to crush Serbia, they received both direct and indirect verbal indications from St. Petersburg that Russia would fight rather than acquiesce.
had little effect on German leaders’ beliefs, however, since they knew Russian leaders had a strategic incentive to misrepresent.
At the same time, the Chancellor had an incentive to misrepresent the strength and nature of German support for Austria’s plans. Bethmann correctly anticipated that revealing this information would make Germany appear the aggressor
led him to pretend to go along with the British Foreign Secretary’s proposals for a conference to mediate the dispute. In consequence, Lord Grey may not have grasped the need for a stronger warning to Germany until fairly late in the crisis.
Fearon’s argument about war due to commitment problems
Even if private information and incentives to misrepresent it do not tempt states into a risky process of discovery or foster costly investments in reputation, states may be unable to settle on an efficient bargained outcome when for structural reasons they cannot trust each other to uphold the deal.
Fearon and anarchy
to do with commitment problem
anarchy does matter but very specifically- Anarchy matters when an unfortunate combination of state preferences and opportunities for action imply that one or both sides in a dispute have incentives to renege on peaceful bargains which, if they were enforceable, would be mutually preferred to war.
How offensive and pre-emptive advantages fit into Fearon’s theory
linked to commitment problem
an offensive advantage might mean that the costs of fighting are lower for an attacking state than for a defending state and the odds of winning are better for the former - narrows bargaining range
under anarchy, large enough first-strike incentives (relative to cost benefit ratios) can make all of these agreements unenforceable and incredible as bargains.
o Rather than completely eliminating enforceable bargains and so causing war, it seems more plausible that first-strike and offensive advantages exacerbate other causes of war by narrowing the bargaining range. If for whatever reason the issues in dispute are hard to divide up, then war will be more likely the smaller the set of enforceable agreements both sides prefer to a fight.
can be conflated by incentives to misrepresent - , in 1914 large perceived first-strike advantages meant that relatively few costly signals of intent were sufficient to commit both sides to war
Levy and misperceptions as a cause of war
misperception is meaningful only if there exists in principle a correct perception.
war provides an objective test of actual capabilities. It
Levy and Misperceptions of capabilities- the deliberate escalation to war resulting from a miscalculation of the states’ relative capabilities or resolve.
numerous intangibles that are particularly subject to misperception. In addition to such things as morale, leadership, and the quality of military intelligence, the nature of the adversary’s military doctrine is especially important. Uncertainty or ignorance regarding the adversary’s doctrine and its impact on the conduct and outcome of the war is a major source of misperception of overall capabilities
misperceptions of existing military capabilities are important because of the common expectation of a short, victorious war with minimum losses, misperceptions of military potential are also significant since they may determine the outcome of a protracted war… Hitler believed, for example, that the Russian people would embrace his National Socialist ideology.
Levy and Misperceptions of capabilities. bargaining’s escalation to war- escalation resulting from the decision-makers’ loss of control over the situation.
decision-makers could expect gains even from a losing war- to only is the expectation of victory not absolutely necessary for war… even a weaker state that perceives war as the least favorable alternative may rationally choose to initiate war if it expects that a preemptive strike will minimize its costs in a war that it perceives to be inevitable.
This generally occurs at the final stages of a conflict spiral that is driven by an action-reaction process and fueled by further misperceptions, including the perception of the inevitability of war.
Levy - misperception of intentions- overestimation
Exaggeration of the hostility of the adversary’s intentions is the most common form of misperception. It derives from system-induced worst-case analysis, the tendency to define intentions in terms of available capabilities, diabolical images of the adversary, and psychological constraints on information processing. In the extreme case, perceptions of unmitigated hostility generate belief in the inevitability of war
Levy - misperception of intentions- vital interests
- Contributing to the misperception of the adversary’s intentions is the misperception of the adversary’s conception of his vital interests and his perception of one’s own capabilities and intentions, as well as the threat these pose to his interests.
o The Korean War is a good example: because the United States failed to understand China’s perception of the threat imposed by a unified Korean regime associated with the U.S., it failed to anticipate the Chinese intervention in response to the crossing of the 38th parallel.
Levy - misperception of intentions- underestimation
The underestimation of an adversary’s hostility can also lead to war, but by different paths than the exaggeration of hostile intent. Underestimation of the adversary’s resolve in crisis is more common because of its tendency to be linked with (and generated by) military overconfidence, and its path to war is more direct. Such misperceptions may generate a refusal to compromise, an increase in one s commitment, or the initiation of new coercive moves. This process may lead directly to war.
Johnson and Toft territory theory
Evolutionary not necessarily rationalist
do not doubt that conventional explanations such as rational choice, misperceptions, or domestic politics may play a role in the causes of conflict
missing contributory factor is humans’ evolutionary legacy of territoriality.
1648-1989, 79% of wars involved territorial issues.
* An overall decline in war does not mean that human territoriality has vanished, or changed. On the contrary, the strong international concern to preserve existing state boundaries is itself evidence of a robust human penchant for territoriality
Johnson and Toft- how does it fit with Fearon
Maybe changes the stakes of war/ incentive to misrepresent/ lowers bargaining range – conflated by Fearon’s theory. Also dislikes traditional rational theories
Agree with Fearon: If states were rational actors, options to resolve conflicts short of war should always be available.
* But: They say that If military victory can deliver more than any negotiated solution could, other states may calculate that the benefits of war will exceed the costs, but because wars do erupt even where such conditions are absent, they have to be explained in terms of imperfect processes that prevent rational actors from avoiding costly fights
. In response to Fearon who downplays the role of indivisible issues- In territorial disputes, however, both sides can often view the same location as indivisible; examples include Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and al-Aqsa Mosqu