Imperial Attitudes - 1947-1967 Flashcards
What did the years between 1947 and 1967 see for the British Empire? Was British decolonisation alone?
Decolonisation - the dismantling of the British Empire as former colonies were granted - or won - their independence.
-British decolonisation part of a wider international phenomenon - the Empires of other European powers also came to an end - notably in France (in Asia and Africa) and the Netherlands (in Southeast Asia).
What were the reasons for British decolonisation? Was it planned?
-Economic impact of WW2 - imperial powers emerged from the war much poorer - none could really afford to fight a series of prolonged colonial wars against insurgent (rebel) nationalist movements - imperial control unsustainable.
-The changed international situation - new dominant powers of the USA and USSR both hostile to old-style European imperialism. Britain, and other colonial powers, heavily dependent on the USA for defence and economic support - susceptible to American pressure to speed up decolonisation - e.g tension at Tehran Conference (November 1943) - President Roosevelt opposed British colonialism and supported the independence of British colonies. Harder for Britain to reassert authority without jeopardising wider international interests, or burdening the home government politically and financially.
-The emergence of powerful nationalist movements - these movements emerged in all parts of the world with the goal of securing independence from European empires - posed a challenge to imperial governments - new political conditions made the colonies harder to rule.
-Changing priorities in Europe - by the 1950’s, Western Europe was experiencing a dramatic post-war economic recovery (full employment and rising living standards) - made it less dependent on colonial support. In 1957, the emergence of a new free trade community, the EEC (European Economic Community), helped refocus trade within Europe itself (away from Empire) - Britain joined in 1973. This weakened support in all the main European imperial powers among powerful business interests.
-Specific problems - Britain did not simply give up on their empires after WW2. The decolonisation of India, Burma and Palestine came in response to specific problems in those regions. Key principle - benefits of holding onto these possessions were outweighed by the costs that their possession would incur. Decisions to relinquish empire often forced by specific developments rather than an immediate post-war shift in thinking - there was certainly no plan to decolonise.
Summary - Changing international climate + changes within colonies + political changes at home + economic impact = decolonisation (a vicious cycle of imperial decline).
Who were the British PM’s in the post-war period up to 1970?
-Clement Attlee (L) - 1945-51.
-Sir Winston Churchill (C) - 1951-1955 - 2nd time as PM. Attlee remained in opposition.
-Anthony Eden (C) - 1955-57. Beat Attlee (who was still opposition leader at the 1955 election) who then retired as Labour leader shortly after the election defeat and became a peer.
-Harold Macmillan (C) - 1957-63.
-Sir Alec Douglas-Home (C) - 1963-64.
-Harold Wilson (L) - 1964-70.
-Edward Heath (C) - 1970-74 - Britain finally joined the EEC under Heath.
How did Britain approach its post-war colonial policy and administration in the 1940’s and 1950’s? How realistic were Britain’s aims in relation to the situation after WW2?
Britain’s approach:
-In the post-war years, despite the loss of India in 1947, and Burma and Palestine in 1948, there was still a belief that future prosperity lay in trade with the Empire and Commonwealth, rather than Europe - it took time for Britain to realise their diminished status.
-Concerned with managing Britain’s remaining empire in a way that would maximise its economic value to Britain, assure its loyalty and resist independence (or attempt to manage it to benefit Britain).
-This belief was most notable in the Churchill premiership.
-Therefore, in the 1950’s, many colonial administrators were no longer just concerned with keeping order and balancing the budget, they now sought to raise colonial production and to modernise their economies - e.g rapid agricultural improvements and steps towards industrialisation.
-Administration took on a new aggressive approach known as ‘economic colonialism’ - priorities were to protect British trading interests, guard vital supplies and destroy insurgencies (especially communist ones).
-With this in mind, colonial administration became much more proactive - a ‘second colonial occupation’ occurred as experts and more settlers were sent in to reassert a British monopoly of force. This meant giving less power to traditional indigenous leaders - e.g in Kenya and the Rhodesias, devolution to local elites was no longer practical. Grants of further indigenous control through legislative councils were presented as a stepping stone to independence, but indigenous representation was constrained by governors of other offices.
-Similarly in Malaya, it was no longer possible to rely on the Malay sultans in the conditions of the Malayan Emergency.
-However, some British leaders also recognised the need to widen representative government and develop a timeline for self-rule.
-Theoretically, the British were hopeful that decolonisation could be ‘managed’ on their terms to benefit them.
Reality - a shift in policy was inevitable:
-Britain’s promotion of economic development, health provisions and educational opportunities (as in Africa) made little difference in the wake of international, domestic, and colonial upheavals - they actually added to the growth in skills, knowledge and understanding among indigenous elites.
-This revival of Britain’s imperial creativity in the immediate aftermath of WW2 was much too late - Empire could not restore Britain’s ‘Great Power’ status.
-Neither the British government or the electorate were prepared to commit resources which would make little difference to the African colonies anyway.
-No matter the idealism invested in the Commonwealth, it could not make the Empire a competitive option.
-WW2 created political climates in the colonies, undermining the authority of colonial administrators to impose solutions on problems.
-When the Director of the Colonial Services, Ralph Furse, who had reformed and professionalised colonial service, retired in 1948, only 66,000 employees out of the 250,000 were British - colonial service gradually ceased to be a career.
-During the 1950’s, in the colonies without a white settler majority (so Rhodesia excluded), an educated indigenous elite from the missionary school system had acquired an increasing say in the management of their own territories - e.g the creation of legislative assemblies in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the CAF, Kenya, Malaya and elsewhere.
-A sense that the world had outgrown even the largest of Empires.
How successfully did Britain leave its colonies? How did it compare to other European powers? How did the Commonwealth play a role in maintaining post-colonial British influence?
Britain extricated themselves from Empire with a degree of skill and dignity - it was largely still ‘managed’ on their terms.
Successful:
-Almost all of Britain’s former colonies joined the Commonwealth (evidence of management and control through economic links - only Burma, Aden and the Republic of Ireland did not join the Commonwealth at the end of Empire) - the now voluntary organisation was originally an ‘exclusive club’ for the self-governing white Dominions. The Dominions had been governed by independent legislatures since 1931 - although rights were not extended to their indigenous populations for several decades later - e.g Canada’s First Nations received equal voting rights in 1960, and the same right given to Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander in 1965.
-A new, but short-lived Commonwealth Office was created in 1966, but its functions were transferred to the Foreign Office in 1968.
-Compared to other European powers (e.g ‘Congo Crisis’ after Belgium withdrew saw 100,000 dead in a Cold War proxy war), the process of withdrawal was relatively smooth and peaceful - remarkably little bloodshed by comparison.
-Britain happy to wash their hands of certain colonies if it suited them with minimum repercussions for Britain - e.g Burma - Britain happy to leave quickly, or India.
-Able to replace formal colonial control for informal political influence, sealed by economic ties and defence treaties - e.g oil installations in Aden, copper royalties in Zambia, military bases in Singapore, and the idea of ‘imperialism of decolonisation’ in Malaya (remained in the Sterling Area).
-By the 1960’s, Britain were, for the most part, less concerned with fighting for its imperial life - they had come to terms with reality.
Less successful:
-However, though peaceful on the surface, the apparent stability in which Britain left its now independent ex-colonies was not the case.
-Events moved more quickly than Whitehall expected - quickly and perhaps out of control - hustled and harried out of their old colonies. E.g India, Burma, Palestine.
-The process of decolonisation might have been rushed, but was not always swift - e.g Malayan Emergency dragged on, and African countries not given independence until the 1960’s and beyond.
-South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961 - influence somewhat dented.
-Britain had lost the bargaining power of threatening to withhold independence.
-Britain did indeed fight bloody campaigns to stem the rising tide of nationalism - not dignified - e.g in Kenya, Malaya, India, Cyprus. Whether in Africa or India, the British never hesitated to imprison nationalist leaders - e.g Nkrumah, Gandhi, Nehru.
-Whilst formal decolonisation may not have directly involved violence, Britain had still been willing to employ violence whilst trying to salvage something from the wreckage. Britain not so much fighting for its imperial life, but wanted to make sure to give the impression of control as they attempted to rescue some vestige of control.
What speech was the idea of managed decolonisation consistent with? Where was the speech made? What was the content of the speech?
The ‘wind of change’ speech - Harold Macmillan - 3 February 1960.
-The speech was given in Cape Town, South Africa,
Content of speech:
-Macmillan made it clear that Britain would grant independence in its African territories.
-“The wind of change is blowing through this continent [Africa] and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.” “The strength of this African national consciousness”.
What were MacMillan’s views on Empire? What wider considerations perhaps explain the speech? What did it show about how decolonisation was being managed? How had certain events led MacMillan’s government to this point?
MacMillan’s Views:
-Macmillan became Prime Minister in February 1957. PM from 1957-63.
-He was not as committed to Empire as Churchill and Eden had been - he was also able to change course according to what served his purpose.
-Independently, Macmillan decided that Empire was an undesirable burden - Britain could cope with limited colonial insurgency, but not colonial warfare (e.g the Mau Mau).
Macmillan’s wider considerations:
-Above all, Macmillan aimed to secure the friendship of the US, and equally to avoid conflict with African nationalism.
-Macmillan had to show the US, and the rest of the world, that Britain no longer possessed an aggressively imperialist attitude - colonialism now against international sentiment.
-Some colonial governments, particular those with large white settler populations, were reluctant to relinquish power - hence why the speech was arguably needed to give the impression that it was all under control / decolonisation was being ‘managed’ - no one had foreseen the scope of decolonisation and the speed at which it happened - hence Britain and Macmillan required a narrative of control, especially in the face of opposition from reluctant colonial hands.
-The speech wasn’t anything particularly new or outstanding- it was purely a summary of what had already happened - a sombre realisation of the inevitable.
Other events:
-A difficult but necessary choice for MacMillan and his new Colonial Secretary from October 1959, Ian Macleod - the maltreatment of the Mau Mau prisoners at the Hola Camp, combined with the publication of the British Commission about Nyasaland - which concluded that the 1959 State of Emergency had been an overreaction, denouncing the government in Nyasaland for employing unnecessary and illegal force.
-Decolonisation was necessary - CAF formally dissolved in 1963.
What was the impact of Macmillan’s speech on British policy? What were the reactions to the speech in South Africa and in Britain? How did it impact black African nationalists?
Impact:
-Suggested a shift in British policy, but also Conservative thinking, signalling Britain’s intention to withdraw from its colonies - especially in Africa.
-But, in reality, the speech was a realisation of what had already happened.
-Britain had underestimated the speed of decolonisation.
-Wanted to give the impression of Britain being in control / planned decolonisation - wanted it to seem like their decision.
-The interests of the indigenous people were not at the heart of it - it wasn’t a gift. Britain were conscious of their own image and status - the idea of decolonisation being planned was an attempt to justify and legitimise the whole colonial project as if it was all meant to lead to this point - (makes it seem like Empire benefited the colonies).
Reactions in South Africa and Britain:
-South African government - a frosty reception from South African politicians after speaking frankly against apartheid. South African PM, Dr Hendrik Verwoerd (the architect of apartheid), thanked Macmillan for the speech, but said he could not agree. “We are the people who brought civilisation to Africa” “To do justice in Africa means not only being just to the black man of Africa.”
-The reception was perhaps a factor in explaining why South Africa voted to leave the Commonwealth and become a republic in 1961 - also about Britain’s initial failure to hand over its remaining colonies in the region.
-In Britain, the speech was met with surprise and accusations of betrayal by British Conservatives who believed that Macmillan had caved in to African nationalist pressure - this opinion shared by Ian Smith after Macmillan and Macleod broke up the federation and demanded majority or shared rule. They felt that the Conservative Party was moving to the left. ‘The Monday Club’ pressure group formed in response to Macmillan’s speech - argued against decolonisation and non-white immigration - supported apartheid.
Impact on black African nationalists:
-Although the speech showed support for black Africans, its message of collaboration in economic and political preparation for independence was not delivered.
-Much skill was used to suggest that decolonisation was a gift, but decolonisation was at its core reactionary, and the pace of change rarely satisfied the nationalists.
-The British tried to convey the idea of working in collaboration with nationalists movements, but were often compelled to move much faster than they had originally intended.
Who was the Foreign Secretary post-WW2? How did he assess the international scene in January 1948? What does this tell us about how Britain viewed themselves at this moment?
Ernest Bevin - Attlee’s Foreign Secretary from the election of Labour government in July 1945, until shortly before his death in April 1951.
-January 1948 - Bevin was adamant that Britain were not subservient to the USA or the Soviet Union in foreign affairs - he said that, by developing the material resources from Empire, Britain would be able to develop their own power and resources to be equal to that of the USA and USSR.
-Shows the dual approach (at a stage where decolonisation still not acknowledged as policy), but also how the reality of Britain’s position had not yet been realised.
How was British imperial policy shaped by a changed international scene between 1947 and 1967? What key international development was to have the biggest impact on post-war international relations and on British imperial policy?
1947-67 - British imperial policy moulded by the emergence of the USA and USSR from WW2 as ‘superpowers’ - able to dictate international affairs and relations in the post-war world.
-The emergence of the Cold War, between the US-dominated capitalist West and the USSR-led communist East, was to play a crucial role in shaping British imperial policy.
-The ‘Cold’ War in many ways was actually violently played out through the wars of decolonisation (‘proxy wars’ - instigated by major powers) that erupted in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
How did the Cold War initially give a boost to British imperialism? What did America turn a blind eye to?
The emergence of the Cold War initially gave a renewed impetus to British imperialism.
-Despite American anti-imperialist attitudes (e.g Tehran Conference November 1943, where British colonialism was a major tension point as President Roosevelt believed it was a greater threat than the USSR, or when the USA ended Lend-Lease in 1945 because it wasn’t prepared to support a revived British Empire financially), it suited the USA to have a strong Britain.
-A strong Britain would be in a position to resist and prevent communist advances in all quarters of the globe - USA willing to tolerate Empire if it meant stopping the spread of communism.
-America was therefore prepared to turn a blind eye to the post-war re-imposition of British control over its colonies, particularly where this involved driving out communist insurgents.
-American even indirectly financed this re-imposition of control through low interest loans.
What doctrine was a big display of American support for Britain in March 1947? What were the ramification for the Cold War?
March 1947 - the Truman Doctrine.
-America stepped in when the British support for the monarchists fighting communist guerrillas in Greece could no longer be sustained because of financial considerations.
-The Truman Doctrine pledged help to countries ‘resisting attempted subjugation’ (i.e communist subjugation) and provided $400 million of economic and military aid to prop up Greece and Turkey as Britain withdrew from the region.
-Signalled America’s determination to act as a global leader and end its long-standing policy of isolationism (shifted US policy to containment of communism).
-Truman likened fighting communism to good versus evil.
How did US attitudes towards the British Empire change from 1947? What did the US believe was now the best way to prevent the spread of communism?
As the state of the Cold War hardened from 1947, the USA became more fearful of communist expansion in areas such as the Middle East and Africa.
-They soon believed that the best way of preventing communism becoming an attractive option to nationalist movements was to build up these countries as stable and economically prosperous areas.
-The only way for this to happen was for them to be dependent, not on Britain, but on American loans, capitalist practices and world trade.
Why were Britain not able to resist US attitudes on using British decolonisation to prevent communism? What position were Britain in emerging from WW2? How were Britain financially and militarily dependent on the USA?
Britain was in no position to resist such an attitude.
-Britain was indeed a strong ally of the USA and liked to think of itself as an equal partner - referred to as a ‘special relationship’ stemming from the shared cultural and historical heritage (even after Suez in 1956).
-However, in practice, Britain was limited by its financial and military dependence on the USA.
Financially dependent:
-Britain had borrowed from the USA from 1941-45 in the form of Lend-Lease. As a result, Britain emerged from the war with massive debts. John Maynard Keynes had also negotiated a massive US loan (£900 million) in 1945.
-Britain were also large beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan (1948-52) which firmly divided Europe into 2 economic camps by providing economic aid for post-WW2 reconstruction - Britain received $3.3 billion support (largely thanks to the work of Ernest Bevin).
-Britain’s financial dependence on USA most exposed when it was American economic pressure that forced Britain and France to end their invasion of Egypt in the 1956 Suez affair.
Militarily dependent:
-By the 1960’s, it was clear that the British were in no position to combat nationalist independence movements without US backing,
-NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - set up in 1949 with America at the head. Britain relied on NATO and America’s nuclear capacity for defence (despite developing its own nuclear weapons from 1952).
-Britain cooperated with the USA in the Korean War (1950-53) - the command was American led.
-The Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement 1958 - America provided assistance for the development of a British nuclear arsenal.
-Polaris Sales Agreement 1963 - USA agreed to supply Britain with Polaris ballistic missiles for use in Royal Navy submarines.
How did Britain’s reliance on the USA become increasingly obvious in relations with the Dominions? What organisation was formed that signalled the need for an American-led alliance in South Asia?
Whereas previously, the Dominions had looked at Britain as guarantors of their safety, they were now increasingly turning to the US.
-The formation of SEATO in 1954 - the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation - brought together Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Britain and the USA in the wake of the Korean War of 1950-53 (a proxy war for the Cold War - the UN-backed US and UK supported South Korea against the communist USSR and China-backed North Korea).
-SEATO an acknowledgment of the need for an American-led protective alliance.
What was the EEC? Why did Britain not join the EEC when it started?
The European Economic Community (EEC) was created in 1957 - it was an economic union which brought together Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany.
-Until the 1960’s, Britian was reluctant to join the EEC as Britain still had hopes of reconstituting and preserving its Empire (develop the Commonwealth) - initially trusted their reliant on Empire.
-They wished to pursue a ‘one-world’ economic system and were worried about damaging links with the Commonwealth.
-Disliked the supranational (when member states of an international organisation cede authority and sovereignty on at least some internal matters to the collective organisation) and technocratic (experts in government) nature of EEC.
What happened when Britain realised that its economic future lay more with Europe? What did French President de Gaulle think about Britain’s compatibility with the EEC? When were Britain eventually let in to the EEC? What was the significance of this in terms of Empire?
The French, under Charles de Gaulle, conspired to keep Britain out of the EEC - de Gaulle believed that Britain held a “deep-seated hostility” towards any pan-European project (i.e a strong collaborative Europe - in response to the wars in Europe).
-He believed EEC membership was incompatible with the British economy, Britain’s chronic deficiency in balance of payments, and the British tradition of obtaining cheap food from all parts of the world. Britain not a fit.
-He also felt Britain were too close to America and were only willing to join now that they had no choice with the decline of their Empire.
-For all these reasons, France wished to prevent Britain from joining the solid, interdependent and assured society of the EEC.
-British EEC membership vetoed twice by France (under President de Gaulle) in 1963 and 1967 - Britain had insisted on special concessions being allowed for British commerce with the Commonwealth.
-Britain joined the EEC in 1973 with Edward Heath as PM (after de Gaulle’s ten year presidency had ended in 1969) - Britain had to accept many of the elements that were controversial with British voters - supranationalism, common agricultural policy, and budget.
Significance:
-Because of the EEC, from the 1950’s, support for empire in all the main imperial powers was dwindling - especially among powerful business interests.
-When Britain joined in 1973, this marked a shift in Britain’s imperial world economic position.
How were Britain still trying to play the role of ‘world policeman’ in the 1960’s? How did this end in January 1968?
In the mid-1960’s, Britain tried to adopt a role as the guardian of Western interest ‘East of Suez’.
-‘East of Suez’ (a phrase popularised by Rudyard Kipling) was an area from East Africa to Australia, including the Persian Gulf and former British Malaya and Borneo.
-Occasionally, British leaders still spoke of India as falling within a British sphere of influence - little more than an illusion.
January 1968:
-Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announced that British troops would be withdrawn from major military bases in Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Maldives.
-This was a final acknowledgment that Britain’s days as a self-declared ‘world policeman’ were over.
What were the ways in which colonial rule looked set to be challenged in Asia and Africa after WW2? What were the key underlying factors?
Challenges to colonial rule in Asia:
-Southeast Asia - where the effects of the disruptive consequences of WW2 were perhaps most stark.
-Rapid Japanese conquests of Malaya and Burma destroyed colonial notions of British invincibility, leaving many indigenous groups with strong convictions about the vulnerability of British power - even after it had been reinstated.
Challenges to colonial rule in Africa:
-Similar processes were evident in Africa.
-Rapid economic development had been generated during the war by the need to provide raw materials and food to support the British war effort.
-Major cities in East and West Africa became theatres of industrial conflict and anti-British agitation. E.g Nairobi (Kenya) and Mombasa (Kenya) in East Africa, Accra (Gold Coast) and Lagos (Nigeria) in West Africa.
Key factors:
-As the men who had served in imperial and Commonwealth forces during the war returned to the colonies, there was a feeling that their sacrifices should be rewarded with greater self-determination - violence had left its mark on many.
-Close contact with ordinary British soldiers continued to puncture the myth of white superiority.
