European Politics Final

Question 1

“remaining variations in suffrage/franchise come down to a) age and b) citizenship requirements” (EXP) maximum timing/years between elections (exp) and b) minimum/fixed term vs. minimum/no fixed term (exp)

Answer 1

In Europe, the age of voting is the age of legal adulthood, and in some countries, citizenship is required to vote; 5 years is the max in between elections, and the UK has a fixed term of 5 years and only Norway requires a minimum of 4 years.

Question 2

plurality/first past the post (FPP)—a) seats per constituency, b) who wins and c) national swing local impact*

Answer 2

FPP systems use single-member constituencies or districts process to elect candidates, and the candidate that gets a majority or plurality (more votes than the other candidate) gets elected

Question 3

majority/France—a) seats per constituency, b) who wins/how, c) making runoff, d) winning it, e) deals/blocs*

Answer 3

France’s system, like the UK, conducts legislative elections in many single-member constituencies and there are two rounds of voting, the second held a week after the first. The candidate who wins over 50% wine, but those who get a plurality (the majority of the rest of the votes) contest in the second ballot. In presidential systems like France, the president is elected under a two-ballot majority that encourages voters to “vote with their hearts” at first, then vote for the system next.

Question 4

a) how and b) why P/M impacts proportionality when a party’s vote is spread too thin (e.g. Lib Dems) impact of a) piling up votes in safe seats vs. b) efficient distribution in marginal constituencies under P/M; how/why a party that wins the most votes under P/M may win fewer seats than a rival

Answer 4

Proportional systems use multimember constituencies so party seats in legislature more accurately reflect its share of the vote; plurality systems can cause disproportionality, dependent on where a party wins its votes as parties don’t want to spread their vote too thin across the country. In the UK, Lib Dems won 22% in 2000s, but they had less than 10 of parliamentary votes because the vote was insufficiently concentrated for them to win a plurality in individual constituencies. Even so, parties cannot pile up votes in safe seats, and the winning party can win fewer seats than its rival and lose office.

Question 5

what all PR a) seeks to ensure and b) its common impact on party systems/governments a) types of parties/their supporters (des) who first sought to introduce PR and b) their motivation for doing so PR list systems a) constituencies (des), b) lists/origins (des) and c) allocation of seats to party vote share (exp)

Answer 5

European electoral systems try to ensure that the share of seats from a party in parliament reflects the national share of the vote. The parties that represent the privileged hope to survive the coming of universal suffrage and the enfranchisement of the working class. Works alongside the decline of party families as the middle class grows, parties have to use different strategies to evenly distribute their vote.

Question 6

why having a) one national constituency or b) a higher tier (exp) maximizes proportionality under PR list systems a) closed (des), b) open (des) and c) hybrid PR lists—and how/why d) one most strengthens party discipline

Answer 6

Voters in multimember constituencies have candidate lists organized by party or alliance, and when votes are counted, each list is given seats in proportion to the casted votes; regional variations produce disproportionate results overall. Some countries reserve a portion of seats to correct the imbalance as higher-tier seats. In countries like Spain and Portugal, closed lists are used so parties determine the rank order of the candidates and voters do not have a say. In open seats, however, candidates who make it to parliament off the list are chosen by voters who rank the order of other names as well. Hybrid PR systems occur where voters express a preference within a party list rather than choosing the party list completely.

Question 7

a) two votes (des), b) two types of constituencies (des), c) “compensatory” feature (exp) of PR mixed systems/MMP how/why more list seats/fewer constituency seats affects the degree of proportionality in PR mixed systems/MMP how/why PR mixed systems/MMP are said to offer the “best of both worlds”

Answer 7

Mixed systems give voters 2 votes, for the candidate of the local district and the other for the multimember constituency. Additional member districts or Mixed member proportional systems (MMP) give voters the best of both worlds and link between the constituency MP and parliament, accurately representing the spread of opinion nationwide, but critics say it fails to fulfill expectations of its advocates and has downsides/upsides.

Question 8

distinct features of a) constituencies (des), b) ballots (des), and c) voter’s role in PR single transferrable vote/STV
a) first preference quota and b) two forms of transfers of lower preferences in PR single transferrable vote/STVa) two advantages PR single transferrable vote/STV combines but b) two criticisms of it from parties’ viewpoint

Answer 8

Candidates in multimember constituencies are presented in lists and not individual/rank order. There is a quota of 1st preference voters and are elected and any votes over the quota are transferred to other candidates. The transfer process continues until all the seats are filled by candidates that have reached the quota; this ensures proportionality while maintaining the link between individual legislators and voters by paying attention to the candidate rather than the party.

Question 9

PR a) thresholds (des), b) their purpose (exp), c) their numerical range and d) how/why they might be tinkered with

Answer 9

Thresholds are a percent figure of the vote a party has to score before it has a share of the seats in parliament; around 5%. The higher the threshold, the higher the hurdle and the harder it is for small parties to make parliament.

Question 10

PR a) district magnitude (exp) and b) how/why variation in it affects proportionality (exp)—e.g. Netherlands vs. Spain; aspects of their PR list systems that lead to more/less proportionality in a) the Netherlands, b) Spain and c) Italy

Answer 10

Different than proportionality in that there is a 2nd tier of seats to correct regional disproportionality. The lower the # of MPs allocated to each constituency, the lower the proportionality of the overall result. Proportionality in the Netherlands where the entire country is 1 constituency, and in Italy, the 1993 vote to abandon a pure PR list for mixed system combining party lists and FPP contests, and in Spain, there are strong regional constituencies there are fewer MPs for 52 constituencies.

Question 11

ENPP range where a) P/M, b) STV and c) PR list/MMP are used and d) which most fosters ideological dispersion two problems with assuming correlation between type of electoral system and party system indicates causation; why on their own a) a plurality system does not limit the number of parties and b) PR does not increase it [Sartori]
how a) PR may foster new parties and b) plurality systems psychological effect (exp) may hurt small ones [Duverger]

Answer 11

In ENPPs, the count of parties in a system is combined with a sense of their strength enduring that the presence of ½ of the small parties won’t lead to a big change. The count decides whether the type of electoral system is associated with a country having more or fewer parties. List PR can produce different outcomes in countries with the most proportional systems that have more parties of significance in parliament, as lower thresholds make big differences.

Question 12

• three possible features of a particular election that may explain why/when fewer people show up to vote in it; a) the electoral system, b) rule for voting and c) voting methods/technologies that may make for higher turnout

Answer 12

Change occurs via dealignment as votes become disenchanted with traditional connections between citizens and parties, cleavages are no longer applicable as voters aren’t wedded to long-term parties. US elections have greater wasted votes, and the frequency of elections in parliamentary systems make it more difficult to get people to the polls; early elections increase polarization because of party disunity.

Question 13

“volatility (def) may be a) overstated given shifts within blocs or b) understated due to poor measuring” (EXP)

Answer 13

Volatility is the rate at which voters change their vote over time from one election to the next. It’s usually not divided by party source, but for each party, if 15% is lost, and the same is gained, there is zero volatility.

Question 14

a) left-right self-placement still correlates with voter choice, but b) party ID (def) levels/their effect less so” (EXP)

Answer 14

Voter self-placement and how voters conceive of party placement is party identification as brand loyalty long term, having a correlation with negative polarization

Question 15

a) economic discontent might seem to explain trends in overall party ID (exp), b) but the data aren’t clear” (EXP); a) modernization thesis (exp) might seem to explain overall party ID trends (exp) b) but the data aren’t clear” (EXP); a) if party ID and social group identity were always linked b) trends in one may explain trends in the other” (EXP)

Answer 15

Socialization in party families than 1 specific party; the modernization thesis claims that as voters are more educated, they make individualized, consumer-based decisions for party backing. The theory is that doing something because it’s what you’ve always done via brand loyalty, but democracy created a more informed public.

Question 16

region/part of Europe where class voting (des) is relatively high
a) the traditional class composition effect in voting and b) how it is clearly changing
a) the traditional class correlation effect and b) how/why its possible decline may reflect voter realignment (exp)

Answer 16

Industrial era importance as runoff of 19th century effects of class economic and social strata dictating social organization

Question 17

how a) post-industrial economies (des) may erode b) class voting so that c) other cleavages supersede it [Box 6.5]
how a) modernization and (separately) b) post-materialism may change voting behavior, eroding class voting [Box 6.5]
how center-left parties’ choices of a) strategy and b) personnel may erode class voting [Box 6.5]

Answer 17

The change in class composition led to a decrease in the industrial/manufacturing sector as society now contains less industrial voters, factory voters and less owners of the means of production.

Question 18

a) job sector (exp) more than class may explain voting for b) center right, c) far right and d) left parties
“traditional authoritarian values have long shaped voting, yet don’t correlate with social class or party ID” (EXP)

Answer 18

Service employment is increasing as private and public sectors cause different affiliations in politics via the floating voter theory. The welfare state and class correlation decreases; a decline in composition (# of people identified in each class) could result in consistent correlation. Today declining composition is met with a decline correlation as a result of post-industrialism.

Question 19

Religion’s correlation effect (exp) still (some say) impacts a) two types of voters—b) directly or c) indirectly (EXP); a) two aspects of religion correlated with voting CD—one each with b) explicitly religious and c) left party voters; a) why the religious composition effect is waning (exp) and b) how CDs have shifted their appeals in response; “religious voting may be inadvertently mobilized by a) leftwing governments’ policies and b) immigration” (EXP)

Answer 19

After the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats followed religion being less inherited, the generations of voters joining the CDS, and the correlation effect much like the general working-class accordance. Party religious affiliation can be tracked by church attendance; the correlation effect in the post-industrial age hasn’t changed, but even if church attendance decreases, many still affiliate with the CD party. Secularization specifically among working-class voters, led to strong composition and correlations, but now there is a declining composition and strong correlations

Question 20

a) collective and b) individual policy roles/responsibility of parliamentary (vs. presidential) cabinet members; the two different methods by which decisions are reached during cabinet meetings (in parliamentary systems)

Answer 20

The HOS appoints 15 people to oversee ministries as cabinet secretaries as officials can meet with each other on issues that affect both ministries, but the cabinet never meets. The president deals with department secretaries in the US, but with presidentialism, cabinet secretaries also have policy portfolios and oversee a ministry, but in UK, proposals in ministries become draft legislation and are then approved by the cabinet and ratified by parliament, then enforced back in the ministry, as all ministers are responsible for the lower house. In the UK, cabinet meetings are at least once a week, and decisions are made via consensus, but votes are ultimately decided by the majority. Once an agreement occurs, cabinet solidarity extending from responsibility requires ministers to back the policy publicly. Cabinet confidentiality requires keeping all details of deliberation secret.

Question 21

a) vice/deputy prime ministers (exp/des), b) what role they may serve, c) and limits on that role (vs. US vice presidents); how ministers without portfolio (exp) illustrate the contrast between cabinet ministers and US cabinet secretaries

Answer 21

A cabinet member fills in when a PM is absent, usually from the PM’s party and is approved as permanent replacements via junior coalition partners, which rarely cause new elections.

Question 21

Junior ministers’ a) government role (compare/contrast to cabinet ministers) and b) possible partisan/political roles

Answer 21

Junior ministers don’t vote or sit in cabinet but attend meetings a help ministers by governing sub-units. They often remain in parliament as they back party cabinet agendas, and ministers often get juniors to maintain partisan balance.

Question 22

a) standing vs. b) ad hoc cabinet committees (exp/des) and c) their roles
a) inner cabinets’ general composition and b) role; how a) coalition committees’ general composition (des) b) and role (des) c) relates to yet also diminishes cabinet

Answer 22

Standing committees are permanent and deal with multi-portfolio issues like national security. Ad Hoc committees are created for current events issues like Brexit or Covid. The inner cabinet occurs when cabinet is too large and the PM makes an internal minister group organizing overall priorities, containing the PM, deputy PM, and top minister.

Question 23

o what a) collective and b) collegial each measure, with c) the range of variation
* how/why the degree of collegiality and/or collectiveness within executive decision-making can be affected by:
constitutional/legal factors a) overall and b) within the executive
a PM’s own bureaucratic resources
a government’s a) number/strength of parties, b) cohesion and c) popularity
walkaway values of a PM’s a) coalition partners and b) own party
a PM’s standing/relationship with his/her own party

Answer 23

The Coalition committee contains the chair of each governing party’s organization, the head of the parliamentary caucus, and deputy, which speak for parties, not ministries.

Question 24

Cabinet government’s a) main features, b) the prime minister’s role and c) team vs. board of management variants
Ministerial government’s a) key features b) including what makes it very collegial but c) not very collective

Answer 24

The collective measures are the scope of participation, as all ministries are involved in decisions prior to final cabinet approval. The weight given to each minister’s input on policy, if equal/hierarchical positions steer outcomes as collegial measures. The degree of both measures varies via country and depends on policy area as some issues are decided by a small portion of the cabinet or the whole group. Conventional cabinet as collective decision-making and ministerial collegiality form ideal cabinet. Coalitions are routines as board of management involves reliance on cabinet committees to expedite policy formation. Ministerial government in which broad coalitions are the norm, an executive decisions making can be collegial, but is collective or highly decentralized.

Question 25

Extent of what most upper houses can do to cabinet bills and how b) rules or c) partisanship limit even that; why given a) delay, b) constitutions and c) forum/“ping-pong” even weak upper houses are not powerless; what makes upper houses in a) Switzerland (p. 125) and b) Italy (Box 4.4.) strong, including the latter’s drawbacks
a) basis of Bundesrat membership, b) its two types of legislative power, and c) divided government’s pros/cons

Answer 25

All but Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, the lower house is more powerful and gets public attention. The upper house amends/delays rather than blocks bills passed by the lower house and many possess veto power. The upper house mantra is to protect the rights/interests of sub-national government because of less media attention, they are more clear-headed and have less pressure.

Question 25

Party government’s a) key features b) including those that make it collective but c) not very collegial
The a) presidentialization thesis broad version, b) why that is seen as inaccurate and c) the narrower version

Answer 25

Bureaucratic resources are expected to keep tabs on draft legislation in each ministry, so the more staff resources, the more bureaucratic resources are at their disposal. Political factors influence whether one or pore parties is represented in cabinet and whether they can command a majority in parliament. Being the head of a single party majority implies more authority for the PM within cabinet.

Question 26

a) prime ministerial government’s key features b) including what makes it neither collegial nor collective
a) why prime ministerial government is likelier with a one-party majority but b) when/why it can occur in coalitions

Answer 26

Presidentialization within the government and cabinet, PMs wield authority similar to presidents, but skeptical as PMs are separate. Ministerialism guides principle as hierarchy rather than collegiality as PMs cease the 1st among equals and become president-ministers. PMs can dominate colleagues if factors are operative as PM is not only head of party but has relationships within it.

Question 27

Number of WE countries with upper house and b) two features of those that traditionally favor bicamerality; upper house members are chosen either a) like lower house members (exp) or b) by other bodies (exp) [omit UK]

Answer 27

Out of 15 older democracies in the EU, 9 had parliaments with 2 houses, whereas today, out of 28, 15 are unicameral and favored by smaller, unitary states. In bicameral countries, the lower house has MPs/depities elected by all adult voters and the upper house isn’t directly elected. Switzerland, Germany and Belgium have strong bicameralism, and in Germany, the upper house must see/approve all state legislation from the federation.

Question 28

a) Private member (exp) vs. government bills, b) latters’ average share of all bills and c) latters’ passage rate; average hours it takes to pass a bill in WE and why it is not greater when there are more parties in a coalition

Answer 28

Most governments get their legislation through, if it refers to a policy settled by coalition agreements and when there’s time to curtail debates. In worst cases, the executive is thought to shove its pills, crank the handle, and tear apart the opposition. WE are either majoritarian or consensus democracies.

Question 29

a) Parliament’s hiring power (exp) and b) why it gives that body as a whole only limited power over governments; a) how often no-confidence votes pass and b) three steps/tactics that can help many governments to avoid them; how the a) constructive rule (exp), b) fixed elections/Norway and c) early dissolution can limit no-confidence votes

Answer 29

Hiring pits 1 or more parties against others, and only 5% of no-confidence votes result in government failure. In some cases, institutional rules make votes of no confidence more unlikely, and it takes a majority of MPs to vote or a government can be defeated only by a constructive vote. NC motions aren’t attractive ways to solve intractable parliamentary problems. If as an MP, your party isn’t likely to do well in a snap election, you’re unlikely to stage a vote of NC and risk small losses for the greater victory.

Question 30

Majoritarian model—a) four countries, b) conduct of government, c) opposition’s options, d) parliament’s role; how a) parliament’s lawmaking role in the consensus model (des) may reflect certain b) party/electoral systems

Answer 30

In majoritarian countries, the government pursues its agenda with little regard for the input of other parties that aren’t clearly the opposition. Opposition parties can undermine the government’s popularity. Parliament is an arena rather than a transformative institution. Consensus democracies, are reactive feature more constructive criticism, and operate in cross-party rather than inter-party mode, tending towards proportional electoral systems and multiparty politics that force coalitions and consult interest groups often.

Question 31

How a) parliament’s lawmaking role in the consensus model (des) may reflect b) ‘micro-institutional’ rules”; when/how much committees can affect legislation (readings/plenary) in consensus vs. majoritarian democracy; indicators (committee number/size and ministerial tools) of strong/weak parliamentary policing powers; reasons for power of Danish Folketing committees (number/size, report, government composition, EU affairs)v

Answer 31

The difference between the 2 democracies is overstated, but most important is legislative committees which make amendments to bills before they’re debated on the floor of the house by all interested MPs as plenary sessions. In majoritarian countries, committees go over bills once they’re received via 1 or 2 plenary readings. In consensus, committee membership isn’t distributed by each party’s seat share, so committees in these countries are conflictual.

Question 32

Role of a) parliamentary questions (des) and b) interpellations (des) in oversight; why a) parliamentary oversight committees (des) can be strong even where b) legislative committees are not; how “democratic deficit” affects need for and options of parliamentary committee oversight (“gatekeeping”)

Answer 32

Scrutiny and oversight is used via committees, which hold ministers accountable for their departmental work. The democratic deficit in the EU is a gap between powers and competencies assumed by the EU and citizens’ ability to determine the makeup of its institutions to oversee the exercise of those powers, arising from member state tendencies to cede legislative and executive functions that preserve elected governments.

Question 33

How/why the law of anticipated reactions (exp) makes it hard to measure government domination of parliaments; a) why voters criticize backbencher MP loyalty/PPG unity b) and yet why they also want it; how/why PPG unity is due to MPs’ a) natural identity, b) input into PPG decisions and c) desire for re-election; two “behavioral phenomena” (next two subheads) that explain why PPGs are more coherent in WE than US

Answer 33

There is a problem of assessing arguments on the domination of parliaments by parties as it’s difficult to measure the power of parliaments. The continuous acceptance of the government’s superiority rests on its capacity to represent successfully and/or anticipate the will of the majority. Voters punish parties that convey disunity as PPG unity helps reduce the risks of democratic delegation. Government backbenders/whips support MPs in the same party as they have a sense of identity and loyalty, and even members that disagree with a decision will go along because it represents the majority. Nearly all parliamentary decisions take backbenders into account.

Question 34

Why in legislative elections WE voters a) “vote for parties, not people,” b) let alone candidates without a party; voters don’t vote for parties because parties are powerful; parties are powerful because voters vote for parties
a) whether or not candidate names appear on a ballot, b) voting for WE legislators is not like in the US (EXP)

Answer 34

When voters vote, they think they’re helping choose the government, so they take into account what parties support which parties. These effects include the size of a candidate’s personal vote, as it’s less in WE than in the US, where the fate of candidates is more determined by national forces. Incumbent candidates have fewer built-in advantages than US candidates, and in almost all countries, MPs cant’ supply particularized benefits to localities through legislation. Parliamentary committees don’t have distributive power and members operate as parts of their PPGs rather than autonomous entrepreneurs. Party labels are valuable commodities as legislators are unwilling to vote against the party line in parliament which might cost them the label next election. Power for party oligarchs comes from being gatekeepers to political office and rewarding those who are loyal. An increase in party cohesion is linked to the # of MPs increasing and seeking ministerial posts, that gaining preferment requires loyalty to party leadership.

Question 35

Regional identity has a) locational, b) economic and c) political features, but d) minority nationalism is more; a) “clear” vs. b) two forms of “complex/confused” territorial demarcations of national minorities; how/why a) Cold War and b) prosperity meant WE borders were not changed despite national minorities; two approaches post-WWII WE governments took to minority nationalism—e.g. France vs. Spain; how a) subsidiarity (exp), b) waning class cleavage and c) EU integration made minority nationalism relevant

Answer 35

In some countries, there’s a clear territorial/historical/cultural demarcation between national minorities and majorities. Irredentism is the pursuit of reunification with the homeland occurring more frequently in Eastern Europe than in the West. Postwar border establishment left linguistic minorities stranded by the state. In some states, people feel their territory should be a part of a neighboring state or have a nation of their own. There was a transition of minority nationalism from latency to relevancy resulting in the idea that democracy had stretched since postwar to include subsidiary decisions taken at the lowest appropriate level, and democracy and voting seemed less dictated by class, but as class declines, regional identities increase.

Question 35

How a) minority nationalism (exp/des) challenges the b) sovereignty (exp/des) of c) nation-states (exp/des)

Answer 35

There is an overlap between political and legal entities of the state that are shared with cultural/traditional sub-national tendencies. Accepting nationalities within the nation-state is tricky, but MN suggests that the nationality entails a separate state identity from national consensus.

Question 36

Belgium—federalism or slippery slope?
Source of subnational/regional government a) power and b) policy areas/competence in unitary vs federal states; a) the three traditional WE federal states and b) how/why the unitary/federal distinction is growing more blurred; a) what divides and b) links Walloons and Flemish, c) why Walloons long dominated, and d) Brussels’ status

Answer 36

Unitary states exist as regional governments are the only administrations of centrally determined services where power exercised by regions depends on central state consent. Federal states exist as territorial subnational governments enjoy constitutionally guaranteed autonomy and competence. Former unitary state Belgium was federalist, and during postwar, the government operated in French, with links to Wallonia being national Catholicism. Francophone control of the government even though Wallonis contributed national wealth, the decline of SOS of heavy industry reversed the political tide and as more French regions grew in wealth, Wallonians sought independence.

Question 37

“a) post-WWII economic trends (des) b) led to political demands (des) c) transforming the Belgian state by 1993” (EXP)

Answer 37

There was a 1993 push for autonomy meaning devolution involved the transfer of powers not just to geographical regions, but language regions as well. Belgium’s constitutional reform in the 70s, set up linguistic communities with cultural responsibilities like education and broadcasting.

Question 38

a) devolution overall (exp/des), b) the UK version (des), and c) how Belgium’s process started vs. how it ended up; Belgium’s a) three regions (des) vs. its b) three “communities” (des), and c) policy areas each type of unit covers; a) two policies Belgium’s federal government still controls and b) two other factors holding Belgium together; a) minority nationalism’s impact on Belgian parties and b) the makeup/process of forming federal governments

Answer 38

The balancing of linguistic groups in the government via representation paralleled decentralization in Belgium. Other countries offered devolution as the solution to minority nationalism, and devolution says centralized government gives more power to the states, and allows them more autonomy further than decentralization, but not quite a federation. There is skepticism that devolution is nonreversible politically, but the unitary state can retract state powers.

Question 39

Spain’s a) post-1978 devolution process (des), b) institutions all regions have, and c) limits on use of their powers; “a) Spain’s constitution grants two forms of autonomy but has a clause that b) seems to override it” (EXP); a) what makes Spain’s devolution “asymmetrical”/hybrid and b) and why the state is still unitary in theory only
“a) ETA and PNV pursued different approaches (until 2011) b) to the same ultimate aim” (EXP)

Answer 39

Spain transferred increased powers to autonomous communities from historic kingdoms that now have an elected assembly and the government can exercise foreign power, as long as they don’t conflict with the constitution. Catalunya makes either differentiated or asymmetric federalism, but Spain is not a federal state.

Question 40

ETA/PNV aims are resisted by a) the central government’s stance and b) opinion/multiple identities (EXP); “concessions to Spain’s nationalities raise demands by other regions, leading the former to demand more” (EXP); a) three bases for Catalunya’s claim to nationhood and b) leverage its parties used to win more autonomy (Box 2.4); why Spain’s right/Court opposed the a) preamble and b) economic powers in the 2006 Catalan autonomy statute; why Catalan independence referenda are a) “illegal” and b) their results less impressive than they seem

Answer 40

Peaceful nationalist parties EAJ-PNV performed better than regional extremists, but in the 90s, moderate nationalists were willing to work with the ETA, but Madrid still rejected Basque independence.

Question 41

a) Ulster’s origins as a province, b) how it was governed (1920s-70s) and c) the makeup/identity of unionists; a) the makeup/aims of Ulster nationalists/republicans, b) IRA tactics and c) Britain’s two responses (1970s);a) what republicans recognized, b) London conceded and c) Dublin conceded that led to talks in the 1980s/90s; a) distinctive feature of the Ulster Assembly’s executive and b) how Ulster is governed if power-sharing fails

Answer 41

NI or Ulster occurred because of Protestant population in the north-east committed to the Union, but other conservatives advocated for the Irish Republic via the IRA and violence triggered the addressing of Catholic civil rights issues.

Question 41

Switzerland’s a) linguistic/religious divisions and b) the primary basis of identity; why the basis of identity in Switzerland in effect may prevent it from suffering the problem Belgium faces; *why the Swiss federal government is taking on more policy responsibilities/why the cantons can’t; a) two limits on new Swiss federal power, and Swiss cantonal powers b) at home as well as c) over federal laws

Answer 41

In unitary Scandinavia, the local government has long collected a large portion of state revenues, and outside Scandinavia, local authorities are responsible for preserving the central government via welfare, health, and public housing, because even if they don’t collect revenue, they account for a lot of spending. The Swiss Confederations has 26 cantons in CH, government with 64% German, 20% French, and 8% Italian speakers. The government was formed across religious/linguistic divisions as federal not unitary, the Swizz root of cultural/political identity in cantons rather than the nation. While the federal government controls the day to day life, the constitution requires that new powers must be agreed upon by the cantons and citizens referendum, cantons determine their own taxes, as well as the upper house of parliament. Note: if countries moving towards federalism are in the minority, they aren’t alone in pursuing decentralization.

Question 42

Trend of Ulster’s divide, b) how it shows in the two main parties and c) why they may be better dealmakers; a) 1980s events that led to calls for Scottish independence [p. 41] and b) why such calls were weaker in Wales; a) why UK Labour agreed to devolution in 1997, b) the resulting institutions, and c) how Wales’ were weaker

Answer 42

The British government sent troops to break off violence in Ireland, but the United Irish Republic and the UK in the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the 80s. Now the UK supports a United Ireland, but Northern Ireland executive branch at Stormont was suspended in 2002, and 2003 election saw support or Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein grew.

Question 43

How trends in a) the powers of Scottish/Welsh institutions and b) regional voting suggest devolution backfired; “a) after its 2014 referendum Scotland gained more autonomy but b) lost power within the UK as a whole” (EXP); “a) Brexit increased calls for Scottish independence (exp); b) oil prices and the Euro may decrease them” (EXP)

Answer 43

The NI troubles took a toll on the UK population and the British now want an end of their union with Scotland, as well as increased Welsh independence. There is a slippery slope of devolution via the Labour Party and 2014 referendum to Scottish succession 55-45. Actual governance in a regional country means instilling a national assembly without majorities in elections per majority.

Question 44

Contrast between the origin of German Laender/federalism and Swiss cantons
German a) Land, b) federal and c) shared policy responsibilities—d) and the federation’s “ultimate say”
How German Land governments can a) interact with the EU and b) effect/limit the extent of European unity

Answer 44

Unlike Switzerland, 14 landers are artificially created not to reflect regional identities but to disperse federal power under the 1949 Basic Law (Constitution). Each land has a separate parliament that handles broadcasting, transport, police, and education, but shares environmental policy and the labor market with the Bundesrat (fed. Government). The federal government delegates the implementation and administration of policy; Lander deals directly with the European Commission on specific issues that may affect them and can make agreements with foreign states. Cooperative federalism still creates tension and grants Lander more autonomy in exchange for reducing its ability to block federal legislation in the Bundesrat.

Question 45

How a) overload, b) limits on communes and c) EU priorities explain why and how unitary states decentralized
In France/Italy how the shift from a) prefects’* original role/power to b) regional councils reflect decentralization

Answer 45

In France, 22 bodies allowed the transfer of discretion to the federal government outside Paris, then 22 became 13. Centralization was traditionally mitigated by many French national politicians holding elected positions at the local level taking subnational needs into account. The 80s caused the transfer of powers to prefects that control the local government almost 1.2 of the government expenditures from 22 to 13 regions. Even in cities without direct elections, local councils have moved from the traditional appointment of a chief executive overseen by committees of elections councilors to a council leader without a cabinet. France and Germany have the tradition of individualized administrative power, but the UK and Italy are trending towards personalized leadership in local government.

Question 46

a) Main reason/grievance behind Padania***, b) how the League sold it and c) how far the idea went; why Greece/the Netherlands tried (one successfully) to regionalize subnational government structures; what most unitary states’ central governments continue to control that limits regionalization; a) local government policy roles/responsibilities and b) why Scandinavia’s have even more latitude [bottom p. 72]; **a) how WE mayors traditionally came to power, b) the recent trend and c) why the trend is popular; **traditional power/role of mayors/councils in a) dualist (Italian/French/German mayors) vs. b) monist systems; examples of and a) institutional vs. b) political reasons for frictions between regional and local governments

Answer 46

Devolution is understood as the transfer of power to the subnational government, but in the UK, the transfer of power isn’t the forerunner of federalism. Italy’s Lega Nord in the national government, intensely populist and exclusionary, leaders wanted more autonomy in the richest regions. The idealistic Padania nation was united by history and culture, making a case for federalism rather than independence, but didn’t sit well with voters. The presence of the Lega as a coalition partner with governing power, led the campaign for federal Italy, which in 2002, began passing devolution legislation.