Berkeleys idealism Flashcards
what does Berkley’s idealism claim
- Ordinary objects are collections of ideas in a mind caused by God.
- The immediate objects of perception are ordinary objects (such as tables, chairs, etc) which are mind-dependent.
anti-realism
All that exists are minds and their (mind-dependent) ideas. Ordinary objects are nothing more than collections of (mind-dependent) ideas. (We cannot conceive of mind-independent objects - the ‘master argument’.)
what do ideas claim
We immediately perceive (mind-dependent) ideas.
- He doesn’t just mean by this an idea that we have in the sense of “I just had an idea…let’s go shopping”.
For Berkeley, ideas include perceptions, thoughts, imaginings, pains, hopes, etc. Anything that is “in the mind”.
For Berkeley we cannot say that ‘idea’ means the same as ‘representation’ because Berkeley doesn’t think that ideas represent mind-independent objects (as indirect realists like Locke do).
theism
God exists as the cause of our ideas and of their coherence.
Berkley’s idealism explained
-everything we know about an object we learn through sense-perception. instead of thinking that the real object is something mysterious that lies behind and hidden from our perceptions
- if I was asked to describe an apple, all I would ever think of doing is to list its sensible properties: its size, shape, weight, colour, texture, smell, taste and so on. It would not occur to me to add to the end of this list the mysterious, indiscernible property of being a [mind-independent] material thing.
- Thus, to all intents and purposes, the apple is nothing over and above a collection of sensible properties.
- the whole idea that objective reality is material and exists independently of any perceiving subject is mistaken.
- since these properties, as [indirect realists] admit, are essentially subjective – that is, they exist only in the mind of the perceiving subject – what we call objects are also mind-dependent.
- their being consists in their being perceived and thus they can exist only ‘in’ the mind.
- He simply believes that these objects consist entirely of ideas and not any material substance which exists outside of the mind. We don’t have to change the way we talk about and predict/explain the behaviour of objects. We just have to admit that they are mind-dependent.
sensible property
a property that we are able to sense (i.e. have experience of)
berkelys idealism
the view that the immediate objects of perception are ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc. and/but these objects are mind-dependent objects
Berkley’s argument against realism
the question of ‘what are ordinary objects’
what are ordinary objects according to Berkley
P1: We are directly/immediately aware of ordinary objects (tables, chairs, etc.)
“houses, mountains, rivers…[are]…the things we perceive by sense”
P2: The only things we are directly/immediately aware of are (collections of) ideas/sensations
“what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations”
C1: Therefore, ordinary objects (such as tables, chairs, “houses, mountains, rivers”) are (collections of) ideas/sensations.
P3: Ideas/sensations cannot exist unperceived.
C2: Therefore, ordinary objects (such as tables, chairs, “houses, mountains, rivers”) cannot exist unperceived (i.e. are mind-dependent).
why does Berkley attack Lockes argument on SQ and PQ
- Berkeley thinks that Locke was wrong to make a distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects.
- Berkeley thinks they have the same status as each other - they are both entirely mind-dependent.
- Both shape and colour are purely mind-dependent ideas.
what is Berkley’s attack on the variation argument
P1: If a property is subject to perceptual variation then that property is mind-dependent*
* Note that Berkeley here (mis)interprets Locke as claiming that secondary qualities are mind-dependent (when he in fact says they are properties of mind-independent objects)
P2: Both “secondary” and “primary” properties are subject to interpersonal and intrapersonal perceptual variation. (This counters what Locke says)
C: Therefore both “secondary” and “primary” properties are mind-dependent (so there is no distinction)
- Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another.
what is Berkley’s argument on the conceivability argument
P1: An object with primary properties but without any secondary properties is inconceivable.
P2: If such an object is inconceivable then it is impossible.
P3: If it is impossible then both “primary” and “secondary” properties must both be essential properties of objects.
C1: Therefore, both “primary” and “secondary” properties are essential properties of objects (so there is no distinction)
C2: Therefore they must both be in the mind (since it has already been shown that “secondary” properties are in the mind)
- They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not – which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter.
- f it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind
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Berkley’s inconceivability argument (MASTER ARGUMENT)
- He asks us here to try and imagine an unconceived/unperceived object (i.e. a mind-independent object). When we attempt to do this (e.g. by giving an example such as a bike locked in an empty garage) Berkeley points out that we are still conceiving of it at that moment so it is mind-dependent. He thinks that it is impossible to conceive of a mind-independent object, and that this shows that such an object is impossible.
P1: Mind-independent objects are inconceivable because the moment you attempt to conceive of one, what you conceive of is in the mind and so is mind-dependent.
P2: If X is inconceivable then X is impossible.
C1: Therefore, mind-independent objects are impossible.
C2: Therefore realism is impossible and so false.
Berkley’s argument for gods existence and the role played by god
- Berkeley instead thinks that the truth of idealism gives us a reason to believe in the existence of God
- He argues for God, and thinks that God must then play a specific role.
P1: Mind-dependent objects/ideas (e.g. apples/apple-ideas, pain/pain-ideas) must have a cause. (causal principle)
P2: A mind-independent reality cannot be the cause because it does not exist.
P3: The only options left are:
(1) other mind-dependent objects,
(2) my mind,
(3) another mind.
P4: (1) Other mind-dependent objects cannot be the cause because mind-dependent objects cannot cause anything (only minds can).
P5: (2) My mind cannot be the cause because I cannot control the perceptual ideas I have.
C1: Therefore, mind-dependent objects/ideas (e.g. apple-ideas, pain-ideas) must be caused by another mind.
P5: The complexity and orderliness of these objects requires a powerful and wise mind. They behave in regular/predictable ways
P6: The most likely cause, therefore, is God.
C2: Therefore, God exists.
- This leaves us, then, with the third option: my sensory ideas must be caused by some other spirit. Berkeley thinks that when we consider the stunning complexity and systematicity of our sensory ideas, we must conclude that the spirit in question is wise and benevolent beyond measure, that, in short, he is God.
- The existence of God gives Berkeley a way of explaining what happens to ordinary objects that are unperceived.
- God perceives it - he is the permanent perceiver of all mind-dependent objects / collections of ideas.
