Internal Agency Relationship Flashcards
What is the requirement of the agent’s authority?
Authority is crucial - the agent must be authorised into entering into contracts. The principal establishes how much authority the agent has and the principal can only be bound to this extent.
There are two types of authority: express and implied.
What is the express and implied authority of the agent?
Express:
The extent of the authority may be stipulated either orally or in the contract - if so this is express authority.
The parties must have expressly discussed this and agreed as to what the agent can/cannot do.
Implied:
If the contract is silent as to the extent of authority, the agent has implied authority to do whatever
is necessary and incidental to the completion of the transaction.
⁃ Custom and usage of the trade may help to define the scope of authority.
What is the scope of the agent’s authority?
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Why must you distinguish between general and special agents?
Implied authority can only apply to general as opposed to special agents.
⁃ The former are appointed to carry out all of the business of the principal, or all of the principal’s business of a particular kind (e.g. a solicitor acting in general for an individual); the latter to carry out a specific task (e.g. buy a particular item).
⁃ The fact that an agent is a general agent allows third parties to assume that the agent possesses the authority which agents of that type normally have. This presumption does not apply in relation to special agents.
- To determine whether an agent is general or special you must look at what the agent is being asked to do: If they are appointed on wide basis this is likely to be general - special agents are appointed to carry out a specific task.
- In order to determine what authority a particular general agent has (solicitor) then you can look at custom and usage of the trade - I.e. What do other general agents of that type have.
- A Special agent can have authority implied by the nature of the task he has been asked to carry out - but this will be limited. He may have authority to do things to get that task completed but no more.
What happens if an agent acts without authority?
There are legal rules to protect the third party from agents without authority[ It is not something which can be used by the principal or the agent.] - these help to prevent inconsistent conduct by the principle. This normally relies on the notion of apparent or ostensible authority
Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Limited [1964] per Diplock LJ
***The following English case is treated as authoritative in Scotland (and is required reading):
⁃ An agent may not be authorised to act but the principal may have created the impression of authority. If the principal acts in a manner which suggests to the third party that the agent is authorised, the principal cannot thereafter seek to deny that the agent is properly authorised (this is an example of personal bar). [Complex definition of apparent authority][ ⁃ ‘…a legal relationship between the principal and contractor created by a representation, made by the principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted on by the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the “apparent” authority so as to render the principal liable to perform any obligations imposed on him by such a contract.’]
In other words, if the principal acts in a manner which suggests to the third party that the agent is authorised, the principal cannot thereafter seek to deny that the agent is properly authorised. This Can be rationalised as a type of personal bar in Scots law or estoppel by representation in English law.
How can you show apparent authority?
The following three factors must be proved for damages to be available to the third party in such an instance:
⁃ 1) Representation by the principal[ See below for confusing case law.]
i) The Principal must create an impression of the authority of the agent through representation to the third party
ii) There must be a causal link between the principals conduct and the third party’s belief that they are authorised. (Third party must be acting due to and in belief of the representation of the conduct).
⁃ 2) Reliance by the third party
⁃ 3) Loss by the third party
If the above are fulfilled then the principal is not able to deny the agent has the requisite authority if to do so would cause a loss to the third party.
AND see further dicta by Diplock LJ:
‘…a legal relationship between the principal and contractor created by a representation, made by the principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted on by the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the “apparent” authority so as to render the principal liable to perform any obligations imposed on him by such a contract.’ per Diplock LJ at 644.
In other words, if the principal acts in a manner which suggests to the third party that the agent is authorised, the principal cannot thereafter seek to deny that the agent is properly authorised.
Can be rationalised as a type of personal bar in Scots law or estoppel by representation in English law.
How then can the third party sue for breach of contract?
The issue of damages is complex since there is no contract
Further, since the primary Scottish remedy for breach of contract is specific implement, may this action be afforded to the third party?[ MacGregor has found it difficult to find any cases where a party has got specific implement in these instances - normally only damages are obtained.] It seems as though the concept is based upon a legal fiction.
What is the meaning of the first requirement?
The first requirement is that the misleading representation must come from the principal. This was set out in the following case:
Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA [1986]
Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA [1986]
Tells us that if only the agent creates the impression then there is no apparent authority - the representation must come from the principal.
**International Sponge Importers Ltd v Watt & Sons 1911 SC (HL) 57
Leading Scottish case:**International Sponge Importers Ltd v Watt & Sons 1911 SC (HL) 57
Agent (Cohen) - authorised to sell spongers on behalf of the pursuer. He called on the defenders to sell the sponges. The usual method of payment was for defenders to make a cheque directly to the principle.
On some occasions the customers had made a cheque out to cohen to give to the pursuers. On four occasions cohen had induced the defenders to make the cheques out to him personally or would receive cash.
He absconds with the money and they do not reach the principle.
HOL held: the pursuers could not recover these funds from the defenders (could not seek payment from customers) judges reached decisions on basis that pursuers had tacitly consented to these other methods of payment (I.e. Cheque to agent) - they knew this was going on and failed to intervene.
There is not positive action by principle but inaction with knowledge of the authority -this meant agent has ostensibly authority to take payments in irregular ways.
Because the irregular payments occurred with knowledge by the principle this was enough to constitute a representation to the customer that the agent was authorised to take payments in this way.
[Look up this case - bad description]
Gregor Homes v Emlick 2012 SLT (Sh Ct) 5
Here pursuers and defenders had entered into missives (contract for the sale of land). Defenders purchasing property from pursuers. The date of entry is very important.
They could not say what date of entry would be. Provisional date in contract - question arose of whether practical completion had been achieved. If it had there was a date of entry.
Practical completion was to be agreed between the parties. Rutherford had been granted authority by defenders to instruct the pursuers to variations and alterations of the property and had represented the defenders interests throughout the transaction.
The question arose as to whether Mr Rutherford had actual or ostensible authority to agree the date of entry on behalf of the defenders. The defenders said R had no authority.
The comments made by sheriff in relation to ostensible authority: “IT was not a matter of the principle seeking to exercise, but the law …the two key elements are representation and reliance…”
Agent does not have authority but principle is prevented from withdrawing on his obligations.
Sheriff held: R had actual authority but he hadn’t found hint to have this. Of the opinion he had the defenders ostensible authority. Both parities had relied on strength of R’s authority at certain times.
The agent does not have authority but by virtue of principle holding him out to have authority the principle cannot discount the agents action.
[Look up this case - bad description]
First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] [English court of appeal case so only persuasive authority in Scotland].
The following case introduced confusion into the area[ Since it conflicts with Armagas which is a higher level English decision.]:
⁃ This case is an English Court of Appeal case - so it cannot overrule a HL case (yet it could be seen to conflict with the principle of Armagas. In all other cases the impression was created by the principal[ And the principal is thus being punished in a sense for creating this misleading representation.]. But in this case, the impression was created by the agent alone.
⁃ The facts were that there was an agent called ‘Jamieson’ working for the defender (a bank). Jamieson was negotiating with the plaintiff (First Energy). The plaintiff know that Jamieson is not authorised to grant a specific finance agreement and that he would need head office approval. So Jamieson tells them that he is going to receive head office approval. He returns and tells the plaintiff that he has head office approval (but this was untrue). Jamieson then concludes the contract with the plaintiff, despite not being authorised. The defenders find out about this and deny the contract since Jamieson was not authorised. The problem is that it was Jamieson who had represented that he was authorised, rather than the principal. SO following Armagas, there can be no apparent authority.
⁃ However, Lord Steyn attempted to circumvent this rule because he felt that the third party ought to be protected. His judgement suggests that although the agent may not be entitled to represent the extent of his or her own authority, he may be authorised to communicate information on behalf of the principal. Such information may include the fact that the agent is authorised to carry out a specific transaction. (Does this, in effect, amount to the same thing as a representation by the agent as to the extent of his own authority?)
- Had the bank thus conferred ostensible authority on Jamieson either to make the offer or to communicate on behalf of the bank to make the offer?
- CoA Held: J had no authority to enter into the transaction; however he had apparent (ostensible) authority to communicate the banks authority for the transaction to First Energy. He did not have authority to enter into the transaction however he approved the transaction and had authority to communicate that.
⁃ The end result is that it is very unclear which of Armagas or First Energy is a more accurate representation of the law.
- The case goes some way from the requirement that there needs to be actual conduct by the principal - it takes ostensible authority some way from underpinning personal bar in Scots law.
- The agent could only communicate the banks approval to the customer.
- Judge’s line of reasoning: Want to protect those entering into transactions on what they have been told by agents in important and influential roles (J was senior manager of the bank).
Thomas Hayman & Sons v American Cotton Oil Co (1907) 45 SLR 207 Dornier GmbH v Cannon 1991 SC 310
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Bank of Scotland v Brunswick Developments (1987) Ltd No 2 1997 SC 226
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