Epistemology philosophy AS course booklet Flashcards
4 types of k
1. ability knowledge knowledge-how 2. experiential knowledge knowledge-what-it's like 3. acquiantance knowledge ' knowing Roger' 4. propositional knowledge * ' knowing that Roger is a philosopher ' [Zagzebski, 1999]
explaining a word’s meaning
state necessary & sufficient conditions for such & such o obtain
e.g. being unmarried + male + adult are the individually necessary & jointly sufficient conditions for someone to be a bachelor
necessary condition
prerequisite for p
i.e. if not p then not q
sufficient condition
guarantees that p
i.e. if p then q
[ Zagzebski ] ‘s objection to defining knowledge
questions whether we can cite necessary & sufficient conditions of k
{refer to difficulties of JTB and 4th condition responses}
looking for a ‘real definition’ presupposes some disputable semantical and metaphysical views
one would >< attempt real definition of rich, candy or large
-> in these cases a contingent definition is probably sufficient
feasible to aim for a definition of k iff KNOWLEDGE is >< like A LARGE PLANT
[ Zagzebski ] ‘s requirements for a good definition
- > < ad hoc
- > < negative when they can be positive
- should be brief (succinct) if possible
- should avoid circularity
- utilise concepts less obscure than the concept being defined
- be informative
[ Wittgenstein ] ‘s ‘contingent definition’ of ‘knowledge’
[philosophical investigations]
examine the phenomena under discussion by listening to the many ways the term is used
+ map these uses -> might be enough for a ‘contingent definition’
tripartite
Plato [Theaetetus] : true belief is >< sufficient for k
because : too broad a scope (covers lucky intuitions and educated guesses)
to say someone committed a crime we need Justification
(evidence/ proof/ having good reason to believe something)
//standard form// tripartite
Person S knows p iff:
- person S believes p
- person S is justified in believing p
- p is true
believing in JTB
acceptance/ endorsement/ signing up to an idea
truth in JTB
something being the case
i.e. corresponding to how the world is or how maths works
Gettier-type counter examples
JTB ≠ k
largely rely on coincidence
as long as the 3rd condition differs from truth these counter examples will arise
[ Dancy ] ‘s Gettier-type counter example
I believe that there is a sheep in the next field
because of what I am seeing
I am not inferring
I take myself to see that there simply is one
animal I see is instead a large furry dog
belief ≠ false as there is a sheep too (unknown to me -> hidden by the hedge)
counter example aganist 4th condition responses
[ Goodman ]’s ‘barn county’
JTB objections
JTB are not individually necessary
or
JTB are not jointly sufficient
OBJ : B >< individually necessary
a) stressed student knows all the answers but begins to doubt himself and believes that he is incorrect
b) mother knows that ‘deep down’ her daughter is in pain but refuses to believe it
a + b both have deep down unconsious belief otherwise the student would have handed in the paper blank
OBJ : J >< individually necessary
a) it just is e.g. ‘ 5 is 5 ‘
RESP a : propositional knowledge is often more complex and that is why we consult philosophy in the first place
b) impossible to justify
RESP b : not knowing in the same sense that Plato argued for
c) statements justified by further claims ad infinitum
(J is open ended)
RESP c : should be able to give a clear account if pressed further. If not that is a mere accusation rather than knowledge
OBJ : T >< individually necessary
most important of the tripartite necessary conditions
e.g. urban myths or scientific claims which have been disproven later
they were knowledge until disproven?
NB distinction between thinking that you know p VS knowing that you know p
to say we know p where in every case p is true -> presupposes access to the truth which we do >< seem to possess
i.e. ideal gas law is used out of convinience but recognised that it is not true - approximation and >< knowledge
OBJ : JTB >< jointly sufficient
RESP : strengthen the J (infallibilism)
‘infallibility’ = can never be mistaken
3. S could >< be mistaken about p
e.g. D’s quest for certainty
OBJ : >< clear that knowing p is the same as being certain about p
