General Security Flashcards
Risk management is a five-step process that provides a framework for collecting and evaluating information to:
- Assess assets (identify value of asset and degree of impact if asset is damaged or lost)
- Assess threats (type and degree of threat)
- Assess vulnerabilities (identification and extent of vulnerabilities)
- Assess risks (calculation of risks)
- Determine countermeasures (security countermeasure options that can reduce or mitigate risks cost effectively
Assets can be assigned to one of five categories:
- People
- Information
- Equipment
- Facilities
- Activities & Operations
T or F: The first step in the risk management process is to identify and assess your organization’s assets.
True
T or F: An asset is anything of value or importance to the organization or an adversary, such as people, computers, buildings or strategic advantages.
True
_____ is comprised of communications and the electronic and telemetry collection of information in the non-visible portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)
_____ is intelligence derived from people through interviews, elicitation, or reports originating from people.
HUMINT (Human Intelligence)
HUMINT insider – information collection techniques:
• Attempting to obtain information without need to know
• Making unusual use of or requests for classified publications
• Attempting to access classified databases
• Removing information without approval
• Placing classified material in a desk or briefcase
• Copying classified material in other offices
• Borrowing or making notes of classified material
• Bringing cameras or recording devices into cleared facilities
• Obtaining or attempting to obtain witness signatures on classified
destruction records
• Stockpiling classified or proprietary documents outside cleared area
HUMINIT insider indicators - personnel who:
• Are disgruntled with management
• Are disgruntled with the U.S. Government
• Are fascinated with and have a strong desire to engage in spy
work
• Suddenly purchase high value items
• Suddenly settle large outstanding debts
• Travel to foreign countries repeatedly
• Make short trips overseas
• Have contact with foreign officials and representatives
• Attempt to conceal contacts with foreigners
• Have relatives or friends residing abroad
• Avoid or decline assignments requiring a counterintelligence-
oriented polygraph
• Work an unusual amount of overtime
• Sudden decline in work quality
_____ involves using various sources, such as satellites, photos, infrared, imaging radar, and electro-optical for collecting image data.
IMINT (Imagery Intelligence)
_____ It excludes signals intelligence and traditional imagery intelligence. When collected, processed, and analyzed, MASINT locates, tracks, identifies, or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. It includes the advanced data processing and exploitation of data from overhead and airborne imagery collection systems. MASINT data can be acquired from a variety of satellite, airborne, or ship borne platforms; remotely piloted vehicles; or from mobile or fixed ground-based collection sites.
MASINT (Measurement and Signatures Intelligence)
_____ includes resources such as newspapers, internet, magazines, international conventions, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, seminars, and exhibits (e.g., CNN.com, The New York Times, Aviation Week, and Space & Technology).
OSINT (Open Source Intelligence)
The Threat Level Decision Matrix requires assigning a level of critical (C), high (H), medium (M), or low (L) for each asset’s threat/adversary(s).
For example:
“yes + yes + yes” = critical
“no + no + no” = low
Human Vulnerability Areas
Human vulnerability areas include persons who exhibit the following traits/issues:
• A big ego: Persons with a big ego may mishandle or improperly protect critical assets.
• Anger management problems: Persons with anger management problems may damage or destroy critical assets out of anger.
• Are ignorant of technology: Persons who are ignorant of technology fail to learn how to properly operate computers, secure telephones, etc. This may place sensitive
information at risk.
• Behavioral issues: Behavioral issues apply to disgruntled personnel, persons with personality disorders, etc. These persons may represent either a direct or indirect threat to assets.
• Boredom: Persons suffering from boredom may become careless.
• Greedy: Persons who are greedy may compromise or steal critical assets for personal gain.
• Loose lips: Persons with loose lips may compromise sensitive information.
• Mental illness: Persons with mental illness may represent a threat to critical assets or place critical assets in jeopardy either knowingly or unknowingly.
• Overworked: Persons who are overworked may become careless.
• Practice poor security: Persons practicing poor security fail to comply with security requirements and may place critical assets in jeopardy.
• Seek revenge: Persons who seek revenge may attack critical assets to get even for a perceived wrong.
• Substance abusers: Persons who are substance abusers may pose a threat to critical assets by selling them for cash or being careless while under the influence.
Operational Vulnerability Areas
Operational vulnerability areas include the following:
- Poor tradecraft practices that potentially place critical assets at risk. For example, failure to develop and operate a property control system places critical assets at risk
- Observables are practices, activities, or assets that can be surveilled. The information gained could be utilized to threaten critical assets. An example is an activity that uses roving security guard patrols at exact intervals. An adversary may be able to observe this fact and estimate a timeframe within which to infiltrate a facility.
- Other Operations Security (OPSEC) issues – OPSEC is an analytical process used to deny an adversary information, generally unclassified, concerning an organization’s intentions and capabilities by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning processes or operations. OPSEC does not replace other security disciplines - it supplements them.
- Press exposure of sensitive information represents a potential vulnerability. For example, an activity with poor entry control procedures may be susceptible to loss/theft of property and may have implanted listening devices.
Information Vulnerability Areas
Information vulnerability areas include the following:
- Information unnecessarily disseminated to a wide audience – the wider the dissemination the more difficult it is to protect.
- Failure to practice need-to-know - “Need-to-know” refers to the determination by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform an authorized governmental function.
- Poor program administration includes failure to properly safeguard sensitive information, improperly classifying information and failure to mark classified information.
- Failure to follow Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements - Adversaries routinely request information through FOIA. Failure to properly evaluate information that has been requested for public release may pose a threat to critical assets
Facility Vulnerability Areas
Facility vulnerability areas leave assets in jeopardy. These are some potential issues:
• Location – Areas designated as high crime areas or with a significant potential for natural disasters could be a concern.
• Poor perimeter fencing with holes, gaps, vegetation overgrowth, etc.
• Building design characteristics with floor plans that inhibit access control
measures, ground floor windows along a heavy pedestrian route, etc.
• Tunnels and drains that permit an avenue of approach by an adversary
• Unsecured doors that allow adversary access.
• Parking lots provide adversaries with a venue for observing a facility, perpetrating a crime, detonating mobile explosive devices, etc.
• Vehicle barriers – They must be reinforced and security personnel must be trained to be effective.
• Untrained guard forces may be ineffective in observing, preventing, or responding to an adversary attack. Guard forces must understand their duties and be trained to carry them out.
• Unsecured windows provide adversaries with a potential avenue of approach.
• Insufficient access control allows adversaries a potential means of entry either detected or undetected.
• Gates must be properly operated when in use, locked when not in use, and regularly evaluated to ensure they do not provide adversaries with a potential avenue of approach.
Equipment Vulnerability Areas
Equipment vulnerability areas include the following:
- Signal interceptions that can occur when using devices like cell phones, wireless networked computers, and personal digital assistants (PDAs).
- TEMPEST emanations - TEMPEST is the short name referring to the investigation, study, and control of compromising emanations from telecommunications and information systems equipment. Computer equipment, typewriters, etc. emanate electronic signals that can be collected by an adversary. They can then interpret the signals and obtain the information that was being processed on the electronic equipment.
- Equipment tampering in which equipment is modified to permit collection of information by an adversary. For example, modifications to a reproduction machine might enable image storage of everything copied.
- Remote activation/operation that allows modifications or programming permitting an adversary to remotely activate and/or operate equipment.
Additional sources that can assist with gathering vulnerability information include the following:
- Personnel who work at the “site”
- Existing site surveys
- Engineering drawings and blueprints
- Maps
- Security planning documents
- Surveys and audits
- Incident reports
Regressive analysis is a five-step process:
- Assess the asset’s vulnerabilities in a pure, unprotected state.
- Reevaluate the asset’s vulnerabilities taking into consideration the efficacy of the existing countermeasures.
- Identify the asset’s vulnerability differences between the unprotected and protected assessments.
- Identify the ineffective countermeasures.
- Identify and characterize the specific vulnerabilities that still exist, given the
current countermeasures.
T or F: The overall risk level varies with relation to the values of each item. The larger the risk area shared by assets, threats, and vulnerabilities, the higher the risk level.
True
The three risk factors are incorporated into a formula to determine and assign a more precise risk rating:
Risk = Impact x (Threat x Vulnerability) or (R = I [T x V])
Countermeasure Cost Determination:
The costs of implementing countermeasures must be considered relative to the following:
• Dollars - Consider the purchase price and the life-cycle maintenance costs (e.g.
installation, preventive maintenance, repair/warranty, replacement, and training).
• Inconvenience - Consider whether the inconvenience caused is offset by the
measure of risk reduction gained. If a countermeasure is inconvenient, people will
find a way to circumvent it.
• Time - Include the time to implement and oversee the countermeasure and the time
to prepare for its implementation, as well as any time required for follow-up and
evaluation.
• Personnel - Consider the number of personnel needed to manage the
countermeasure as well as the skills, knowledge, and abilities of the personnel
involved. Also consider personnel training needs and costs.
• Other - Consider the adverse publicity, political repercussions, reduced operational
efficiency, and unfavorable working conditions resulting from countermeasure implementation.
Information Security Program, Volume 3, Enclosure 5: Security Education and Training
- Initial Orientation
- Special Requirements
- Continuing Security Education/Refresher Training
- Termination Briefings
- Program Oversight
Personnel Security Program, Section 9.2: Security Education
- Initial Briefings
- Refresher Briefing
- Foreign Travel Briefing
- Termination Briefing
NISPOM, Chapter 3: Security Training and Briefings
- FSO Training
- Initial Security Briefings
- Refresher Training
- Debriefings
DD Form 441
Contractual agreement establishing industry’s security responsibility
NISPOM
The manual that includes the security education requirements for industry
SF-312
The form all personnel must sign to access classified information
DOD 5200.2-R
Regulation mandating training prior to access to classified information
E.O. 12968
The overarching policy that mandates security education
DoDM 5200.01
Regulation mandating security education for DoD employees
______ is the uninterrupted assessment of an individual for retention of a security clearance and involves reinvestigation at given intervals. To maintain eligibility, employees must recognize and avoid behaviors that might jeopardize their security clearance. Employees, coworkers, supervisors, and managers all play an important role in the continuous evaluation program and all must receive training on their responsibilities.
Continuous evaluation
Initial Briefing
- Varies by role and whether DoD or industry - Includes basic security roles and responsibilities
- Includes overview of classification system
- Discusses penalties for unauthorized disclosure
Continuing Education
- Required for all cleared DoD personnel
- Supplement formal briefings
- Informational and promotional efforts
- Job performance aids
Refresher Training
- Performed at least annually
- Reinforce contents of initial briefing, including:
o Policies, principles, and procedures
o Penalties for engaging in espionage - Address new threats and techniques and changes in security regulations
- Address issues or concerns identified during self-inspections
Termination Briefing
- Debrief employees when:
o Employee terminates employment or is discharged
o Employee’s access is terminated, suspended, or revoked - Include:
o Continued responsibility to protect classified information
o Requirement to report unauthorized attempts to gain access
o Prohibition against retaining materials
o Civil and criminal penalties for violations
T or F: A new SF-312 must be executed and recorded in JPAS each time an individual needs access to classified information.
False
If the individual already has an SF-312 recorded in JPAS, then it does not need to be executed again.
T or F: Job-specific security procedures are usually included as part of an initial security briefing.
True
T or F: Information on current security threats must be included as part of security training.
True
T or F: Termination briefings should communicate the continued requirement for individuals to protect classified information, even after resigning or being discharged.
True
T or F: Refresher training is required only for individuals who have violated security procedures.
False
Refresher training is required for ALL cleared personnel.
Declassification authorities other than original classifiers must receive training addressing the standards, methods, and procedures for declassifying information as mandated by what executive orders and policies?
Executive Order 13526 and the DoDM 5200.01.
T or F: Declassification authorities are always U.S. Government employees or military members who have specifically been given this responsibility.
True
Derivative classifiers, security managers and specialists, classification management officers, and others with responsibilities relating to the oversight of classified information, must receive training and education on the following topics:
the processes for classifying information originally and derivatively, and the standards applicable to each, the avoidance of over classification, proper and complete classification markings, and the authorities, methods and process for downgrading and declassifying information.
A designated, cleared employee, whose principal duty is to transmit classified material to its destination. The classified material remains in the personal possession of the courier except for authorized overnight storage.
Courier
A designated, cleared employee, who occasionally hand carries classified material to its destination in connection with a classified visit or meeting. The classified material remains in the personal possession of the handcarrier except for authorized overnight storage.
Handcarrier
A designated, cleared person, who accompanies a shipment of classified material to its destination. The classified material does not remain in the personal possession of the escort but the conveyance in which the material is transported remains under the constant observation and control of the escort.
Escort
_____ is TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA or SECRET RESTRICTED DATA that reveals the theory of operation or design of the components of a thermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb, warhead, demolition, munitions, or test device.
Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information, CNWDI
In addition to TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL, many foreign governments have a fourth classification level, known as ____________, for which there is no U.S. equivalent.
RESTRICTED
_____ is classified information derived from intelligence sources and requiring special handling.
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
_____ are additional security measures which may be used to ensure strict need-to-know protection when standard security measures are insufficient.
Alternative Compensatory Control Measures (ACCM)
_____ is a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities.
Operations Security (OPSEC)
_____ are provided to personnel who will be traveling, either officially or unofficially, to foreign countries, professional meetings or conferences where foreign attendance is likely, and any other locations where there are concerns about possible foreign intelligence exploitation. This briefing is usually required for all personnel with SCI or SAP access.
Foreign Travel Briefing
These individuals must be receiving training on international security and foreign disclosure guidelines by taking either the International Security Requirements course offered by USD(P)
Internation Programs
Facility Security Officers / Roles and Responsibilities
• As deemed appropriate by CSA
• Based on facility’s involvement
• FSO Orientation for non-possessing facilities or FSO Program
Management course for possessing facilities
• Received within 1 year of appointment
ISSM / Roles and Responsibilities
- Training to level commensurate with IS complexity
- Responsibility for providing IS security education for relevant personnel,
prior to processing classified information on AIS