European Politics Midterm Short Answers

Question 1

a) role/power of cabinet, b) where most members come from, c) and to what it is collectively responsible

Answer 1

Cabinet is the final democratic decision-making body in a state made up by party politicians chosen from ranks of members of parliament and are responsible for parliament. General executive power is divided among the PM and ministers in cabinet over their respective departments.

Question 2

a) how WE blurs the US version of separation of powers yet b) has another separation of powers the US does not

Answer 2

WE blurs US separation of powers via cabinet/parliament relationships as US separation of powers in the executive namely means executive power is only in the hands of the Pres., but in WE, cabinet shares exec. Power and parliament is the mean legislative, but often times, members of parliament in the PM’s party also serve in cabinet. However, WE has extra head of state position/head of government which serves as the monarch or president. While they don’t have formal governing duties, they facilitate events in government like signing bills and nomination ceremonies.

Question 3

head of state’s a) diplomatic, b) three constitutional tasks (des), and c) expected behavior (vs. US president)

Answer 3

HOS is to represent the people and diplomatically be present for international visits and domestic ceremonies. They perform constitutional tasks neutrally like appointment of PM as HOG, the opening of parliament, and signing parliament bills into low. They are meant to be above day-to-day politics.

Question 4

a) circumstances when head of state may be a “countervailing power”, b) justification for it and c) limitations on it

Answer 4

HOS can constrain the actions of governments by seeking to push mandates too far or promote their personal interests too far. It’s to be used for the good of the country, but those who use it too often are subject to accusations to undermine the elected gov. Limitations are often embedded in the gov. system and resolve themselves like Poland with the EU summits and the Constitutional Court via Poland’s President.

Question 5

French president’s powers viz a) military/treaties, b) elections, c) referenda, and d) prime minister (limits on last)

Answer 5

Semi-presidential system means they are head of armed forces, negotiator of treaties, they can dissolve parliament, and call referenda on policy. They limit PM as both are responsible for parliament and they can exercise executive power when the PM and cabinet are from their party.

Question 6

a) when French presidents have full executive powers vs. b) cohabitation (how it works, yet why it will be rarer)

Answer 6

In cases where full executive power isn’t obtained, the pres. cohabitates with a PM and cabinet and makes the pres. take a back seat, but bc pres. are elected about every 5 years and before parliament elections, cohabitation is less likely.

Question 7

“a PM’s power depends on variables within an executive: a) a PM’s party role and b) other governing parties” (EXP)

Answer 7

Countries with strong executives with limited PM power within the executive like Netherlands or Germany on the flip side. Governing party cohesivity depends on coalition size of parties, weak executive power and few advantages among others in the branch.

Question 8

Other ministers accept a strong PM a) if/when the latter has two assets and b) conducts cabinet in a certain way (exp)

Answer 8

Cabinet accepts a strong PM as long as they are willing to involve the cabinet in policy affairs. Ministers can be reluctant to intervene in the business of other members even when the PM has the power to set the overall direction of policy.

Question 9

how c) coordination, d) the media and c) Europeanization foster a “centralized PM-erial core executive” (exp)

Answer 9

Media leads to presidentialization where an increase in PM strength relative to cabinet leads to an centralized-PM core executive model rather than a centralized-cabinet model. This may be accelerated by Europeanization via European Council and summits with PMs where they make decisions that affect the EU and domestic policy.

Question 10

a) how and b) why PMs (vs. US presidents) must engage in collective executive decision-making (primus inter pares

Answer 10

The PM cannot function without cabinet collective consent, and their power is constrained by time/chance/personality and policy that will affect both the PM and cabinet via “first among equals.”

Question 11

how/why a PM’s a) lack of personal autonomy from parliament and cabinet (exp) b) has upsides (vs. a US president)

Answer 11

The PM and cabinet can feel confident about decisions made into legislation, so the face of executive power reflects the balance of power between the parties in parliament, whereas in US the hold over Congress is non-existent.

Question 12

a) two variants of/number of parties in a minority government [p. 114], b) what it lacks and c) yet how it can exist

Answer 12

Made up of parties whose MPs do not constitute a majority in parliament, but are able to win enough votes to maintain confidence. Parties without a majority are support parties or captives, to lose, the gov. has to be defeated rather than losing confidence.

Question 13

how a) “strong/pivotal party” with the “median legislator” (exp) b) makes minority government possible

Answer 13

Pivotal parties are strong parties with so much of a majority that any minimal connected winning coalition has to include them and would have a MP occupying the middle seat, making them a median legislator.

Question 14

a) why “captive parties” (des) lack “walkaway value” (exp) and b) how they make minority government easier

Answer 14

Captive party is a smaller, less mainstream party that increase walk-away value by threatening to support other sides or cause a new election; becoming captive whose support in confidence motions are guaranteed. They are often median parties able to bargain with either partisan divide. As a result, parties have some incentive to support/captive parties rather than majority parties.

Question 15

a) the deal under contract parliamentarism, b) who it is with and c) two advantages for governing party/ies

Answer 15

When support parties rather than coalition partners involve a deal that falls short of a full coalition agreement promising policy, allowing parties to limit extent of sharing power and affect a “respectable distance” from parties helping them stay in office. Parties benefit if they are small because coalition membership means too much responsibility and forced bargaining. Not entering gov. may allow them to go into the next election combining a claim to be contributing to political stability and claim not to be responsible for every decision that voters didn’t like.

Question 16

how a) pre-electoral pacts and b) denying a close competitor “carte blanche” make O/SMCs more likely

Answer 16

Where parties make deals before election on policy and seat distribution, reinforced by electoral system but new system is designed to give bonus seats to winning party.

Question 17

how/why a) the number of parties combined with b) “shocks/critical events” affect duration of governments

Answer 17

Parliaments with small parties representing large parties mean that relatively minor shock via policy conflict or critical events can cause gov. collapse.

Question 18

a) what portfolio (exp) allocation entails, b) the two stages, and c) why the stages are really not so separate

Answer 18

Deciding which party gets which ministries as parties decide ministry occupation in cabinet coalition, then who in the party will take up portfolios from the 1st choices. Party desires can be conditioned by the need to accommodate politicians as the size of the cabinet can increase to make a deal easier. Over time, cabinet size is decreasing among countries in response to decline of nationalized industries and desire for bigger ministries.

Question 19

how a) bargaining/walk-away value (exp) and b) proportionality (exp) drive the first stage of portfolio allocation

Answer 19

With walk-away value, parties apart of a coalition can use importance to that coalition as leverage to gain highest # of seats in cabinet even if the # is disproportionate to # of MPs. in gov. as proportionality is the norm.

Question 20

Party membership—three obligations that make it more formal in WE than elsewhere (e.g., the U.S.)

Answer 20

Pay annual membership and sign a pledge that one accepts their basic principles

Question 21

a) material, b) solidary and c) purposive reasons for joining a party and b) why each is now weaker [also see p. 338]

Answer 21

Material – desire to gain tangible reward like office or a career
Solidary – desire for social contact/comradeship in a common enterprise
Purposive – desire to advance certain policy goals
Parties think they need a manifesto to be taken seriously. But voters don’t care about them as parties have good excuses for not fulfilling manifesto pledges.

Question 22

Party manifesto and party program(me)—contents/purpose of each (how they differ)

Answer 22

Manifesto – legislative plans for office which change each election cycle
Programme – broad, long-term direction sans agenda, with more principles
Average voters don’t read manifestos, and while journalists report on them, elected officials aren’t bound to fulfill them

Question 23

a) four methods parties use to select a leader and b) whose confidence within a party its leader always needs

Answer 23

Ways include parliamentary group, party congress/convention, a direct vote among the entire membership, or direct open voting which risks supporters of other parties electing a rival.

Question 24

a) a country’s party system (the three features that normally characterize it) and/vs. b) party families (des)

Answer 24

Stable configuration of parties that compete in national elections, characterized by extent to which competition between parties is predictable and post-election changes in gov. are marginal or wholesale.
Families – meaningful categories represented in the system as countries with similar parties are a part of a family even if they have diff. names.

Question 25

a) party system fragmentation (def), b) the effective number (what it takes into account), and c) polarization (def)

Answer 25

Fragmentation – spread of parties in the system, effective parties weighing significance as many parties may be present, but they don’t all have political leveraging power
Polarization – ideological differences among parties present in the system

Question 26

a) social cleavages [p. 2] (des) and b) general thesis on how they produced WE party systems [Lipset/Rokkan]

Answer 26

Social cleavages as splits/divisions in society that cause conflicts that can be expressed politically via forming opposing parties representing people in the split. People think cleavages helped structure or freeze Europe’s party systems for decades.

Question 27

New cleavage based on a) post-materialism (def/des—see p. 204), b) its issue focus and c) resulting party family

Answer 27

Later green and left parties value post-materialism as most people have met their basic material needs which express policy values of the individual and cut across class-voting and targeting middle-class salary earners.

Question 28

The origin and attitudes of a) left-right vs. b) authoritarian-libertarian [GAL-TAN] dimensions of competition

Answer 28

GAL – alternative, lenient, and people-based measure of libertarian/authoritative party-ism like social issues and equality
TAN – traditional authority and nationalist measures like economics

Question 29

o pre-WWII SD’s a) main aims, b) three policies to achieve them, c) allies and d) differences with rivals on both sides
o post-WWII SD’s a) initial policy successes, b) voter support level, and c) mid-1970s problems/crisis (exceptions)
o “today SDs’ a) welfare state aims (exp) are limited by two constraints and b) their EU policy balances two goals” (EXP)

Answer 29

Social democrats bore brunt of post 1970 public-displeasure in gov. but success in 80s was in Spain, Portugal, and Greece who benefitted from end of dictatorship. Post-communist democracies mean SDs have good share of votes, believing in using public initiatives to protect the less fortunate which reduces # of strategies of promoting equality of opportunity, they support EU aims to liberalize and increase trade, but not at the expense of social provision/labor standards.

Question 30

a) two features of party systems where CONs are strongest and b) how that in turn affects their ideological instincts

Answer 30

Strongest in countries with tendency to give power to 1 of 2 bloc parties and weakness/absence of a traditionally more centrist CD party.

Question 31

a) main UK CON features/positions pre-Thatcher, b) her three neoliberal policy changes and c) limits on the changes
* a) why UK CONs lost voters on socio-economic policy by 1997, b) issues they then stressed and c) cost/benefit

Answer 31

UK Conservatives are “national party” with unashamed nationalism and limiting public ownership and welfare. Thatcher pursued free market but in 1997, con. lost power due to factions, bad reputations and hostility with EU.

Question 32

Given European history and their origins, why CDs would be less nationalistic than CONs [TB does not explain]
o CDs vs. a) the left and b) CONs/LIBs on socio-economics, including how personalism (exp) sets them apart from both

Answer 32

End of WWII, they were opposed to collectivist, class-based ethos of the left, but were more positive about state and trade union involvement. Valued social harmony above individualism and corporatism capital conscience and long-term support of state leading as socially embedded contributors and beneficiaries of organic whole-personalism.

Question 33

a) why/how (non-Scandinavian) CDs modified their strategy and b) how they came closer to CONs on policy
* CDU/CSU a) paradox in terms of origins/voter base and appeal/strategy and b) its mixed socio-economic policy (exp)

Answer 33

Germany and Netherlands appeal to protestants and ecumenical appeals, but balancing faith and centralism. Establish catch-all strategy with pragmatism. But neoliberal economics; this strategy isn’t working as votes decline, and even though they have coalitions, they are losing vote share.

Question 34

a) 19th century LIB support base and principles/aims and b) 20th century neoliberal vs. social liberal strands

Answer 34

Grew from towns during Industrial Revolution and promoted legal, political and religious rights of the individual. 20th century shifting to either neoliberal prioritizing free market and opposition to state interference in economy and morality, but now is too soft on drugs and civil liberties or social liberalism oriented on civil rights and intervention in economy/welfare.

Question 35

How LIBs’ a) two strands (des) and b) average vote level (des) c) affect their role in coalitions

Answer 35

UK Liberal Democrats in 2015 had 23% of the vote moving to 8%; coalition as sometimes bourgeois bloc against social democrats or 3rd parties joining left or right supporting rainbow coalitions.

Question 36

GR a) 1970s/80s post-material appeal, b) five other themes, c) support base and d) distinct organizational features
o GR struggle for votes a) where environmental concern is low (des) b) but also ironically where it is “too” high (exp)

Answer 36

1970s post-materialism encompassing anti-militarism, anti-discrimination, social justice, 3rd world, and saw support among younger generations. Luck of later success from integration of environmentalism in other parties and low care in others.

Question 37

a) why COM won some voters from SDs (exp) but b) how/why their post-WWII role in governments was limited
o “post-Cold War LE trying to modernize (exp) stress a) policies dropped by SDs (exp) and b) post-material issues” (EXP)

Answer 37

Frequent social democratic support, but increased state ownership, high taxation, and social spending, shifting more towards post-WWII modernization was tricky. Spain has United Left as front organization controlling new formation with 3.7% of 2015 vote.

Question 38

“R/E seek a) one of two futures for their region (exp); b) their views on other issues vary (e.g. Italy, Belgian VB)” (EXP)

Answer 38

Seek autonomy or independence and sometimes are important in subnational/national coaltition governments. Belgium party families are all active with Dutch Flanders and French Wallonia.

Question 39

(all) populism’s view/description of a) “the people”, b) the elite and c) what politics should express.

Answer 39

Term refers to ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 2 homogenous and antagonistic groups or the people as pure and the corrupt elite arguing for the general will of the people. Politics should express popular sovereignty and positive valorization of the people with the denigration of the elite and people as homogenous united body obtaining common interests.

Question 40

a) what makes populism a “thin” ideology and b) three different conceptions of “the people” that make it “thick”

Answer 40

Populism’s meaning varies with who is defined s the people and the idealized concept of community which requires it to be associated with more substantive ideologies to make it thick.

Question 41

The populist conception of how democratic government should operate vs. liberal/representative versions

Answer 41

Right-wing populism where people are the nation, left-wing where people as a whole have sovereignty. Populism is less concerned with national exclusiveness or class struggle and more with the general functions of democracy.

Question 42

a) PRR views on ethnicity (des) and b) their ethnopluralism (exp) c) are (in theory) more about culture than biology (EXP)

Answer 42

They view ethnic differences as basic, immutable, and potentially destructive features of political life, adopting positions on immigration that are stricter than those of any other political parties in their countries. They don’t make claims about the biological superiority of one ethnic group over another but argue that each ethnicity should have its own political entity and that a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity inevitably leads to political and social problems.

Question 43

whether a) based on racism or b) rationalized by ethnopluralism (exp), c) all PRR parties are nativist (def)

Answer 43

Whether informed primarily by racism (racial prejudice) or ethnopluralism, nativism (a combination of nationalism and xenophobia), holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that non-native elements, whether persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state. They argue that the native culture is superior to the non-native cultures.

Question 44

PRR’s views on a) ethnocracy (def), b) immigration and c) “options” for non-natives

Answer 44

Ethnocracy as an idea, attempts to create a monocultural state give non-natives a choice between assimilation and repatriation.

Question 45

how PRR’s a) “psychological” authoritarianism (exp) b) shapes its view on most issues and c) reinforces its nativism

Answer 45

Authoritarianism refers to the belief in a strictly ordered society, and psychological views idealize a tough punitive approach that reintroduces the threat to the natural order of morality and traditional education and security. The issue of corruption is exclusively linked to people from the in-group and corruption is mixed with authoritarianism and nativism as well as populism.

Question 46

how a) PRR’s civilizationalist (exp) view of Europe b) aids its political strategy and c) changed its approach to the EU

Answer 46

PRRs have adopted a broader civilizational outlook that centralizes the importance of European culture paradoxically in which the conflict between the self and the other doesn’t fall along national lines, but civilizational ones; ex: not France vs. Germany but Christian vs. Islam. This has shifted PRR away from railing against the existence of the EU and instead towards arguing to transform it from within.

Question 47

a) how PRR fear of changing gender roles reflects a civilizational worldview (exp) and b) the “internal” enemy it blames

Answer 47

PRRs often support policies oriented at defending the traditional family and denounce “gender conspiracies” aiming at subverting traditional European society and values to create a deterritorialized and multicultural Europe. To defend the Christian identity of Europe against external intruders like immigrants and internal enemies like multicultural and religious supporters.

Question 48

“a) two immigration developments (exp) have led PRRs to b) instrumentally (exp) defend liberal gender principles” (EXP)

Answer 48

Immigration and integration policies have increasingly been affiliated with security agendas, so PRRs target practices like wearing headscarves as risks to security and discriminating against women. Worker immigration and refugee immigration have been replaced by family-related migration and parties tend to regard gender relations among immigrants as backward of non-western cultures.

Question 49

a) how PRR have adapted their family/gender policy given attitudes in liberal societies, yet b) where they draw a limit

Answer 49

The defense of liberal principles seems to sit rather uneasily with the conservatism that these parties tend to display when formulating their policy agendas in the domain of family relations.

Question 50

why PRR resist LBGT a) identity and b) activism, yet c) two reasons they may c) reframe/de-emphasize that stance (exp)

Answer 50

The belief that an identity based on sexual orientation introduces individualism that undermines the people’s solidarity. Right-wing populists tend to conceptualize homosexuality not against religious doctrine but as an unnatural, corrupting force on society and the family. These groups are said to be unaccountable to the people and collude with international institutions like the EU to impose laws and sanction governments that undermine national sovereignty by contradicting a nation’s innate and long-held cultural values. They de-emphasize their past or current opposition to equal rights and try to frame the LGBT community as under threat from the same forces as the rest of the nation. A clear line is drawn between communities or identities that right-wing populists assume still consider homosexuality as deviant. On side of that line is the liberal nation and on the other, usually, is Islam.

Question 51

how nativism (exp) feeds a) two PRR economic fears, shaping PRR b) welfare chauvinism (exp) and c) protectionism (exp)

Answer 51

Nativism is visible in their economic agenda, and the core is rooted in us vs. them language where the national economic interest is under threat from foreign forces of trade and immigration.
Economic protectionism is when populists see trade in the short-term as a zero-sum game where production can either employ people at home or abroad and they are opponents of economic globalization and strict trade borders.
Welfare chauvinism is the belief that to maintain solidarity within the welfare state, it should be restricted to native people and foreigners should be excluded.

Question 52

how PRR authoritarianism shapes their a) views on people in economic need and b) thus PRR welfare state policies

Answer 52

Linking law and order policy to the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor as in those who cannot work because of old age and those who can work but prefer to live off of social benefits. Those who break the rules and norms should be punished severely and breaking norms about the welfare state occurs when people live off benefits when they don’t need them. Undeserving poor constitute an internal threat to the welfare state and must be excluded.

Question 53

how wooing to a) knowledge economy/modernization “losers” (exp) b) leads PRR to back some welfare policies (exp)

Answer 53

PRR are often hostile to policies designed to address climate change as a response to structural changes in a global economy that appeal to workers and less-skilled white-collar occupations. These people are known as losers of modernization, as they are hostile to the climate agenda because many of the sectors affected by structural change are the most carbon-intensive, and climate policies pose a threat to their livelihoods. Another argument is that climate policies threaten to pile new burdens on a group that already feels economically insecure and politically excluded.