Civil Rights/Liberties Final

Question 1

Defining Religion—Reynolds (1879)

Answer 1

Reynolds definition recognizing religion as the time of the Constitutional Convention in a very Euro-centric, Anglican perspective. As a result, the Reynolds case involving Mormonism which was created in the 19th century, the courts were more harsh because even though the Constitution warned against the establishment of religion, Mormonism was brought to court because it defied the traditions of the pre-established religions. Reynolds (1879) believed that men had to practice polygamy and failure to marry multiple women resulted in condemnation. The country/federal government thought polygamy was a moral and social evil with immediate consequences for the nation as a whole. They passed a bigamy act that directly targeted Mormons, but the SC ruled that the law did not violate free exercise. (ask about if this relates to danger test of free expression)
o Understanding of the constitutional formation, how to understand establishment and exercise which created a complicated area of the law as overly protecting free exercise bleeds into an establishment. They courts have to figure out a way to keep church and state separate, but still apply and protect freedoms

Question 2

Ballard (1944)

Answer 2

• Ballard definition as beliefs that are sincerely held, rather than factually accurate or objective. Ballard (1944) defining the “I am” movement of self-determination not as a religion, Ballard created the movement and told his followers that he needed money to continue his work, so he began using UPS to defraud individuals, convicting under crimes, not religious beliefs. The trial court argued that the jury could take the views/beliefs into account and utilize individual sincerity, and the SC court upheld this application. Under the Ballard approach, the proper test of a constitutionally protected religious belief is not the truth of its doctrine but the sincerity with which it is held. For our would-be gourmet prisoners, then, we would ask if they sincerely held their religious views, not if those views were factually accurate. This application would have a great effect on the use of conscientious objection to compulsory military service in the 20th century.

Question 3

Welsh (1970)

Answer 3

• Welsh test – The Welsh definition of religion espoused a different perspective on the presence of a supreme being, namely God in the court’s reconciliation/application of religious freedom/exercise deliberation. Following the removal of the 1940 law recognizing religion defined as one’s relation to a supreme being.” In Welsh, the court discussed the exclusion of beliefs that were “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical.” Adding to the sincere belief test, even if an expressed belief (in this case conscientious objection) is not inherently religious, but their moral or ethical beliefs are sincerely held, they take on a religious character and are thus equally protected under the law.

Question 4

Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)

Answer 4

This case in 1940 decided on the issue of saluting the flag in public school for religious students, particularly Jehovah’s Witnesses who did not want their children to recite the pledge or place any institution above that of God. Many states forced students in public schools to salute the flag, particularly after WWII and the increased value of patriotism in the nation. The issue first began in Nazi Germany when Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to salute Hitler under the German flag, but in the US, two children were expelled for refusing to salute the flag, in which the parents brought the suit against the school board under free exercise of religion. The valid secular policy was used to uphold to flag salute requirement under the assertion of patriotism, as the policy did not target any specific religion’s exercise but sought to establish national unity separate from religion. In addition to this, the SC majority opinion argued that the federal government should not wield a strong hand over the public-school policy of local governments, as 18 states had flag salute policies.

Question 5

West Virginia School District v. Barnette (1943)

Answer 5

The case addresses a continuation of the Gobitis case regarding required flag saluting in public schools as well as reciting the pledge of allegiance. Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to participate, and the school board was expelled and parents were forced to pay fines and jail penalties for noncomplying children. In this case, unlike Minersville District v. Gobitis, the court held that compelling public school children to salute the flag was unconstitutional, reasoning that national symbols like flags cannot be held above the constitutional protections of religion or individual rights. The law did not target a specific religion, but the court held that no individual should be required to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance. The dissenting judge from Gobitis became the majority opinion in Barnette as he claimed that even though the court wished to maintain “national cohesion” and national unity, the very essence of the Constitution protects any individual from “compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say.”

Question 6

Valid Secular Policy Test (Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940))

Answer 6

The Valid Secular Policy Test was created in regard to religious freedoms and protections by the 1st Amendment, and the evaluation of a law that claims to violate or burden a religion practice based on whether or not it directly targets a specific religion or religion in general. If the policy/law serves a legitimate governmental goal, not directed at any particular religion, the Court would uphold it, even if the legislation had the effect of conflicting with religious practices. In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested for doing door-to-door in a Catholic neighborhood and violated a statute requiring solicitors to have a warrant to solicit funds from the public, as well as the Connecticut common-law breach of peace. The court ruled a unanimous decision that the Cantells’ actions were protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, reasoning that restrictions based on religious grounds could not be upheld in the same way regulations on general solicitation could. While public maintenance of peace is a valid state interest, it cannot be used to justify the suppression of free speech or free exercise of religion, especially since the individual in the case were not a public threat.

Question 7

Braunfield v. Brown (1961)

Answer 7

This case addresses the issue of religion exercise with employment requirements regarding a Jewish person working the Sabbath on Saturday. Braunfield owned a clothing store and wished to close the store on Saturdays and open it again on Sundays to keep a 6 day work week, but a Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open on Sundays. Braunfield challenged the law as a violation of religious liberty, but the court ruled that the blue law didn’t violate the free exercise clause as the freedom to act in complete accordance with religious conviction is not entirely protected by the free exercise clause as it only completely protects the right to hold one’s beliefs. The Pennsylvania law was upheld even though it burdened the individual’s religious beliefs because the Sunday closing law had a secular basis and did not target religious beliefs. The court would later acknowledge the role of the 14th Amendment and the religious requirements of state laws in Boerne v. Flores (1997) as they held that the federal government/Congress could not force a state to apply more religious protections than those provided in the Constitution. As long as a state law could protect the minimum requirements in the 1st Amendment, the state law could be upheld.

Question 8

Compelling Interest/Least Restrictive Means Approach (Sherbert/Yoder Test)

Answer 8

The Sherbert/Yoder test established a test for the court to evaluate the infringement of religious practices and exercises under the 1st Amendment. The test involved both testing the state’s law of compelling interest to uphold the law even when it burdens an individual’s religious practice/belief, and the least restrictive mean approach in which the state can uphold the law so that it uses the least restrictive way to enforce the statute. First presenting a compelling state interest and using the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.

Question 9

Sherbert v. Verner (1963)

Answer 9

This case addresses an individual choosing not to work on Saturdays as a member of the 7th-Day Adventist Church. Her employer required that she work Saturdays and fired her for not maintaining this schedule. As a result, she applied for unemployment benefits and was rejected because the examiner said her religion was an insufficient justification to refuse to accept a job. The court held that the state’s eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert’s ability to freely exercise her religion, and there was no compelling state interest that justified creating the burden on religion.

Question 10

Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida (1987)

Answer 10

This case addresses a similar issue with Sherbert v. Verner in that it regards an individual of the 7th-Day Adventist Church and their refusal to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. The individual was fired from her job and filed for unemployment at which point she was denied, and the court maintained the ruling in Sherbert that the state cannot deny unemployment benefits to an employee dismissed for having religious conflicts with the employer. The unemployment regulation violates the free exercise clause by pressuring religious individuals to compromise their beliefs to retain employment.

Question 11

Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)

Answer 11

This case addresses the requirement of children under the age of 16 to attend public school, and an Amish church that refused to send their children to school after the 8th grade to protect their religious beliefs. The court held that the individual’s interests in exercising religion outweighed the school’s compelling interest in school attendance as the court addressed the Amish community and their fundamental teachings of belief, reasoning that their community values create their unique education established by the church. This case lends itself to the Sherbert/Yoder test for its acknowledgment of the “legitimate religious belief” test.

Question 12

Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993)

Answer 12

This case addresses the practice of a church sacrificing animals and affirms that laws targeting specific religions violate the free exercise clause. Under the Smith test ruling a neutral law and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. In cases where neutrality and general applicability are not satisfied, a compelling state interest is then required. The court held that the state laws were neither neutral nor generally applicable, so the laws had to be justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Because the laws applied directly to the church, they singled out the practices of the church which tied the burdens only to the religious beliefs of the members. Using strict scrutiny, the court ruled in a unanimous decision in favor of the Church of Lukumi.

Question 13

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) & General Applicability

Answer 13

Employment Division v. Smith took into account the use of drugs for individuals utilizing drugs in their religious practices, but the court sided with the HR division because it required the individuals to follow existing state law when practicing their religion. The law outlawed the collection of unemployment benefits in Oregon if the individual is fired for cause. Unemployment compensation in this case burdened religion, but it did not target the specific religion. Smith ruled that if a case regarding a law that doesn’t target a religion, the Sherbert-Yoder test shouldn’t be applied.

Question 14

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

Answer 14

Boerne City historic law was generally applicable and did not target a specific religion. Following the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the protection of religious exercise, and the Smith test. The exercise principles regard the government unemployment benefits and the Wisconsin v. Yoder cases of the Amish tradition of mandatory school attendance. They created the Sherbert-Yoder test ruling that the state cannot burden the free exercise of religion unless they have a compelling state interest and they can apply it in the most narrow way possible. In Smith, the court asserts that if someone’s religious exercise is hindered, it isn’t unconstitutional unless the law targets the religion, utilizing strict scrutiny, the court must prove that there is a compelling state interest, and because most laws do not target specific religions, strict scrutiny cases are rarely upheld when courts apply it. The Smith decision was unpopular so Congress passed a law saying that in any case where a religious burden is addressed, the Sherbert-Yoder test must be applied. Congress is limited in its abilities to remedy violations of the Constitution, and how they enforce Constitutional applications on state legislation.

Question 15

Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Answer 15

Utilized separation of powers arguments under general applicability, ruling that Congress is overstepping their power in passing a law for the court’s application of precedent, as well as the state’s application of legislation that might burden the free exercise of religion. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was essentially providing greater protection than the 1st Amendment, and Boerne v. Flores invalidated the RFRA and the application of religious protection within state jurisdiction. As long as states are providing Constitutional protections, they can utilize their individual legislation within state jurisdiction. The RFRA only occurs because of the Smith case, and Boerne v. Flores reinstates Smith and disagrees with RFRA.

Question 16

Schools of Thought on Establishment

Answer 16

Neutral concerning religion and non-religion as well as distinctions between different religions, arguing the schools of thought on religion in cases regarding specific institutional religions like Catholicism in private schools, look at religious organizations and their involvement with public schools/private schools. The interpretations/schools of thought on this issue have included
- The clause creates a solid wall of separation between church and state, which prohibits most is not all forms of public aid or support for religion.
- The clause can create a wall of separation but it only prohibits the state from favoring one religion over another, so any protections that the state wishes to afford to religious institutions, it can do so, but it must do so equally and fairly.
- The clause is not applied any more than prohibiting the establishment of an official national religion and can exercise aid to specific religions any way it sees fit.

Question 17

Everson v. Board (1947)

Answer 17

This case addresses a city’s use of tax money to reimburse parents for transportation costs as the city had no public schools and the costs covered the expenses of sending their kids to neighboring public schools and 96% of private schools were affiliated with the Catholic church. A taxpayer filed suit and claimed that the indirect aid to religion violated the NJ constitution and the 1st Amendment. The court held in a 5-4 decision that the law didn’t violate the Constitution, reasoning that it didn’t pay money to the Catholic schools and it didn’t support them directly, as they afforded reimbursement to parents of all religions. This ruling went against separatists’ attempts to completely isolate church and state involvement, especially regarding commercial aid.

Question 18

Walz v. Tax Commission NYC (1970

Answer 18

This case addresses an owner of real estate in NY who brought forward a suit against the tax commission to challenge property tax exemptions for churches and claimed the exemptions forced him to pay taxes indirectly to church contributions. The court held that the exemptions didn’t violate the Establishment Clause, reasoning that the exemptions were set neither to advance nor inhibit religion and no specific church benefitted or was excluded from exempt status. The Court noted that “benevolent neutrality” toward churches and religions was “deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life.” The fear was the upholding certain state laws would endorse the excessive entanglement of church and state.

Question 19

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)

Answer 19

This case addresses a suit against the state superintendent of Pennsylvania to outlaw a statute allowing the school district’s use of state taxes on cigarette to reimburse private school for expenses like teachers’ salaries and textbooks. The law applied only to secular book and courses, but because the students attended Catholic private schools, the plaintiff argued it violates the establishment clause of the 1st and 14th Amendments. The court decided 8-1 that a statute must pass a three-pronged test to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose/goal, it must neither promote or inhibit religion in doing so, and it must not endorse excessive relations between church and state. The court ruled that the Pennsylvania law failed two prongs of the test and didn’t reach a resolution on whether or not it promoted or inhibited religion. The court thus ruled that the law violated the Establishment clause and imposed the test on future cases regarding similar statutes.

Question 20

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)

Answer 20

This case addresses a scholarship program in Ohio that provided tuition aid to students in Cleveland attending public and private schools in which both religious and nonreligious schools were a part of. While over 80% of the students attended religiously affiliated schools, many students were from families below the poverty line. A group of taxpayers filed suit that the program violated the Establishment Clause, and in a 5-4 opinion, the court held that the program was neutral in regard to religion, but specific educational programs are the only way government aid reaches religious institutions. In maintaining the program, Ohio was neither promoting nor inhibiting religion, but attempting to provide equal opportunity to all of its community members.

Question 21

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022)

Answer 21

This case addresses the prayer activities of a high school football coach and the school district that prohibited him from doing so to protect the school from a lawsuit based on a violation of the Establishment Clause. Kennedy filed suit and the court upheld that the free exercise clause protects an individual engaging in personal religious observances and the district’s prohibition of prayer restricted his religious actions, thereby burdening his right to free exercise. The timing and circumstances of Kennedy’s prayer exemplify that he did not force anyone to take part nor did he offer prayer as part of his duties as a coach. This case would be used in cases addressing the exercise of free speech by individuals acting in an official capacity. The Lemon test, however, was abandoned and replaced by a consideration of “historical practices and understandings.”

Question 22

Engel v. Vitale (1962)

Answer 22

This case addresses a NY Board of Regents authorizing a voluntary prayer recitation at the start of school days. A group of organizations challenged the prayer and filed suit that it violated the Establishment Clause. The court held that the state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation isn’t required and the prayer doesn’t endorse a specific religion. The court reasoned that the policy violated the wall of separation between church and state and that the government had no business drafting written prayers for any group, and that daily prayer is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.

Question 23

Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

Answer 23

Warren court era between 1953-1969; is thought to have been the most liberal court in US history as it expanded civil rights significantly. The case addresses the use of Bible verses and the Lord’s prayer in public schools, and the court ruled that it didn’t resolve the prayer issue presented in Vitale, even though the school offered students an opt-out form to not participate. By forcing students to express their religious affiliation even if they didn’t participate, the law violated the 1st Amendment and placed a burden on the children attending the schools.

Question 24

Lee v. Weisman (1992)

Answer 24

This case addresses the practice of middle school reading prayers at graduation, and parents filed suit to prevent public schools from delivering invocations and benedictions at school ceremonies. In a 5-4 decisions, the court held that government involvement in the case creates a school-sponsored religious exercise in public school which create conflicts for proscribing prayer for students even if it’s voluntary. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Question 25

Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)

Answer 25

This case addresses the use of moments of silence in Alabama for public schools allotted for voluntary meditation or prayer. An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. The court ruled that the passage of prayer and meditation wasn’t only a deviation from the state’s duty to maintain absolute neutrality towards religion, but also directly endorsed religion. The court applied the reasoning of the secular purpose test, which the statute failed, and ruled that it violated the 1st Amendment’s Establishment Clause.

Question 26

Lynch v. Donnelly (1984)

Answer 26

This case addresses the use of a Christmas nativity scene in Rhode Island that was used for over 40 years. Donnelly objected the display and filed suit against the Mayor of the town, Lynch, in which case the court ruled 5-4 that the city didn’t violate the Establishment Clause. The court reasoned that the city was only illustrating the historical origins of the holiday and that it has valid secular purposes, as well as not establishing a specific state church.

Question 27

Santa Fe ISD v. Doe (2000)

Answer 27

This case addresses a Texas school district’s defense of student-led invocations before football games, defending the practice as a voluntary, student-voted event not imposed by the state or school district. A Mormon and Catholic family filed suit against the school for its overtly Christian prayer, claiming it violated the Establishment Clause. The court held that the student-led, student-initiated prayer violated the 1st Amendment, and reasoned that the prayers were public speech authorized by the government policy and taking place on government property. For the government not to endorse a specific religious practice under the valid secular policy test, the prayer must be outlawed. Judge Rehnquist dissented and noted the “disturbing” tone of the Court’s opinion that “bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life.”

Question 28

County of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989)

Answer 28

This case addresses holiday displays in Pennsylvania that were challenged by the ACLU which depicted a nativity scene and a Jewish menorah. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion, and the court held in a 5-4 decision that the displays endorsed orthodox Christianity, and even though not all religious celebrations on government property violate the Establishment Clause, the Christian displays violated the Establishment Clause.

Question 29

Gonzales v. O’Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006)

Answer 29

This case addresses a religious organization and their suit preventing the government’s regulation of the ayahuasca drug used during religious ceremonies that was prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. The Church (UDV) argued that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use ayahuasca. In a unanimous decision, the court held that the government filed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the use of drugs for religious purposes, and dismissed the CSA argument that they could accommodate no exceptions. The Court reasoned that they are required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown.

Question 30

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Answer 30

In August 1969, Norma McCorvey, a twenty-one-year-old carnival worker living in Texas, claimed to have been raped and to be pregnant as a result of that rape.7 Her doctor refused to perform an abortion, citing an 1857 Texas law, revised in 1879, that made it a crime to “procure an abortion” unless it was necessary to save the life of a mother. He provided her with the name of a lawyer who handled adoptions. The lawyer, in turn, sent her to two other attorneys, Linda Coffee and Sarah Weddington, who he knew were interested in challenging the Texas law. The court admitted the case on their docket and held the case for oral arguments as a result of controversies and difficulty in deciding. By the time the case was heard, the child in the case had already been born, but in any circumstance, the appellate system wouldn’t have been applicable in time to apply directly to the plaintiff in that specific case, but the same woman could find herself in the same predicament, and it would apply to all women in the US, not just Roe. There are 3 reasons why criminal abortion laws have been pursued in the past, including that the laws were the product of social concerns to discourage illicit sexual conduct, also concerning abortion as a medical procedure that’s particularly dangerous, and lastly the state’s compelling interest in protecting prenatal life.

Question 30

Finding a Right to Privacy Levels of Scrutiny & Privacy Poe v. Ullman (1961)

Answer 30

Right to Privacy as a right the court had to look for, as in the 1st Amendment, the right to privacy is not an explicit/enumerated right, but the right to privacy is implied by other Amendments like the 5th and the 7th. How does it apply in abortion cases from the trimester process to the viability standard and incorporating the definition of undue burden in obtaining an abortion and if the act of having an abortion performed is? In Poe v. Ullman, physician C. Lee Buxton tested Connecticut’s 1879 law banning contraceptives on behalf of two of his patients. The majority of the Court voted to dismiss the case on procedural grounds, with the opinion for the Court pointing out that no prosecutions under the law had been recorded even though contraceptives were apparently “commonly and notoriously sold in Connecticut drug stores.”

Question 31

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Answer 31

Similar almost exactly to Poe v. Ullman (1961), the court dismisses the case of clear collusion not meeting the requirement of cases and controversies for the court to hear it. Estelle Griswold, the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Buxton opened a birth control clinic in 1961 with the intent of being arrested for violating the same Connecticut law at issue in Poe. Three days later, Griswold was arrested for dispensing contraceptives to a married couple. Griswold was heard even though it was clear collusion, but members of the court wished to hear it and resolve the issue. The politics of the birth control pill distribution among the states and women were pressuring the court to set a new precedent for an 18th-century application of legislation that was preventing women from accessing the pill.

Question 32

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)

Answer 32

This case addresses the Pennsylvania legislature’s amending of its abortion control law in the late 80s requiring informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period before the procedure. For minors seeking an abortion, it would require the consent of one parent, and a married woman was required to notify her husband of the procedure, at which point many abortion clinics and physicians filed suit against the state legislature. In a 5-4 decision, the court upheld Roe v. Wade but imposed a new standard where the provision asks whether a state regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an undue burden or substantial obstacle in the path of a woman wishing to get an abortion. Under this standard, only the husband notification failed the burden test.

Question 33

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

Answer 33

This case addresses the issue of private sexual activity between gay individuals, and officers arrested Hardwick for violating a Georgia law prohibiting certain sexual activities. Hardwick and his ACLU attorneys challenged the law, asserting that it violated the fundamental right to privacy as articulated in Griswold and should be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. In a 5-4 decision, the court held that there was no constitutional protection for gay rights/sexual activities, and that states could outlaw those practices, and that for the court to protect rights not clearly identified in the Constitution they had to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.”

Question 34

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989)

Answer 34

This case addresses a Missouri law that placed restrictions on abortions regarding conception, as well as prohibiting the encouragement or counseling to get abortions, and physicians’ requirement to perform viability tests on women in their 20th or more week of pregnancy. In a 5-4 decision, the court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional, reasoning that the preamble hadn’t been applied in any concrete manner for restricting abortions and that the due process clause didn’t require states to enter into the business of abortion, as well as that no case or controversy existed about the counseling provision of the law, upholding the viability test requirement, and the state’s interest in protecting potential life could occur before the point of viability. This would be a new precedent for the court, as they chose not to revisit any essential points decided in Roe v. Wade.

Question 35

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Answer 35

Overruling the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), this case addresses a similar decision to Bowers as the case began with a police visit to a private residence related to gay sexual activity, and the men were convicted of violating a Texas law outlawing gay affairs. The court held that the Texas statute violated the due process clause and reasoned that the case turned on highlighting the presence of the two men as adults who were free to act as they wanted to in a private capacity. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest that can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.

Question 36

Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)

Answer 36

This case addresses a Nebraska law prohibiting any partial birth abortion unless the procedure (where the doctor partially delivers the baby before killing the child), is necessary to save the mother’s life. Violation of the law is a felony, providing the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor’s state license to practice. One doctor filed suit that the statute violates the Constitution as it was vague and placed an undue burden on himself and those seeking abortions. In a 5-4 decision, the court held that the statute violates the Constitution, striking down the statute as it placed an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion and didn’t allow exceptions in cases of threatening health. Dissents from Scalia argued that “[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States… prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd.”

Question 37

Gonzales v. Carhart (2007)

Answer 37

This case similar to Stenberg, addresses the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, and doctors performing late-term abortions who were sued and argued that the Act could apply to a more common abortion process of dilation and evacuation. With this application, the Act would ban most late-term abortions and thus be an unconstitutional “undue burden” on the right to an abortion, as defined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The plaintiffs also argued that the Act’s lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg v. Carhart. The court in a 5-4 decision ruled that Congress’ ban on partial-birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and didn’t impose an undue burden on the right to have an abortion. under the most reasonable interpretation, the Act applies only to the intact D&E method (also known as “partial-birth abortion”) and not to the more common D&E procedure. The Court also held that Congress, after finding intact D&E never to be medically necessary, could validly omit a health exception from the ban, even when “some part of the medical community” considers the procedure necessary.

Question 38

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org. (2022)

Answer 38

This case addresses a Mississippi law called the Gestational Age Act that prohibits all abortions after 15 weeks of gestation. The only licensed abortion facility in the state filed a lawsuit requesting an emergency temporary restraining order. The court held that the Constitution doesn’t confer a right to abortion, and it’s neither rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential ordered liberty. The five factors that should be considered in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled support overruling Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey: (1) they “short-circuited the democratic process,” (2) both lacked grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent, (3) the tests they established were not “workable,” (4) they caused distortion of law in other areas, and (5) overruling them would not upend concrete reliance interests.

Question 39

Rational Basis Test

Answer 39

The rational basis test relates to the court’s determination of whether or not a law is rationally based or related to a legitimate government interest, in which the court gives high deference to the government and usually upholds its law, and if the right is fundamental and the government has interfered with it, the court will invalidate the law. Under the 14th Amendment, rational basis differs from direct relation or compelling interest in that courts generally presume the validity of their policies.

Question 40

Substantive Due Process

Answer 40

As discussed in the footnotes of Carolene Products, substantive due process is understood as the court stressing the word liberty in the due process clauses to prevent governments from enact specific economic or privacy laws. In short terms, it’s the application of the court’s conception of the 1st and 14th Amendments as protecting individual fundamental rights from government interference.

Question 41

Heightened Scrutiny & Strict Scrutiny

Answer 41

Heightened scrutiny states that a law must be substantially related to an important government objective.
Strict Scrutiny states that a law must be the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.

Question 42

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Answer 42

Applying the rational basis test and evaluating the intent of the 14th Amendment, the case addresses racial discrimination regarding a Louisiana law in 1890 ordering the separation of races on railroads. A 1/8 black Union Army officer violated the law in an interstate train and was arrested after sitting in a car for white passengers. The court held that the state law was constitutional, that state-imposed racial segregation was permitted under the 14th Amendment, as it intended to establish absolute equality for the races under the law, and separate treatment didn’t imply discrimination. The majority opinion said that until the present situation of natural discrimination was solved, the states had a right to separate the races to avoid danger or violence. They were simply creating legislation to reflect the desires of the public, rather than hinder the rights of the individual.

Question 43

Sweatt v. Painter (1950)

Answer 43

This case addresses the application of a black man into the University of Texas law school which restricted access to black people. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted into the college, as the court found that the law school for black people would have been very unequal to the Texas law school, and argued that the separate school would be inferior and found that mere separation harmed students’ ability to compete in the legal arena. (Necessity of equal opportunities via tangible and intangible factors)

Question 44

Brown v. Board (1954)

Answer 44

Tackling a similar issue, the case asked what means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? The Brown I decision shall be implemented “with all deliberate speed.”

The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts that originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them “with all deliberate speed.” Issuing the role of the federal district courts, the SC decided when and how to end segregation enlisting the local courts to evaluate local laws based on discriminatory intent and scrutiny tests.

Question 45

Parents Involved v. Seattle (2007)

Answer 45

This case addresses the Seattle school district’s allowing students to apply to any high school in the district. The district used a system of tiebreakers to avoid overcrowding, the second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor used to maintain diversity. At a particular school, either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. Parents involved in Community Schools sued the district arguing that the tiebreaker system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a 5-4 decision the court ruled that Bollinger does not apply to high school students, racial diversity isn’t a compelling interest justifying the use of race for admission, but a school district that normally permits a student to attend the high school violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying student admission to achieve desired racial balance. Applying a strict scrutiny framework, the tiebreaker was found unconstitutional, “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”

Question 46

Reed v. Reed (1971)

Answer 46

This case addresses an Idaho probate code that males must be preferred to females in the appointment of estate administration, as parents sought to be named administrators of their son’s estate after his death. In a unanimous decision, the court held that the law’s unequal treatment of men and women was unconstitutional and forbidden by the Equal Protection clause as an arbitrary legislative choice.

Question 47

Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Answer 47

Loving represents a case regarding inter-race marriage in the state of Virginia, but the case relates to the application of strict scrutiny on equal protection and race discrimination cases utilizing the precedence from Korematsu (1994) and Brown (1954), the court holding in a unanimous decision that the Virginia law had no legitimate purpose other than racial discrimination, and when the state argued that it applied equal treatment to both races in their discrimination, the court argued that that marriage was a basic civil right given to every citizen. In addition to this, the court held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Question 48

Craig v. Boren (1976)

Answer 48

This case addresses an Oklahoma law prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 and females under 18. The court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications based on statistics regarding drunk driving. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. In striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard for review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard for review – rational basis – but less demanding than the highest standard – strict scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard – intermediate scrutiny.

Question 49

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)

Answer 49

This case addresses a dependence allowance from a lieutenant of the US Air Force for her husband. A federal law provided that wives of members of the miliary became dependents, but husbands of female members weren’t accepted unless they were dependent on their wives for over ½ of their support. The court held that the statute commanded dissimilar treatment and violated the due process clause as well as equal protection requirements. The court was unable to reach a clear standard of review, but statutes making decisions solely on race use arbitrary legislative choices that are prohibited by the Constitution.

Question 50

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

Answer 50

This case addresses separate processes of admission for students based on race, and a white man who had been rejected from the UC Medical School argued that his scores exceeded those of applicants admitted because of their race. The school reserved 16 places for each entering class of 100 for qualified minorities, which made the competitive nature of the admissions process worse for minority students. The court held in no single majority opinion that the racial quota system violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but also that the rigid use of quotas violated the Equal Protections Clause of the 14th Amendment. Other 4 justices thought using race in the admissions process was constitutionally permissible, but only used in a plus factor rather than a strict quota.

Question 51

Romer v. Evans (1996)

Answer 51

This case addresses the Colorado vote to adopt Amendment 2 of the state constitution designed to protect anyone from lgbtq discrimination. The court held that the amendment violated the equal protection clause that singled out lgbtq people, by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to “advance a legitimate government interest.” Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest.

Question 52

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Answer 52

The case addresses an application from a white female student to the University of Michigan’s law school, which had a wholistic admissions process that considered race when reviewing applications to obtain a “critical mass” of applicants to create a well-rounded class made up of students with different backgrounds to improve/enhance the classroom experience. The court held that the Equal Protection Clause doesn’t prohibit the narrowly tailored use of race in admissions to further the compelling interest of creating a more diverse student body.

Question 53

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

Answer 53

This case addresses a white female student to the University of Michigan undergrad admissions process in which affirmative action policies took place to rank students based on their race or special circumstances like geographical/socio-economic stance, as well as gender and minority standing. 20 points were given to students from underrepresented groups including race, and applicants needed 100 points to be admitted. The court held that because the college’s use of race in its review process was not narrowly tailored to assert interests in diversity, the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. For the use of race to be upheld in the school admissions process, there must be a compelling state interest to benefit all applicants rather than shift to a policy against certain applications.

Question 54

Students for Fair Admission v. Harvard (2023)

Answer 54

In this case, the SFFA sued Harvard for its use of affirmative action in the admissions, the court decided that university admissions should no longer utilize race as a factor in admissions because of how it affects Asian-American students, as a greater population was applying, and it would hinder the racial minorities rather than help them. Harvard failed strict scrutiny, as they couldn’t demonstrate a compelling interest measurably and avoid stereotypes in the admissions process. This was greatly affected by the fact that a new board/court was hearing the case, compared to the one in Bollinger (2003), and simply asking how they identify creates the separation and group-identity application and while the government defends individual rights, they don’t defend rights as part of a particular racial or identity group.

Question 55

Shelby County v. Holder (2013)

Answer 55

Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act provision of state changes to voting rights regulations. 1965 Voting Rights Act prohibiting all practices including poll taxes and literary tests that were used to discriminate against individuals who wished to vote. Section 4 was set to require a penalty against states where there was a discriminatory test or if less than 40 percent of the voting-age population was registered to vote or did vote in the 1964 election. The Voting Rights Act did not apply to all states, but if two procedures were met, then the state was required to be evaluated under the Voting Rights Act.
Section 5 set up the effects of the pre-clearance procedures for voting rights violations, not just for states, but also for large municipalities. 1976 was the most recent change to the Voting Rights Act as addressed and applied in Shelby County v. Holder (2013). The county in Alabama was forced to apply for pre-clearance under Sections 4 and 5, and while they were originally set to expire, Congress had extended them for 25 years in 2006. The original Voting Rights Sections 4 and 5 utilized the history of racial discrimination in those states to place them under pre-clearance and rights discrimination, using racial data in voting gaps, but states like Alabama today are arguing that by 2009/2013, the racial voting gap is being lowered to a point where it is no longer applicable. They argue that the act has worked, but it shouldn’t be applied as often anymore. The case therefore holds that the Section 4 rules utilize data that is decades old and is thereby unconstitutional for the present day. Since then, the court is still hearing cases regarding voting rights for states and how they change their independent voting laws and whether or not they should go through pre-clearance, or if they should be enacted before or after elections.