Innatism Flashcards
The ‘slave boy’ argument
Plato argues for innate mathematical k in meno slave boy w/o prior mathematical education can explain - corrects himself when making mistakes in order to solve a geometrical proof.
Objections to the ‘slave boy’ argument
- Questions taught the slave boy rather than reviving the knowledge within him already.
-Empiricists; the sb would’ve experienced shapes of objects which helped him during questioning - mathematical knowledge derives from analysing that experience.
Leibniz + His argument based on necessary truths
- we have innate knowledge of necessary truths because a posteriori exp can only give us knowledge of contingent truths and specific instances rather than how things must be.
- knowledge of necessary truths can’t come from exp because k of contingent beings doesn’t involve necessity so k of necessary truths is a priori.
Lock’es criteria for innate k
-Mind is ‘tabula rasa’ at birth. (Locke believed there is no innate knowledge)
-For k to be innate it must fulfil 3 criteria 1) from birth 2) universal 3) be conscious of it
Locke on consciousness
Only in the mind if we are conscious of it - we use general principles w/o explicitly attending to them.
We exp things before knowing abstract principles.
Leibniz -> exp helps us to further understand and employ k of innate abstract principle.
Locke on universal assent
Universal assent is a necessary condition of innate k, HOWEVER, children and idiots do not know the propositions that the innatists talk of - ‘it’s impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time’.
SO no k satisfies this necessary condition of ‘innateness’ and thus there is no innate k.
IF there was a proposition that was universally assented to, that wouldn’t necessarily be innate because there would could be some other explanation of how everyone came to know it
Locke’s objection to Leibniz’s innatism
Leibniz confuses a disposition in human ability with knowledge - e.g, the capacity to see isn’t the same as what we see with our vision.
Leibniz’s marble analogy - resp to Locke’s obj
Innate k could require some sort of unlocking or triggering process by interaction with exp in order to be consciously known - it is more than a capacity.
Analogy of block of veined marble - need to hammer the block (exp the world) and the marble will break away along the veins (activate the pre-existing innate k)
It can’t be created by one smash with a hammer (one instance of exp) thus, the block must have had innate potential.
Experience plays a role in our k - but the relationship between exp and k is not one of inference from exp to k like the empiricists claim.
Triggering - marble analogy combined with empiricism
Exp ‘triggers’ the development of concepts but isn’t sufficient to explain them
We are predisposed to think in certain ways e.g, by thinking of world in terms of things not clusters of features.
Locke’s resp - assessing the criteria of consciousness (1)
Propositional knowledge relies on concepts - can’t know that 1+1=2 without first experiencing one, +, and two.
E.g, newborn babies do not have any concepts beyond those experienced inside the womb (warmth/pain etc), many atheist societies didn’t have the concept of God.
Locke’s resp - assessing the criteria of consciousness (2) - BABY GOD AND MEMORY
-> a newborn baby can’t verbally articulate these thoughts, but this doesn’t mean that the concept isn’t there - we learn to make them explicit but they were always there in the mind.
-> we are disposed to develop the idea of a higher power - not yet the full concept of God as we have it now. Our exp enables a concept that goes beyond what we can learn from exp; Locke explains that our minds are RECEPTIVE to the idea of God.
-> K is stored like a memory, thus we can know without being conscious of it - if its stored like a memory it would have to be neither new nor remembered which is impossible so not innate.
Locke on the mind as ‘tabula rasa’ ( nature of impressions and ideas )
Mind at birth is tabula rasa and contains no ideas, thoughts or concepts
K comes from two types of experience
1) sensation ; exp of external objects, sense perceptions
2) reflection ; exp of own minds - thinking/believing etc .
Locke on simple and complex concepts
Locke’s explanation of s/c/abstract concepts provides an account of how humans can form all knowledge from experience.
SIMPLE CONCEPTS -> blueness of the sky from sensation of blue
COMPLEX CONCEPTS -> from building blocks of simple concepts ( includes uniting impressions into one object - smell/feel of a dog )
ABSTRACT CONCEPTS -> involve looking for common features to develop and extend beyond all limits ( white, horn and horse to form unicorn)
Issue with Locke’s tabula rasa
Sensation of yellow is quite different from the concept of yellow we gain from reflection , thus Locke’s distinction doesn’t account for this.
Hume on the nature of impressions and ideas
Hume correct Locke - COPIES of our sense impressions are what we use whilst thinking.
There are 2 types of perception - impressions and ideas (concepts)
1) impressions -> more lively, vivid, forceful
Ideas -> weaker, fainter
Ideas are copies of impressions and impressions are harder to confuse or mistake than ideas
2) copy principle- concepts/ideas are faint copies of impressions that are impressed on me e.g, idea of yellow copied from impressions/experience of yellow
Lacking an impression results in a lack of the concept - e.g, someone blind from birth lacks the concept of colour
Issue with Hume ( missing shade of blue )
Never before seen a certain shade of blue but can conceive of it were they showed a list of all the other shades of blue, with the one they had not seen missing - idea of that shade of blue would then not have been copied from an impression.
RESP to the missing shade of blue
Weaken the copy principle to say ‘any ideas that aren’t copied from impressions are only meaningful if they could be copied from impressions’ ; what the idea is an idea OF is something we can encounter in experience + missing shade of blue meets this condition.
RESP to the missing blue ( weakened copy principle resp )
Keep the copy principle as it is - ‘ all ideas are copied from impressions ‘ - simple impressions of different shades of blue are related to each other, as they can be arranged according to how they resemble each other so from the arrangement, we can form the idea of the missing shade drawing on other similar impressions we already have by resemblance.
Without relevant similar impressions we cannot form the missing idea - same reason that a blind man cannot form an idea of colour.
THEREFORE< missing shade doesn’t deteriorate Hume’s objection.
Leibiz’s obj to complex concepts
Complex concepts that can’t come from exp, they are understood by reflecting on what is already within us/innate.
REPLY -> reflection upon what I am doesn’t establish innate concepts - my existence and my ability to perceive are innate, but that doesn’t mean that the concepts of SUBSTANCE and PERCEPTION are innate; we first have to exp our own minds to develop the concepts.
Problem of substance
Empiricists claim we experience ourselves in reflection as a substance:
-> Berkeley; we don’t exp physical substance we experience mind developed objects.
-> Hume; concept of substance is confused - similarity doesn’t mean identity because nothing in our experience matches the concepts of substance whether physical or mental.
GOD AND BEAUTY - how are complex concepts broken down?
Knowledge, justice and beauty - these concepts can be seen as separate to sense experience we don’t perceive ideas or impressions that correlate to them and they arguably exist subjectively within our minds.
So concept empiricism cannot be true - if it is, it can’t explain all concepts.
-> Relate to weakened version of copy principle - we still experience them but they don’t have the same meaning (‘any ideas not copied from impressions are only meaningful if they could be copied from impressions’)
