International relations - 1890-1914 Flashcards
1
Q
International relations up to 1890
A
- In the early and middle part of the 19th century, Russia had been seen as the main threat to Britain, particularly under Palmerston and Disraeli
- Russia continued to be viewed as a threat to India due to its action in Afghanistan
- In 1871, Germany had unified and began to compete both economically and militarily with Britain
- France also wanted to assert its “rightful place” in the world so established a foothold in Indo-China in the 1860s
- Britain responded to this and annexed Malaya (1874), Sarawak in North Borneo (1881), Brunei (1885) and Upper Burma (1885)
- Both France and Germany threatened British interests in Africa which led to the scramble for Africa
2
Q
Splendid isolationism
A
- Britain had maintained a policy of splendid isolation throughout the 1800s, which was basically a deliberate avoidance of permanent alliances
- Holding themselves free in every aspect
- This is done out of choice as Britain feel they are strong and not in need of help due to their power and colonies
- “Our isolation is not an isolation of weakness”
3
Q
Britain and Russia before 1907 – why was Afghanistan a flashpoint?
A
- Afghanistan provided a constant source of conflict between Russia and Britain in the 19th and early 20th centuries
- This conflict was sometimes known as “the great game”
- The expansion of Russia and the establishment of a Russian railway to Tashkent (very close to Afghanistan) caused concern for the British
- The movement of 300,000 Russian troops in manoeuvres near Afghanistan in February 1900, a time when Britain was stretched by war in South Africa and had fewer than 100,000 soldiers in the Indian army to defend Northern India, added to Britain’s worries
- Britain’s concerns about Russia’s ambitions in the middle east were also aggravated by a Russian naval presence in Toulon on the Mediterranean, following the military agreements with France in 1892
- This appeared a potential threat to the Suez Canal and, therefore, to British India
4
Q
The Anglo-French entente of 1904
A
- Lansdowne’s last major achievement as foreign secretary was the Anglo-French entente of 1904
- Also known as the Entente Cordiale
- From this “understanding’ of 1904 developed further “understandings” and military agreements which would bring Britain into the European war of 1914
- In 1904, however, it was, from the British side at least, an agreement aimed simply at reducing friction between the two countries on imperial issues
- Showed the general tendency of British governments to take advantage of every opportunity to approach more closely to the ideal conditions of living in honourable peace with all other states
- After the Fashoda incident, French public opinion became extremely hostile to the British/Britain, which was reflected in the newspapers
- The British press was hardly more pro-French
- A much-publicised official visit by Edward VII to Paris followed by a return visit to London by the French president Loubet and Declasse, his Foreign Minister, in 1903 won over public opinion in both countries
- The actual agreement (or convention as it was entitled) was signed in April 1904
- The most important disputes it dealt with concerned Egypt and Morocco
- In return for France giving Britain a free hand in Egypt, Britain did the same for France in Morocco
- The fact that Egypt ceased to be an international problem was a major gain for Britain
- France’s hostility towards British occupation since 1882 had forced the British government to look for allies in the Eastern Mediterranean
- It had also limited the ability of British governor, Lord Cromer, to carry out reforms, especially financial ones
- In return, Britain was prepared to suffer some losses in Morocco which was near where she had trading interests and, due to its position to the south of the Straits of Gibraltar, was strategically important to the sea-route to India
5
Q
The Anglo-Russian entente of 1907
A
- 3 years later, a similar kind of agreement was made with Russia by Liberal Foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey
- Like the Anglo-French entente, the aim was to end friction on imperial matters, which for Britain and Russia were all in Asia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Persia
- Russia was ready for this agreement because she had suffered a humiliating defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05
- This defeat and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ended Russian ambitions in the far east
- The Russian government turned its attention instead westwards towards Europe and the Balkans where it faced opposition from Austria and Germany (hence the desire to end rivalries with Britain)
- As far as Afghanistan was concerned, the Russians agreed to not interfere and to leave it as a British sphere of influence
- As for Tibet, both nations agreed not to interfere, leaving China to re-conquer Tibet in 1910
- Persia was the most important area. Russia had been pressing down on Persia from the North in search of a warm-water port
- Britain’s main concern was to prevent Russia reaching the sea, since this could create a new threat to her sea-route to India
- Persia was divided into 3, without consulting the Persians
- The Russians gained a large northern zone, but with no access to the sea, whilst the British gained a smaller zone in the east, with the rest being left neutral
6
Q
Reasons Britain abandoned their policy of splendid isolationism in the early 20th century
A
- The navy was assumed capable of defeating any naval force that challenged it, so the empire was considered safe, the army, however, was regarded as of second importance. It was the second Anglo Boer war of 1899-1902 that forced a drastic review of strategy, since it was felt that the need to concentrate military power in South Africa had left India vulnerable
- Two alliance systems had emerged in Europe in the late 19th century as German made an alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1870, which was joined by Italy in 1882. This alliance was promptly countered by military agreements between France and Russia in 1892, followed by an alliance between them in 1894. This left Britain in an uneasy position as, whilst isolation might have been the preferred strategy, it could leave Britain vulnerable to the ambitions of these two alliances
- Britain had conflicted with Russia, France, and Germany over colonial expansion, although disputes in Africa had been largely resolved without endangering European peace. Britain’s clashes with France in North Africa, which had culminated in the 1898 Fashoda incident, had been peacefully resolved, but Britain continued to have concerns about Russian ambitions, particularly in Afghanistan (which was a buffer state between Russia and India) but also in the middle east
- Germany, under its new and ambitious Kaiser, Wilhelm II, also challenged Britain in the colonies. For example, the Kaiser sent a telegram of support to the Transvaal following the Jameson Raid and supplied the Boers with weapons during the 1899-1902 war. The Kaiser also established warm relations with the Ottoman Empire, as a means to better access Africa, the Persian Gulf and India’s trade markets, without depending on the British controlled Suez. It was German money that financed railway construction from Constantinople to Baghdad and huge sums were spent to build up the German navy in what appeared to Britain to be a deliberately provocative move to counter Britain’s dominance of the high seas, so essential for the maintenance of empire
- The Kaiser threatened French interests in Morocco on a visit in 1905. After several weeks of tense discussion, the matter was resolved at the Algeciras Conference (1906) when Britain stood by the French. A further crisis erupted when, in 1911, the French sent 20,000 troops to dispense Moroccan rebels who had attacked Fez. The Kaiser sent a warship (the Panther) to the port of Agadir “to prevent a French invasion”. The British, fearful that Wilhelm was planning to seize Agadir, which was near British Gibraltar, prepared the Royal navy for war. Wilhelm gave way and ordered the Panther back to Germany
7
Q
Why Anglo-German relations deteriorated so much between 1890 and 1914
A
- In 1900, Germany appeared to many Britons as Britain’s natural ally and Joseph Chamberlain wanted a combination of Britain, Germany, and the USA to dominate and keep peace in the world
- There were understandable reasons for these pro-German attitudes. After all, France and Russia were Britain’s most serious rivals, and the Kaiser was the Queen’s grandson
- Although the German economy was growing faster than Britain’s, Anglo-German trade was important to both countries. Britain purchased more goods from Germany than any other nation, while 20% of Germany’s imports came from the British Empire
- World trade was growing so fast there seemed enough room for both countries to prosper
- Britain was more tolerant towards the empire-building of Germany in Africa and china than towards France’s or Russia’s because they considered it less threatening
- Germany, however, interpreted Britain’s friendly attitude as a sign of weakness rather than strength
- What made an Anglo-German alliance impossible was the German naval building programme which began in 1898 as part of the Weltpolitik of the Kaiser and his advisers. Germany could not be a genuine world power without a world class navy
- Tirpitz, who became head of the German Admiralty in 1896, planned his new navy to challenge the royal navy. By the Navy Law of 1900, he aimed for a fleet of 38 new battleships. For Britain, this was a very worrying development since Germany already had one of the largest and best equipped armies in Europe which contrasted Britain’s proportionately small army. If Tirpitz succeeded in making his new fleet as strong as the Royal Navy, Britain would be under the threat of invasion for the first time since the Spanish Armada
- Admiral Sir John Fisher, the first Sea Lord and head of the royal navy, possessed colossal drive and determination and met the German challenge head on, concentrating more of the navy in home waters and telling his experts to design for him the most technically advanced battleship which would make Tirpitz’s new fleet immediately out of date. The product was HMS Dreadnought, which was completed in 1905
- This was a brilliant piece of engineering but failed to deter the Germans as they had their own dreadnought designed
- This resulted in a race to build the most dreadnoughts as the British government, in 1911 and 1912, let it be known that it would settle for a battleship ratio with Germany of 16:10 rather than 2:1
- In 1912, Britain sent Haldane to Berlin to discuss how tension between Britain and German could be lessened. Unfortunately, Haldane’s mission came to nothing because the German government insisted that there could be no agreement between the two countries unless Britain promised to remain neutral in a European war between Germany and France or Russia. Worse still, the mission caused Tirpitz to think that the British were wearying of the race and that, if he accelerated again, he could gain a decisive lead
- So, the race continued despite talk by Winston Churchill of a naval holiday in 1913
- Although the naval race played no direct part in the events that brought Britain into the first world war in the summer of 1914, it was the main reason why the British government and public had come to regard Germany as by far their most dangerous enemy
8
Q
Impact of individuals
A
- Sir Edward Grey was Foreign Minister from 1905 to 1916 and had served at the foreign office under Roseberry at Gladstone’s last ministry and was the obvious candidate for the foreign office when the liberals came to power in 1905
- Quietly confident in his own judgement and respected by his colleagues, he directed foreign policy with little interference from the cabinet
- Compared to Salisbury, Grey consulted his officials more frequently
- The senior clerk from 1905 to 1912, later assistant under-secretary, was Eyre Crowe
- Crowe was strongly anti-German and, in 1907, he was convinced that the German government was bent on dominating Europe, if necessary, by force, and convinced Grey that it was vital for Britain to stand by France against German aggression
- Equally anti-German were two foreign office chiefs, Charles Hardinge (1905-1910) and Arthur Nicholson (1910-1916)
- Under Grey, the foreign office view was that if Germany had ever been Britain’s natural ally, that time was past
9
Q
The Moroccan crisis
A
- In 1905 the German Foreign Office wanted to prove that the recent Anglo-French entente was a feeble thing so attempted to bully the French government in order to make Britain leave the French
- The Kaiser appeared in Tangier on horseback on 31st march 1905 and made a fiery anti-French speech demanding that Morocco must be independent, as well as believing that an international conference must be called to settle Morocco’s future
10
Q
Moroccan crisis 1905
A
- The Kaiser visited Morocco and declared it a free and independent state
- This was a deliberate provocative attempt to test Britain’s commitment to France
- This was resolved at the Algeciras Conference
- The result was further suspicion and tension between France and Germany
11
Q
Second Moroccan crisis, 1911
A
- German gunboat arrived at Agadir to challenge the French control of Morocco again
- Despite an eventual agreement, public opinion in Britain became more anti-German due to concerns over German ambitions
12
Q
How and why Britain changed its military policies at the start of the 20th century
A
- A special imperial conference on defence was held in 1909 and the formation of the Dominion fleet considered which was a result of British agitation over the naval race spreading in settler colonies
- Britain accepted that it was no longer in the position to maintain a “two power standard” where it could match the 2 next strongest naval powers
- Instead, Britain settled for a 60% margin over Germany
- However, even this looked ambitious by 1912
- All attempts to come to an agreement with the Germans failed and in July 1912 Britain withdrew the navy from the Mediterranean, in order to redeploy it in the North Sea
- The army was also remodelled for deployment on the European mainland
- Britain was thus reduced to relying on the support of France to protect its Mediterranean interests and the naval approaches to Egypt
- By 1914, Britain appeared to be refocusing away from the Empire to the defence of Britain in Europe
- Britain’s change of strategy might appear dramatic
- British industrial power was entering a period of economic decline and the strain on upholding its world-wide pre-eminence in the face of the ambitions of other European powers seemed to be telling
- However, it would be wrong to exaggerate this pre-war change as strength in Europe was also vital for Britain’s imperial interests, and vice-versa
- Russia, Germany, and Italy all had hopes of extending their empires in the Balkan area by 1914, where the Turkish Ottoman empire was in decline
- Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary, which bordered the Balkan states, wanted to crush the Slavs
- A series of Balkan wars and the assassinations of their heir to the Austrian throne in July 1914 by a Bosnian Serb Slav led these powers into direct conflict with one another
- The German invasion of Belgium (whose neutrality the British had promised to protect since 1839) and the Kaiser’s failure to reply to the British ultimatum led Britain into war in 1914
- Not only was this to become and international and imperial war, involving the colonies of states, it was also to be a war that challenged the legitimacy of European empires and hinted at the urgent desire for national self-determination across the globe