Everything

Question 1

Four steps of negotiation

Answer 1

1. Preparation
2. Information exchange
   3 agreement proposals
3. Resolution

Question 2

Negotiation: Preparation 2 Types

Answer 2

internal preparation: examine your own preferences

external preparation: opponent’s preferences

Question 3

negotiation: Synthesize

Answer 3

prior to the onset of bargaining the negotiator thinks about how he might guide the negotiations toward a final resolution that satisfies both parties

Question 4

Sharpens the Saw (or dulls it)

Answer 4

Sharpens
   physical- exercise
   social/emotional- service, empathy 
   spiritual- value clarification 
   mental- reading, visualizing 

Dulls
alcoholic, drugs, burnout, laziness

Question 5

Habits of Ethical Lawyers

Answer 5

The intersection of:
knowledge- what to, why to
skill- how to
desire- want to

Question 6

Must I communicate strategy or tactics?

Answer 6

Ask questions- yes

no questions- no

Question 7

Must I communicate an offer?

Answer 7

Written/Oral- yes

Question 8

Buyer Beware

Answer 8

In general, there is no duty to disclose even material information that you know an opposing negotiator would find important to the underlying transaction

“Buyer Beware” does not apply to a fiduciary relationship

Question 9

The Disclosure Continuum

Answer 9

Full, Open Truthful disclosure of all information

Non-disclosure of material information

Non-disclosure when the other side has erroneous information

Misleading statements about material facts

Intentional false statements about material facts or law

Question 10

Aspirations

Answer 10

goals; expectations

high aspirations= more desirable outcomes

Question 11

Calculating RP: 7 factors

Answer 11

Alternatives
Preferences 
Probabilities of future events
Risk Preference 
Transaction Costs
Value of Time
Effect on Future Opportunities

Question 12

RP: Two Components

Answer 12

The Market Value of the BATNA

The difference to you between the value of the BATNA and the value of the subject of the negotiation

Question 13

Costs of Lawyer-Agents

Answer 13

Different preferences
Different interests
Different Personalities
Expense

Question 14

Benefits of Lawyer-Agents

Answer 14

1. Technical Expertise
2. Negotiating Expertise
3. Signaling- might signal negotiating power
4. Dispassionate Analysis- detachment; more objective
5. Justification Generation- might help articulate rationales to support the choice that is ultimately made
6. Access- lawyers will have access the principle won’t
7. Strategic Advantage- lawyers future reputation is important so they will make sure it is not damaged
8. Cost Effective- might be cheaper in long run than it would be to leave task to other individuals

Question 15

Caucus

Answer 15

Confidential, private meeting held by mediator with individual parties

Question 16

Mediator Orientation: Facilitative-Broad

Answer 16

Help participants define the subject matter if the mediation in terms of underlying interests and to help them develop their own solutions

Does not use his own assessments, predictions, or proposals

Question 17

Mediator Orientation: Evaluative-Broad

Answer 17

Learn about the circumstances and underlying interests of the parties

Likely to use his own assessments, predictions, or proposals

Question 18

Mediator Orientation: Facilitative-Narrow

Answer 18

educate parties about the strengths and weaknesses of their claims and the likely consequences of failing to settle

does not use his/her own assessments, predictions, or proposals

Question 19

Mediator Orientation: Evaluative-Narrow

Answer 19

helps parties understand the strengths and weaknesses of their positions and the likely outcome of litigation

likely to use his own assessments, predictions, or proposals

Question 20

The Potential Benefits of Mediation

Answer 20

1. Facilitate introspection and analysis
2. facilitate communication
3. evaluate issues relevant to the parties’ RPs
4. filter private info
5. create focal points
6. reduce reactive devaluation
7. deter extreme distributive tactics

Question 21

A Mediator can help the parties:

Answer 21

focus on their BATNAs, rather than aspirations

establish a rational RP

*understand the cost of no agreement

to identify and understand both parties’ interests

Question 22

High Content Cultures v. Low Content Cultures

Answer 22

High content: little information is in the message itself
meaning is inferred rather than directly stated

Low Content: information contained in explicit messages
meaning is conveyed without nuance and is context free

Question 23

Egalitarianism v. Hierarchy

Answer 23

Egalitarianism: social boundaries are permeable
superior social status is short lived

Hierarchical: social status implied power
conflict poses a threat to social structure

Question 24

Individualism v. Collectivism

Answer 24

individualism: norms and institutions promote autonomy of the individual
collectivism: norms and institutions promote interdependence of individuals through emphasis on social obligations

Question 25

How does anger affect negotiations?

Answer 25

1. Moral outrage and desire to retaliate 2. inhibit ability to empathize and work together 3. damage the relationship and ability to work together in the future negotiators with positive mood tend to achieve better results

Question 26

Negotiator's Dilemma

Answer 26

when to conceal and when to reveal (trust) whether to compete or cooperate

Question 27

What to do if faced with a fairness based argument?

Answer 27

agree that fair is desirable but suggest alternate fairness norms challenge opponent to justify why his terms are more fair refuse to agree on basis of fairness; use power tactics suggest allowing a 3rd party to determine what is fair

Question 28

Boulwarism

Answer 28

concept of a first, firm, fair, final offer take it or leave it bargaining

Question 29

Reciprocity

Answer 29

when one person gives something of value to another, we usually expect that the recipient will reciprocate in some way aka "The Negotiation Dance"

Question 30

Conventions

Answer 30

an agreement on conventional terms, that is, the same terms that been agreed upon in similar negotiating situations, is considered fair to both parties ex: objective criteria essentially reference points to govern the transaction

Question 31

Meta Norms of Distributive Justice

Answer 31

Implicitly under lie decisions about how to divide resources 3 most prevalent norms are: equality- equal distribution of benefits equity- distribution based on merits need- distribution according to need generousity

Question 32

Commitments

Answer 32

truncates the BZ in a way that helps you advantage- does not depend upon convincing opponent that you have a high RP weakness- it is difficult to make a commitment that is credible 3 ways to solve credibility dilemma: physically impossible to accept less create a cost to accepting less than your demand appear irrational

Question 33

Power

Answer 33

the ability to force the opponent to give you something you want, even when he would prefer not to do so leverage stems directly from caring about reaching an agreement less than the opponent

Question 34

Distributive Bargaining

Answer 34

Negotiations over a fixed set of resources, in which any agreement is zero-sum in nature no longer trying to expand the BZ two basic methods for dividing up cooperative surplus power social norms

Question 35

Sources of Power

Answer 35

``` personal power organizational power informational power expertise moral ```

Question 36

Positive & Negative Leverage

Answer 36

``` Positive= need based negative= threat based ```

Question 37

Moral Hazard

Answer 37

created by imperfect incentives for behavior after agreement is reached if service provider received pre-payment at a fixed price. She would have incentive to provide low quality services generally a problem when the seller provides an item that is created after agreement is reached

Question 38

Adverse Selection

Answer 38

created by asymmetrical information

Question 39

Logrolling

Answer 39

trading votes to obtain things of interest quid pro quo

Question 40

Integrative Bargaining

Answer 40

create value for negotiators; make both parties better of it can only be done if both parties work together by sharing information about their true interests done by adding or subtracting attributes from the package expanding the bargaining zone

Question 41

Framing Effect

Answer 41

viewed as gains- risk adverse viewed as losses- risk seeking

Question 42

Prospect Theory

Answer 42

rational negotiators will be risk adverse when deciding between risky and certain gains endowment effect- people put higher value on items they own than those they don't status quo bias- people tend to prefer to keep things the same faced with loss- risk taking faced with gain- risk adverse

Question 43

Attribution Bias

Answer 43

cognitive bias that affects the way we determine who or what was responsible for an action or event if we are angry with someone, we want to retaliate and punish them with worse offers or lower offers

Question 44

Reactive Devaluation

Answer 44

a negotiated agreement may be of less value to a negotiator then it otherwise would be merely because his opponent proposed it

Question 45

Anchor

Answer 45

initial offer point in the negotiation can be used to frame the negotiation sets expectations not just numbers- can be ideas, concepts, and impressions

Question 46

Self-serving Bias

Answer 46

perceiving facts about the world in a way that is biased in your favor when presented with conflicting pieces of evidence, people will usually conclude that the evidence on the whole supports their pre-existing view of the world

Question 47

Rational Choice Theory

Answer 47

Assumes that when a negotiator, in valuing his BATNA or determining his RP, has to estimate the expected value of an outcome with probabilistic results, he will make an unbiased estimation of the possible outcomes, and they estimate an accurate estimated value

Question 48

Calculating Reservation Prices

Answer 48

1. Consider alternatives 2. Develop your BATNA 3. Translate BATNA into reservation price

Question 49

Cooperative Surplus

Answer 49

Amount of Value that is created by the parties reaching an agreement wide BZ= large cooperative surplus narrow BZ= small cooperative surplus

Question 50

Bargaining Zone

Answer 50

distance between the buyer's and seller's RPs complete description of possible deals that will make at least one negotiator better off than not reaching an agreement and make neither worse off

Question 51

BATNA

Answer 51

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement **these are actions one might take not dollar figures

Question 52

Reservation Price

Answer 52

Buyer- most someone will give up for subject of the negotiation seller- least someone will accept for the subject of the negotiation

Question 53

Conceptual Modes of Negotiation: Two Types

Answer 53

Adversarial- think in terms of winning and losing; zero-sum problem solving- agreement can make both parties better; benefits do not equal loss for the other party

Question 54

Negotiation: Resolution

Answer 54

either an agreement or an impasse (not necessarily bad)

Question 55

Negotiation: Agreement Proposals

Answer 55

the process of proposing offer and counter-offers

Question 56

Options v. Alternatives

Answer 56

options- what you can do in the BZ alternatives- what you can do outside the BZ

Question 57

cooperative bargaining (integrative bargaining)

Answer 57

growing the BZ trading things that we value differently

Question 58

Positions v. Interests

Answer 58

positions- what they want interests- why they want it

Question 59

scarcity principle

Answer 59

you want something more the more you know its going away

Question 60

Multilateral Negotiations

Answer 60

multiple parties involved in the negotiation holdout- not participating coalition- a group working together in the negotiation

Question 61

Game Theory

Answer 61

there is an optimal strategy- can be cooperative or personal if there is no dominant cooperative strategy then we look to see if the other side has a dominant strategy