H6. King Flashcards
4 reasons that Flood insurance is considered to be uninsurable in the private market:
- Only the people with the highest risk levels tend to purchase coverage
- Possibility of catastrophic losses
- Difficult to accurately price the risk due to limitations in hazard assessment
- Because the risk of losses among the insureds are not independent, a very high risk load is required
Policy questions/ concerns raised by the fact that storms of Sandy’s strengths are expected to occur more frequently:
- Is federal flood insurance that complements land use management still an appropriate method to manage flood risk? Does it distribute the burden effectively between the insured and the general public
- Is flood risk possible for the private market to underwrite?
- Could flood risk be effectively transferred to the private sector (via reinsurance) or the capital markets (via catastrophe bonds)
- Should the NFIP debt to the Treasury be forgiven
- Are the consequences of flood risk and the level of protection offered by hurricane protection systems effectively communicated to the public?
What are two conflicting objectives of policymakers:
- Reduce the long term exposure to flood losses, while
2. Maintaining the program’s solvency and mandate to provide affordable flood insurance to the public
3 uses of the flood hazard maps developed by FEMA for NFIP:
- Set insurance rates
- Regulate floodplain development
- Inform those who live in the 100-year floodplain of the potential flood hazards
Issues with the current NFIP:
- Even though residents who have a federally backed mortgage and live in a floodplain need to have flood insurance, many do not purchase
- Many individuals misunderstand flood risk, thinking that if a 100 year flood occurs, there will be no more floods of the same magnitude for 100 years.
- Many individuals misunderstand the risk spreading function of insurance, and are too optimistic about the chance of damage to their property
- NFIP rates may not adequately reflect the flood risk, because Congress requires that the coverage is widely available and affordable
- FEMA’s new digital maps may not meet appropriate flood hazard data quality standards.
- The public cost of post disaster recovery financing is increasing
List some questions raised by the conflicting policymaker objectives
- How can FEMA balance actuarial rates and affordability?
- How to reduce the escalating cost of flooding?
- How to motivate property owners to purchase insurance protection, and encourage the local governments to make land use adjustments to restrict development in high risk flood zones?
- How can the private sector’s role be expanded in assuming NFIP flood risk?
3 responsibilities of FEMA regarding hazard maps:
- Identifying areas of special flood, mudslide or flood related erosion hazards
- Completing a Flood Insurance Study (FIS)
- Issuing a Flood Insurance Risk Map (FIRM) that indicates risk premium rate zones
2 reasons that hazard mitigation is not always incorporated into the risk management decision making of the government and private sector:
- the restrictive land-use zoning regulations and building requirements may conflict with plans for economic development
- the cost-sharing mitigation funding requirements on property buyouts and relocation of at risk properties is a financial burden for the communities
List some issues of contention that still exist after the Biggert-Waters Act:
- It is difficult for FEMA to assess the levee-specific risk and corresponding risk premium
- The premium adjustments necessary to strengthen the financial solvency of the NFIP could result in property owners dropping their policies
- Experts believe that even if FEMA increases the rates up to the maximum amount allowed (20% per year), they would still have insufficient funds to cover the obligations.
- FEMA owes $17.5B to the Treasury for losses due to Katrina.
- Many experts do not believe that FEMA will be able to repay this within 10 years.
2 changes made to the NFIP by the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012:
- Increasing the premiums
2. Reducing incentives for rebuilding in flood risk zones
2 ways that the government became a de facto regulator of economic activity in flood prone areas under NFIP:
- Flood insurance may be required as a condition of obtaining a federally secured mortgage loan, for buildings located in SFHAs
- Managerial regulation, where the government provided
subsidized flood insurance in communities that took steps to regulate the flood plain through land-use zoning ordinances and building standards
List some examples of questions that policymakers ask when deciding whether to intervene in private insurance markets:
- Do economic markets provide a sufficient amount of insurance against flood hazards?
- Are the insuring firms (that cover flood) sufficiently capitalized so that widespread insolvency would not occur?
- Would federal disaster insurance crowd out the private market and create unintended liabilities for taxpayers?
- Would insurers cherry pick the most appealing risks, leaving the unprofitable business for the government?
3 reasons that premium subsidies are often thought to be appropriate for flood risk:
- residents of flood-prone areas did not understand the flood risk when they built there
- there were no public safeguards restricting construction in the floodplain
- premium subsidies on pre-FIRM structures could motivate communities to participate in the program
List the 4 causes for economic regulation:
- People insisted that social and ethical values need to be reflected in the operation of the economy, in addition to economic values.
- The government was viewed as necessary to more efficiently coordinate and use the resources, as it is able to prescribe land use zoning ordinances and building code standards
- Due to the widespread flooding in the 60s, people became interested in shifting risk from themselves to the government. Premium subsidies were thought to be appropriate
- Sole reliance on insurance markets was not an option. Historically, the insurers and individuals have not had sufficient information for the market to operate effectively
2 ways that the premium subsidies to RLPS have been phased out
- voluntary buyouts
2. charging full actuarial rates to owners who do not accept FEMA’s offer to mitigate the impact of flood damage