Health Care Systems & Emotional Design Flashcards
what is the Therac-25
- medical linear accelerator that delivers radiation beam to patient- used to remove remnants of cancerous growths or tumours after surgery- treatment usually involves many low-energy dosages over successive treatment sessions- machine controlled via DEC VT100 terminal connected to PDP-11 mainframe computer located in another room- software (not hardware) largely responsible for maintaining safety, including monitoring electron-beam scanning- Therac-25 software modified from Therac-20
the two modes of therac-25
- Lo-Energy mode.mode: electron beam of about 200 rads aimed directly at patient andsent off in a short burst; used to treat shallow tissue2. Hi-Energy X-ray mode.uses full 25 million electron volt capacity of the machine;used to reach deeper tissue• for “electron mode”, technician types “e”; for “X-ray mode”, technician types “x”• for mode 2, beam switch occurs, arm moves tungsten plate between beam sourceand patient• beam passes through plate  transformed into X-ray
the case of Ray Cox and Therac-25
-went in for 9th lo-energy electron beam treatment for shoulder-technician entered prescription in terminal, but kept getting “malfunction 54” error-sheet listed it as a “dose input 2” error (too hi or too low?)-operator did this 3 times, same error-Ray then felt repeated burning/stabbing pains and pulled himself off table-DIED of complications from overdose 5 mo. later-problem not diagnosed until 3 weeks later-same thing had happend to another patient, six similar overdoses in Georgia Washington and Canada!-machine recalled!!!
causes of Therac-25 overdose
-software bug (latent error).if command sequence entered too quickly, race condition occured, two sets of instructions, first one that arrived set the mode.arm withdrew correctly for electron beam mode… but beam switch never occurred!-machine left in a hybrid proton beam mode, delievered >125x normal radiation-poor safety engineering.error condition detected, but did not inform operator (why not, machine configured incorrectly?).operator’ manual also did not explain malfunction codes (operators made own sheet)-tech’s behavior erroneous.misinterpreted situation, chose inappropriate procedure-lax safety culture-inadequate reporting structure in company, legislation
iatrogenic injury
caused by a physician or other health-care provider (sort of a revenge effect)
To err is human: building a safer health system, summary of results, criticisms
-released by Institute of Medicine-3-4% rate of adverse effects caused by treatment!!-of these, 58% caused by error, 14% fatal-estimated 44-98k deaths/year due to iatrogenic injuries in hospitals (8th leading cause of death in US!!!!)-cost $29 billion per year!!!-most iatrogenic injuries due to error, which are preventablecriticisms: [X] eliminating AEs may not prevent deaths[X] NY data focused on patients w/ high AE likelihood
IOM report results, consequences
President Clinton directed task force to develop a strategy-Patient Safety & Quality Improvement Act enacted in 2005; created blame-free adverse event reporting-2009, released report To Err is Human – To Delay is Deadly -argued for greater change-use of a checklist reduced infections by 66%! saving 1.5k lives and $200m over 18 mo!
why study errors?
psychologists: to create theories; understand human behaviourengineers/designers: to assess systems; prevent further errors, reduce their probability,or lessen their effectsmedical scientists: to understand effects of treatments; to find and punish the negligent(those who fail to meet the “ordinary standard of care”)
potential problems causing medical error
-intrumentation.hi tech instruments are complex; many fucking controls-labs/test reports.may be ignored, misplaced, forgotten.results may vary.e.g. “white-coat hypertension” (elevated blood pressure only found in clinical situations, due to patient anxiety) affects 5% patients-decision-making process.based on patient self-reports (what is considered nothing to worry about? severe enough for attention?).affected by biases-medication & prescriptions.contraindications, side effects, interactions.sound-alike or easily confused drug names.poor writing (use TALL MAN capital letters).abbreviations misread-reporting.errors often not reported b/c AEs often have no lasting harmful effects.malpractice insurance expensive, errors told to deny/defend.can lead to “defensive medicine!!!” practices to safeguard against patients.should assume errors occur, so can study prevent reduce, but nobody wants to admit it!
types of medical errors
more than 75% of errors were PREVENTABLE-most errors due to mismanagement of patients–not due to rare conditions or negligence1. treatment: 60.5%-performance error-delayed treatment/inappropriate care2. diagnosis: 21.9%-failure to employ indicated tests-misread lab results-failure to act on results of monitoring/testing3. Preventive: 16.2%-inadequate monitoring or follow-up4. Other: 1.2%-equipment failure-poor comunication
Lesar et al. (1990) medication error in NY teaching hospital
-overall rate: 3 per 1000 prescriptions, 1.8 significant-most common types• overdose: 41.8%• under dose: 16.5%• allergy: 12.9%• dosage form: 11.6%• wrong drug: 5%• duplicate therapy: 5% • wrong route: 3.3% (wrong organ or skin)• wrong patient!: 0.4%
patient safety in canada study, baker et. al (2004)
reviewed charts from various provinces in canada-AE rate 7.5%!!-36.9% judged preventable-mortality rate 20.8%!!!! of the AE rate
Loepelmann & Hamilton (2001): Medical Error Description study
-questionnaires given to 97 medical residency candidates-25 qs on perceptions of errors-most common error type:.slip: 60.3%.mistake: 20.6%.both: 7.4%severity of most errors.slight/no treatment: 45.6%.slight/minor treatment: 26.5%.none apparent: 23.5%.moderate: 1.5%most problematic shift.midnight-6am: 41%.6pm-midnight: 26.2%percentage of problems due to medication: 49%percentage of errors due to miscommunication: 45.7%most problematic meds: antibiotics: 32.6%why errors not reported?-minor/no consequences/problem fixed: 61.4%fear of consequences: 22.8%
barriers to change in medical profession (errors)
-complexity.technology, operations, relationships-culture of shame/blame.physicians held to standard of perfection.errors seen as result of negligence, treated as “dirty secrets-misguided professionalism.overemphasis on technical skill at expense of training in teamwork or “soft” sciences-lack of organizational control.hospital/state/national oversight is piecemeal.little standardization (“critical condition” vs “serious condition”?) terms-inadequate development/use of IT-lack of organizational commitment to safety.no formalized, systematic review process.individualized review process: cause in system not determined (M & Ms, see below)M and Ms: morbidity and mortality.if there was a shitty procedure, and someone makes an error: all medicine people get together and the last person who touched it has to confess and explain why they made the mistake and apologize….Wow. Very punitive, humiliating
error solution: disclosure & apology
-disclose to patient that you made an error, and apologize.UofMichigan, existing claims/lawsuits dropped from 262 to 83.UofIllinois, malpractice filings dropped by half.Colorado, malpractice claims dropped by 50%.2009, 36 states had “apology laws,” malpractice payments in these states 14-17% lower