Epistemology - Idealism Flashcards
What does idealism argue?
The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects, and there are no mind-indp objects.
For an idealist, what does size, motion etc have in common?
They are due to perceptual variation.
For an idealist, what are the differences between primary and secondary qualities?
No difference - they are both due to perceptual variation.
What does idealism provide us with?
We know that our ideas exist and cannot be sceptic e.g, you can’t imagine a tree nobody else has imagined, it is impossible to perceive and impossible thing.
How does idealism combat the problem of regularity and continuity in our perceptions?
God perceives everything all the time, thus everything must exist always.
What is solipsism?
The idea that we can only be sure that our mind exists.
Berkeley’s claim that everything i perceive is mind-dep leads to the conc. that all that exists is my own experience.
Berkeley response -> my experience contains evidence that there are other minds like mine e.g, the ideas i perceive originate in the mind of God.
What is the master argument?
Created by Berkeley. (Pinnacle of Idealism)
In the argument he states, in order to determine whether it is possible for a tree to exist outside of the mind, we need to be able to think of an unconceived tree.
As soon as we try to think about this ‘unconceived tree’, we have conceived it.
Thus, we have failed and there is no good reason to believe that trees exist outside of the mind.
Therefore, the notion of unperceived concepts is contradictory and wha is contradictory is not real.
Berkeley’s likeness principle
Sense experiences can only be like other sense experiences (ATTACK ON IDR)
IDR response - mind-dep sense data resemble MIO.
Berkeley’s response (1) - my sense data is not fixed whereas MIO are fixed/constant.
(2) my sense-data are perceived directly and give me all PQ and SQ. MIO are never directly perceived.
Combine master argument with the likeness principle
What a thought IS is different to what a thought is ABOUT.
E.g, ask the realist to explain what the mind-insp tree that their thought is ABOUT looks like/would be like - they would respond with a description of features that appear mind-dep.
If you then ask the realist to distinguish between mind-indp features and mind-dep features it would end in incoherence - we only have access to our sense experiences and THEREFORE the tree we conceive of is a mind-dep object.
Berkeley’s argument from perceptual variation
P1) there are variations in perceptions.
P2) our perception varies w/o corresponding changes in the physical objects we perceive.
C1) THEREFORE, the properties that physical objects have and the properties that they APPEAR to have aren’t identical.
C2) THEREFORE, we do not perceive objects directly.
IN RELATION TO COLOUR
P1) a cloud from a distance looks pink, but up close it loses colour.
P2) to change colour, then it would be necessary to change the object itself if colours really existed in physical objects.
C1) THEREFORE, all colours are appearances, not properties of physical objects.
Berkeley’s attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction
P1) what looks small to me may look huge to a small animal.
P2) motion isn’t constant - based on reaction time.
C1) THEREFORE, p1 and p2 together suggest that we can’t say an object has a real shape or motion.
C2) thus the PQ of an object is just as mind-dep as secondary qualities.
Issue - role played by God
P1) My perceptions and sensations are part of my mind. What I perceive and feel is in my mind, not God’s mind.
P2) God can’t have the sorts of perceptual experiences I have.
P3) The ordinary objects of perception change whereas God’s mind is said to be unchanging and eternal.
C1) THEREFORE, what i perceive and feel can’t be part of God’s mind.
Berkeley’s response to the role of God
He clarifies his theory;
1) The idea of physical objects exist in God’s mind, not as perceptions, but as part of God’s understanding.
2) The same is true of sensations e.g, he doesn’t feel pain but knows what it’s like to undergo the sensation.
3) What I perceive is what God wills me to perceive.
Issue - Illusions + Hallucinations
Illusions; Pencil in water example; appears crooked -> BERKELEY responds that illusions mislead us only based on the ideas we associate with what we perceive. (For example; If I touched the pencil, then it would be crooked).
RESP; BUT Berkeley argues that reality is the ideas we perceive, thus there’s no appearance-reality distinction; ‘the pencil LOOKS crooked’ not ‘IS crooked’.
Hallucination; takes the form of dreams. Hallucinations are involuntary, like perceptions. Berkeley argues that there are 2 criteria;
1) ‘irregular, confused’
2) hallucinations aren’t coherently connected with our perceptual experience.
HOWEVER; the criteria shows a difference in DEGREE, not KIND.
- In perception you experience something that exists outside of your mind whereas in hallucinations you don’t.
