Interpersonal, Team, & Group Dynamics Flashcards
Group polarization
endency for group decisions to be more extreme than themembers’ individual decisions
Mr. A group polarization example, Stoner (1961)
- described scenario of Mr. A staying with a secure, modestly paying job, or leaving to try ariskier, more lucrative job- participants selected the lowest probability that would make this a worthwhile switch-group decisions were RISKIER than made by the same individual alone!-initially called “risky switch phenomenon,” but not always risky!!
Myers & Bishop, group polarization, groups discussing racial issues
-had groups discuss racial issues- high-prejudice groups  became more prejudiced - low-prejudice groups  became more tolerant!
potential cause of group polarization: normative influence
normative influence-you gain conviction if others’ opinions match yours- social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954): you compare yourself with others to determine what is correct, appropriate and desirable- it is the PROCESS of discussion (rather than the content) that produces change- [X] BUT, polarization obtained without any interaction…
potential cause of group polarization: informational influence
informational influence-new info may sway your opinions- during discussion, pro-risk: pro-caution arguments were 6:4 (Burnstein & Vinokur,1977)- it is the content of discussion (rather than the process) that produces change-likelihood is LOW ppl will share info/opinion only THEY have, emphasis on SHARED knowledge[X] BUT, groups typically rely on common knowledge, rather than sharing new info
potential cause of group polarization: self-categorization
self-categorization-group is not an external influence, but rather provides you with a social identity-membership in a group helps you define your OWN individual identity- you are not a part of the group as much as the group is a part of YOU- social influence is informational and normative: you evaluate info rationally, but values are normatively established- when you perceive yourself to be a group member, you should polarize away fromyour own personal position and toward the group norm-pro/con of this approach: flexible, explains a lot, but that loses explaining power…
groupthink definition (irving janis)
“a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”
groupthink
- tendency for all members in a small, close-knit group to think alike, and discourage dissent/disagreement- others’ opinions count; you compare yourself to others; uniformity/social norms may develop within a group- individuals do not want to be singled out as “different”:- dissenters must debate their position with entire group- if group fails to change dissenter’s mind, dissenter is EXCLUDED- social systems are tension systems: discrepancy between group norm and individualproduces tension (e.g., cognitive dissonance)Group: Unwritten goal is unanimity. Is individual rejected?Individual: Do you (1) influence group to change? (2) change your own opinion?or (3) reject the group?- thus, conformity is viewed positively
groupthink model
antecedent conditions -> symptoms of groupthink -> symptoms of defective decision making -> low probability of successful outcome
antecedent conditions
- Decision makers constitute a cohesive group (friends, get along outside of work)2. Structural faults of the organization.insulation of the group.lack of tradition of impartial leadership (everyone looks up to them).lack of norms requiring methodical procedures.homogeneity of members’ social background & ideology (overlaps w/ 1, middle aged white guys)3. provocative situational context.high stress from external threats w/ low hope of a better solution than leader’s.low self-esteem temp induced by…a) recent failures that made members’ inadequacies salient (maybe feel like have something to prove now)b) excessive difficulties on current decision-making tasks that lower members’ self-efficacyc) moral dillemmas: only feasible alternatives violate ethical standards
symptoms of groupthink
- overestimation of group (thinks too much of itself).illusion of invulnerability (we haven’t screwed up yet!).belief in inherent morality of group (pres. kennedy, leader of free world)2. close-mindedness.collective rationalization (past success -> future success).stereotyping of outgroups (avoid outside/contrary opinions, dirty commies)3. pressure toward uniformity.self-censorship (dissenting opinions left unspoken).direct pressure on dissenters.self-appointed mindguards (discourage others from expressing beliefs, suppress info quick from dissenters).illusion of unanimity!
symptoms of defective decision making
- incomplete survey of alternatives2. incomplete survey of objectives3. failure to examine risks of preferred choice4. poor information search5. selective bias in processing given information 6. failure to reappraise alternatives7. failure to work out contingency plans(prof says overlap between a lot of these)
how to minimize groupthink
- open mind, lol2. do not stereotype opponents3. encourage dissent (appoint devil’s advocate)4. divide into subgroups meet separately, then come together to discuss differences (CEO present, they can go into one group, that way their influence/pressure not felt in every group. if group comes up with dissenting opinion, can say “OUR group” thought…)5. have members discuss group’s deliberations w/ trusted associates, report reactions6. call in outside experts to challenge group’s views7. AFTER achieving consensus, have another meeting for members to express remaining DOUBTS
pros/cons of groupthink theory
CHECK: evidence, historical accounts of Pearl Harbor, Viet Nam war, Watergate, Chernobyl,9/11[X] empirical evidence is equivocal; groupthink found in both GOOD and bad decisions[X] subjective! how do you define a dynamic influential leader?[X] based on post hoc reports
space shuttle challenger: basics
- launch of flight 51-L first scheduled for January 22, 1986 - postponed due to:• payload changes• bad weather forecast • equipment problem• dangerous crosswinds- rescheduled for January 28, 1986- takeoff delayed until 11:38:00 am, due to ICE on launchpad (some icicles 2m long)- first problem T+0.678: smoke spurt visible from aft field joint ofright Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) (nobody noticed this in real time)- in the next 2 seconds, 8 more smoke puffs appear- T+58.788: flame appears- aerodynamic slipstream deflects flame plume onto External FuelTank- T+64.660: tank breached; hydrogen fuel ignited- T+73: structural integrity lost; liquid O2 propellant ignited- all seven crewmembers died
Rogers Commission: CAUSE of Challenger Accident
- “O-ring” (pressure seal) in aft field joint of right SRB failed to contain hot gases 2. due to “a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors”:temperature, physical dimensions, character of materials, effects of reusability,processing, and reaction of joint to dynamic loading 3. O-rings had previously showed signs of erosion
Rogers Commission: CONTRIBUTING cause of Challenger Accident
“The DECISION to launch the Challenger was flawed.”1. decision-makers unaware of contractors’ written recommendation advising against launch below 53 °F (launch date forecast: 26- 29 °F) (NASA just administration, remember)2. were also unaware of opposition by engineers, protesting management positions onlaunch
People involved in launch decision
TOPLevel I: Associate Administrator for Space FlightLevel II: National Space Transportation Program Manager Level III: NASA program managers for shuttle elements- Johnson and Kennedy Space Centers- Marshall Space Flight Center (responsible for SRBs) -these centres dispersed thru states, not centrally located!Level IV: shuttle element contractors (design & production)- Morton Thiokol Inc. (SRB maker)- Rockwell International (orbiter maker) Information flows from Level IV up to Level I
Moorhead, Ference, & Neck (1991), evidence for groupthink challenger
- antecedent conditions, groupthink symptoms, and decision-making defects present - suggest additions to groupthink:• time pressure• increased importance of leadership style (vs. personality) - based on qualitative analysis
Esser & Lindoerfer (1989): attempted quantifaction of groupthink
overall analysis:antecedents: 11 pos, 6 negconsequences: 32 positive, 7 negativeBUT based on rogers commission report-no influential leader-no evidence for all antecedents (group not cohesive, on diff parts of country!)-who comprised the “group”? only level III managers?
Schafer & Crichlow (1996) -quantitative re-analysis of Janis’ crises
-correlated antecedents with ACTUAL (info-processing) errorsbasically, zero:-group homogeneity-high stress-group insulationlittle significant-lack of methodical proceduresmoreso-lack of impartial leadershipSO, not all antecedents EQUALLY important, so suggest change model toantecedents of groupthinkbranching arrows to-> info-processing errors-> unfavorable outcomes
Hirokawa, Gouran, & Martz (1988) factors of challenger explosion: cognitive
- MT engineers warned against low-temp launch; but managers believed secondary O- rings were redundant- management recommended launch delay until after noon–then reversed their decision (waffling back and forth!)- also, no incident had occurred in the past, so managers believed that none would occur this time(“Gambler’s fallacy”: erroneously predicting an event based on expectation, not probability)-management used “engineering judgment”: failure 1:100,000.but working engineers set it to 1:100, HUGE diff!- NASA/MT management knew that O-rings had eroded on previous flights without incident- rings no more than 33% eroded, thus safety factor = 3?!
Hirokawa, Gouran, & Martz (1988) factors of challenger explosion: motivational
- MT perceived pressure from NASA to launch- decision rule shifted from “convince me to launch” to “convince me NOT TO LAUNCH” - to get funding from Congress, NASA painted a rosy picture, and began to believe it (wanted to show they were on top of things, could launch shuttles reliably)
Hirokawa, Gouran, & Martz (1988) factors of challenger explosion: social factors
- engineers expressed concerns:Rockwell: Ice (!) on launch padMT: O-ring integrity at low temps- recommendations against launch not heeded by Level III or IV managers–why not? - data not conclusive; based on inference- due to ambiguous language, upper-level decision- makers had an unclear understanding of engineers’ concernse.g., “Rockwell cannot assure that it is safe to fly”Where’s the problem? In the assurance? Or in the flying?
Edward Tufte (1997): if it was so obvious what went wrong, why did it happen?
- proximal cause: no link between low temp & O- ring damage - Analysis was sound, but presentation was unconvincing“Temperature Concern on SRM Joints, 27 Jan 1986”.concern not attention grabbing, what if “could explode?!”.analysis filled with lots of qualifying language, “may happen”
Diane Vaughn: The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA: conclusions?
- O-rings originally classified “C 1-R” (criticality 1, having redundancy): failure wouldmean the loss of the shuttle and crew-(C for critical1 for really importantR for redundant..But actually, having two O-rings was not redundant, it was required for operation! Revised…)- changed to more serious “C 1” in 1982-only 1 reliability engineer responsible for catching errors in miscategorization!-engine problem summaries book was 8cm thick!!-organizational contribution underestimated: “normalization of deviancy,” people got used to things going wrong!
Crew Resource Management
“training flight crews to reduce “pilot error; by enhancing interpersonal aspects of flight operations”-views captain not as pilot, but team leader-aviation beyond stick-and-rudder now, skills include human resources as critical to flying-HuFa beyond “knobs&dials” too, incorporates behaviour, social science, engineering…
Southwest Airlines CRM procedures when noticing departure from safety procedures
- State the facts”our approach speed is off” (no pointing blame, just facts)2. Challenge: use first name, add quantifier to fact”mike, are you going to make this approach? check your altitude.”(a question, they must respond)3. take action(make a public commitment, makes entire crew commit to this course of action. prevents fighting over controls)e.g. e.g., go on radio and say to ATC, “Southwest 1 going around. We’re too high for approach” ATC will cancel clearance. Then go around and try approach again.these approaches “flatten the authority gradient”
1st generation of CRM (then called COCKPIT resource management)
- originally modeled closely on training called Managerial Grid (Blake & Mouton, 1964),which classifies five different leadership styles based on concern for people versusconcern for production- emphasized changing of individuals’ self-diagnosed style, and correcting deficienciese.g., lack of assertiveness by juniors, and authoritarian behavior by captains - conducted in an intensive seminar setting, went rly well (originally weekend getaway, entice ppl)-first by united airlines in 1981
2nd generation CREW resource management
-by mid-1980s, many airlines had CRM training-focus changed to group dynamics! among crew, hence change in terminology-training now included team building, briefing strategies, SA, stress management (you bring your troubles w/ you onto flight deck, how balance)
3rd generation CRM
- by the early 1990s, CRM training was broadened to include flight attendants, flight dispatchers, and maintenance personnel!- however, this may have diluted the original focus on human error
4th gen CRM
-mid-1990s, CRM became an integral part of all flight training, requirement!-not run as separate seminars
CRM pros/cons
CHECK likely helped reduce fatal accident rate per million flights (hard to verify tho, better safety tech?)CHECK increased acceptanceCHECK easier to get acceptance in high uncertainty avoidance cultures (greece and korea like it, flattens authority gradient, otherwise considered rude in their culture)[X] difficult to get acceptance in High Power Distance cultures (China/Latin American stress absolute authority of leaders, hard to challenge captain as junior)[X] some pilots (DRONGOS COWBOYS) reject CRM, sit thru it but don’t accept it, their numbers are dwindling tho
Next generation CRM?
-majority of pilots hold unrealistic attitudes about their ability to perform at a high level-underlying premise should be that human error is ubiquitous and inevitable, so CRM viewed as countermeasure against error-CRM training should includes instruction on cognitive errors, and effects of WAFOS (workload, anxiety, fatigue…)
