arguments for property dualism Flashcards
what are the 2 properties that physical things have
- physical
- non-physical
what are non-physical mental properties, properties of
they are properties of the physical world
who wrote the Mary argument/knowledge argument
frank Jackson
what is the Mary argument/knowledge argument
P1: Mary has proportional knowledge about all physical properties/facts. there are facts about consciousness that are not deducible from physical facts, someone could know all physical facts, be a perfect reasoner and still be unable to know all the facts about consciousness on tat basis. Mary has never experienced red despite all of her knowledge; however she doesn’t know what it is like to see red. even complete physical knowledge do not enable her to know this.
P2: after seeing red for the first time, Mary gains propositional knowledge. she comes to experience red for the first time and learn a new fact of which she was previously ignorant: she will learn what it is like to see red.
P3: if she gains propositional knowledge then this knowledge must be about non-physical properties/facts
C1: therefore, there are non-physical properties/facts
what does the philosophical zombie argument outline
asks us whether the physical world could exist without any minds existing
what is the philosophical zombie argument
P1: a zombie world is conceivable. a zombie world is a world that is physically identical to the actual world but in which there are no phenomenal properties (qualia/consciousness)
P2: if a zombie world is conceivable then it is metaphysically possible
C1: therefore a zombie world is metaphysically possible.
P3: if a zombie world is metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties are not physical properties.
C2: therefore, phenomenal properties (qualia) are not physical properties.
what is a philosophical zombie
a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but lacks consciousness entirely.
it will look identical to a normal conscious being from a third person perspective, their brain processes will be molecule for molecule identical with the original and its behaviour will be indistinguishable; yet it is absent from any consciousness/qualia
who wrote the philosophical zombie argument
David Chalmers
what type of argument is this
deductive
how is this argument justified
a priori
difference between property dualism and substance dualism
substance dualism:
- minds exist and are not identical to material bodies or parts of material bodies
- there is a non-physical realm (the realm of mental substances) in which non-physical minds which is entire separate from the physical realm (the realm of physical substance)
- there is non-physical substance and physical substance; there are non-physical things and physical things
- minds are part of a completely different substance (immaterial substance) and so each mind is an ontologically separate entity/thing to the physical world and therefore separate to the physical body and brain.
- in a sense, substance dualism are also dualists about properties in addition as they think that these non-physical substances have non-physical properties.
property dualism:
- two distinct types of property exists: physical and non-physical mental properties
- dualists who are property dualists but not substance dualist claim that there are non-physical properties of the physical world in additional to all the physical properties of the physical world
- so non-physical conscious mental states can still be seen as properties of the physical brain or body- in this way, property dualists deny substance dualist claims that non-physical substances exist.
- consciousness and its properties of qualia and intentionality, prove that non-physical properties exist