F3 Factors that influence political stability after the early period Flashcards

1
Q

What are the factors which influence political stability after the early period (5)

A
  1. Leaders
  2. Constitutional Processes + Elections
  3. Dealing with opposition
  4. Role of military
  5. Role of Cold War
    * Political culture/context
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2
Q

How did leaders influence political stability?

A

Leaders’ political strategies

1a. Masters of political manoeuvres to shore up power base under maximum rule. Manipulation of formal structures to consolidate power.
1b. Leaders’ ties to military. Ensured complete control over bureaucracy.

Leaders’ political styles

2a. Personal style of relying on a core group of people led to systems of patronage (I, M). Cultivated informal circles of influence and deep patronage networks. Assured of political support through mutual benefit.
2b. Astute reading of political dynamics. Skillful leaders able to manoeuver different political groups and resources adeptly. Positive responses stabilised politics.

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3
Q

Examples of political strategies – political manouvres to shore up power base under maximum rule? etc

A

P: Marcos — master of constitutional manoeuvres during martial law, granting himself unlimited powers for an indefinite period of time
I: Suharto — forced amalgamation of opposition groups in 1973 to erode their support base

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4
Q

Examples of leaders’ ties to military, ensuring complete control over the bureaucracy?

A

I: Suharto and choice of ABRI General; personnel rotation. Rewarded loyal military officers with lucrative monopolies, forestry connections and access to oil. Inbu Sutowo, a close military associate, headed the state oil company Pertamina in 1968. 1983, appointed Benny Murdani as ABRI commander. When Murdani led ABRI disagreements against Suharto, was replaced in 1988.
P: Marcos and Fabian Ver. Fabian Ver, close supporter, was promoted from Captain in 1965 to Brigadier general in 1970, and tasked with leading the National Intelligence Security Agency.

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5
Q

Examples of leaders’ personal styles - relying on a core group of people?

A

M: Mahathir — concentration of wealth among his economic allies formed his elite support base: e.g. finance minister Daim Zainuddin and associates were given shares in firms such as berjaya in return for government approval to list them
I: Cukongs such as Liem Sioe Liong provided capital and connections

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6
Q

Examples of astute reading of political dynamics? Skillful leaders who were able to manoeuver different political groups and resources adeptly?

A

T: Prem - strategized among different groups (Young Turks, businesses etc) for stability in the 1980s
SG: Goh Chok Tong - responded to different demands in 1990s, improved PAP’s electoral majority

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7
Q

Limits to role of leaders?

A

In semi-democracies, role is checked by constitutional processes (SG and M)

In max regimes, role is limited by its dependence on other groups for influence.

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8
Q

Examples of dependence of max leaders on other groups for influence?

A

I: Military and economic associates and patronage networks: 1998 loss of military support from Generals Susilo Babang and Wiranto — managed to overpower Prabowo (Suharto’s son in law) and pressed for Suharto’s resignation
P: Military and Church. Archbishop Jamie Sin and defection of air force and police, role is EDSA revolution/People Power
T: Role of monarch. 1992 — Thai King intervened to put an end to military repression of the masses, in support of democratisation. Chamlong Srimuang (leader of pro-democracy protests, former Bangkok governor) and General Suchinda (announced he would become PM despite not standing for elections) — both appeared on television, kneeling in front of the King as he called for disengagement between the two. Elections held in 1992.

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9
Q

How did constitutional processes influence political stability?

A

In max regimes:

  1. Constitutions are manipulated by new leaders to bolster their own political power bases — leaders precede norms (negative LT effect)
  2. Elections are farcical, accompanied by strict controls over political opposition, and are sometimes vehicles for party propaganda. Hobbled political opposition and entrenched governments.

In semi-democratic regimes:

  1. Safeguard important political process of participation. Adherence in general, norms precede leaders (positive effect)
  2. Safeguard interests of different groups. Setting the parameters of political discussion and conversation. Regulating historical tensions and potential sources of instability (positive effect)
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10
Q

Examples of constitutions being manipulated by max leaders to bolster their own political power bases?

A

T: Constantly changing constitution, changed as frequently as governments changed, usually a means to protect the interests of those in power, mirrored and perpetuated instability, one of the most stable periods under Sarit, 1959-1963, lacked constitution and elections
P: Marcos granted himself unlimited powers under martial law w 1973 constitution, powers further extended with 1981 constitution - referendums held for constitutional

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11
Q

Examples of farcical elections in max regimes?

A

I: Presidential Elections with Suharto as the only candidate
B: Party endorsement of candidates, 1990 election results were nullified. 1969 law assured government in MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) with 33% appointed, enough to block constitutional amendment, 1972 forced amalgamation of political parties into 2 (PDI and PPP), screened opposition candidates, Suharto fell in 1998

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12
Q

Examples of constitutional processes and elections safeguarding processes on political participation in semi-democracies?

A

SG: Regular elections, few restrictions against formation of political parties, good conduct (despite gerrymandering) - some degree of political expression
M: Regular Elections, Post-1969 May 13 incident, resumption of Parliament in 1971 - restoration indicated the strength of parliamentary rule

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13
Q

Examples of constitutional processes and elections safeguarding different groups and regulating historical tensions?

A

SG: Regulation of interracial sensitivities with 1970 Presidential Council on Minorities, 1988 GRC scheme, 1990 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (forbade religious groups from interfering with politics) → response to 1964 Racial Riots, racial tensions during merger period in general
M: 1971 - restoration of Parliament → movement towards a Malay-based system, constitutional entrenchment of Malay rights, banned discussion on sensitive topics such as the rights of Malays and other communities

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14
Q

What are the limits to role of constitutional processes?

A
  1. Constitutions by themselves are insufficient to ensure stability. Depends on purpose behind constitutions; and leadership behaviours which respect political conventions
  2. Leaders’ respect for constitutional norms directly influences stability
  3. On its own, constancy of constitutions does not promise political stability. The nature and purpose of constitutional norms matter more
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15
Q

Examples of purpose behind constitutions being more important?

A

I/P: Manipulation of constitutions meant for monopolization of political power led to loss of LT legitimacy and political opposition (P: 1972 Marcos imposed martial law, I: 1985 Ormas legislation — govt dissolution of societal organizations without a court order)
SG/M: Semi-democratic constitutions allow for some degree of political participation and internal unity.

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16
Q

Examples of leaders’ respect for constitutional norms directly influencing stability - leaders’ actions more important?

A

SG/M: Respect for democratic conventions (see above)

T: Constant abrogation of constitutions and thus instability

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17
Q

Examples of changing constitutions having stabilising effect?

A

M: Malaysia’s new 1971 constitution — positive
B: Burma’s constancy of maximum institutions

18
Q

How did the military influence political stability?

A
  1. Individual military leaders were close associates of leaders, assuring leaders of military support in return for other benefits
  2. Part of the larger military-bureaucratic structure which controlled important institutions for military leaders
  3. Provided the necessary force for suppression of widespread opposition. Cracked down on civilian uprisings.
  4. Intervention in periods of instability, led opposition or replaced discredited civilian leaders
19
Q

Examples of individual leaders being close associates of military?

A

P: Marcos close association with Fabian Ver
I: Ibnu Sutowo

20
Q

Examples of military-bureaucratic structure?

A

I: ABRI Dwifungsi, Ibnu Sutowo
P: AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) in charge of public utilities, economic development, judicial functions, Marcos groomed supporters (Roberto Benedicto, Cojuangco)

21
Q

Examples of military providing the necessary force for suppression of widespread opposition?

A

I: ABRI Dwifungsi, Ibnu Sutowo
P: AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) in charge of public utilities, economic development, judicial functions, Marcos groomed supporters (Roberto Benedicto, Cojuangco)

22
Q

Examples of military intervening in periods of instability?

A

B,I,T: Ended early period of political instability
I: 1980 Petition of Fifty
P: 1986 RAF movement

23
Q

Other roles of military?

A

Limited role/professionalism of military (historical context) (SG, M, V)
SG, M: Completely professional, defense role
V: Deeply interlinked with party (VCP), historical legitimacy, but first and foremost party members

As direct rulers (B, T, V*)
B: Direct leading role in politics, through Ne Win’s leadership of the Revolutionary Council and Lansin Party/BSPP (long-term positive)
T: Inter-service rivalry, political vacillation (negative)
V: Unique relationship b/w VCP and military

24
Q

Limits to role of military?

A
  1. Subject to civilian leaders’ other institutions’ control after all
  2. Can be a source of political instability by the 1980s. Military is not a monolith — divisions, not necessarily controllable
  3. Reduced role in 1990s as most militaries professionalised
25
Q

Examples of militaries being subject to civilian leaders’ control after all?

A

I: Suharto removing Benny Murdani from role as head of ABRI
P: Marcos and Fabian Ver. Marcos replaced Ver with Fidel Ramos in 86 due to his ties to the Aquino assassination (But tacitly kept him in power). Ver advised Marcos to give him orders to fire on crowds during protest in 1986, Marcos dismissed him with a salute.
T: Thai King in 1973 and 1992

26
Q

Examples of militaries being a source of political instability by the 1980s?

A

I: AFC 1998, protected students
P: Reform the Armed Forces (RAF) movement, During 1986 elections - defection of Police and Air Force

27
Q

Examples of reduced role in 1990s as most militaries professionalised?

A

I and P

28
Q

How did the Cold War influence political stability?

A
  1. Impact on decolonisation process and subsequent internal politics
  2. International/US support for maximum regimes in Indonesia and the Philippines
  3. Vietnam War — leading to internal legitimacy of the VCP
29
Q

Examples of Cold War on decol process?

A

SG/M: Involvement of the West and subsequent stability
M: British reduced political threats posed by the Malayan Communist Party by countering them through the Emergency from 1948 to 1960 - Malaysia did not have to contend with a strong communist presence or threat of insurgency, political parties had a degree of ideological consistency (moderate, anti-communist)
I/B: Abrupt colonial withdrawal. Subsequent political fractiousness and instability

30
Q

Examples of international/US support for max regimes?

A

I/P: US-supported economic growth enabled expansion of state institutions and networks for political control, US tolerance for coercive means
Vs Eventual withdrawal of US support as CW lost its impetus (negative effect): I,P
P: Withdrawal of US support from Marcos in late 1980s contributed to the People’s Power protests and Marcos’ fall
I: Anti-communist roots, favoured capitalist-style development. However, Clinton administration was less forgiving towards Indonesia’s human rights record, 1993 - US vetoed an arms sale to Indonesia

31
Q

Vietnam war?

A

Ideological confrontation with anti-communist neighbours and US denial of reparations and aid strengthened stability - internal conflict was subordinated to the immediate objective of survival.

32
Q

Limits to impact of CW to pol stab?

A

Similar context but affected different countries differently
SG/M vs I/P

How leaders made use of western support to shore up their political base and economic performance was more important

Domestic legitimacy vs over-dependence on external support
SG/M/T vs I/P

33
Q

How did responses to opposition influence political stability?

A

Max vs Semi-demo: Max — relied on both coercive suppression and non-coercive legislative measures
vs
Semi-demo — context of genuine political participation averted widespread popular demonstrations. Hence, coercive measures far more limited in both scale and frequency

34
Q

Examples of coercive dealing with political opposition?

A

Negative immediate effect: P, M
P: Marcos economic means - seizing of assets, detaining political opponents, assassination of Aquino - trigger event which led to his downfall
M: Mahathir vs Anwar - imprisonment of Anwar → loss in Malay support for BN

Positive/limited effect: SG, M
SG: Legal means - suing for defamation (Chee Soon Juan), inflaming racial tensions (Tang Liang Hoon), ISA (not invoked as often as time progressed)
M: Operation Lalang - 106 detained without trial under ISA for ‘Marxist tendencies’
Differences?
Degree of influence of political opposition?
Buildup of tensions?

35
Q

Examples of non-coercive dealing with political opposition?

A

Positive effect - Semi-demo
SG: Tommy Koh, David Marshall (Individuals)
M: Formation of Barisan Nasional - coalition of political elites 1974 (Groups)

Positive effect - Max
I: Military-bureaucratic apparatus (indiv/groups), ABRI dwifungsi (dual function), Suharto rewarding his supporters in the military e.g. Ibnu Suotowo
P: Military-bureaucratic apparatus → AFP in charge of judicial functions, economic development, economic development, public utilities (groups), groomed supporters with monopolies (e.g. Roberto Benedicto - sugar, Cojuangco - San Miguel Corp) (Individuals)
T: Sarit expanded political role of King → bolstered his legitimacy

Negative effect (long/mid-term)
M: Mahathir co-optation of religious/Islamic groups & Anwar - led to conflict which led to loss in Malay support for BN/UMNO
T: Co-optation of business groups - military supported formation of business conglomerates, patron-client networks → exacerbated divide in military, business groups built up organisational capacity to oppose military rule, businessmen won 46% of seats

36
Q

Examples of coercive dealing with popular opposition?

A
Mass crackdowns (Repeated and prolonged → long-term buildup of tensions, showed government inability to control/appease)
I: 1974 Malari Riots, 1984 tanjung Priok demonstrations, crackdown on PKI, Medan 1994, 1998 AFC (trigger for downfall)
B: 1962 Uni of Rangoon demonstration → military suppression, students shot, 1974 Demonstration over low wages by students and workers, 1988 8888 protests
37
Q

Non-coercive dealing with popular opposition? (suppressing, pre-empting)

A

SG, V: Adaptation to changing aspirations
V, B, M: Ideological programmes
V, B, M, SG: Social Controls
I, M, SG: Legislations

38
Q

Examples of adaptation to changing aspirations?

A

SG: GCT → more consultative style of politics, “heartware” - 1997 Singapore 21 Committee: 6000 Singaporeans consulted, tapping on private sector expertise through government review committees (e.g. Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness of 1997, Financial Sector review committee 1998) – PAP regained its favour among the electorate after a consistent decline in the 80s: ‘91 - 61%, ‘01 - 75.3%
V: Doi Moi, economic liberalisation

39
Q

Examples of ideological programmes?

A

V: Communism, re-education programmes (⅓ - ½ of the population of South Vietnam)
B: Burmese Way to Socialism (from 1962), Control of Buddhist Sangha by 1980 (behavioural code for monks), ideological control over all levels of society
M: Rukunegara

40
Q

Examples of social controls?

A

V, B: Mass organizations, mass mobilisation (policing of ideological programmes)
M: Press muzzled (at one point owned by UMNO), 1975 Amendment to Universities and Colleges Act, Amendment to Societies Act
SG: Grassroots organizations - means of supporting the party and identifying new talent, also a conduit for removal of govt services should constituencies go opposition (GCT - “slums”) - circumscribed political space of opposition

41
Q

Examples of legislations?

A

M: Press muzzled (at one point owned by UMNO), 1975 Amendment to Universities and Colleges Act, Amendment to Societies Act
SG: NTUC → tripartite framework (workers, employees, govt), keep labour movement quiescent
I: 1977 NKK/BKK policies, 1985 Ormas (govt dissolution of societal organizations without a court order)

42
Q

Limits to govt dealing with opposition?

A

Effectiveness in responding to opposition depended obviously on the nature of opposition.
Singapore & Malaysia: limited internal opposition
In contrast to internal fractiousness in Indonesia and Philippines

Failure to respond to challenges in 1980s demonstrated the limits of coercive measures over time. Balance between political participation and control led to best outcomes.
Indonesia, Philippines vs. Singapore, Malaysia

Early success in max regimes was also premised on US permissiveness during the CW.