Evaluating ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina War Flashcards
Overall Verdict
ASEAN was effective in mobilising international support to pressure Vietnam and present an image of regional solidarity, but the organisation was ultimately unsuccessful in providing a tangible solution to the crisis.
ASEAN did not resolve the Cambodian conflict, and a comprehensive settlement was only attained with Great Power involvement of the UNSC P5 members and UNTAC’s mandate.
That said, ASEAN’s role was nonetheless important in initiating the search for a comprehensive political settlement, and mobilising international attention/support.
Further, success of foreign intervention was built on the foundations of earlier ASEAN diplomacy, specifically its contributions in bringing together the conflicting Cambodian factions under a single platform for negotiations to actualise
How was ASEAN successful in maintaining an outward appearance of regional solidarity through upholding ASEAN principles of non-interference and non-aggression?
12 Jan 1979: (ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting)
Called for UNSC to take immediate steps to end conflict; joint statements in condemning invasion + affirming Cambodia’s right to self-determination free from foreign interference
Feb 1984: Indonesia establishes bilateral channel with Vietnam; ASEAN designated Indonesia as its ‘interlocutor with Vietnam’ → invoke image of solidarity
1985: ASEAN Ministers joint statement calling for total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces
Jan 1989: THL invites Hun Sen (PRK) to Bangkok → ASEAN recognised PRK as administratively in charge of Cambodia in negotiations to maintain facade of solidarity
How was ASEAN effective in mobilising of international support through proactive diplomatic efforts actively undertaken by ASEAN?
Lobbying for International Diplomatic opposition to Vietnam
Nov 1979: Passing of ASEAN Resolution 34/22 (UNGA 91-2)
1979: Senior ASEAN statesman LKY urged ASEAN’s Asia Pacific counterparts to levy economic sanctions against VNM
Jul 1981: UN International Conference on Kampuchea
(UNICK) - international legitimacy of ASEAN’s proposed solution to hold a free election in Cambodia - self determination
More Effective from late 80s:
1985: Vietnam’s Doi Moi Reforms + Gorbachev’s New Thinking (focus on economy + normalisation of relations and reduced commitment to the Third World
Explain what the Internal divergences in perceptions of threat and security interests among member states were?
lack of consensus and solidarity
Hardliners:
Thailand: frontline state sharing a common border with Cambodia → directly threatened by Vietnamese expansionism and refugee problem
PHP, SG, Brunei saw invasion as a violation of international norms and regionally, a violation of the ZOPFAN principle.
SG and Brunei: survival premised upon international respect for sovereignty → concerned with upholding principles of non-aggression and non-intervention which VNM violated
Softliners:
Malaysia: Architect of ZOPFAN, dominant concern for USSR and China to have minimal role in region
Indonesia: Shared common decolonisation experience with VNM → more sympathetic and did not view VNM as regional threat; saw China and USSR as main
Explain how the Internal divergences in perceptions of threat and security interests among member states led to Intra-ASEAN disunity arising?
1980: Kuantan Principle (rejected)
Trade-off between security interests of ASEAN and Vietnam → tolerance of VNM invasion in exchange for Vietnam’s cessation of dependence on USSR → called for neutralisation of the region from Great Power interference → to enhance THL security and insulate the rest of the region from Great Power rivalry
THL: Unacceptable → viewed any concession granted to VNM given their refusal to withdraw as ill-timed
SG: perceived as letting VNM off scot-free → wary of setting a bad precedent for future intrusions against her own delicate sovereignty
1983: New Delhi Non-Aligned Summit - 5+2 Talks
MY, VNM proposed that informal talks be conducted between ASEAN, VNM and Laos → proposition differed from ICK formula via exclusion of Cambodia
Rejected by Thailand with backing of China → wanted Cambodia involvement → no consensus → ASEAN did not adopt proposal
Feb 1984: Indonesia establishes bilateral channel with Vietnam
IND announced that it did not view VNM as regional threat; established bilateral channels → threatened ASEAN solidarity against VNM aggression
ASEAN designated IND as interlocutor with VNM → integrating its dual-track diplomacy into political strategy against Vietnam
July 1987: Indonesia and Vietnam proposal to diplomatically change conflict into civil war → forced ASEAN partners to accept arrangement even though ASEAN had insisted on not negotiating with the PRK
Proposal allowed ASEAN to not recognise PRK and for VNM to not acknowledge CGDK as representative of Cambodia simultaneously
Reluctance; but ASEAN accepted the arrangement
Aug 1988: Thailand’s ‘Battlefields to Marketplaces’ Policy → New PM Chatichai Choonhaven established bilateral channels with Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam → promised economic incentives in exchange for peaceful borders and commercial relations
Perceived by other members as driven by selfish economic gains harmful to ASEAN’s hitherto steadfast opposition to VNM-installed Cambodian regime
Worried about causing further Vietnamese intransigence following VNM’s failure to compromise during JIM I (1988)
MY and SG: pressured Chatichai to clarify that THL’s official policy remained unchanged and diplomatic pressure would be maintained; notwithstanding private sector dealings
Jan 1989: THL invites Hun Sen (PRK) to Bangkok → ASEAN recognised PRK as administratively in charge of Cambodia in negotiations to maintain facade of solidarity
De Facto recognition of PRK as in charge of Cambodia
‘Unilaterally undermined a decade of ASEAN diplomacy’
Explain how the Internal divergences in perceptions of threat and security interests among member states led to ASEAN’s inability to independently bring a settlement of the Cambodian issue
Ineffective at maintaining regional resilience due to reliance on Great Power intervention to concretely solve problems afflicting regional peace
International developments drove the peace process decisively instead
1985: Gorbachev’s rise to power and New Thinking
Pursuit of warmer relations → with USA + normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989 which made Vietnamese withdrawal a precondition → as a reciprocal move, China distanced itself from the Khmer Rouge
Reduced commitment to the Third World → reduced aid to VNM which they were heavily reliant on
Aug 1989: First Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia
Brought together parties involved and concerned but failed in aim of laying a groundwork for an international body to monitor Vietnamese withdrawal and proposed truce between warring Cambodian factions
BUT marked significant shift in peace process → Shift occurred with deliberations in the UN among the UNSC P5
UNSC P5 decided that instead of deferring to ASEAN’s leadership role in the process, UN was a more neutral and appropriate framework for Cambodian factions to accept a political settlement
1991: Paris Peace Conference II
Signed Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict
UN Transitional Authority on Cambodia created and given mandate to bring about comprehensive settlement of conflict
Explain how the Internal divergences in perceptions of threat and security interests among member states led to a regression to bilateralism and unilateralism from initial multilateralist, regional approach in settling VK issue
1980 Kuantan Declaration → MY and IND declare tolerance of Vietnamese occupation in exchange for cessation of USSR influence in conflict
1988 and 1989 Jakarta Informal Meetings I and II saw Indonesia bring together various Cambodian factions for discussions towards a political solution
Crucially, ASEAN regression from collective position behind 1971 ZOPFAN demonstrated gradual obsolescence of ASEAN as a regional organisation in the promotion of regional peace.
