History 130 Part III Flashcards
1
Q
Big Three end of WWII
A
Britain (Churchill), Soviet Union (Stalin), US (Truman)
2
Q
Formation of Two Worlds post-WWII
A
Soviet Union’s need for security & isolation too big for Stalin to situate Soviet Union w/in US led intl order
3
Q
Soviet non-participation in Bretton Woods
A
Soviet Union not going to participate in liberal postwar economic order
4
Q
Widening US-Soviet relations 1945-46
A
structural hostility between east & west
5
Q
Kennan’s Long Telegram (1946)
A
- deep reservoir of Russian anti-westernism
- Marxist Leninist ideology
hostility inevitable, reconciliation impossible
6
Q
Churchill’s Iron Curtain 1946
A
curtain has descended on Europe, Soviet Union threat to peace/stability
7
Q
American confusion on Stalin’s ambitions 1946
A
whether Soviet Union will be willing to coexist peacefully w/ west
whether Soviet Union trying to expand its domain in Europe
8
Q
Stalin’s mixed pattern in Eastern Europe
A
works w/ local communist parties to establish government power, but elsewhere more willing to coexist w/ free postwar Europe
9
Q
Turkey Crisis 1946
A
Crisis between Turkey & Soviet Union over Dardanelles Straits
Soviets demand Turkey gives them right to free navigation of Strait
Truman sends aircraft carrier to Mediterranean as show of strength
Stalin backs down
10
Q
Iran Crisis 1946
A
Shah requests Soviet Union remove troops they brought to Iran during WWII
Soviet Union refuses
US intervenes on behalf of Iran
Stalin backs down
11
Q
Mid-term election 1960
A
Rightward shift
Truman now dealing w/ Republicans in Congress
Harder to get spending packages through
12
Q
Europe’s postwar crisis
A
cities destroyed, economic misery
misery could lead to war & radicalization
Truman proposes financial assistance
13
Q
Britain’s postwar predicament
A
British empire beaten by WWII
Let’s go of India
Tries holding onto Palestinian mandate
14
Q
Greek Civil War (1946-1949)
A
communists win war, want to put communists back in power
Britain ends support for anticommunist government in Greece
Question of how US will intervene
15
Q
Truman Doctrine (1947)
A
US commits to providing assistance to free peoples everywhere struggling to retain independence against hostile external forces
16
Q
Implications of Truman Doctrine
A
Charter for US embroilment everywhere
17
Q
Marshall Plan (1948)
A
13B to help Europe’s socioeconomic crisis
Empowers Europeans to import goods from America
18
Q
German Problem post-WWII
A
End of WWII Britain & France incapable of feeding Germany
Want to stabilize Germany to be able to stand on its own
Britain, US, and France merge their occupation zones
Give Marshall Aid
19
Q
Soviet Union response to integration of West Bloc
A
1947 Stalin worried rehabilitation of Germany is being done to use Germany against Soviet Union
Stalin takes steps to secure east Germany against rehabilitated west German state
20
Q
Eastern Europe 1947-48
A
Stalin consolidates East bloc
Stalinist regimes created in Eastern European countries
Eastern Europe transformed into ideological sphere of influence
21
Q
Origins of Berlin Crisis 1948
A
Culimination of struggle for Germany’s fate starting in 1946/47
22
Q
Currency Reform 1948
A
western powers have integrated their zones & undertake monetary reform by introducing new currency
Stalin sees reform as confirmation of western desire to use Germany against Soviet Union
23
Q
Stalin’s blockade in Berlin
A
Closes West’s access to Berlin
24
Q
Resolution of Berlin Crisis
A
Western powers resupply civilians of Berlin via airlift
Stalin backs down
25
Permanent US military role in Europe
1949 US enacts NATO
26
Military alliance debate shifts 1947-49
1947 Britain proposes military union w/ involvement of US → US unwilling to commit to Britain plan for western union of military powers
1948 West European Union created (limited version of what Britain wanted)
1949 Truman decides to committ to NATO
27
Origins of NATO
Military alliance (not political organization)
Designed to counter Germany & resolve Germany problem
28
Two purposes of NATO
1. Anti-Soviet alliance
2. Solves problem of Germany’s threat to security of Europe
29
Crises of 1949
Spring 1949 things going West’s way → late summer/fall takes turn
30
3 symptoms of upheavel in 1949
1. August 1949 Soviet Union tests atomic bomb
2. September 1949 Mao ZeDong delcares victory in China, People’s Republic of China born
3. Domestic political mood in US takes anticommunist turn
31
Fate of East Asia after WWII
Bombing of Japan during WWII creates vacuum in Japanese occupied China & Southeast Asia
Japan still in command of a lot of Chinese territory at end of WWII
32
China after WWII
1945 two rival claims to leadership in China: Chinese Nationalist Party (Shek, Kuomintang) & Chinese Communist Party (Mao ZeDong)
Two parties had come to truce to fight Japan in 1937, but never came to full collaboration
- Nationalist party bore costs of fighting Japanese
- ZeDong avoided overengagement in fighting Japanese
Communist party in stronger position when war ends
33
Decolonization of Manchuria
1945 Soviet Union occupies Manchuria, Japanese forces surrender to Soviets
Stalin plays both sides:
- Agrees w/ nationalists to delay departure of Soviet forces until Kuomintang can take over Manchuria government
- Secretly encourages Chinese communists to bolster their position in Manchuria
US airlifts nationalist forces into Manchuria to help them gain strength to inherit political responsibility
Soviet w/drawal from province creates power vaccum that Chinese communists ready to fill
34
Two Factors in Chinese Civil War
1. Power vaccum that exists after Japan’s defeat
2. Unresolved conflict between nationalists & communists over postwar political rule
35
Chinese Civil War: KMT’s 1946 offensive
Nationalists launch offensive to destroy Mao's communist party
Nationalists military victory doesn’t end Civil War
36
Chinese Civil War: CCP Counteroffensive
Civil War moves in favor of CCP
37
Factors of Civil War & CCP’s success
1. CCP well organized & highly disciplined
2. Nationalist party exhausted its military capabilities fighting Japanese during WWII
3. Communists benefited from adept military & strategic leadership
38
Origins of Sino-Soviet alliance
Mao’s 1949 trip to Moscow
39
Sino-Soviet Treaty (1950)
Commits China & Soviet Union to security agreement
Commits Soviet Union to support postwar China’s economic reconstruction/development
Mao wants to get help from Soviet Union to make China modern
40
Implications of Sino-Soviet alliance for Cold War
US thinks Sino-Soviet alliance will dominate Eurasia
41
Domestic anticommunism
Belief treason in government (wasn’t)
McCarthy leads anticommunism
McCarthy argued US government filled w/ communists & treachery was explanation for Cold War setbacks in 1949
42
Implications of anticommunism for Truman
Critical of Truman Cold War strategy
Second half 1949 setbacks: Soviet bomb, loss of China, emergence of domestic anticommunism
43
NSC-68 analysis
Survival amid globalization demands engagement
World communism is monolithic, dynamic, cohesive
Soviet Union urgent threat
Democratic institutions make US unprepared for war
44
NSC-68 recommendations
1. Continuation of present strategy (Kennan)
→ not credible bc isn’t working
2. Reversion to prewar isolationism
→ ludicrous, opposite of what Truman wants
3. Immediate, preemptive war
→ place holder option, no one arguing for war
4. Rapid build up of political, economic, military strength of free world
→ favored option, continue Kennan’s containment, no direct confrontation
45
Kennan's containment
Focused on Western Europe & Japan
Exploit tensions in communist world
Socialize Soviet Union into more liberal international order
46
Nitze's NSC-68
Encirclement of communist world
Communist world as monolithic bloc
Defeat of Soviet Union
47
Truman's troubles w/ NSC-68
Thinks NSC-68 too radical/disruptive
Says US economy can’t afford to support domestic welfare state he wants to build
48
Origins of Korean War (1950-1953)
End of WWII Korean peninsula occuped by US in South & Soviet Union in North
Rhee: anticommunist in South
Kim II-Sung: communist in North
North Korea attacks South Korea
49
External actors in Korean War
Kim tells Stalin he wants to go to war to unify peninsula & create communist government
Kim tells Stalin Mao thinks this is great idea
Kim goes to Mao saying Stalin thinks it’s great idea
50
North Korean attack & UN response
US mobilizes coalition w/in UN Security Council to provide military assistance to South Korea
Soviets boycotting Council
51
Waging of Korean War
Fighting first good for North Koreans then for UN forces
52
Inchon Landin and MacArthur's 1950 offensive
Stages landing behind North Korean offensive line
Launches counter offensive towards Yellow River
53
PCR/USSR intervention in Korea
Mao authorizes Chinese combat forces
End 1950 stalemate on 39th parallel
54
US rollback debate in Korea
MacArthur advocates for US advance into China
Truman recalls MacArthur
55
Implications of rollback
1. Political message: civilian supremacy in matters of war/peace will be preserved
2. Geopolitical message: US won’t undertake risky military escalation of Cold War by rolling back communist influence where it’s already well-established
- Truman’s rollback establishes geopolitical limits in which US will wage Cold War
56
Implications of Korean War
Failure of Truman administration is his inability to reconcile Cold War commitments US makes w/ domestic fiscal realities of US
Sharp increase in military spending 1949-53 by Truman
57
Eisenhower Background
Apolitical military leader
Committed to structure of Cold War commitments Truman has built
International figure
58
Eisenhower's Two Policy Problems
1. Military fiscal escalation under Truman
2. Ending Korean War
- Agreement establishing 38th parallel as line of demarcation
59
Eisenhower's NSC-162/2 (1953)
1. Containment
- Political & economic strengthing of war, nonmilitary methods of confrontation
2. Deterrence
- Security perimeter around USSR, peaceful coexistence
3. Liberation
-Use of political, economic, psychological means to roll back Soviet power in Eastern Europe
60
Eisenhower's New Look
Reaffirmation of Truman’s containment w/ new elements
Nuclear weapons
Military pacts
Propaganda
61
Conventional forces
Non-nuclear military capabilities
Cold War is conventional & nuclear competition
Soviets have conventional advantage
62
Strategic nuclear weapons
Destroy enemy’s capacity to wage war & terrorize people
63
Tactical nuclear weapons
For battlefield use, destroy enemy’s military formations
64
Strategic defense
Stop inbound nuclear weapons
65
Deterrence
State w/ nuclear weapons refrains from using them in fear of destruction
1950s/60s deterrence becomes default solution to safer world
Nuclear stability vs Nuclear abolitionist arguments
66
Nuclear weapons as turning point in history of warfare
Invention in 1945 seen as paradigm shift - but advent of nukes isn’t a binary (have them or you don’t)
Takes decade to get from early nuclear weapons to thermo-nuclear warheads of Cold War
67
Origins of Atomic Age
1920s/30s physicists perceive possibility of using energy in atoms
Leo Szilard set Manhattan Project into motion (urges Einstein & Eisenhower)
Eisentein pacifist
1940 Manhattan Project - US wins race to bomb
68
Soviet Bomb
1947 US estimates will take Soviet Union 10-15 years to develop bomb → take 4 years
Soviets use espionage
1945 Soviets test bomb, US still immune
69
Fission
Splitting of unstable isotope of uranium 235
70
Fusion
Uses hydrogen
Transforms hydrogen to helium releasing energy like sun
More destructive
71
US decision to build superbomb
Aftermath of Soviet bomb US reconsiders building superbomb
Edward Teller leads the way
72
Early 1950s race to hydrogen bomb
1952/54 US tests fusion bomb
1953 Soviets test fusion bomb
73
Nuclear delivery vehicles
Development during 1950s of hydrogen bomb creates new opportunities for delivery
Fusion reactions larger than fission, a smaller warhead can be deployed → fit on missile & rockets
Late 1950s deploying rockets as delivery vehicles
74
Eisenhower's Grand Strategy
Believes Truman set in motion reckless escalation of fiscal spending/burden in Cold War
Wants to bring Cold War under control
Wants to restore primacy of civilian economy
75
Four parts of Eisenhower's Strategy
1. End Korean War
2. Prosposes to substitute nuclear weapons for conventional arms
- Nuclear weapons become most important pillar of Eisenhower’s defense strategy
3. Eager to form mutual defensive agreements w/ sovereign postcolonial states
4. Seeks to expand covert capabilities
76
Eisenhower resolves Korean War
Summer 1953 Korean peninsula divided
Stalin’s death brings new flexibility to North Korean diplomacy
US enacts truce at 38th parallel
77
Eisenhower stabilizes East Asia 1950s
In Indochina Eisenhower strives to enact territorial division between North & South Vietnam at 17th parallel
1953 Eisenhower works to ensure defense of Taiwan
78
Taiwan in Cold War
Establishing defensive frontier between China & Taiwan is big issue for Eisenhower administration
Eisenhower concludes mutual defense agreement w/ Taiwan (1955)
Eisenhower resolves crisis between China & Taiwan
79
Stabilizing Europe
1955 neutralization of Austria
Integration of West Germany into Western defense institutions (West European Union, NATO)
Soviet Union creates Warsaw Pact 1955
80
Role of alliance in stabilization of Europe
Military alliances in mid-50s as developments that led to stabilization of Cold War in Europe
Mid-50s Europe divided: NATO camp West & Warsaw Pact East
- Division led to stability
81
Move toward detente after Stalin's death 1953
Clarity of geopolitical vision enacted by mid-50s provides basis on which east-west negotiations can resume
1955 Eisenhower meets w/ Bulganin at Four Power Summit in Geneva (US, USSR, UK, France)
Now regular meetings between US & Soviet Union
82
Elvis in germany
to be killed/defeated in event of Soviet invasion (tripwire force) & provide pretext for use of nukes
Eisenhower concluded US couldn’t afford to station force in Europe capable of deterring Soviet conventional attack on Germany
83
Asymmetric strategy mid-50s
US presumes to deter Soviet conventional attack through nuclear deterrent & tripwire soldiers
Asymmetric deterence basis of US military strategy
84
Problem of second strike 1950s
US policymakers dealing w/ problem of survivability of US nuclear forces in event of Soviet preemptive attack on US
To maintain credible deterrent, US has to survive first strike w/ second strike capability intact
US builds bunkers to house weapons
85
Assessing Eisenhower's Cold War policy
Eisenhower succeeds in effort to calm Cold War’s military-fiscal escalation
Eisenhower’s strategy relies on subsitution of conventional weapons for nuclear forces moving humans to brink of apocalypse
86
Modernity in history
Until 19thC average human poor
In modernity only minority involved in food production
Modernity deals w/ relationship between society & energy
Industrial revolution transforms health, wealth, welfare of socieities
Industrialization isn't global revolution
87
Logic of communism
Primitive communism
Slavery feudalism
Capitalism
Socialism
Communism
88
Communism & modernity
capitalism more exploitative than hierarchical agrarian society
89
Bolshevik Gambit
Marxist revolutionaries capture Russian state in 1917
Second half 1920s reconsolidation of political control in hands of Stalin
90
Stalinization
Late 1920s he embarks to remake Soviet economy in Marxist-Leninst mold
Sets out to create modern industrial society
Turns Russia into industrial society in 20 years
91
US democratic capitalism
Natural rights
Political power gets legitmacy from democracy & electoral process
Mark based allocation of scarce resources
- Markets determine who gets what
92
Soviet Marxist Leninist
All history understood as class struggle
Communist party gets right to rule as self-proclaimed political vanguard, dictatorship
Public ownership
Authoritive control of sources
93
Decolonization and Cold War
Sovereign states increase after WWII
1950 UN affirms prerogative of all nations to constitute nation states for themselves
94
Two intersections of decolonization & Cold War
1. Leaders of decolonizing societies strive to avoid embroilment in Soviet-American Cold War
2. Superpower interventionism in global south
- Superpowers see global south as arena where Cold War could be won or lost
95
US intervention in Iran 1953
British petroleum company after 1951 considered nationalist Iranian PM might nationalize BP’s oil holdings in Iran
British government goes to Truman saying they want to do something about nationalist PM
Truman says its your problem Britain
Iran PM overthrown --> new authoritarian regime under Mosaddegh
Eisenhower too anxious about ideological proclivities of Mosaddegh & gets played by British petroleum interests
96
US intervention in Guatemala 1954
Expropreated land Arbenz trying to use to help poor belonged to United Fruit Corporation
US forms coup & overthrows Arbenz
Central America destabilized by corporate interests
97
Suez Crisis 1956
Nasser in power trying to promote Egypt's development
1956 Nasser uses canal to gain financial support for dam he wants to build & decides to nationalize Canal
98
Response to Suez Crisis
Eisenhower worries Anglo-French operation could turn Arab world towards Soviet Union
Eisenhower tanks British pound
99
Cold War significance of Suez Canal
Cold War preoccupations capable of motivating superpower intervention in postcolonial world, but in this case Cold War preoccupations function as break on western intervention in postcolonial world
100
Eisenhower in Lebanon
Eisenhower commits to use US military support to support American allies in Middle East that are threatened by Soviet Union
1958 Eisenhower sends US forces to Lebanon
Eisenhower sends forces to support PM Chamoun's government
101
Background Nikita Khrushchev
Big Leninist
Envisions liberalization of political controls Stalin put in place
Refocuses Soviet economy on consumer needs
Sees Cold War as ideological competition
102
Sputnik 1957
implications for US prestige, science, military
103
US response to Sputnik
Eisenhower calls for national investment in science, tech, education & expansion of civil defense programs
104
Sputnik and Crisis of Deterrence
If Soviets can put satellite in orbit, high probability they have ballistic missiles that can reach US
Political question of whether US willing to expose American cities to attack in order to protect European allies?
105
Reformulating deterrence after Sputnik
Sputnik produces logic of deterrence
Up til now Eisenhower able to pursue logic of asymmetric deterrence
106
Making US deterrence survivable
Aftermath of Sputnik Americans trying to make US military’s nuclear deterrence more survivable
US develops missile silos to house ICBMs
107
1960 election Kennedy's attacks on Eisenhower-Nixon
Eisenhower too willing to prioritize needs of civilian economy
Eisenhower insufficiently pursued military development
Missile gap (not actually true)
108
Kennedy's foreign policy
Wage war w/ more vigor
Surpass Soviet investments in nuclear weapons technology
Flexible response: build up NATO’s conventional military capability in Europe
More engagment in Global South
109
Kennedy economic development
1961 Inagural Address preached stronger campaign to bring democratic capitalism to agrarian societies
advocates for more spending for development in Global South
110
Kennedy's Alliance for Progress comittments
effort to address Latin America’s marginality in US Cold War strategy
Seeks to align US w/ prodemocratic social/economic reformers in Latin America
111
Older patterns of US intervention in Latin America
Latin America used to be principle arena of US international engagement
Western Europe now US’ commitment
112
Origins of Cuban Revolution (1953-1959)
Castro comes to power
Castro was fighting against pro-US Bautista dictatorship
Castro not a communist in 1959
113
Cuba and Cold War balance
East bloc (Sino-Soviet world)
West (US, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia)
Global South (nonaligned countries)
disrupts geopolitical equilibrium --> communism in western hemisphere
114
Cuba's leftward drift after 1959
American decisionmakers push Castro towards Soviet Union
Castro thinks explosion of ship in harbor in 1960 is CIA plot--> Castro driven closer to Soviet Union
115
Bay of Pigs 1961
Eisenhower created plan for invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro anticommunist forces & Kennedy executes plan
It fails --> Kennedy shifts to outing Castro via covert ops
116
Khrushchev's Dilemma in Cuba
1961 Cuba formal ally of Soviet Union
Soviet Union is source of protection against US
Risk in what will Soviet Union do if US invades?
117
Khrushchev's decision in Cuba 1962
Weapons equip Soviet Union w/ means to defend Cuba from US
Missiles in Cuba closes missile gap giving Soviet Union new deterrent capability
118
US discovery in Cuba Oct 16, 1962
photos of missiles
119
Kennedy's ExComm
knowledge w/in group of insiders
120
Kennedy's four options
1. Enact airstrike against missile sites
2. All out air offensive against Cuba
3. Launch ground invasion
4. Naval blockade to prevent delivering of new missiles
121
Kennedy's departure from ExComm
first favors airstrike, then convinced any military action risk escalation, opts for blockade
Oct 24, 1962 blockade implemented
122
ExComm Divided
All out air strikes
Invasion
Limited air strikes
123
Backchannel diplomacy
Brother Robert communications w/ Soviet KGB agent at embassy
Kennedy relies on this agent
124
Black Saturday Oct 27
Soviets shoot down American U2 plane
Soviet sub close to firing nuclear torpedo against American destroyer
125
Towards resolution of Cuban Crisis
Khrushchev telegraphs Washinton (Oct 28): if US removes missiles from Turkey & pledges not to invade Cuba, Soviet Union will remove missiles
Kennedy agrees, publicly commits only not to invade
126
Why Khrushchev backed down
Understood military advantages in Caribbean favored US
If situation escalated to conventional war, US success inevitable
Nuclear war would be catastrophic to Soviet Union
Convinced history on his side
127
Transformations after Cuban Crisis
Soviet buildsup ICBMs
Mid-60s US stops building ICBMs (MAD)
128
Stabilizing arms race
Limited Test Ban Treaty 1963
NPT (nuclear non-proliferation treaty) 1968: no sharing nuclear weapons technology w/ non-NPT countries
129
History of Indochina wars
First Indochina War (1946-1954): Japanese occupation during WWII, French colonialism uncertain
Second Indochina War (1955-1975): US now principle participant in wars in Vietnam on side of Republic
Third Indochina War (1979 or 1978-1991): Vietnam & China fight border war
130
Fate of colonialism in Southeast Asia
Blows to France in WWII jeopardize sustainability of French empire
Japanese empire in Indochina
131
Truman's stance on Vietnam & French colonialism
1949/50 US aligns w/ French effort to build client state in Indochina
US provides France w/ financial military assistance
132
Battle of Dien Bien Phu 1954
Vietnamese forces overrun French fortress
Leads French to want to dissolve imperial project
Playing last cared French ask Eisenhower to intervene to help French forces → Eisenhower says no
133
Eisenhower's dilemma w/ French colonialism
doesn't want to be savior of European colonialism
wants to thwart communism w/o embracing colonialism
134
US logic of nation building in Vietnam
US encourages interim government in South Vietnam to resist unification between communist North & anticommunist South
US accepts geographical division as basis on which anticommunist Vietnamese state might be built
135
Anticommunist state building in South Vietnam
US supports Ngo Dinh Diem as president of independent South Vietnamese republic
Building up Diem begins central US foreign policy in region
136
Dilemmas of Diem's regime
growing communist insurgency (National Liberation Front) in South
NLF supported by North's government
North supported by China & Soviet Union
137
Kennedy & Vietnam after missile crisis
Escalating US commitment in South Vietnam, but doesn't send troops
138
US coup against Diem
1963 coup to overthrow Diem
US aligns w/ military rulers to accomplish its anticommunist war aims
139
LBJ's priorities
domestic politician
priority is domestic programs not war
140
Gulf of Tonkin (1964)
Maddox attacked by North Vietnamese
First attack happened, second attack didn’t
141
Policy consequences of Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution gives US president authority to provide military assistance to any Southeast Asian government compromised by communist aggression
142
Vietnam during 1964 election
Americans fixated on election not war, LBJ promotes himself as peace candidate
143
LBJ's choice for escalation 1965
Escalatory military strategy
Authorizes South Vietnamese attacks
Bombing campaigns against North
US ground troops in South
Americanization
144
LBJ's objective in Vietnam 1965
Kill more communists combatants than North can replenish → this fails
145
US policy shift after 1964 election
Antiwar movement
US allies refuse to support war
King’s “Beyond Vietnam” speech (1967)
McNamara resigns, believes war unwinnable
146
Nixon's stabilization
early 70s he stabilized relations w/ Soviet Union & China
147
Western alliance during 1960s
Western alliance & eastern alliance as hierarchial system w/ superpower at top
European allies/clients of US that in 40s had embraced Marshall Aid begin to chaff US leadership
148
Charles De Gaulle's bid for autonomy in three ways
1. Commits in 1960 to pursue for France independent nuclear deterrent
2. Engages in independent diplomatic outreach to Soviet Union and China
(1964 he vists Moscow; 1965 recognizes PRC as legitimate government of China)
3. Monetary economics
(Challenge to primacy of US dollar)
149
Willy Brandt
Determined to overcome postwar division of Germany
Eastern Policy: engaged in unprecedented diplomatic outreach towards East Germany
Challenges to Cold War superpower politics in Europe
150
East Bloc in 1960s
Eastern Europe experiences uprisings against illegitimate communist regimes
151
Czechoslovakia crisis of 1968
Czech decides it will leave Warsaw Pact & pursue neutral policy
1969 Soviet Union invades Prague to hold East Bloc together & restore pro-communist orthodoxy
152
Sino-Soviet split
Soviet Union doesn’t have capacity to enforce Marxist Leninst dogmatism on China
China’s pursuit of developmental trajectory different from Soviet model impacts Sino-Soviet relations
153
Mao & PRC history
First half 1950s Mao follows Soviet model for development in China
Mid-50s Mao takes turn (Great Leap Forward Chinese modernity, but fails)
Mid-60s Cultural Revolution w/ vision of communism different from Moscow
1964 pursures/accomplishes independent nuclear capability
154
US political economy
Permanent national security state created in 1940s is unprecedented American project
Prior to Cold War US mobilized for war by federal government undertaking temporary expansive warfare state then quickly demobilized
Cold War US commits significant national resources to military spending
155
LBJ's political economy
Spending begins to change as result of LBJ’s Great Society programs
Early 70s US can't continue to devote so much of GDP to defense
Vietnam + LBJ’s domestic agenda overheats economy
156
Nixon background
Elected 1968
VP under Eisenhower
Cold War insider
Committed to preserving Cold War internationalism & Cold War foreign policy commitments
Convinced American had role to play in leading the world
Crisis of American hegemonic leadership
157
Mansfield Amendment
In late 60s Mansfield attempts to amend US military budget to force executive to slash US troop levels in Europe
Nixon works against Amendment & succeeds
158
Kissinger background
National security adviser
Learns to exercise immense authority over foreign policy process through interagency process
159
Imperial overstretch & decline 1960s/70s
End of WWII US has vast margins of material superiority over rest of intl system
Nixon determined to resolve economic decline US experiences as other countries recover from war
160
Three elements of Nixon's Vietnam policy
1. Vietnamization
(reverse LBJ’s Americanization by making South Vietnam capable of fighting on its own)
2. Search for peace
(diplomatic negotiations, peace terms acceptable to US, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and National Liberation Front)
3. Brutal military escalations of war
(produce political circumstances more favorable to US exit)
161
Three elements of 1969 Nixon Doctrine
1. US will keep its existing treaty commitments to allies
2. US will provide nuclear shield to countries protected by nuclear guarantee
3. US will in future look to its allies to maintain their own internal security
(reduce burdens of US war fighting responsibility)
162
Difficulties in ending Vietnam War
US unable to strike deal w/ North that South will accept
1972 Kissinger concludes w/ North Vietnamese peace agreement committing US to w/draw all ground forces from South Vietnam & North Vietnam agrees to temporary cease fire w/ South
South reincorporated into North as single Vietnamese state
163
Why Nixon accepts Oct peace
Election around the corner
Was escalating pressure from Congress to end war
Executive & legislative efforts to end war proceed on parallel tracks
164
Detente
Relaxation of adversarial relationship
Describes relations Nixon built w/ Cold War adversaries in 1970s
Trying to triangulate/stabilize Cold War by playing China & Soviet Union against each other to advantage of US
