Everything Flashcards

1
Q

Four steps of negotiation

A
  1. Preparation
  2. Information exchange
    3 agreement proposals
  3. Resolution
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2
Q

Negotiation: Preparation 2 Types

A

internal preparation: examine your own preferences

external preparation: opponent’s preferences

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3
Q

negotiation: Synthesize

A

prior to the onset of bargaining the negotiator thinks about how he might guide the negotiations toward a final resolution that satisfies both parties

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4
Q

Sharpens the Saw (or dulls it)

A
Sharpens
   physical- exercise
   social/emotional- service, empathy 
   spiritual- value clarification 
   mental- reading, visualizing 

Dulls
alcoholic, drugs, burnout, laziness

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5
Q

Habits of Ethical Lawyers

A

The intersection of:
knowledge- what to, why to
skill- how to
desire- want to

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6
Q

Must I communicate strategy or tactics?

A

Ask questions- yes

no questions- no

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7
Q

Must I communicate an offer?

A

Written/Oral- yes

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8
Q

Buyer Beware

A

In general, there is no duty to disclose even material information that you know an opposing negotiator would find important to the underlying transaction

“Buyer Beware” does not apply to a fiduciary relationship

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9
Q

The Disclosure Continuum

A

Full, Open Truthful disclosure of all information

Non-disclosure of material information

Non-disclosure when the other side has erroneous information

Misleading statements about material facts

Intentional false statements about material facts or law

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10
Q

Aspirations

A

goals; expectations

high aspirations= more desirable outcomes

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11
Q

Calculating RP: 7 factors

A
Alternatives
Preferences 
Probabilities of future events
Risk Preference 
Transaction Costs
Value of Time
Effect on Future Opportunities
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12
Q

RP: Two Components

A

The Market Value of the BATNA

The difference to you between the value of the BATNA and the value of the subject of the negotiation

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13
Q

Costs of Lawyer-Agents

A

Different preferences
Different interests
Different Personalities
Expense

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14
Q

Benefits of Lawyer-Agents

A
  1. Technical Expertise
  2. Negotiating Expertise
  3. Signaling- might signal negotiating power
  4. Dispassionate Analysis- detachment; more objective
  5. Justification Generation- might help articulate rationales to support the choice that is ultimately made
  6. Access- lawyers will have access the principle won’t
  7. Strategic Advantage- lawyers future reputation is important so they will make sure it is not damaged
  8. Cost Effective- might be cheaper in long run than it would be to leave task to other individuals
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15
Q

Caucus

A

Confidential, private meeting held by mediator with individual parties

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16
Q

Mediator Orientation: Facilitative-Broad

A

Help participants define the subject matter if the mediation in terms of underlying interests and to help them develop their own solutions

Does not use his own assessments, predictions, or proposals

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17
Q

Mediator Orientation: Evaluative-Broad

A

Learn about the circumstances and underlying interests of the parties

Likely to use his own assessments, predictions, or proposals

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18
Q

Mediator Orientation: Facilitative-Narrow

A

educate parties about the strengths and weaknesses of their claims and the likely consequences of failing to settle

does not use his/her own assessments, predictions, or proposals

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19
Q

Mediator Orientation: Evaluative-Narrow

A

helps parties understand the strengths and weaknesses of their positions and the likely outcome of litigation

likely to use his own assessments, predictions, or proposals

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20
Q

The Potential Benefits of Mediation

A
  1. Facilitate introspection and analysis
  2. facilitate communication
  3. evaluate issues relevant to the parties’ RPs
  4. filter private info
  5. create focal points
  6. reduce reactive devaluation
  7. deter extreme distributive tactics
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21
Q

A Mediator can help the parties:

A

focus on their BATNAs, rather than aspirations

establish a rational RP

*understand the cost of no agreement

to identify and understand both parties’ interests

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22
Q

High Content Cultures v. Low Content Cultures

A

High content: little information is in the message itself
meaning is inferred rather than directly stated

Low Content: information contained in explicit messages
meaning is conveyed without nuance and is context free

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23
Q

Egalitarianism v. Hierarchy

A

Egalitarianism: social boundaries are permeable
superior social status is short lived

Hierarchical: social status implied power
conflict poses a threat to social structure

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24
Q

Individualism v. Collectivism

A

individualism: norms and institutions promote autonomy of the individual
collectivism: norms and institutions promote interdependence of individuals through emphasis on social obligations

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25
Q

How does anger affect negotiations?

A
  1. Moral outrage and desire to retaliate
  2. inhibit ability to empathize and work together
  3. damage the relationship and ability to work together in the future

negotiators with positive mood tend to achieve better results

26
Q

Negotiator’s Dilemma

A

when to conceal and when to reveal (trust)

whether to compete or cooperate

27
Q

What to do if faced with a fairness based argument?

A

agree that fair is desirable but suggest alternate fairness norms

challenge opponent to justify why his terms are more fair

refuse to agree on basis of fairness; use power tactics

suggest allowing a 3rd party to determine what is fair

28
Q

Boulwarism

A

concept of a first, firm, fair, final offer

take it or leave it bargaining

29
Q

Reciprocity

A

when one person gives something of value to another, we usually expect that the recipient will reciprocate in some way

aka “The Negotiation Dance”

30
Q

Conventions

A

an agreement on conventional terms, that is, the same terms that been agreed upon in similar negotiating situations, is considered fair to both parties
ex: objective criteria

essentially reference points to govern the transaction

31
Q

Meta Norms of Distributive Justice

A

Implicitly under lie decisions about how to divide resources

3 most prevalent norms are:
equality- equal distribution of benefits
equity- distribution based on merits
need- distribution according to need

generousity

32
Q

Commitments

A

truncates the BZ in a way that helps you

advantage- does not depend upon convincing opponent that you have a high RP

weakness- it is difficult to make a commitment that is credible
3 ways to solve credibility dilemma:
physically impossible to accept less
create a cost to accepting less than your demand
appear irrational

33
Q

Power

A

the ability to force the opponent to give you something you want, even when he would prefer not to do so

leverage

stems directly from caring about reaching an agreement less than the opponent

34
Q

Distributive Bargaining

A

Negotiations over a fixed set of resources, in which any agreement is zero-sum in nature

no longer trying to expand the BZ

two basic methods for dividing up cooperative surplus
power
social norms

35
Q

Sources of Power

A
personal power
organizational power
informational power
expertise 
moral
36
Q

Positive & Negative Leverage

A
Positive= need based
negative= threat based
37
Q

Moral Hazard

A

created by imperfect incentives for behavior after agreement is reached

if service provider received pre-payment at a fixed price. She would have incentive to provide low quality services

generally a problem when the seller provides an item that is created after agreement is reached

38
Q

Adverse Selection

A

created by asymmetrical information

39
Q

Logrolling

A

trading votes to obtain things of interest

quid pro quo

40
Q

Integrative Bargaining

A

create value for negotiators; make both parties better of

it can only be done if both parties work together by sharing information about their true interests

done by adding or subtracting attributes from the package

expanding the bargaining zone

41
Q

Framing Effect

A

viewed as gains- risk adverse

viewed as losses- risk seeking

42
Q

Prospect Theory

A

rational negotiators will be risk adverse when deciding between risky and certain gains

endowment effect- people put higher value on items they own than those they don’t

status quo bias- people tend to prefer to keep things the same

faced with loss- risk taking
faced with gain- risk adverse

43
Q

Attribution Bias

A

cognitive bias that affects the way we determine who or what was responsible for an action or event

if we are angry with someone, we want to retaliate and punish them with worse offers or lower offers

44
Q

Reactive Devaluation

A

a negotiated agreement may be of less value to a negotiator then it otherwise would be merely because his opponent proposed it

45
Q

Anchor

A

initial offer point in the negotiation

can be used to frame the negotiation

sets expectations

not just numbers- can be ideas, concepts, and impressions

46
Q

Self-serving Bias

A

perceiving facts about the world in a way that is biased in your favor

when presented with conflicting pieces of evidence, people will usually conclude that the evidence on the whole supports their pre-existing view of the world

47
Q

Rational Choice Theory

A

Assumes that when a negotiator, in valuing his BATNA or determining his RP, has to estimate the expected value of an outcome with probabilistic results, he will make an unbiased estimation of the possible outcomes, and they estimate an accurate estimated value

48
Q

Calculating Reservation Prices

A
  1. Consider alternatives
  2. Develop your BATNA
  3. Translate BATNA into reservation price
49
Q

Cooperative Surplus

A

Amount of Value that is created by the parties reaching an agreement

wide BZ= large cooperative surplus

narrow BZ= small cooperative surplus

50
Q

Bargaining Zone

A

distance between the buyer’s and seller’s RPs

complete description of possible deals that will make at least one negotiator better off than not reaching an agreement and make neither worse off

51
Q

BATNA

A

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement

**these are actions one might take not dollar figures

52
Q

Reservation Price

A

Buyer- most someone will give up for subject of the negotiation

seller- least someone will accept for the subject of the negotiation

53
Q

Conceptual Modes of Negotiation: Two Types

A

Adversarial- think in terms of winning and losing; zero-sum

problem solving- agreement can make both parties better; benefits do not equal loss for the other party

54
Q

Negotiation: Resolution

A

either an agreement or an impasse (not necessarily bad)

55
Q

Negotiation: Agreement Proposals

A

the process of proposing offer and counter-offers

56
Q

Options v. Alternatives

A

options- what you can do in the BZ

alternatives- what you can do outside the BZ

57
Q

cooperative bargaining (integrative bargaining)

A

growing the BZ

trading things that we value differently

58
Q

Positions v. Interests

A

positions- what they want

interests- why they want it

59
Q

scarcity principle

A

you want something more the more you know its going away

60
Q

Multilateral Negotiations

A

multiple parties involved in the negotiation

holdout- not participating
coalition- a group working together in the negotiation

61
Q

Game Theory

A

there is an optimal strategy- can be cooperative or personal

if there is no dominant cooperative strategy then we look to see if the other side has a dominant strategy