Imagery Flashcards
Imagery
Mental representation of something that isn’t currently present
Paivio’s dual coding theory
Knowledge can be stored as:
- Abstract verbal code: Symbol doesn’t resemble real world object (except for onomatopoeia)
- Analogue imagery-based code: Retains perceptual features of physical stimulus they represent
Functional-equivalence hypothesis (Kosslyn)
Propositional theory (Pylyshyn)
All images are represented as spatial reps (analogue codes)
Images are byproducts of underlying propositional networks and are stored as byproducts
- Proposition: An idea unit that can be verified as true or false
Evidence used in imagery debate:
Mental rotation (Shepard and Metzer)
Image scanning / Mental scanning (Kosslyn)
Image scaling / Mental scaling (Kosslyn)
Ambiguous figures (Reed)
Which support functional equivalence?
Participants take longer the more you have to rotate an image
- Longer when comparing 2 same shapes at diff angles
- Supports
Participants asked to scan mental images while response time is measured
- It would take longer time to process larger mental distances than short
- Supports
Smaller images take longer to process than larger images (bcuz of zooming in effect)
- Mouse-sized elephant longer to analyze than elephant-sized mouse
- Supports
Participants not able to tell if new shapes were part of original image
- Suggested images may be stored using meaningful verbal labels rather than depictive representations
- Refutes
Picture superiority effect
Bizarreness effect
Concreteness effect
If something is coded twice, it’s easier to retrieve later
Interactive images are more distinct and stand out more in memory
Concrete words easier to remember than abstract because it can be dual coded more easily
Embodied cognition vs Representational theories
Embodied:
- Simulations
- Modality-specific
- Situated (relies on context)
- Dynamic
Representational:
- Symbolic
- Amodal (Not linked to senses)
- Decontextualized
- Stable
Situated simulation theory (Barsalou)
Type of embodied cognition view of knowledge stemming from idea of mental simulations (similar to functional equivalence hypothesis)
1) Body and sensorimotor system have causal role in generating intelligent behav
2) Cognition requires reactivation/simulation of sensorimotor system
3) Distributed brain activations from sensory and motor centres serve as representation of concepts (but not amodal/abstract)
4) Knowledge is flexible + goal-driven
- We may be taking in diff info at diff times (flexible)
- Categories may be formed from goals (e.g. what to pack in a suitcase)
Category-specific deficits
Semantic dimentia
Some patients demonstrate category-specific deficits:
- Damage to visual areas -> Loss of knowledge of living things
- Damage to motor areas -> Loss if knowledge of manipulable objects
Patients w/ semantic dementia have damage to anterior temporal lobe
- But diff categories are stored in diff locations
- Imaging studies show that semantic knowledge is widely distributed in brain
Huak’s study on modality-specific brain activations for verbal labels
Participants performed actions using body parts
- Then read actions related to body parts
Fond areas for movements and words had similar activation
- We use mental simulations
Hub and spoke model
Probic study
Hub: Modality-independent concept centre
- Allows info to be combined across situations into coherent category
Spoke: Modality-specific sensory and motor areas
- Represent specific instances of category members in active simulation
Applied TMS to anterior parietal lobe (hub) and inferior parietal lobe (spokes)
- Found IPL involved in naming nonliving things, APL in naming all things
- IPL only slowed when naming things that can be manipulated w/ hands (shows that it’s a spoke for things you manipulate w/ hands)