Epistemology philosophy AS course booklet

Question 1

4 types of k

Answer 1

1. ability knowledge 
knowledge-how
2. experiential knowledge 
knowledge-what-it's like
3. acquiantance knowledge 
' knowing Roger'
4. propositional knowledge *
' knowing that Roger is a philosopher ' [Zagzebski, 1999]

Question 2

explaining a word’s meaning

Answer 2

state necessary & sufficient conditions for such & such o obtain
e.g. being unmarried + male + adult are the individually necessary & jointly sufficient conditions for someone to be a bachelor

Question 3

necessary condition

Answer 3

prerequisite for p

i.e. if not p then not q

Question 4

sufficient condition

Answer 4

guarantees that p

i.e. if p then q

Question 5

[ Zagzebski ] ‘s objection to defining knowledge

Answer 5

questions whether we can cite necessary & sufficient conditions of k
{refer to difficulties of JTB and 4th condition responses}
looking for a ‘real definition’ presupposes some disputable semantical and metaphysical views
one would >< attempt real definition of rich, candy or large
-> in these cases a contingent definition is probably sufficient
feasible to aim for a definition of k iff KNOWLEDGE is >< like A LARGE PLANT

Question 6

[ Zagzebski ] ‘s requirements for a good definition

Answer 6

• > < ad hoc
• > < negative when they can be positive
• should be brief (succinct) if possible
• should avoid circularity
• utilise concepts less obscure than the concept being defined
• be informative

Question 7

[ Wittgenstein ] ‘s ‘contingent definition’ of ‘knowledge’

Answer 7

[philosophical investigations]
examine the phenomena under discussion by listening to the many ways the term is used
+ map these uses -> might be enough for a ‘contingent definition’

Question 8

tripartite

Answer 8

Plato [Theaetetus] : true belief is >< sufficient for k
because : too broad a scope (covers lucky intuitions and educated guesses)
to say someone committed a crime we need Justification
(evidence/ proof/ having good reason to believe something)

Question 9

//standard form// 
tripartite

Answer 9

Person S knows p iff:

1. person S believes p
2. person S is justified in believing p
3. p is true

Question 10

believing in JTB

Answer 10

acceptance/ endorsement/ signing up to an idea

Question 11

truth in JTB

Answer 11

something being the case

i.e. corresponding to how the world is or how maths works

Question 12

Gettier-type counter examples

Answer 12

JTB ≠ k
largely rely on coincidence
as long as the 3rd condition differs from truth these counter examples will arise

Question 13

[ Dancy ] ‘s Gettier-type counter example

Answer 13

I believe that there is a sheep in the next field
because of what I am seeing
I am not inferring
I take myself to see that there simply is one
animal I see is instead a large furry dog
belief ≠ false as there is a sheep too (unknown to me -> hidden by the hedge)

Question 14

counter example aganist 4th condition responses

Answer 14

[ Goodman ]’s ‘barn county’

Question 15

JTB objections

Answer 15

JTB are not individually necessary
or
JTB are not jointly sufficient

Question 16

OBJ : B >< individually necessary

Answer 16

a) stressed student knows all the answers but begins to doubt himself and believes that he is incorrect
b) mother knows that ‘deep down’ her daughter is in pain but refuses to believe it

a + b both have deep down unconsious belief otherwise the student would have handed in the paper blank

Question 17

OBJ : J >< individually necessary

Answer 17

a) it just is e.g. ‘ 5 is 5 ‘
RESP a : propositional knowledge is often more complex and that is why we consult philosophy in the first place
b) impossible to justify
RESP b : not knowing in the same sense that Plato argued for
c) statements justified by further claims ad infinitum
(J is open ended)
RESP c : should be able to give a clear account if pressed further. If not that is a mere accusation rather than knowledge

Question 18

OBJ : T >< individually necessary

Answer 18

most important of the tripartite necessary conditions
e.g. urban myths or scientific claims which have been disproven later
they were knowledge until disproven?
NB distinction between thinking that you know p VS knowing that you know p
to say we know p where in every case p is true -> presupposes access to the truth which we do >< seem to possess
i.e. ideal gas law is used out of convinience but recognised that it is not true - approximation and >< knowledge

Question 19

OBJ : JTB >< jointly sufficient

RESP : strengthen the J (infallibilism)

Answer 19

‘infallibility’ = can never be mistaken
3. S could >< be mistaken about p
e.g. D’s quest for certainty
OBJ : >< clear that knowing p is the same as being certain about p