indirect realism Flashcards
what is indirect realism
The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
the mind-dependent object (sense data) is perceived by the perceiver, the sense data then represents mind-independent objects which then represents the min-dependent object.
what is the indirect perception of the external world VIA sense data
The immediate objects of awareness during perception are mind-dependent objects/properties - so we are indirectly aware of the mind-independent external world during perception via immediate awareness of mind-dependent sense-data.
Representation
These mind-dependent sense-data represent (during veridical/accurate perception) mind-independent objects/properties
Causation
These mind-dependent sense-data are caused by the mind-independent objects that they represent.
knowledge of the external world
We can have knowledge of the EW because we are immediately aware of mind-dependent sense-data that represent it.
examples/analogies of indirect realism
When I perceive a tree, there is a mind-independent tree, and I am indirectly aware of this tree via direct awareness of mind-dependent sense-data which represent that tree.
what do indirect realists claim
mind-independent physical objects CAUSE representations (which consist of ideas/sense-data) within our minds. So what we experience (mind-dependently) is, when we are perceiving accurately, connected to what is happening in the (mind-independent) external world.
key characteristics of sense data/representations/ideas according to an indirect realist
- they are mind-dependent
-we are infallible about them - they are non-physical/immaterial
- they are private/subjective
mind dependent
- Cannot exist unexperienced.
- An unexperienced sense-datum is impossible.
- Their existence depends on the existence of a mind.
infallible
- It is impossible for us to think that they have a property that they don’t have, and for us to think they exist when they do not.
- So the judgements I make about them will always be right.
they are non-physical/immaterial
they do not exist in 3D space and do not have a volume, a location, a specific weight etc.
they are private/subjective
It is impossible for more than one perceiver to experience them.
Key characteristics of external objects according to an indirect realist
- they are mind-independent
- we are fallible about them
- they are physical/material
- they are public/objective
mind-independent
- Can exist even if not experienced.
- An unexperienced external object is possible.
- Their existence does NOT depend on the existence of a mind.
fallible
- It is possible for us to think that they have a property that they don’t have (e.g. illusions), and for us to think they exist when they do not (i.e. hallucination).
- So the judgements I make about them may sometimes be wrong and sometimes be right.
physical/material
they exist in 3D space and have a volume, a location, a specific weight etc.
they are public/objective
It is possible for all perceivers to indirectly experience them.
who made the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities
John locke
primary quality
A property that the mind-independent object has which gives it the “power” to cause ideas / sense-data in my mind that resemble the property the object really has.
e.g. the size, shape, number, position, motion.
when we talk about the shape of an object we are talking about the power/property it has to produce (shape) ideas in our minds which resemble the way the object is.
secondary quality
A property that the mind-independent object has which gives it the “power” to cause ideas / sense-data in my mind that do not resemble the property that the object really has.
e.g. colours, sounds, smells, tastes.
when we talk about the colour of an object we are talking about the power/property it has to produce (colour) ideas in my mind which do not resemble any properties the object has.
So the ideas caused by the colour of an object do not resemble any actual properties of the object.
what argument does Locke use to support his primary/secondary quality distinction
Primary qualities do not vary, we cannot conceive of an object without them, and they can be accessed using more than one sense; not so for secondary qualities.
P1- variation argument
P2- conceivability argument
P3- multi sensory argument
(put all of these argument in one argument when explaining)
variation
- an object cannot be perceived to be spherical (PQ) to the left hand and cubical (PQ) to the right hand.
- whereas, the same object can be perceived to be cold (SQ) to the left hand and warm (SQ) to the right hand.
- He thinks that this shows that objects really do have a shape but do not really have a warmth, so the power to produce sensations of warmth is a secondary quality of the object, and the power to produce ideas of shape is a primary quality of the object
conceivability
- an object cannot be conceived of as existing without a shape (PQ) (e.g. as we divide the wheat up it will always have a shape)
- Whereas, an object can be conceived of as existing without a colour, We can conceive of a colourless physical object but we are unable to conceive of a shapeless physical object.
- [Locke] describes breaking a piece of wheat up into smaller and smaller pieces. He points out that as small as the wheat becomes we cannot conceive of it without its primary qualities, whereas we can conceive of the wheat without colour, there is nothing literally incoherent about a body without colour, even if it is difficult to imagine one in actuality
multi-sensory
- An object can be perceived to be spherical (PQ) by more than one sense (e.g. by touch and by sight)
- Whereas, the same object cannot be perceived to have a colour (SQ) by more than one sense (i.e. this can only be experienced by sight)
- if more than one sense can access it then it is more likely to be a genuine property of the object
- Some qualities can be perceived using more than one sense (the senses cohere) and so must exist as independent/objective properties of the objects – i.e. as primary qualities. This is not the case for “secondary” qualities.
Lockes argument supporting his PQ and SQ distinction
P1: variation
P2: conceivability
P3: multi-sensory
P4: These three differences give us good reason to think that our ideas of shape resemble properties that the objects really have whereas our ideas of colour/felt-temperature do not.
P5: Similar arguments can be used to distinguish between the properties like shape, size, motion, number, extension/volume etc. on the one hand and properties like colour, taste, smell etc. on the other.
C: Therefore, our representation is an accurate resemblance of an object’s primary qualities but not an accurate resemblance of its secondary qualities.
